Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  As has been the case in most of the positions captured from the Germans, there were many “booby traps” in Le Havre. One of these led to an explosion and fatal casualties when someone moved a chair in the main telephone exchange.

  Le Havre was for some time useless as a supply port, but it was very soon in use as a base for some of our light coastal craft, and it seemed only right that the flotilla which was first to use Le Havre had been one of the flotillas which had done such magnificent work against the E-boats which had previously been based there.

  By the time Le Havre fell to the Allies other ports were beginning to become available as links in the great supply system of the Allied Armies. Up to the fall of Le Havre over 2,200,000 men, nearly 4,000,000 tons of stores and more than 450,000 vehicles had been landed in France, and the great majority of these had been landed over the beaches or through the prefabricated “Mulberry” harbour laid off Arromanches.

  Under the direction of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, a special organisation had been set up to ensure that there should be the minimum of delay in bringing a captured port into action in the service of the Allies. This Organisation began considering the problems of the individual ports some time before their capture was expected. As a result, plans were made not only for opening a particular port, but also for clearing the sea routes to that port.

  As soon as the most suitable sea route to a port had been decided upon, having regard to known dangers and the probable future course of military operations in the coastal area, arrangements were made for provision of the necessary minesweepers and for the swept channel to be marked by buoys.

  Before a port was captured the minesweepers had cleared as much as possible of the channel to that port, and as this preliminary sweeping progressed, the channel was buoyed by Trinity House buoy-laying vessels and surveying vessels.

  As soon as the port was captured the sweeping of the channel to the port was completed, and the minesweepers then cleared an anchorage off the port. Thus the minesweepers were always ready to start work in the inshore waters as soon as the capture of a port had led to the silencing of the German batteries. Also in readiness to penetrate the captured port at the earliest possible moment was the advance surveying party, which was usually in a motor launch or a DUKW amphibious lorry fitted with an echo-sounding machine and other specialised apparatus.

  The advance surveying party’s task was to make a preliminary survey which would allow the surveying ship to enter the port with the main surveying party, whose task it was to survey all wrecks and obstructions and so provide the necessary data for the salvage parties.

  In every captured port there was immediately set up a Port Executive Committee, on which all the Services were represented, and which had as its chairman the naval officer in charge of the port. The Port Executive Committee, armed with the knowledge obtained by the surveying parties and the salvage experts, was able to produce a forecast of berths suitable for various types of vessel and an estimated date at which the shipping of certain types could be received in the port. This forecast was passed to the Build-up Control Organisation, whose duty it was to see that the stores the army wanted were loaded into the craft which could be accepted at the port, and that these were in readiness by the date forecast by the Port Executive Committee.

  Of the French Channel ports which fell into our hands during the months after the break-out from the Normandy beachhead Dieppe was, apart from Cherbourg, the first to receive convoys of ships carrying supplies and reinforcements for the Army. Dieppe had been severely damaged by the Germans before its capture, and three blockships had been sunk in the harbour, in which there were also eighteen wrecks. Yet before very long Dieppe was handling as much as 7,000 tons of cargo a day, which was many times that which it had averaged in peace-time.

  Boulogne was in worse state than Dieppe, and yet Boulogne was of great importance. This was not so much because of the harbour as because, as soon as it was captured, another “Operation Pluto” was carried out. This was the laying of petrol pipe lines across the Channel as had been done from the Isle of Wight to Cherbourg soon after the capture of that port. Boulogne was to become the continental terminal of the cross-Channel petrol pipe system at the eastern end of the English Channel, and this system was far more extensive than that which had been in operation to Cherbourg. There were four “pipe lines under the ocean” to Cherbourg, but to Boulogne there were no less than sixteen.

  Allied bombs falling on Dieppe.

  At Boulogne the Germans had sunk no fewer than twenty-six blockships across the harbour entrance, and in the harbour itself there were twenty-five wrecks. Yet Boulogne too, was duly cleared by the naval port parties.

  The Germans were driven out of Ostend some time before the storming of Walcheren led to the clearing of the Scheldt and the opening of the port of Antwerp, and Ostend therefore assumed for the Allies an importance greater than it would otherwise have done for it was for some time the port nearest to the bitter fighting going on in Holland and along the Belgian-German frontier.

  When the naval port party made its preliminary survey of Ostend harbour immediately after its capture they discovered that the Germans had sunk fourteen ships, close together and roughly in three lines, across the harbour entrance. The way in which this problem was dealt with was subsequently described by Commodore T. Mackenzie, Principal Salvage Officer on the staff of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, in the following words:

  “The removal of these three lines of wrecks by ordinary salvage practice would have taken three to six months. The use of the port was vital to the Army. I decided therefore to disperse the wrecks by mass demolition. Our wreck disposal vessels were called forward, and a few days after they commenced operations our salvage vessels entered the port astern of the minesweepers and commenced clearing the berths of wrecks. Two days later ships carrying thousands of tons of vital war material for the Army entered the port and commenced discharging. The volume of traffic increased as the channel at the blockships was deepened by our wreck disposal vessels and more berths were cleared by the salvage vessels.”

