Book Read Free

The Crusader States

Page 34

by Malcolm Barber


  Shirkuh and Shawar were at first unsuccessful, but when Dirgham was killed in the fighting, Shawar was able to seize power, slaughtering all of Dirgham's relations and allies. However, it soon became evident that Shirkuh had every intention of conquering the country himself, for he showed no sign of leaving, but instead began an attack on the city of Bilbais. This was the occasion of Amalric's second expedition, for Shawar realised he needed help and, says William of Tyre, offered the king even greater rewards than those given by Dirgham. Amalric therefore set out again in July 1164. According to Ibn abi-Taiyi (a lost source extracted in the thirteenth-century anthology of the Damascene historian Abu Shama), Shawar covered Amalric's expenses, paying him a total of 27,000 dinars, made up of 1,000 dinars for each stage of his march into Egypt, and the costs of fodder for his horses and beasts of burden.42 William's account is succinct. Amalric drove out Shirkuh and re-established Shawar as vizier, returning victorious to Jerusalem in October.43

  He had no time to enjoy the glory. In his absence, Nur al-Din had brought disaster to the north, underlining the risks inherent in Amalric's southern strategy. In the battle of Artah on 10 August 1164, he completely routed a formidable northern army, killing a large proportion of its 600 knights and 12,000 foot soldiers, and capturing all the important leaders, including Raymond III, count of Tripoli, Bohemond III, prince of Antioch, Joscelin III, titular count of Edessa, and Constantine Coloman, Byzantine governor of Cilicia.44 Western crusaders like Hugh the Brown of Lusignan, successful in defeating Nur al-Din at La Boquée in eastern Tripoli the previous year, now found themselves carted off to prison.45 Two days later Nur al-Din forced the capitulation of Harim, following this with the capture of Banyas on 18 October. Both places were seen as strategically vital, for Harim was only 18 miles from Antioch and controlled the Iron Bridge across the Orontes River, while Banyas was described by Amalric of Nesle, patriarch of Jerusalem, as the gateway to the whole kingdom.46 Even the arrival of Thierry of Flanders, now on his fourth expedition to the East, together with ‘a considerable body of knights’, failed to deter Nur al-Din.47 Both Bertrand of Blancfort, master of the Temple, and Amalric blamed the fall of Banyas on traitors, named by William of Tyre as a knight called Walter of Quesnoy, who had been left in charge of the city, and a priest called Roger, who allegedly accepted bribes, although William is not sure if the story was true.48 However, they could not disguise the underlying problem, which was that the kingdom had been left without adequate numbers of defenders.49

  As Nur al-Din had intended, the crisis diverted Amalric from his campaigns in Egypt.50 He and Thierry rapidly moved north and, in a process that had become familiar to all the kings of Jerusalem, set about restoring the affairs of the principality. When he had installed governors in all the important cities, he returned to Jerusalem, although throughout he seems to have been actively seeking to free Bohemond from captivity. Surprisingly, he succeeded, for Bohemond was released in the summer of 1165, on payment of part of the ransom demanded, with hostages taken for the rest. Bohemond (perhaps on Amalric's advice) at once travelled to Constantinople, where his sister, Maria, was now married to the emperor, and received the hospitality and gifts customarily dispensed by Manuel to those whom he regarded as his subordinates.51 Some of the largesse dispensed must have gone towards the remainder of Bohemond's ransom. Maintaining good relations was evidently wise, for Nur al-Din remained very wary of the Byzantines. According to Ibn al-Athir, he refrained from attacking Antioch itself after the victory at Artah, partly because he believed that the citadel would be very difficult to take, but primarily because he did not want to provoke an appeal to Manuel for aid.52 Both Ibn al-Athir and William of Tyre attribute the release of Bohemond to Nur al-Din's belief that he would be easier to cope with than the Byzantines.

