Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  It was rather more than a quarter of an hour later that the bombarding force suffered the only damage which could be accounted in any way serious. This was to HMS Glasgow. The Glasgow, which had led the line in the initial stages, had been firing very rapidly and very accurately with her twelve 6-inch guns. It was obvious that the fire of this ship had been causing great annoyance to the Germans, for some of the most belligerent of the enemy’s batteries had clearly been concentrating their fire on her and she had several times been straddled and narrowly missed. Then, at 1.42 p.m., she was hit by a salvo. Two shells of this salvo hit and a third was a very near miss. None of these shells was a “dud.”

  One of the shells which hit exploded in the aircraft hangar just abaft the bridge and started a fire. It was this fire rather than the actual damage caused by the shells which forced the Glasgow to interrupt her bombardment and haul away to the northward. In a very few minutes, however, the fire had been got under control and the ship was again in the thick of it, with all her guns in action and wreaking vengeance for the casualties which she had suffered. There were casualties from splinters in ships which were not actually hit, for the Germans were using shells which burst immediately on impact with the water.

  After the damage to the Glasgow the gunfire of the ships gained a steadily increasing ascendancy over the German forts and shore batteries. Rear-Admiral Deyo kept up the bombardment until it had been in progress for three hours—exactly double the planned time—and although the protected German batteries were never completely silenced, they were all damaged and suffered serious casualties. Moreover, the German guns’ crews were kept so busy by the bombarding ships that they were unable to give any attention to what was happening inshore of them, or to the minesweepers which had begun to clear the approaches to the port under cover of the bombardment.

  A total of just under 3,000 shells were fired by the ships during the bombardment of Cherbourg. Of these 376 were 14-inch or 12-inch shells from the battleships.

  The surrender of Cherbourg, 26 June 1944. German soldiers emerge from underground defensive bunkers with their hands in the air.

  The three hours’ bombardment of the forts and heavy gun batteries of Cherbourg from close range in broad daylight was an operation of difficulty and considerable risk. The Anglo-American bombarding squadron, however, manoeuvred so skilfully that no ship was lost and serious damage was avoided. Of the accuracy and effectiveness of the gunfire there is no doubt. Nor is there any doubt that the naval bombardment played a most important part in the reduction of the fortress port of Cherbourg, which fell to the American troops on the following day. The risks taken by Rear-Admiral Deyo’s squadron had been amply justified.

  American naval personnel played an important part in the actual capture of Cherbourg. These were officers who were working with the army and who entered the town and port from the landward side.

  It was, for instance, an American naval officer-Lieutenant John E. Lambie, USNR—who discovered the great underground stronghold which housed the German military and naval headquarters. He reported his discovery and led troops to it, which resulted in the final surrender of the German forces in Cherbourg and the capture of General von Schlieben and Admiral Hennecke. A brother officer of Lieutenant Lambie—Lieutenant-Commander Leslie E. Riggins, USNR—was instrumental in discovering in this underground fortress headquarters certain documents which proved to be of immense value to the Allies in clearing the port and its approaches.

  The surrender of Lt.-General Karl Wilhelm von Schlieben, Commander of the Festung Cherbourg, and Admiral Walter Hennecke.

  Thus within three weeks of D-day, and despite the delay caused by the great gale in the building up of the strength of the Allied armies in Normandy, the greatest port on the French northern seaboard was in our hands.

  Much hard work and great gallantry were required before the port of Cherbourg was fully available for the requirements of the Allies, but this could implicitly be relied upon. The important thing was its capture, and this marked one of the great milestones on the road to ultimate victory.

  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, fully appreciated that the capture of Cherbourg was not only of immense importance, but also that it set a clear limit to the first phase of the invasion. Hitherto practically every man, vehicle and ton of equipment or supplies had had to be landed over the beaches or through the artificial “Mulberry” harbour off Arromanches. Once Cherbourg could be cleared the problem would be the far simpler one of supply through an established deep-water port. The Arromanches “Mulberry” and the beaches would still carry an enormous traffic, but they would no longer be the only routes of supply. Moreover, the whole defensive position of the sea lines of communication across the English Channel and the anchorages off the beaches was radically altered by the dislodgment of the enemy from Cherbourg. The enemy had lost a great base of tremendous strategic value on the flank of our main supply line. The threat to the western flank had been enormously reduced. E-boats were no longer seriously to be feared on that flank, although adequate steps would have still to be taken to prevent interference by the U-boats or other craft from Brest. The security of the eastern flank was also affected. There, in Le Havre, the enemy still held a strong strategic position on our flank, but the danger could be reduced because the Allied forces on that flank could be reinforced by forces freed from the western flank.

  On all counts the position had been immensely improved. So much so that, as soon as the port of Cherbourg had been surveyed and he had received a report that it would be possible to use a portion of it very soon—a portion which would increase rapidly as the work of clearance and rehabilitation progressed—Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay decided that he could make large reductions in the naval forces which he had had under his command since before D-day.

