Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  Preparations for the Walcheren expedition at Ostend.

  47 RM Commando embark for Walcheren at Ostend on the evening of 31 October 1944. As part of Naval Force T they set sail in the early hours of the next morning.

  HMS Kingsmill, a photograph while still in port. Kingsmill became Captain A. F. Pugsley’s command headquarters for the Walcheren expedition.

  HMS Kingsmill had been fitted with more wireless telegraphy installations than had ever before been carried in a ship of this type.

  A view of the gap in the dyke at Westkapelle. The photograph was taken soon after RAF Lancasters had made the breach.

  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, had established temporary advanced naval headquarters in his caravan in the Breskens area, and he and Lieutenant-General Simonds discussed the situation produced by the deteriorating weather.

  Since the force which was to carry out the assault in the Westkapelle area had to make the passage from Ostend in assault craft and landing craft, an immediate decision had to be taken to sail or to remain in harbour.

  Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay had had plenty of experience of weather improving suddenly just before a combined operation took place. In the light of this experience, and in view of the immense advantages to be gained by launching all three assaults simultaneously, and the fact that the passage from Ostend would take some time, he ordered the force to sail. At the same time he delegated to Captain Pugsley, the naval force commander, the responsibility for deciding whether or not the assault should go in. This decision Captain Pugsley was to take when he reached a position off Westkapelle and could judge for himself the conditions of sea and surf on the spot.

  The passage of the force from Ostend was assisted by motor launches, which marked the channels, and was uneventful.

  When the force reached the vicinity of Westkapelle early next morning it was found that the weather conditions were considerably better than had been anticipated, although it was appreciated that air spotting would not be available for the bombarding ships and that the assault would have to go in without air cover. This was because all the airfields in Britain, from which the spotting and supporting aircraft were to have flown, were shrouded in fog. Captain Pugsley and Brigadier Leicester, however, decided to launch the assault, since they considered that the advantages to be gained by timing the Westkapelle assault to fit in with the Breskens-Flushing assault and the causeway attack from South Beveland more than outweighed the disadvantages of having to dispense with spotting aircraft or air support in the early stages.

  It is interesting to recall that the sea and surf conditions on the dyke became far worse after 1 November, and had the assault in the Westkapelle area not been carried out it could not have been launched for several more days.

  Aerial view of Westkapelle showing the flooding and devastation.

  As the force approached Walcheren from the westward it was noticed that the Germans were trying to shroud Westkapelle lighthouse in smoke, apparently in the hope of impeding our navigation and robbing bombarding ships of a convenient point of aim. Their efforts, however, were not very successful.

  It had been arranged that H-hour—that is the time at which the landing craft should “touch down” on the tiny beaches on either side of the breach in the dyke—should be 9.45 a.m., but things began to happen long before then.

  At 7.15 a.m. the approaching force could see that the battery of 220 mm (8.7-inch) guns at Domburg, north of Westkapelle, was firing. It was apparently firing over the island at Flushing, which indicated that the Breskens-Flushing assault had already gone in and had met with initial success.

  Motor Launch No. 902 was the first ship to come under fire at Walcheren. She was acting as a navigational mark when a German battery opened fire on her and she was ordered to withdraw. Ten minutes later the battleship Warspite and the monitor Roberts opened fire with their 15-inch guns. For some time the big guns of these ships pounded away at the larger German batteries and every now and then a big mushroom-shaped cloud of black smoke showed that a 15-inch shell had struck home hard. Nevertheless, there was no denying that the absence of air spotting very severely reduced the efficiency of the initial bombardment by the heavy ships. The Warspite and Roberts, however, were able temporarily to silence some of the large German batteries, and notably that known as “W.15.” This battery consisted of four 150 mm (5.9-inch) guns and was situated south of Westkapelle and just to the north of the breach in the dyke, so that the assault craft would have had to steer almost straight for it. The big ships fired eight rounds of 15-inch at this battery at 8.30 a.m. and effectively silenced it for half an hour. Moreover, when the Germans got it back into action it was not firing with its former vigour.