  Even had he wished to do so, Amalric could not ignore Egypt. While individual lords were, as William of Tyre puts it, ‘anxious over their own affairs and eager to extend their lands’, both the king and the masters of the military orders had a wider strategy to consider.53 However, the sheer size of Egypt presented a huge challenge to their resources, for it was over 500 miles from the Nile Delta in the north to the First Cataract at Aswan in the south.54 In 1163 and 1164, the master of the Temple, Bertrand of Blancfort, expressed his concerns in a series of letters to Louis VII. In the autumn of 1164, he returned from Egypt to find that his order had lost sixty knights at Artah and a larger number of sergeants and turcopoles.55 ‘Paneas [Banyas], the strongest city in the kingdom, had been handed over to the Turks by the ruse of traitors. Antioch is in a miserable, lamentable state and ready to be overthrown with a terrible, unspeakable slaughter of its inhabitants. There is no doubt that it will fall into the hands of the Greeks or the Turks, and very soon, unless divine pity and your super-excellent greatness come to its help with all speed.’ The king's aid was vital because they simply did not have the resources to cope. ‘Although our King Amalric is great and magnificent, thanks to God, he cannot organise a fourfold army to defend Antioch, Tripoli, Jerusalem and Babylon [Egypt], in which he remains with his sons and which is most to be feared. But Nur al-Din can attack all four at one and the same time if he so desires, so great is the number of his dogs.’56

  Nevertheless, the conquest of Egypt was possible. Fatimid determination to defend Ascalon had been based on the assumption that, if it fell, Egypt would be open to Frankish invasion.57 This was a realistic calculation as the Christian kingdoms of al-Maqurra and ‘Alwa were located to the south, while Franco-Byzantine control of the sea meant that the ports of Alexandria, Rosetta and Damietta would be targets.58 For his part, Saladin established himself as ruler of the country despite the obvious difficulties, overcoming a revolt against him in Cairo in August 1169, as well as surviving both Nur al-Din's antagonism and Frankish and Byzantine attacks.59

  Amalric must have calculated that the potential rewards justified the risks, for the kingdom of Jerusalem would have been transformed into a major regional power, the southern territories would have been made safe, many more settlers from the expanding population of the West would have emigrated, and new resources would have been obtained, some of which might have been of value in defending the northern states. Alexandria, for example, was a great port, with links to the West and Upper Egypt, but especially to the East via the Red Sea, a key spice route beyond the reach of the kingdom of Jerusalem, while the local and regional trade which the Franks had developed would have been further stimulated.60 Moreover, as early as the 1120s, the Premonstratensians of St Samuel on Mountjoy found that most of the sites around Jerusalem had already been acquired by other monasteries, a situation that explains their interest in the south-west around Ascalon, a region not fully encompassed until the 1150s.61 Egypt was an obvious attraction for a crowded kingdom seeking new territorial outlets.

  Louis VII, however, showed no sign of intending to lead a new expedition in the near future, despite the blizzard of letters aimed at him.62 Thus, their condemnations of the Greeks in the letters to France notwithstanding, the Latin leaders in the East continued to cultivate the Byzantines. Bohemond must have taken an oath of fidelity to Manuel before he left Constantinople since, in the words put into the emperor's mouth by John Kinnamos, ‘the city of Antioch was anciently tributary to the Romans and now is subject to our majesty’.63 When Bohemond returned to Syria he brought with him Athanasius I Manasses, the latest in the line of titular Greek patriarchs of Antioch appointed by the Comnenian emperors. Aimery of Limoges was obliged to leave, taking up residence in his castle of al-Qusair, about 12 miles south of Antioch, probably held by the patriarchs since 1134. He showed his resentment by excommunicating the inhabitants of Antioch.64 Soon after, in the autumn of 1165, Amalric, unmarried since his enforced separation from Agnes of Courtenay at the beginning of the reign, sent an embassy to Constantinople led by Ernesius, archbishop of Caesarea, and Odo of Saint-Amand, the royal butler, with the aim of negotiating a marriage alliance with the imperial family.65

&nb
sp; However, the Byzantines could not provide immediate help. The embassy did not return for nearly two years, but in January 1167 news reached Jerusalem that Shirkuh was marching through the desert towards Egypt at the head of another army. William of Tyre says that Shirkuh had convinced the Abbasid caliph at Baghdad that Egypt was a rich country, ruled by a decadent dynasty that adhered to law and traditions quite contrary to Sunnite teaching.66 Nur al-Din was less enthusiastic but, says Ibn al-Athir, Shirkuh was ‘extremely eager to do this’, and Nur al-Din agreed to furnish him with 2,000 cavalry and the company of several emirs, as he feared that too weak a force would meet with disaster. In early February, Shirkuh reached Atfih on the Nile, crossed over to the west bank and encamped at Giza, opposite Old Cairo.67 Meanwhile, Amalric called a general council at Nablus at which a tax of a tenth on movable property was agreed to finance the Christian response. Amalric set out from Ascalon on 30 January, crossing what William calls the desolate wilderness between Gaza and al-Arish. The mobilisation had been extremely rapid and at al-Arish they had to wait for reinforcements before the army moved on to Bilbais. The king had hurried because he had hoped to catch Shirkuh before he crossed the Nile, but discovered he was too late. As William of Tyre realised, Shirkuh was ‘a most vigilant leader’.68