  US Army Engineers begin a railway line to the right of the dock of Mielles in the port of Cherbourg.

  This series of photographs was taken on 31 July 1944, five weeks after the surrender of the German garrison.

  In the early stages of construction a large landing craft shift is utilised. The low number of vessels carrying trains will push the use of LST “specially landscaped Ferry Train”, the shallow draft of the LST allows them to land by playing shallow.

  The US Army Transportation Corps is responsible for complex operations at Cherbourg Port.

  Severe gradient issues need to be overcome to avoid derailment. To successfully unload the train from the LST system a built-mobile ramp is made, the movable ramp slides to arrive at the lower deck of the LST for the final adjustment.

  The cross-channel ferry, Hampton was re-christened HMS Hampton and had a special gantry fitted to her stern which could cope with a load of 84 tons and would first turn a railway engine and then gently drop it on board. The ferry’s full load was 16 locomotives and about 20 trucks, with the engines already coaled. To handle the locomotives the ship had a staff of 18 American soldiers who were under the command of Captain Munton. Their first ‘delivery’ was 30 June 1944, just four days after Cherbourg was captured. Here she is ready on 31 July 1944 to unload her first locomotives for the US Army.

  HMS Twickenham, sister ship to HMS Hampton, stern on, unloads a locomotive onto the rails laid by the Transportation Corps at Cherbourg.

  To this end the commanders of the Eastern and Western Task Forces—Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian and Rear-Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN—were withdrawn. Rear-Admiral Kirk, however, remained in general command of all American naval forces. The commanders of the Assault Forces—Rear-Admiral A. G. Talbot and Commodores C. E. Douglas-Pennant and G. N. Oliver in the Eastern area and Rear-Admirals J. L. Hall, USN, and D. P. Moon, USN, in the Western area—were also withdrawn. The places of all these officers were taken by a British flag officer to command the whole of the Eastern area and an American flag officer to command the whole of the Western area. These two officers were Rear-Admiral RivettCarnac in the Eastern area with the title of Flag Offic
er British Assault Area (FOBAA for short) and Rear-Admiral Wilkes, USN, in the Western area with the title of Flag Officer West. All forces operating in the two assault areas came under the jurisdiction of these two commanders. On the east, forces under the command of FOBAA operated beyond the actual eastern limit of the British Assault Area because this remained the fighting flank where considerable resilience was necessary.

  The Task Forces of the Assault Forces were withdrawn and a number of ships thus became available for other duties. In particular, it made possible a greater degree of reinforcement to the Allied fleets in the Far East and the Pacific.

  Ships for bombarding duties on the eastern flank and for the bombardment of Brest and the safe conduct of the steady stream of cross-Channel convoys, of course remained available, but they operated under the orders of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief only when required. Normally they were administered by the naval authorities at the ports in which they were based. The English Channel ceased to be the responsibility of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, and sections of it once again became the responsibility of the Commanders-in-Chief at Plymouth, Portsmouth and the Nore, and the Vice-Admiral, Dover. The Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, however, still held the high command of both Assault Areas and the ultimate responsibility for all naval operations connected with the invasion and the maintenance and reinforcement of the Allied Armies of Liberation.

  Rear-Admiral Alan G. Kirk, USN, who had commanded the Western Task Force throughout the operations, and who was soon to be promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral, paid the following tribute in his despatch to the high commanders under whom he had been serving:

  “The skilful co-ordination of this vast operation by Supreme Commander General Eisenhower and the high professional skill and sympathetic leadership of Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force, Admiral Ramsay, will be remembered by all who served under them in the Western Task Force.”

  “Operation Neptune” was technically brought to a conclusion by the withdrawal of the Task Force Commanders on 30 June. The consolidation and extension of the successes gained by the operation, however, long continued. These did not end until the Allied armies were fully supplied to a strength which enabled them to launch across the Rhine the great offensive which was to end only with the signing of Germany’s unconditional surrender.

  The naval responsibility became more and more that of the Royal Navy as the western flank was made more and more safe from enemy interference. For both the American Navy and the Royal Navy there was much hard work to be done in supplying the armies with the sinews of victory, and for the Royal Navy there was still much hard fighting in store in direct continuation of “Operation Neptune.”

  An LCT (Mark 6), with wounded soldiers being transferred to a large vessel using a conveyor incline. The wounded are covered with a blanket strapped on stretchers. Some of the less badly wounded are reading newspapers.

  Part Three

  CONSOLIDATION

  CHAPTER I

  CHERBOURG AND BREST

  German strategy of holding and destroying ports—The “Red Ball Route”—Clearing Cherbourg—“Human minesweepers”—Marseilles and Antwerp—Brest

  After the break-through of the American Third Army at St Lo and the Battle of the Falaise Gap, enemy resistance in the inland areas of France largely collapsed, and large bodies of German troops were cut off in ports along the Channel coast and in the Brittany Peninsula and the Bay of Biscay.