  It all sounds astonishingly easy and extraordinarily quick. It certainly was extraordinarily quick, but it was anything but easy or simple. Moreover, it was fraught with considerable risk. Divers and men who are handling explosives and heavy weights and have to deal with intricate problems of buoyancy and ship construction usually have an ingrained aversion to haste, for knowledge and experience has taught them that haste is so often the forerunner of disaster. Yet in the captured ports they were always called upon to work against time, and often fairly close to where mine clearance and disposal experts were working. The latter added to the risks taken by the salvage organisation because there was always the danger of a mine being exploded. Even if it did not detonate other explosives, it would inevitably have a “water-hammer” effect and might well cause a wave capable of upsetting the salvage calculations at a critical moment. Like every other officer and man connected with the “sea affair,” however, the salvage crews and the port clearance parties worked with complete singleness of purpose. Their motto might well have been “The Army shall not want.”

  With every port that had been in German hands clung to by their defenders without any hope of relief, and with each port being blocked and damaged by the enemy before their surrender, it was amazing that Antwerp—by far the greatest port of them all—should have fallen into our hands virtually undamaged. There was some damage in Antwerp. Seven large vessels, including two of 11,000 tons, had been sunk in the port, and there were about twenty smaller wrecks of various types. This damage had not, however, been done by the enemy in order to prevent us from making use of the port. The wrecks and such damage as had been done to the harbour installations, had been caused by Allied bombing raids, and notably the raids of the Royal Air Force in the black days of 1940 when an invasion armada was being collected in Antwerp by the Germans.

  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Co
mmander-in-Chief, alluded to Antwerp, the third largest port in the world, as a rich prize for the Allies, but at the same time he struck a note of warning, saying that in the general rejoicing at the fall of Antwerp it was not sufficiently realised that before the facilities of the port could be used the enemy would have to be cleared from both banks of the Scheldt and that thereafter a considerable minesweeping effort would be necessary before the waterway to the port was navigable by Allied shipping.

  Nevertheless, possession of the port of Antwerp in good condition was a great and unexpected success. This the Allies owed to the great speed of the advance of the British armoured column and also to some extent to the bravery and resourcefulness of members of the Belgian “underground” movement.

  Antwerp was not captured undamaged because the Germans had made no attempt to wreck it, but because the efforts in this direction which were made by the Germans were frustrated and neutralised by members of the Belgian “underground” resistance movement.

  Some six miles north of the town of Antwerp, at the extreme north-western end of the great system of wet docks and basins, lie the great locks connecting this tideless system with the tidal Scheldt. This tideless part of the port is quite separate from the miles long ocean quays along the Scheldt where it borders Antwerp town. The Germans had tried to destroy the enormous lock gates controlling the tideless part of the port, and if they had succeeded in doing so they would have closed a large proportion of the three and a half million square yards of dock basins. To destroy the docks the Germans fitted very large demolition charges to the most vulnerable points. Fortunately for the Allies and for the post-war prosperity of the port of Antwerp, the Germans were carefully watched by members of the Belgian “underground” movement while they were engaged on these tasks. As soon as night fell the Belgian patriots emerged from their hiding places and cut the electric leads with which the explosive charges were connected with the distant firing arrangements. Then the Belgians removed the charges and fitted dummy charges in their places, so that the Germans would not think that all their work had been undone. Having fitted the dummy charges in place, the Belgians carefully connected up the wires and, leaving everything apparently just as the Germans had arranged it, disappeared.

  CHAPTER III

  THE EPIC OF WALCHEREN

  Three-fold assault—Bad weather precludes air spotting and support—Initial bombardment—Great fight of the Support Squadron—Drawing the enemy’s fire—Work of the Commandos—Difficulty in landing supplies.

  The capture of the great port of Antwerp in a virtually undamaged condition was a great success on the road to final victory. It was, however, an incomplete success, for Antwerp lies more than seventy miles up the Scheldt. So long as our minesweepers were prevented from clearing the mines from the estuary and river, so long did Antwerp remain useless to us as a supply port. The enemy was fully aware that Antwerp, once the approaches were cleared and it was operating as the main supply port, would be a dagger poised at the heart of the Reich. They determined, therefore, to deny the use of Antwerp to the Allies with every means at their disposal.

  To this end the Germans clung most tenaciously to both banks of the Scheldt. They had strong positions on the south bank in the Breskens area. On the north side of the estuary they were even stronger. The big island of South Beveland is connected to the mainland only by a causeway which could be held by few against many. Moreover, west of South Beveland lies the island of Walcheren, which had been very heavily fortified with nearly thirty batteries with guns varying in calibre from 9-inch to 3-inch, and many other strong points.

