Operation Neptune

by Kenneth Edwards

  “This,” as Captain Pugsley said in his report, “was most heartening news, since it appeared from my position some 3,000 yards off the beach that the beaching would have been extremely difficult and accompanied by heavy casualties to Commandos and craft.”

  Captain Pugsley’s report, in fact, makes reference to “the apparent impossibility, at the time of ordering the assault groups in, of landing from either LCI(S) or LCT. without severe and possibly crippling casualties” and to “the consequently unexpectedly successful beaching and un-beaching of all the assaulting craft.” That is a measure of the success achieved by the gallant Support Squadron.

  The first wave of the assault consisted of one Royal Marine Commando landed north of the breach in the dyke, and another landed to the south of it. This initial assault was quickly followed by a second wave, an Allied Commando being landed north of the breach and another Royal Marine Commando south of the breach.

  The Marines north of the gap at once found themselves confronted by a German pillbox. This they quickly reduced and pushed northwards, only to be held up by very stiff resistance from the “W.15” battery of four 150 mm guns. By this time, however, a few tanks had been landed and with their help the Marines succeeded in capturing this battery. Once past this battery, they swept on fast along the dyke to the north-eastward. The Germans began to come tumbling out to surrender from the strongpoints and concrete burrows with which the dyke and sand-dunes were honeycombed. In a few hours this Royal Marine Commando reached the neighbourhood of the village of Domburg, but here they encountered stiff resistance from the big battery known as “ W.17,” consisting of four 220 mm guns. By this time the troops of the Allied Commando had come up with them, and together they fought their way into this powerful battery and killed or captured the whole of its German garrison. Then they halted to consolidate.

  The Royal Marine Commando landed on the southern side of the breach in the dyke also progressed rapidly at first. They cleared the radar station and the small battery and strongpoint known as “W.154,” and pushed on along the dyke to the south-eastward until they reached the vicinity of the big battery “W.13,” with its six 150 mm guns. A quick assault on this battery was attempted, but proved impossible. The leading troop commander in this assault was killed and many of his men became casualties. A second troop at once took over the assault, but it came under such intense mortar fire that most of its men were killed or wounded. This was some of the toughest fighting ever experienced, even by the Royal Marine Commandos. It was hard slogging along the dyke between the sea and the flooded hinterland; through deep sand which clogged rifles and tommy guns and filled eyes, mouth and hair; and in the face of a determined enemy in concrete positions and provided with heavy guns as well as light weapons.

  The Royal Marine Commando was held up by the “W.13” battery while fire support was arranged. Some of this came from craft of the Support Squadron which had followed the progress of the Marines along the dyke and were then just to seaward of the big Zouteland sandbank, while some of it came from military field batteries on the southern side of the Scheldt. Moreover, the weather over the British airfields had by that time cleared, and Typhoons of the Royal Air Force were able to make an important contribution by “strafing” the “W.13” battery.

  As soon as the support fire ceased a fresh troop of the Royal Marine Commando assaulted the battery under cover of a smoke screen. They succeeded in fighting their way into the centre of the battery and in capturing its control position. The whole of the “W.13” battery was cleared of the enemy during the night and at dawn the Royal Marine Commando pushed on to the village of Zouteland. They had to fight two small battles on the way in order to dislodge the Germans from the sand-dunes dominating the village, but the German Commandant surrendered and resistance virtually ceased in the immediate vicinity of Zouteland.

  The two Commandos which had cleared the dyke from the breach to Zouteland rested in that village while a third Commando pushed on farther to the south-east. This Commando pushed on steadily until it reached a very strong German position guarded by an anti-tank ditch and large concrete “dragon’s teeth.” This was one of the defensive positions covering the “ W.11” battery of six 150 mm guns. Here again, supporting fire was called for and was provided by the field batteries on the south side of the Scheldt, but the weather had closed down again and no air support was available.

  With the assistance of the artillery support two troops succeeded in storming across the ditch, but they then came under very heavy mortar fire and suffered severely; both the troop commanders being wounded.

  Meanwhile the “W.11” battery itself was being attacked. The leading elements of the Royal Marine Commando almost reached the battery in their initial assault, but in so doing they overran some pockets of German resistance which “came to life” behind them, inflicting casualties and isolating the forward troops. At dusk, however, these German pockets of resistance were dealt with by another troop, and ammunition and supplies were man-handled up to the forward troops close to the battery after dark and just in time to enable them to repulse a sharp German counter-attack during the night.

  Early next morning reinforcements were brought up and a determined assault was made on the “ W.11” battery under cover of supporting fire. By noon the Germans had had enough and began to surrender. German officers who were taken prisoner were induced to call upon the Germans in the deep concrete shelters to come up and lay down their arms. When the German Commandant of the battery surrendered he handed over his revolver with the words: “If you think I am a coward, shoot me.” It was his way of paying tribute to the irresistible courage and determination of the Royal Marine Commandos.

  After clearing the” W.11” battery the Royal Marine Commando advanced fairly rapidly along the dyke until they made contact with the Army Commando which had been landed at Flushing and had been fighting its way north-westwards to meet the Royal Marines.