  “The German Command followed a perfectly sound strategic plan. Each port must be destroyed as far as possible and the garrison must resist for as long as possible to enable this destruction to be effected and to deny us the use of the port. On the Allied side, the object was to clear the enemy from the ports before effective demolition could be achieved, and thereafter to repair the port installation as effectively and as expeditiously as possible in order to receive men and equipment.

  “The Germans succeeded in achieving their object to a high degree in certain of the Channel ports. Port facilities were demolished, ships were sunk alongside the quays and in the inner harbours, lock gates were destroyed and the entrances to ports were blocked with sunken ships. These ports had also been the target of severe Allied air attacks while in enemy hands. As a result of our own and the enemy’s efforts, nearly every port was a scene of utter desolation.”

  These paragraphs are quoted from a statement made by Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief. They indicate the task which lay before the Allied navies in consolidating the victory over the German armies in the inland portion of France and Belgium, which “Operation Neptune” had made possible.

  By the end of September the fighting fronts had moved right across France from Normandy to the German frontier. We had captured the ports of Brest, Cherbourg, Le Havre, Ostend and Antwerp, but still the vast majority of the supplies and reinforcements for the Allies armies had to come into France by way of Cherbourg and the great prefabricated harbour at Arromanches. Thence they had to be hauled right across France and Belgium. Some of the railways were working, but most of the supplies had to go by road along the famous “Red Ball Route” from Normandy to the German border. That road was so called because it was marked everywhere with a red ball. On it the military traffic stopped neither by day nor night. It was entirely closed to any other traffic and the military traffic knew no speed limit and its drivers no rest. The motto painted on big boards nailed to the trees was “Get on or get off the road.” A breakdown meant “ditching” the vehicle to avoid causing any obstruction or delay to others. Drivers used to change over with the vehicle in motion, the relief climbing up behind the driver’s shoulders and sliding down into the seat as the driver edged out of it sideways. The thundering tank transporters were fitted with constantly flashing “red ball” lights which gave them absolute priority over everything.

  The story of the Red Ball Road is the story of the greatest feat of administration and supply in military history, but behind the Red Ball Road were the ports, which had always been considered the bottleneck in any overseas supply system.

  They were not the bottleneck. There was no bottleneck. That this was so was a triumph of the Allied navies and merchant navies, who saw to it that the victory of “Neptune” was consolidated and exploited as the Allies progressed towards the final defeat of Germany.

  The seizure of deep-water ports and the ability to make use of them are an absolute pre-requisite of success in invasion. The artificial “Mulberry” harbour at Arromanches had provided us with one such port during the critical weeks of the build-up of the Allied military strength in Normandy. Then, on 27 June, three weeks after D-day, United States troops had captured Cherbourg after bombardment by American and British warships.

  Cherbourg was the first French port of any size to fall into Allied hands. Its capture was therefore a matter of the first importance. There was a considerable difference, however, between the port being in Allied hands and the port operating to capacity in the service of the Allied cause.

  The Germans, specialists as they had long shown themselves in science and in destruction, had combined the two in an attempt to make the port unusable for the longest possible time. Ships were sunk alongside the jetties and in the entrances to the docks. Cranes had been toppled on top of these, and even railway trucks had been added to the piles of twisted steel which lay mostly below water close up against the jetties so that no ship could come alongside them. Moreover, explosive “booby traps” had been inserted in the tangled wreckage with the object of causing casualties among our salvage experts and discouraging their successors. Add to this the fact that the whole of the great harbour was thickly sown with every conceivable type of mine in all manner of combinations and provided with all sorts of anti-sweeping devices. There were even trip-wires on the sea bed connected with explosive charges to trap and kill divers sent down on the salvage work. It was afterwards discovered that the Germans, with true Teutonic thoroughness, had sent charts of
the port and blueprints of its installations to the experts so that a comprehensive plan had been drawn up and followed for the destruction and blocking of the ports. This method had been followed by the Germans in the case of most of the ports to which they clung so stubbornly.

  Commodore T. McKenzie, the Principal Salvage Officer on the staff of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, Expeditionary Force, flew to Cherbourg with Commodore W. A. Sullivan, the Chief of the United States Naval Salvage, immediately after the liberation of that port. In Commodore McKenzie’s own words: “It was a scene of complete devastation. Quays had been demolished; cranes, elevators, etc., had been blown into the water; dozens of railway wagons had been run into the harbour before the quays were demolished; and sixty-seven ships and craft ranging from 12,000 tons downward to 100 tons had been sunk alongside the demolished quays or near the harbour entrances.

  “Six British salvage vessels, twelve lifting ‘camels,’ and three American salvage vessels were allocated for the work, and as soon as minesweeping permitted they entered the port.

  “Inside a few days some berths had been cleared and ships were discharging at the few undamaged quays, while DUKW’s and LCT’s poured stores and equipment over the beaches. The combined United States and British salvage parties worked at such a speed that inside four months practically every sunken ship had been either re-floated or lifted and dumped in our marine graveyard. In all, 81 wrecks and obstructions were cleared in Cherbourg harbour.”