  The big-gun battery, “W.17,” just south of Domburg and consisting of four 220 mm (8.7-inch) guns, was also successfully engaged and silenced by HMS Warspite, but it came into action again later. It was, moreover, known early in the day that air spotting would almost certainly be available early in the afternoon and even better results were therefore confidently expected.

  At 8.48 a.m. the Support Squadron deployed about five miles off the breach in the dyke. The Support Squadron was commanded by Commander K. A. Sellar and consisted of LCG’s (Landing Craft, Gun), LCS’s (Landing Craft, Support), LCF’s (Landing Craft, Flak) and LCR’s (Landing Graft, Rocket).

  By 9 a.m. the battle between the German batteries and the craft of the Support Squadron had been joined. It raged unabated for three and a half hours at very close range and was very costly, but it was this squadron which, by its epic fight, made the assault in the Westkapelle area possible and successful. Captain Pugsley, in fact, reported to Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay m the following words: “This success would NOT have been achieved without the outstanding gallantry and determination displayed by all officers and men of the Support Squadron, under the command of Commander K. A. Sellar, who led the attack and engaged the extremely active enemy batteries.”

  A landing craft nosing into the gap.

  Elsewhere in his official report Captain Pugsley stated: “From 9 a.m. till 12.30 p.m. the Support Squadron continuously engaged the enemy batteries, firstly in support of the landings and later supporting the Commandos’ advance to the southward. Their losses were heavy, but they stuck to their job of engaging the enemy, thereby drawing the enemy’s fire and enabling the landings to proceed.”

  The assault in the Westkapelle area had, in fact, been planned in the light of experience of German tendencies so that the German fire should be drawn by the craft of the Support Squadron away from the assault craft carrying the Commandos.

  Experience during and after D-day in Normandy had shown that the Germans, particularly when manning shore batteries, will always fire at the craft which are firing at them. It was this experience which was exploited by the Support Squadron, and there is no doubt that if the Germans had been able to resist the temptation of shooting at the craft of the Support Squadron which were shooting at them and had concentrated the fire of their batteries upon the craft carrying the assault troops, the assault on the Westkapelle sector of Walcheren would have been a costly failure.

  Commander Sellar alluded to this in his report on the action. He said: “It was early recognised that we were up against formidable opposition and that losses and damage were to be expected in craft engaging shore batteries at close range. It is considered that this was fully justified because the Commandos got ashore well and lightly. I considered that, so long as the Germans made the mistake of concentrating their fire on the Support Squadron, close action was justified and losses acceptable. In fact, I decided that if there were signs of batteries selecting incoming loaded LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) as their primary target even closer action would be ordered so as to force the Germans to fire on the Support Squadron.”

  There can have been few more gallant actions in naval history than the way in which the Support Squadron drew the fire of the formidable German batteries on to itself
and so provided the assault forces with a comparative safe conduct to the shore.

  The casualties in the Support Squadron during those memorable hours off the west coast of Walcheren amounted to 172 officers and men killed or missing and 125 officers and men wounded—a total of 297. This compared with 5 killed and 28 wounded—a total of 33—in the LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) and LCI(S)’s (Landing Craft, Infantry, Small) of the assaulting force. By the time the Support Squadron was withdrawn during the afternoon it consisted of only seven craft fit for action, and three of these were vessels fitted only for the laying of smoke screens. Eight craft had been sunk and eight more put out of action, while four had suffered damage which affected their fighting efficiency.

  During the whole period in which the vessels of the Support Squadron was in action off Walcheren it lost 20 officers and 152 men killed or missing; 15 officers and 11 men badly wounded, and about 160 officers and men slightly wounded or suffering from shock after the loss of their craft. Of a grand total of 28 craft employed in the Squadron, 9 were sunk, 11 were put out of action, 1 was damaged but still capable of service, and 7 were undamaged and fit for action.

