The Crusader States

by Malcolm Barber

  However, this new climate of cordiality is most vividly demonstrated by the extensive, high-quality mosaic programme that was now undertaken in the church of the Nativity at Bethlehem. Uniquely, this church had been inherited by the crusaders largely in the form in which it had been rebuilt in the sixth century at the time of Emperor Justinian. The first generation of settlers had added other buildings to the complex, including episcopal accommodation, a cloister and monastic structures for the Augustinian canons established there and, perhaps later, a hospital. The church itself had a narthex, a central nave flanked by double rows of columns, and three apses at the east end and on the transepts. Below the choir was the Cave of the Nativity, believed to be the place of Christ's birth, and beneath the north transept was the tomb of St Jerome. In c.1130, the body of Joseph of Arimathea was brought to a tomb on the west side of the choir.81 For pilgrims, this site was therefore second only to that of the Holy Sepulchre and some showed their devotion by sponsoring paintings on the rows of columns in the nave, the earliest of which, an image of the Virgin and Child in the form known as Mary Glykophilousa, includes an inscription dating it to 1130.82 At the foot of the column are two kneeling figures, evidently of western origin, assumed to be the donors.83 There are forty-four columns in all, on twenty-seven of which are painted a variety of sacred figures, using a technique that involved fixing the pigment in oil or wax, and then applying it directly to the stone surface, following the outlines of the subject in sepia.84 It seems likely that the earlier examples are a series of individual votive images, painted over the years between 1130 and 1167, when an attempt was made to integrate the column paintings with the redecoration of the church undertaken at that time.85

  The mosaic programme must have been started soon after the marriage of Amalric and Maria; the use of an obviously Byzantine church already decorated with paintings heavily influenced by Byzantine models reflects the alliance that was sealed by this marriage. The work seems to have been overseen by Ephraim, apparently an Orthodox cleric-artist resident in Palestine, assisted by two others, Basil, a Syrian Melkite, and another mosaicist, whose name is not known. The inscription on the south side of the apse which records Ephraim's supervision of the decoration of this part of the church states that it had been done under the sponsorship of Manuel, ruler of the Greeks, and Amalric, who among other qualities is described as being ‘the guardian of virtue’, and during the episcopacy of Ralph, bishop of Bethlehem, teacher of the Church. As was appropriate at such a site, the mosaics in the sanctuary concentrate upon the Virgin and Child, while those in the two side apses illustrate the Life and Passion of Christ. On the south wall of the nave were set out seven ecumenical councils, beginning with Nicaea in 325 at the eastern end and continuing onto the north wall, which showed six provincial councils, the first of which was Carthage in 254. Inscriptions were in Greek and Latin, but in the conciliar series all but one were Greek. The aim was to show the ecumenical councils as the repositories of doctrine, while the provincial councils laid down the related disciplinary actions.86

  This ambitious programme is a striking demonstration of the way Manuel viewed the world in the late 1160s, and it is significant that Amalric and his lay and ecclesiastical advisers were willing to accept this in return for the military and political support that could be obtained from a co-operative Byzantine emperor. The fact that Ralph was royal chancellor as well as bishop of Bethlehem must have had an influence on the choice of the church of the Nativity as the site for the mosaics, while Ralph himself must have seen the work as a means of elevating the status of his see following the resolution of a long dispute over the incorporation of the bishopric of Ascalon.87 For Amalric, theological differences (such as the exclusion of the filioque clause in the Creed in the inscriptions) were of much less consequence than practical help. Thus Manuel was able to present himself as the successor of Constantine and Justinian, presiding over an ecumenical Church that encompassed not only Greeks and Latins, but also Armenians and Jacobites, whose reconciliation was part of a long-term programme projected through councils held under imperial auspices between 1157 and 1179. Both the human and divine natures of Christ, as seen in the apses, and the series of councils along the nave walls were integral to Manuel's ecumenical programme. He himself was portrayed in the sanctuary, probably next to the scene showing the Presentation of Christ. This would never have been accepted by the papacy, for, in a world in which theological and disciplinary matters were decided in councils called by the emperor, Roman claims to primacy were ignored. At the same time Manuel dispensed his patronage to other Orthodox sites in Palestine, including the church of the Holy Sepulchre and the Greek monasteries of the area, emphasising the continued presence of Orthodox clergy and monks in the kingdom of Jerusalem.88 Not surprisingly in these circumstances, local Greek clergy were once again allowed access to the Holy Sepulchre. The contrast with the early years of the kingdom is stark, when the only matter upon which Daibert of Pisa and Arnulf of Chocques could agree was the expulsion of the Greeks.89