  The importance with which these positions were regarded by the enemy was shown by a captured German army order which was quoted by Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds in his Order of the Day to the First Canadian Army, on the opening of the Scheldt.

  The full text to Lieutenant-General Simond’s Order is as follows:

  “Headquarters, First Canadian Army.

  TO ALL SOLDIERS SERVING IN THE FIRST CANADIAN ARMY

  Our victories in the battles for the Scheldt Estuary and the opening of the port of Antwerp mark a decisive step in the final defeat of Germany. There should be no questioning of this fact. It is testified by the following extracts from a captured order issued by the German Army Commander.

  ‘The defence of the approaches to Antwerp represents a task which is decisive for the further conduct of the war. After overrunning the Scheldt fortifications the English would finally be in a position to land great masses of material in a large and completely protected harbour. With this material they might deliver a deathblow at the North German Plateau and at Berlin before the onset of winter. For this reason we must hold the Scheldt fortifications to the end. The German people is watching us. In this hour the fortifications along the Scheldt occupy a role which is decisive for the future of our people.’

  The fighting has had to be conducted under the most appalling conditions of ground and weather. Every soldier serving in this army—whether he has fought along the banks of the Scheldt or in driving the enemy from the north-east approaches to Antwerp, and every sailor and every airman who has supported us—can take a just and lasting pride in a great and decisive victory.

  In the name of the Army Commander, I thank all commanders and troops for the loyal and able exertions which have contributed to such important successes.

  G. G. Simonds, Lieutenant-General, 4.11.44

  By the end of October the First Canadian Army had captured Breskens and driven the Germans from the south bank of the Scheldt. On the north side of the estuary they had succeeded, after a grim struggle, in fighting their way over the causeway leading to South Beveland and were gradually clearing the Germans from the whole of that island.

  There remained Walcheren, the last bolt which secured the door to Antwerp. Walcheren had been heavily attacked by Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force, and the bombs had breached the great sea dyke about a mile south of Westkapelle, which lies at the western extremity of the island. As a result of this breach in the dyke a great part of the island had been flooded. This, however, did not impair the defences, which were mounted on and in the dykes. At the same time the breach made it possible to contemplate a landing on the island from the sea, which would have been suicidal if the great fortified dyke had had to be frontally assaulted.

  Those concerned were under no illusions regarding the strength of the Walcheren defences or the difficulty of carrying out an assault, even upon the breach in the dyke. Yet it was appreciated that this would be the only way in which to capture the island and silence its batteries, so that the minesweepers could set about the task of clearing the Scheldt and opening the port of Antwerp.

  A hundred and thirty-five years before, the island of Walcheren had been the scene of a great disaster to British arms, caused by procrastination and disputes between the two commanders. It had been this expedition of 1809 which had inspired the following wellknown quatrain:

  Great Chatham, with his sabre drawn,

  Stood waiting for Sir Richard Strachan;

  Sir Richard, longing to be at ’em,

  Stood waiting for the Earl of Chatham.

  The expedition was a complete disaster, thousands of our troops dying of fever before the remnants were at last withdrawn.

  In 1944 it was very different. There was complete agreement upon the method of assault and nothing but impatience to see the fortress island reduced and the estuary and river cleared of mines.

  The planning of the assault on Walcheren had been begun at the headquarters of the First Canadian Army during the third week of September. Captain A. F. Pugsley had been nominated as the naval force commander, and on 1 October Brigadier B. W. Leicester, Royal Marines, was appointed as the military force commander.

  The plan for the assault on the island of Walcheren was for a threefold attack. There was to be a direct attack by the Canadian Army along the causeway linking Walcheren with South Beveland; an assault by Army Commando troop
s across the Scheldt from Breskens and directed against Flushing; and an assault from seaward in the Westkapelle area by Royal Marine Commandos landed and supported by the Royal Navy. The timing of the Flushing and Westkapelle assaults had, of course, to be closely linked with the progress of the Canadian troops who were clearing South Beveland of the enemy. All these operations were under the general charge of Lieutenant-General G. G. Simonds, Commanding the First Canadian Army.

  The force detailed for the assault in the Westkapelle area assembled at Ostend on 27-28 October, Captain Pugsley’s headquarters ship being the frigate HMS Kingsmill, which had been fitted with more wireless telegraphy installations than had ever before been carried in a ship of this type.

  As October drew to an end it became apparent that the Canadian troops in South Beveland would be able to reach the Walcheren causeway by 1 November, and Lieutenant-General Simonds accordingly decided to put in the Breskens-Flushing assault on that day. At the same time it was appreciated that the weather prospects for the Westkapelle assault were far from good. The urgency of clearing the Scheldt and opening Antwerp, however, was such that it was decided to proceed with the Breskens-Flushing assault and the causeway assault even if the Westkapelle assault proved to be impossible owing to the weather.