  The junction of these forces completed the clearing of the coast of Walcheren which faced on to the Scheldt Estuary. Much, however, remained to be done in mopping up and consolidating in the north, for it was known that there were a great many German troops on the island of North Beveland which might have put in a strong counter-attack on Walcheren from the north. Such a counter-attack, however, never materialised, and North Beveland was finally cleared of the enemy by the men of the First Canadian Army.

  The most critical phase of the Walcheren operations, after the landing and the action of the Support Squadron in the Westkapelle area, was that of landing the supplies for the Commandos. For forty-eight hours after the landings the tiny beaches on either side of the breach in the dyke were under heavy and accurate German shell fire. The Support Squadron had diverted the attention of the batteries with great success during the landing of the assault troops, but it could not continue to do so during the supply phase with the very limited resources which remained available to it.

  The force was provided with three LCT’s (Landing Craft, Tank) laden with ammunition and stores. This would have been an ample supply for the Commandos if it had been possible to land it at the right time. This, however, was not possible.

  The first time attempt was made to beach these LCT’s and land their stores one of the three craft struck a mine and sank. The immediately available stores had been reduced by one-third before any supplies at all had been landed. The two remaining LCT’s with supplies were sent in at three o’clock on the afternoon of 1 November, but they were ordered back by the Principal Beach Master.

  The Principal Beach Master was Commander R. M. Prior, who had walked across France and escaped through Spain after having been left on the beach during the Dieppe raid of August 1942, and who subsequently entered Parliament. Of the work of the Beach Parties Captain Pugsley wrote in his report: “The gallantry and determination shown by the Beach Parties, who worked the beaches under fire for the first forty-eight hours, was in accordance with the highest traditions of the Service.”
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  The decision to order back the LCT’s carrying supplies was a most difficult one for Commander Prior to take. He was an experienced officer fully aware of the need to get supplies ashore and up to the Commandos as soon as possible. At the same time, he had seen one of the craft sink and appreciated that the cargoes of the two remaining craft had thereby assumed a greatly added importance. He had been on the beach since the first craft had “touched down” and could assess with accuracy the effect of the German shell fire. This was of such intensity and accuracy that to allow the LCT’s to come into the beach would have been virtually to have ensured the loss of the craft and the urgently required supplies which they carried. It was therefore preferable to accept delay in the hope that the German fire would slacken and enable the craft to come in again and beach with the prospect of being able to land their cargoes intact.

  Unfortunately, however, the German fire on the beaches did not slacken until the weather had deteriorated to a degree which made beaching Impossible. Several further attempts were made to beach the supply LCT’s during the night and the following day, but they met with no success, and it was not until three o’clock on the morning of 4 November that the two LCT’s were at last able to beach. Even then, they did so with great difficulty and such an element of danger that both the craft became total losses due to the weather, but providentially not before they had landed their supplies. One of the craft was “broached to” in the breach in the dyke, and the other was driven against a groyne and held there by the seas which battered her to pieces. The wind was lashing up waves eight feet high in the breach. Commander Prior had decided in view of the deteriorating weather and the urgent need of ammunition and supplies for the Commandos that craft carrying supplies would be beached regardless of the virtual certainty of the loss of the craft, provided there was reasonable chance of being able to offload the supplies before the vessels broke up.

  The supply situation would have been far more serious had the Commandos not captured quantities of German rations. Even so, the Royal Air Force had to be asked to drop supplies for the Commando troops on the island. This was a matter of great difficulty owing to the widespread flooding of the island, but it was successfully accomplished and greatly eased the situation.

  The difficulty of landing supplies, and the delay and difficulty in taking off wounded unhappily increased the sufferings of the latter, but this was inevitable in the circumstances. The assault on the Westkapelle area of Walcheren had been superbly carried out under conditions which demanded the highest form of courage and determination. It was the fortune of war that after a magnificent start, and when the resistance of the enemy had been virtually quelled, the weather made it impossible to give to the troops the supply and succour which every naval officer and man so desperately wished to afford to them.

  So Walcheren fell to the United Nations and the gateway to the Scheldt had been forced. In this action the Royal Marines, who had acquitted themselves so well, had been acting strictly in accordance with their traditional role. They had been landed from the sea by the Royal Navy in order to fight for and secure positions which, in our hands, would afford us the use of a great port.

  Winter conditions on Walcheren Expedition.

  The fall of Walcheren did not automatically open the port of Antwerp. The river was thickly sown with mines of every known type and with other obstructions. The channel to the port of Antwerp, which had to be cleared of these mines and obstructions, is seventy-three miles long. At Flushing the channel is about a mile wide, and between Flushing and Antwerp it varies in width between 300 yards and 1,400 yards. Here lay a mine-clearance task of great magnitude and complexity, which had to be pushed forward against time—so great was the urgency of opening the port of Antwerp; but the minesweepers proved equal to it as they have to every other call made upon them.