  Unlike the expedition of 1164, which he covered in a couple of lines, this campaign was of intense interest to William of Tyre. He was now resident in the kingdom and he had reliable informants who could give him first-hand information. Moreover, Amalric penetrated far deeper into the country than ever before, enabling William to set out the historical and religious context of famous places of central importance to the Classical and Christian past.69 For some of this material he could, of course, call on his library, but his dramatic descriptions of the fighting and of the meeting of the Frankish envoys with the caliph himself are clearly based directly on information given by the participants immediately after they returned and written up very soon after. The most important of his sources was Hugh, lord of Caesarea since c.1154 and a member of one of the oldest families in the kingdom, since his grandfather was Eustace Grenier, who had served both Baldwin I and Baldwin II. He was the younger son of Walter of Caesarea, whose elder son, Eustace, appears to have contracted leprosy and entered the Order of St Lazarus. William describes Hugh as ‘a young man of uncommon prudence and circumspection beyond that which is usually found at that age’.70

  William says that Shawar could scarcely believe that Shirkuh was again threatening the country, but, once convinced, he was extremely anxious to secure Frankish support. He agreed to an annual tribute of 400,000 gold pieces (presumably dinars) of which half would be paid immediately, on condition that the Franks either destroy Shirkuh or drive him out. Hugh of Caesarea and the Templar Geoffrey Fulcher were sent to the caliph to confirm the treaty and, in a unique passage, William describes their entry into his palace in Cairo and their audience with him. No other westerners had been allowed into the place or into the presence of the caliph in the crusader era.71 They were led by Shawar through a series of dark passages, the entrances of which were guarded by Ethiopians, until they came to a large, open court. Here they encountered an exotic world, quite unknown to them.

  There, supported by columns of marble covered with designs in relief were promenades with fretted and gilded ceilings and pavements of various colored stones. Throughout the entire circuit royal magnificence prevailed. So elegant was both material and workmanship that involuntarily the eyes of all who saw it were ravished by the rare beauty and never wearied of the sight. There were marble fishpools filled with limpid waters; there were birds of many kinds, unknown to our part of the world. These were larger than those familiar to us, their forms were unusual, their colors strange, and their songs different. The food of each varied according to its species and was suited to its own kind.72

  From here they were conducted by the chief eunuch through elegant and opulent buildings to the inner palace where the caliph resided, their sense of having entered another world reinforced as they encountered animals from Africa and Asia which William had not seen outside the pages of Solinus.73 Al-Adid, the caliph, still in his mid-teens, was seated on a golden throne, concealed by curtains embroidered with pearls and gold. After Shawar had prostrated himself three times the curtains opened and Shawar approached, kissed the caliph's foot and then explained the agreement he had made and the reasons for it. Al-Adid readily consented, but Hugh of Caesarea caused consternation by asking not only that he confirm it by clasping hands but that his hand should be uncovered, as would have been the case in the western world. ‘Finally, with extreme unwillingness, as if it detracted from his majesty, yet with a slight smile which greatly aggrieved the Egyptians, he put his uncovered hand into that of Hugh.’74

  On the morning after the envoys’ return, the Christians discovered that Shirkuh had encamped on the opposite bank. Their reaction was to build a wooden bridge, fortified with towers, that extended halfway across the river, and a stalemate ensued that lasted for over a month. This was partly because Amalric was waiting for reinforcements: Humphrey of Toron, the constable, and Philip of Nablus joined the camp at this time, having been delayed by their own affairs. Amalric now secretly moved his army 8 miles upstream, where most of his men were ferried across to an island called al-Mahallah. A force under Hugh of Ibelin was left to guard the wooden bridge and protect the caliph in Cairo. The plan was hindered, however, by what William describes as a whirlwind, which prevented the army from crossing the other channel to the opposite bank, so losing the element of surprise and giving the enemy time to react.