  It seems amazing that the casualties in the Support Squadron were not even higher when one considers that the German batteries on Walcheren mounted four 220 mm (8.7-inch) guns, twenty-four 150 mm (5.4-inch) guns, four 120 mm (4.7-inch) guns, twenty 105 mm (4.1-inch) guns, four 94 mm (3.7-inch) guns and four 75 mm (3-inch) guns. These were the guns in the established batteries, and there were also numerous guns, ranging in size up to 105 mm, sited in the various strongpoints.

  Disembarking vehicles at Walcheren.

  Destruction at Westkapelle.

  There were, of course, many instances of outstanding gallantry during this phase of the Walcheren operation, but it must be borne in mind that, where all wrought so magnificently, instances and experiences which may be quoted are typical rather than exceptional.

  There was the case of LCG2 (Landing Craft, Gun), commanded by Lieutenant A. Cheney, RNVR This LCG opened fire at a range of 7,400 yards on the battery of four 150 mm guns close to the northern shoulder of the breach in the dyke, and closed that battery to a range between 500 and 700 yards. Then she was hit in the engine-room, which began to flood so fast that the hatches were battened down in order that an airlock over the flooding might support the ship. At the same time she turned away from the dyke but found herself stopped and incapable of moving when only 2,000 yards from the battery. Lieutenant Cheney kept his guns in action until his craft was swung by the tide so that they could no longer be brought to bear on the enemy. Then he hailed another craft to tow him round so that his guns would bear, and opened fire again. About 11.30 a.m. the tide again swung the LCG so that her guns would no longer bear, and at the same time a very big gun began firing at her. Another craft came to her rescue and took LCG2 in tow under very heavy shell fire. She was towed for about half an hour when both vessels struck mines. As she drifted, LCG2 struck another mine and sank by the bows.

  The log of LCG10 is laconic in the extreme. It reads as follows:

  08.15—Four batteries opened fire on marking ML. (This was ML902.)

  08.25—LCG10 opened fire on batteries and drew fire at 08.45.

  09.30—Concentrated fire falling all round. LCG10. One cordite locker blown to bits or detonated and three others on fire. Burning cordite everywhere. Hoses got going in a very short time and every sort of extinguisher brought into play. All worked with great courage and calmness. Fire spread to wardroom and accommodation but eventually everything was under control.

  10.50—Bombardment resumed with full force, closing range. 543 rounds fired. 46 cartridges and 11 shell destroyed or thrown overboard.

  The report of one of the smaller LCG’s commanded by Lieutenant A. H. Ballard, RNR, is rather more detailed, but also gives a good idea of what these little craft of the Support Squadron went through. Lieutenant Ballard’s report reads:

  “At about 09.30 I started to really close the range to about 600 to 800 yards and continued to engage with rapid fire the heavier battery, whilst trying to evade the fire of the 88 mm battery in the sand dunes and engaging them with Oerlikon fire. I had only received three direct hits up to this time. . . . We started to receive further direct hits. One, passing through the bridge, took the compass from under my hands and bursting, knocked me for six, wounding me in the leg and also wounding another officer. I started to get up to give orders through the remains of the voice pipe when the First-Lieutenant arrived on the bridge, I having stationed him forward in case of such an eventuality. Then another shell came and carried away the compass pedestal and voice pipe and knocked me down again. By this time all the officers were wounded and the ship had received numerous direct hits elsewhere. I had, however, passed the order ‘Full speed ahead, hard and starboard’ to the wheelhouse—it was shouted through the hole in the deck that was all that remained. Then both engines packed up. Their fuel pipes had been severed. We were helpless, with our stern to the shore so that our guns would not bear on the enemy. We had 2 killed and 20 wounded on board and were being heavily pounded by 88 mm’s. An LCS(L) (Landing Craft, Support, Light) came alongside and rescued us.”

  When one thinks of these craft engaging protected batteries of larger guns at ranges of a few hundred yards one cannot but think that Captain Pugsley’s remark was an under-statement when he wrote: “The magnificent fight put up by the Support Squadron was indeed inspiring.”

  Meanwhile the Commando troops were being landed on either side of the breach in the dyke under the covering fire provided by the Support Squadron. Even closer range covering fire for the landings was provided by two medium LCG’s. These were Numbers 101 and 102, commanded by Lieutenant G. A. Flamank, RNVR, and Lieutenant D. R. V. Flory, RNVR respectively.