  The minesweepers were ready to begin the task at the earliest possible moment. In fact, one group of small minesweepers had actually succeeded in anticipating events by slipping past the Walcheren batteries before daylight while some of these were still in enemy hands. The magnitude of the minesweeping task is illustrated by the fact that nearly 200 minesweepers of different types took part in the clearing of the Scheldt. In the first initial sweep over seventy mines were accounted for.

  The job was done. Antwerp was opened to shipping on 28 November 1944, thus setting the seal of a decisive victory upon the successful reduction of Walcheren.

  CHAPTER IV

  AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE IN HOLLAND

  “V” weapons on Antwerp—Von Rundstedt’s offensive—Death of Admiral Ramsay—German midget U-boats—Watching, patrolling and raiding—Planting a “Cuckoo” on Overflakkee—Raiding Schouwen—Second battle for Arnhem—The crossing of the Rhine.

  It might have been thought, with the opening of so many of the French and Belgian ports, and particularly the clearing of the Scheldt and the opening of Antwerp, that the navy’s part in the liberation of Europe and the invasion of Germany would have come to an end, while the part of the merchant navies would he one merely of pouring in supplies and reinforcements.

  This was far from being the case, and an official statement issued by Supreme Allied Headquarters on the last day of 1944 sounded a necessary warning. That statement concluded with the words: “The enemy will make every effort he can to interfere with the smooth movement of supplies into Antwerp—the third largest port in the world. So long as Allied armies are fighting on the continent of Europe a great maritime effort will be required and many calls made on the seamen of the United Nations.”

  The enemy had, in fact, already devoted a very considerable effort to endeavouring to interrupt the flow of supplies through Antwerp by launching against that port large numbers of his so-called “V weapons”—flying bombs and rockets. These did much damage in the town, but they did no appreciable damage to the docks or to the shipping using the docks.

  At the turn of the year the German High Command must have realised that the offensive against Antwerp with “V weapons” was a failure. It was for this reason that they embarked upon a far more ambitious plan. This was nothing less than Von Rundstedt’s great offensive in the Ardennes. The plan was for the German Ardennes offensive, having broken through the Allied positions where these were weakly held, to swing north-westward across the Maas at Namur or Huy and drive straight for Antwerp. This offensive was to be co-ordinated with a southward attack from the German positions on the islands of Schouwen and Overflakkee and the Dordrecht area. This drive was designed once again to close the Scheldt estuary and then to link up with von Rundstedt’s column in Antwerp.

  It was a grand and audacious conception. Had it been successful the whole of the British and Canadian armies would have been cut off without a supply port in the whole of the area which they occupied. Moreover, Antwerp would have been wrested from the Allies and the threat to the German Westphalian plain removed.

  As the world knows, von Rundstedt did succeed in breaking through the Allied positions in the Ardennes, and he caused the Allied Supreme Command no little anxiety for a few days.

  It was to a conference at Brussels on the subject of the threat to Antwerp that Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay, the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief, was travelling when he was tragically killed in an aircraft accident. Thus the United Nations lost the services of one of the chief architects of victory in Europe. Admiral Ramsay’s place as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief was taken by Admiral Sir Harold Burrough, who had served with General Eisenhower in North Africa.

  With the progress, halting, and defeat of von Rundstedt’s offensive we are not here concerned, for that was a purely military operation. With the defences of the Scheldt and the sea route to Antwerp we are concerned. These provided a most interesting and unorthodox form of naval and amphibious warfare, in which information of the enemy’s movements and intentions was one of the goals and “keeping the enemy guessing” one of the most profitable gambits.

  Ever since the landings on the N
ormandy beaches on D-day, the left flank—which had continued throughout to be the fighting flank at sea—had been held by a motley collection of small craft manned by officers and men who could be surprised by nothing and were always ready for anything. It will be remembered that off the Normandy beaches Captain A. F. Pugsley had been Captain of Patrols and that the Support Squadron, Eastern Flank, which had formed the “Trout line” and repelled the German human torpedoes and explosive motor boats had been commanded by Commander K. A. Sellar, under Captain Pugsley.

  It had been these two officers who had so successfully landed the Royal Marine Commandos in the desperate assault on the Westkapelle area of Walcheren. By that time the force had been given the title of “Force T.” After the reduction of the fortress island of Walcheren and the clearing of the Scheldt it devolved on “Force T” to guard the northern flank of the Scheldt estuary leading to Antwerp, and in this task they worked in conjunction with the Royal Marine Commandos whom they had got to know so well.

  ‘Seehund’ midget submarines.

  They had a hard task, for the enemy was very active. On the sea route across the North Sea to Antwerp the Germans were doing their utmost with more new weapons. These were forms of midget submarine, of which that called the “Seehund” was the most formidable. The “Seehund” was a two-man midget submarine with a radius of action of over 250 miles and carrying two torpedoes. It was by no means a “suicide” weapon, although the German Command obviously considered them to be “expendable.” In addition to the “Seehund” and other types of midget submarine the German tried to use explosive motor boats against the short sea route to Antwerp.