Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  There was always plenty of humour as well as plenty of work and plenty of danger in the SSEF. After HMS Locust had been relieved as headquarters ship on 2 August by HMS Nith they could not resist the temptation of replying to signals asking for permission to do this, that or the other by “Yeth” instead of the more conventional “Yes.” On one never-to-be-forgotten occasion the squadron received a visit from a gallant ENSA party, complete with girls. Each of them now have a suitably embellished certificate as a holder of the “Order of Neptune, East.”

  On only one occasion after 9 August did the enemy try to break through into the British Assault Area anchorages with his infernal machines. This was on the night of 18 August. The attack was on only a moderate scale and was somewhat half-hearted, although it caused some amusement because it was directed chiefly against the sunken blockships of the “Gooseberry” shelter harbour. In this attack the poor old French battleship Courbet was torpedoed yet again. She was one of the blockships in the breakwater of No. 5 “Gooseberry” harbour. Resting on the bottom she did not draw very much more water than she would have done in full fighting trim, and she used to fly an immense Tricolour and a big Croix de Lorraine flag. The Courbet seemed to become something of an obsession with the Germans. She was torpedoed, shelled and bombed, but continued to remain what she was—a very efficient blockship. On 8 July, after the first attack with human torpedoes, the Germans triumphantly broadcast a claim that she had been seriously damaged, and driven ashore, with all her guns silenced! It must he admitted that the German illusion that the Courbet was a rich prize was deliberately fostered by the craft of the SSEF, which frequently carried out indirect bombardments of German positions from behind the Courbet and under cover of smoke, so that the Germans might well have thought that it was the old French battleship which was causing them so much trouble. Smoke cover was very greatly used in the eastern flank area, because this was so closely overlooked by German batteries east of the River Orne, notably that at Houlgate.

  During the abortive attack of 18 August a complete human torpedo unit was captured and brought to the shore. This feat was performed by LCS(L) (Landing Craft, Support, Light) 251, commanded by Sub-Lieutenant Dean, RNVR, in the face of considerable difficulty. The human torpedo was sighted at a quarter to seven in the morning at a range of 400 yards. The LCS at once altered course to close the human torpedo, and opened fire, but the enemy craft took violent avoiding action and was seen to submerge completely for short periods. Sub-Lieutenant Dean therefore gave the order to cease fire, but he continued to close the human torpedo. When the LCS (L) was within 80 yards of the human torpedo fire was opened with machine-guns at the perspex dome. Although some shots ricocheted off this, others pierced it and killed the pilot. Thereupon the human torpedo stopped. The First-Lieutenant and one seaman of LCS(L) 251 went away in the dinghy and went alongside the German contrivance—a ticklish business, for they did not know whether or not it would explode at any moment. However, they succeeded in securing a tow line to the stern of the human torpedo and the LCS(L) began to tow it stern first.

  Ten minutes later it was observed that the human torpedo was apparently losing buoyancy and settling deeper in the water, and when LCS(L) 251 stopped her engines the German craft sank, so that it was suspended below the stern of the LCS(L) by the tow line. Fortunately this held. It was brought to the craft’s winch and hove up so that the human torpedo broke surface stern first. With great difficulty and care the crew of the LCS(L) succeeded in passing wires round the body of the human torpedo and hove in on these until it rested half out of water, lying horizontally alongside the British craft.

  This work had to be tackled very carefully and gingerly, observing that a very dangerous and lethal weapon was being dealt with, and in the circumstances it is hardly surprising that the operation took four hours to complete. Moreover, the whole operation had to be done under cover of a smoke screen laid by another craft, for if the Germans manning the shore batteries had seen what was going on they would certainly have opened fire with every available gun to prevent the capture intact of one of their cherished “secret weapons.” Even when the human torpedo was properly slung and secured LCS(L) 251 had to be towed to the anchorage by LCS(L) 260, for it was found that if LCS(L) 251 went ahead on her engines the human torpedo bumped heavily against her side—a singularly unpleasant sensation with a “live” torpedo!

  If more attention has been paid in this account to the defensive role of the craft of the SSEF than to their offensive work in bombarding the enemy positions on the flank of the British Assault Area it is because the former were more full of incident of a novel and exciting nature. Nevertheless, the bombardments carried out by the force were of the utmost value to the British troops and particularly to the Royal Marine Commando troops who were holding the Franceville area immediately to the east of the mouth of the River Orne.

  Day after day and week after week the craft of the SSEF carried out bombardments. These were of three distinct types. Every day two LCG’s (Landing Craft, Gun) carried out harassing fire on the German positions and lines of communication in the Franceville area. There was always opposition to this fire, usually by 88 mm and 105 mm anti-tank guns, although there was a certain amount of heavier shelling from the batteries to the eastward.

  Other LCG.s carried out numerous indirect bombardments of enemy positions. These were done in response to a request for fire support from the troops ashore and were controlled by the Forward Observation Officers, Bombardment, attached to the military, who said on several occasions that they were of great value on that exposed eastern flank. Nearly all these indirect bombardments were carried out under cover of smoke screens, and many of them from behind the old French battleship-blockship Courbet.