  Therefore, when William of Tyre arrived back in the kingdom he was astonished to find that the king had already left on a new expedition to Egypt, having set out soon after 20 October.90 William clearly thought that this was an extraordinary thing to have done. As he was absent at the time he could not be certain what had prompted the new campaign, apparently undertaken in contravention of the treaty made with Shawar in August 1167, not to mention in the face of the planned joint campaign with Manuel, for which the Byzantines could not possibly have been ready. There was, he says, a rumour that Shawar had been trying to obtain aid from Nur al-Din, and it was in order to prevent such an alliance that the hasty mobilisation was made. Indeed, Ibn al-Athir says that al-Kamil Shuja, Shawar's son, had offered allegiance and tribute to Nur al-Din soon after the Franks had left Egypt in August 1167. As a consequence, Nur al-Din had sent ‘a large sum of money’, although no military action had followed.91

  William of Tyre clearly did not believe that this was the real reason for Amalric's invasion, however. ‘There are those who claim that all these charges were false, that the Sultan Shawar was quite innocent and, far from deserving such treatment, had in good faith kept the treaty and all its stipulations. They assert that the war made against him was unjust and contrary to divine law; that it was merely a pretext invented to defend an outrageous enterprise.’92 Ibn al-Athir places Shirkuh's intervention in Egypt in December, after Amalric had invaded, explaining that it was because the Franks had taken control of Cairo and had established ‘a tyrannical rule over the Muslims’. He portrays Amalric as a reluctant aggressor, concerned in case Nur al-Din might be provoked, but eventually acceding to the pressure of what he calls ‘the Frankish knights and policy makers’.93

  Although it is difficult to pin down the exact circumstances, Amalric's fourth expedition to Egypt was therefore highly controversial within the kingdom. The upshot was serious disagreement, which profoundly affected the Frankish ability to achieve any permanent occupation. This expressed itself most dramatically in the attitude of the Templars, who refused to take part. They themselves have left no record of their reasons, but William of Tyre, who was not in Jerusalem at the time, speculates that they had either objected to the dissolution of the treaty with Shawar, which they saw as bad faith, or, less honourably, withdrew ‘because the master of a rival house was apparently the originator and leader of the enterprise’.94 The rival house was, of course, the Hospital, and had its master refused to participate Amalric could not have undertaken the expedition. In fact, the Hospitallers were instrumental. ‘It is said,’ William of Tyre reports, ‘that Gerbert, surnamed Assallit, the master of the house of the Hospital at Jerusalem, was the prime mover, if not the originator, of this ill-fated campaign.’ In an agreement with the king of 11 October 1168, the Hospitallers committed themselves to furnish 500 knights and 500 turcopoles, to be assembled at al-Arish before the marshal or the constable, a greater force than they had ever previously provi
ded.95

  This extravagant promise was matched by an extraordinary set of potential privileges, which suggests that Amalric was far from reluctant to undertake the enterprise. In return for their military help, the Hospitallers were offered the opportunity to create a vast lordship centred on Bilbais and extending as far as the coast, the return on which was estimated to be a rental of 100,000 old besants per annum.96 There would then be another 50,000 besants from ten other places: Cairo, Tinnis, Damietta, the island of al-Mahallah, Alexandria, Qus, Aswan, al-Bahnasa, Atfih and Fayyum. In each of these places they would receive the best house or palace after the king, as well as a tenth of the caliph's treasure in Cairo and other cities. The Hospitallers could take their own proportion of the plunder before all others, after the king had had his half-share, and they would be entitled to all the spoils from any of their own military operations, unless the king were present in person. If the order could not muster as many men as had been agreed, its share would be proportionately lower, but if it could provide more men, then it would receive an even greater recompense.