  These two craft ran in under very heavy fire from the batteries and beached themselves on either side of the breach in the dyke. From their positions on the edges of the landing “beaches” they were able to give covering fire at point-blank range, and they also drew a great deal of the enemy’s fire which would without doubt have otherwise been directed at the personnel craft and the troops as they were disembarking. They were both engaged at very close range by batteries of 5.9-inch and 4.1-inch guns, and both these craft were lost.

  “Theirs was a very gallant action,” said Commander Sellar in his report, “I cannot speak highly enough of the courage; determination and devotion to duty of these LCG’s.” No. 102 was soon on fire, but the fire was got under control and the craft remained in action for a time. Then the fire broke out again and she was last seen burning on the beach, broached to. No. 101 remained on the beach and in action against the enemy until shortly after 10 a.m., when she un-beached, but was so badly damaged that she promptly sank. LCI(S) 538 (Landing Craft, Infantry, Small), commanded by Sub-Lieutenant B. S. B. Lingwood, RNVR, un-beached at just about the same time and saw LCG(M) 101 with only her starboard side showing above water. Able-Seaman Green and Able-Seaman Garthwaite of LCI(S) 538 promptly dived overboard to support wounded survivors who were in danger of drowning. As a result, six lives, including that of Lieutenant Flamank, the Commanding Officer of LCC(M) 101 were saved. Lieutenant Flamank subsequently reported officially: “I regret to report the loss of my ship off Westkapelle shortly after H-hour on November 1st, 1944, after being in action with a German pillbox at a range of 40 or 50 yards.”

  The Walcheren Expedition, November 1944.

  A flail tank landing at Walcheren.

  The LCG’s which were beached on either side of the breach in the dyke were each supported by three LCS(L)’s (Landing Craft, Support, Large) whose duty it was to draw the attention of the enemy as far as possible. All three of the craft which tried to support the LCG(M) on the southern side of the breach were set on fire. It was here that Lieutenant S. N. Orum, RN, RNVR, who led them in and who had so gallantly boarded a German explosive motor boat off the Normandy beaches, lost his life. He led his craft in to “point
blank and what proved to be suicidal range of the German strongpoints on the southern shoulder of the breach.” It may have been suicidal, but he certainly achieved his object of drawing the enemy’s fire away from the landing troops.

  It was in one of these LCS(L)’s—No. 260—that a motor mechanic performed an act of great bravery. His craft had been hit by shells and fire broke out in the engine-room and fuel-tank compartment. The fire in the engine-room was got under control with extinguishers, but nobody could get near the hatch of the fuel-tank compartment owing to the heat. Then another craft came alongside and the motor mechanic rigged a hose from it and fought and controlled the fire while sitting in a large shell-hole in the ship’s side. This he did without the least thought for his own safety, although about 2,600 gallons of petrol remained in the compartment that was on fire, and there is no doubt that he saved the ship.

  The LCF’s (Landing Craft, Flak) also did magnificent work, in fact, one of the outstanding features of the assault was the way in which the LCF’s engaged the German pillboxes while the landing craft with the Commandos were going in to beach. This they did under heavy shell fire. Lieutenant R. J. Elliott, RNVR, who commanded LCF 32 reported: “Between 10.05 and 11.00 we were under continual accurate shell fire and were hit five times. I reported the damage to the headquarters ship and was told to disengage. The headquarters ship then advised me to increase speed as I was being followed by shells. This advice was rather unnecessary as I was ‘emergency full speed ahead’ and the bridge had been swamped twice by near misses.”

  Captain Pugsley, who was anxiously watching from HMS Kingsmill, found it difficult to get a clear idea of what was going on during the early stage of the landing, so fierce was the action being fought close to the shore. At 10.15 he signalled to an LCI(S) (Landing Craft, Infantry, Small) which was on her way out from the beaches: “What is happening on beaches?” The LCI(S) replied: “Good beaching. All troops landed.”