  In addition to these types of bombardment, the LCS’s (L) (Landing Craft, Support, Light) were almost continuously engaged during daylight hours in “beating up” the coast between Franceville and Cabourg. This was perhaps the most dangerous form of bombarding carried out by the force, for it entailed these little craft working close in off the enemy-occupied coast and virtually under the guns of established coast-defence batteries, and smoke had frequently to be resorted to. At one time or another all the craft engaged on this duty suffered casualties and damage, yet it is on record that the jobs were tackled “with considerable enthusiasm.”

  Of the effect on the enemy of these bombardments by craft of the Support Squadron, Eastern Flank, there is no doubt. After the Franceville-Houlgate area had finally been occupied by our troops German prisoners testified to its accuracy and to its effect upon the German defensive arrangements. Among other things, they admitted that these bombardments completely denied to them the one main road which formed their main line of communication with the forces holding the Franceville area.

  Of the success of the craft of the SSEF against the German infernal machines which tried to break through into the anchorage of the British Assault Area there was forthcoming even more dramatic testimony after the country east of the Orne had been liberated. It was found that the German human torpedoes had been launched from a little village called Villers. A Frenchwoman of that village stated that on one night the Germans had launched and sent out 93 human torpedoes, and that only 18 of this number had come back. The pilots of these 18 were, she said, extremely frightened and needed much brandy to restore them.

  In recording this evidence, Commander Sellar commented: “She should know—she was the owner of the ‘local.’”

  . . . . .

  By September 1944, Havre had fallen, as well as the nearer batteries overlooking SWORD area. No longer was there ever-present danger on that exposed flank from all the enemy could do with orthodox weapons and unorthodox “horrors.” The Support Squadron, Eastern Flank was no longer needed in that area, and on 11 September it left the troubled waters in which it had performed so tirelessly and so well since 24 June. It had levied a toll upon the enemy which had proved crippling to his plans with his new weapons, and i
t had rendered invaluable service to the military forces along the Orne flank. These things it had not done without loss to itself. It had lost four craft. Two LCG’s (Landing Craft, Gun) had been mined and sunk. One LCG had been sunk by an explosive motor boat, and one LCF (Landing Craft, Flak) had been torpedoed and sunk. A great many other craft had suffered damage. The cost in personnel had been 8 officers and 57 men killed or missing, and 3 officers and 112 men wounded.

  To the Support Squadron, Eastern Flank the Flag Officer commanding the British Assault Area made the following richly deserved farewell signal on 11 September:

  “Your work in the British Assault Area in support of the Army and in defending the anchorage has been unfailingly successful. I am very sorry to lose you but the shooting season for you here is now closed. Goodbye and Good Luck.”

  CHAPTER XIII

  BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF CHERBOURG

  “Cruiser Division Seven”—Close range bombardment—Three hours of hot action—importance of Cherbourg—Withdrawal of the Task Forces.

  During the third week of June the United States troops were steadily approaching Cherbourg from the southward, and by D plus 18 they were in the outskirts of the town built round the great fortress port which had been the major northern base of the French Navy.

  The stage was set for an operation of great importance. The truism that even the first phase of an invasion cannot be considered successful until the invaders have seized a port in which reinforcements and supplies can be landed irrespective of weather conditions had been to some extent modified by the success of the artificial “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches. The Allies had, however, planned to have two such harbours in operation, but the gale had destroyed the St Laurent “Mulberry” harbour. That made the capture of a big deep-water port the more important. And even if both of the artificial harbours had been completely successful the capture of Cherbourg would have been of great importance, for the “Mulberry” harbours had been designed to last for only ninety summer days.

  Even before the war Cherbourg had been a very heavily defended port, and there was no doubt that the Germans had very substantially increased its defences. The port and its defences had been heavily attacked from the air, but it was known that many of the gun positions and strong points were under reinforced concrete of such thickness as to make them immune from air attacks unless each individual position received a direct hit from a penetrating bomb—a most unlikely contingency. Most of the gun casemates, however, had fairly large openings to seaward, for the defences faced the sea and the guns had been mounted in such a way as to give them the maximum arcs of fire. They were, therefore, to some extent vulnerable to low trajectory fire from seaward.

  This fact indicated that a naval bombardment from fairly close range would be required to reduce these positions. There was another point which had to be considered. Along the breakwater, which is more than two miles long, there are three forts. These, and the Fort du Homet on the seaward side of the arsenal and naval dockyard, might well have been given guns which would bear upon the sea front and the town. It was quite possible, in fact, that the Germans had moved some of the guns in the forts for this purpose while the Americans were advancing towards Cherbourg from the south. The German coast defences were manned by German naval personnel of a higher quality than the garrison troops, and they were commanded by a young enthusiast who was both a gunnery and a torpedo expert. Rear-Admiral Hennecke was only forty-six years of age and he had been specially selected to command the naval port and defences of Cherbourg.

  It was essential that these forts, which might be used against the American troops entering the town and fighting their way through to the harbour, should be silenced, and a naval bombardment promised the best results. If some of the guns in the circular forts on the mole had been moved to the landward side, the empty casemates to seaward would make them the more vulnerable to bombardment from the sea.