  William of Tyre and Ibn al-Athir agree that Shirkuh now retreated upriver, pursued by Amalric and his knights, the foot soldiers having been left behind for greater speed. After three days the Franks caught up at ‘a place called Bbayn’ and decided to give battle. William gives the date as 18 March. He claims that Shirkuh had 12,000 Turks and 10,000 or 11,000 Arabs, whereas Amalric had only 374 knights together with ‘the worthless and effeminate Egyptians’ and some useless turcopoles. The situation must have looked different from the other side, however, for there was a debate about whether to fight or attempt to escape back to Syria, ‘because of their small numbers and their distance from their homes and homelands and the dangers of the route’. Urged on by a mamluk called Sharaf al-Din Buzghush, lord of Shaqif, and by Salah al-Din, Shirkuh's nephew, they chose to stand and fight. This, as Ibn al-Athir saw it, was fully justified by their rout of ‘the armies of Egypt and the Franks of the Levant coast’ with a force of only 2,000 cavalry.75 William of Tyre is more equivocal, describing a rather incoherent battle broken up by the terrain into a series of smaller engagements, in which ultimately Amalric was obliged to regroup and retreat across the river to Lamonia, 10 miles away. When he reached Cairo he found that 100 knights were missing, whereas the enemy had lost 1,500. Among those not present was Hugh of Caesarea, taken prisoner by Saladin.76

  Whatever the truth about the losses on both sides, the battle was evidently indecisive. Shirkuh did not wait for further contact, but rapidly took his army north to Alexandria, which at once submitted to him. Again he was followed by the Franks, who blockaded the city for a month by closing the branch of the Nile by which the inhabitants obtained food supplies from Upper Egypt. With famine imminent, Shirkuh managed to escape upriver, leaving Saladin in charge. Briefly Amalric pursued him, but was then persuaded by the Egyptians that the city itself could be taken. Alexandria was now fully besieged: ships were sent from Palestine, the Pisans brought their fleet, siege engines were constructed and the orchards around the city were cut down, much to the resentment of the inhabitants.77 Inside the city there was increasing bitterness against the Turks, who were blamed for bringing these miseries on the population.

  These circumstances forced Shirkuh to offer terms, which he discussed with Hugh of Caesarea and which were conveyed to the king by another captive, Arnulf of Turbessel. William of Tyre says that Alexandria was to be ceded to th
e king and the Turkish garrison allowed to depart, prisoners were to be exchanged, and Shirkuh and his forces were to leave Egypt. Ibn al-Athir has the Franks paying Shirkuh 50,000 dinars and promising to leave the country, but agrees with William of Tyre that the Franks were allowed to place a garrison in Alexandria to prevent Nur al-Din from sending in further forces. He says that the Franks were given an annual tribute of 100,000 dinars by the Egyptians. The Turks left Alexandria on 4 August and Shirkuh arrived back in Damascus on 5 September.78 With the departure of Shirkuh, the Christians entered the city in triumph, where the king placed his banner on the Pharos, Alexandria's famous lighthouse. William of Tyre claims that they were welcomed, although the heavy exactions placed on the city by Shawar suggest that most of the tribute money was extracted from the local population, presumably as punishment for submitting to the Turks. In accordance with the agreement, the Franks then returned to the kingdom of Jerusalem, some by sea but mostly overland; Amalric reached Ascalon on 21 August.

  Eight days later Amalric married Maria Comnena, daughter of Manuel's nephew, John, in the cathedral at Tyre in a ceremony conducted by Patriarch Amalric. She had arrived in the company of the envoys sent to Constantinople nearly two years before. Soon after, two south Italians from Manuel's court – Alexander, count of Gravina, and Michael Hydruntius from Otranto – also landed at Tyre, and immediately had a private conference with the king and selected notables.79 The Byzantine envoys suggested that since Egypt was in such a feeble state it would soon fall under the control of another power unless the emperor and the king conquered it for themselves, a task which they said could easily be accomplished. William of Tyre evidently believed that the initiative had come from Amalric and, indeed, the marriage and the arrival of the ambassadors were obviously connected. Accordingly, a treaty was drawn up and William himself was chosen as one of the envoys to be sent to Manuel to ratify its terms, setting out from Tripoli soon after. Manuel himself was campaigning in Serbia and the royal representatives finally caught up with him near Ochrida, where both parties confirmed the treaty on oath. William and his companions then set out on the return journey on 1 October 1168. It is no coincidence that, during this period, Amalric is depicted on royal seals wearing a sash crossed over his chest, a style of dress that derives from the Byzantine loros, itself a symbol of imperial sovereignty.80

 

‹ Prev