  It was for these reasons that there was organised a special naval bombarding force for Cherbourg, and this was kept in readiness for several days so that its work should be perfectly co-ordinated with the progress of the troops up the Cotentin Peninsula to Cherbourg.

  The Cherbourg bombardment force was Anglo-American and consisted of three American battleships, two American cruisers, and two British cruisers. It was under United States command in the person of Rear-Admiral Morton L. Deyo, USN. The minesweepers allocated to clear the waters ahead of the bombarding force were predominately British, while the destroyers which screened it were American. It was right that the force should be under American command since not only were most of the larger units American, but their bombardment had to be closely co-ordinated with the advancing American army. Any slight delay or confusion in communication might well have led to shells from the American and British warships falling among American troops.

  Rear-Admiral Deyo’s flagship was the cruiser Tuscaloosa. The Quincy was the other American cruiser and the British cruisers were the Glasgow and Enterprise, the latter being commanded by Captain H. Grant, of the Royal Canadian Navy. The American battleships in the squadron were the Nevada, Texas and Arkansas.

  An aerial view of Cherbourg, June 1944.

  The plan was for the Nevada to take part in the initial bombardment with the cruisers while the Texas and Arkansas formed a powerful supporting group slightly to seaward and ready to take part in the bombardment. Rear-Admiral Deyo’s bombardment squadron was given the title of “Cruiser Division Seven.” It was considered that a ninety-minute bombardment by this force should be sufficient to silence the German defences, formidable as these were. They consisted of at least twenty casemated batteries. Of these three were of guns of 280 mm, and at least fifteen housed guns of 150 mm calibre or greater. There were also a large number of smaller batteries.

  By D plus 18 (24 June) the situation on the Cotentin Peninsula was developing rapidly. The American troops advancing up the peninsula had compressed the Germans into a narrow strip along its northern coast from Cap de la Hogue to Cape Barfleur. Cherbourg, near the centre of this coast, was by far the strongest German position and, moreover, one which the Allies urgently required for their own use. The time had come for the naval bombardment of Cherbourg and the final assault on the town and port.

  Rear-Admiral Deyo’s “Cruiser Division Seven” sailed from Portland at dawn on 25 June. It was a beautiful morning as the force was swept across the Channel by the minesweepers. When the ships were still fifteen miles from the coast their crews could see the smoke of fires in Cherbourg, and as they drew nearer they could hear the rumble of gunfire. The battle for the shoreward approaches to Cherbourg was already in progress.

  When the bombarding ships were about nine miles from the coast they turned parallel to it. They were steaming in the order Glasgow, Enterprise, Nevada, Tuscaloosa and Quincy, and were preceded by the minesweepers and flanked by the screening destroyers. The Texas and Arkansas kept station to seaward.

  The ships were well within range of the German heavy batteries, but these showed no sign of fight. The run parallel to the coast was completed without incident and then the minesweepers, followed by the bombarding ships, turned south again to approach even closer to the shore. Still there was no opposition from the enemy defences. Less than five miles from the forts the minesweepers altered course and once again began sweeping parallel to the coast. It was then just before noon.

  Then suddenly a German battery opened fire on the minesweepers. At once the bombarding ships replied, and so drew the German fire from the minesweepers and on to themselves.

  The action at once became general, with ships and shore batteries engaged in a very fierce and rapid firing duel. The German batteries were shooting very accurately, and the ships were forced to zigzag to avoid the fall of their shells. Up and down off the coast they steamed, almost continuously under helm and yet maintaining great accuracy in the fire they directed at the German forts. The battleship Nevada, being slower than the cruisers, and more s
luggish in answering her helm, was ill-fitted to take part in this sort of weaving with lighter and faster ships, and about half an hour after opening fire she “cut loose” from the squadron and manoeuvred independently to the northward, still, however, continuing her bombardment.

  Despite the almost continuous use of helm, the ships were being repeatedly straddled by German salvoes. In face of so hot and accurate a fire it seemed inevitable that the ships should be hit. Many of them were hit, but not one of them was put out of action or forced to interrupt the bombardment for more than a few minutes.

  The first ship to be hit was the American destroyer O’Brien. At 12.53 p.m. she was hit by an 8-inch shell. The little ship stood up to it well, however, and was able to continue the action. Twenty-two minutes later both the other American destroyers—the Barton and the Laffey were hit by heavy shells, but in each case the shell failed to explode. By that time, too, the battleship Texas had been hit, but this also was a “dud” shell which smashed against the armour of the ship’s conning tower but did not explode.

  The planned ninety minutes of bombardment expired at 1.25 p.m., but the German batteries and forts were still very much alive at that time, despite the fact that the aircraft spotting for the ships reported that at least 75 per cent of their fire was effective. RearAdmiral Deyo was determined not to leave the task half completed, although there was considerable risk in extending the bombardment because the military situation on shore was developing so rapidly that it was well-nigh impossible to be certain of exactly where the forward elements of the American troops were at any given moment. He gave the order for the bombardment to be continued.