  In fact, Gilbert of Assailly stretched the resources of the Hospital to breaking point, borrowing large sums of money to hire additional knights the order could not provide itself. This evidently reflected the contrasting personalities of the two masters. William of Tyre offers a vivid portrait of Gilbert, whom he presents as a highly emotional and unstable man, given to extremes, whose actions eventually led to his resignation in a fit of depression. By contrast, Bertrand of Blancfort, says William, was ‘a religious and God-fearing man’, his policies perhaps tempered by his own bitter experience of nearly two years in a Muslim prison following the defeat of Baldwin III's army near Jacob's Ford in June 1157.97 Although the Temple had participated in the earlier Egyptian campaigns, the Franks had failed to turn their invasions into permanent conquests, despite actually occupying Alexandria in 1167.

  Moreover, the master was aware of the increasing responsibilities of the order. At some point before April 1168, possibly because of worries about attacks on the north while he was away in Egypt, Amalric had given Safad in northern Galilee to the Templars, a castle that overlooked all the places of pilgrimage in the northern part of the kingdom and that was only about 7 miles west of the Jordan.98 Inevitably this brought additional expenses on a large scale.99 At the same time Nur al-Din was able to inflict heavy losses on Antioch when the army of the kingdom of Jerusalem was absent, losses felt more acutely by the Templars, who had a greater stake in the principality than the Hospitallers, as can be seen by the fact that the Antiochene commander of the Templars ranked higher within his order than did his Hospitaller equivalent, reflecting the early date at which the Templars had become involved in Antioch's defence.100 This belief in the vulnerability of the northern states was shared by the Muslims. The qadi Abu'l-Mahsin Yusuf, quoted by Abu Shama, describes the departure of the Christians from Egypt in 1167 as having been provoked by Nur al-Din, for the Franks feared for their possessions.101

  Bertrand of Blancfort's reluctance may have been strengthened by an incident that had apparently occurred in 1166, although William of Tyre is vague about the date. William claims that, under siege by Shirkuh, a Templar garrison surrendered an unnamed cave fortress lying beyond the Jordan, despite the fact that Amalric had mounted a relief expedition. According to William, in his anger, Amalric hanged about twelve of the Templars responsible, which, if true, was an evident violation of the order's jurisdictional immunity.102 This is a puzzling episode, since William provides no context, nor mentions any repercussions, but there may be a connection with the royal confirmation of a grant to the Temple of parts of the fief of Transjordan held by Philip of Nablus. This grant was made by Philip on the occasion of his entrance to the order on 17 January 1166 at Acre, and encompassed a considerable portion of the northern part of the fief, including the castle of Amman and half of the land Philip held in the Belqa, north of the Dead Sea.103 If the cave fortress surrendered by the Templars had been situated in lands so recently entrusted to the care of the Temple, then the king's reaction is more comprehensible, the order's papal privileges notwithstanding.104

  For the Templars, pragmatism may have been reinforced by principle, since the expedition involved the abandonment of the agreement with Shawar, made the previous year, to which the Templar, Geoffrey Fulcher, had made a major contribution. William of Tyre was always very aware of such issues and he thought that in the expedition of 1168 the Christians had broken their word, leading to the withdrawal of God's favour and therefore inevitable failure. Ibn Shaddad thus had some justification for his accusation that the Franks were ‘breaking all the terms of the peace that had been agreed with the Egyptians and Asad al-Din, in their eagerness for the country’.105

  In these circumstances, William makes no effort to present the campaign in a positive light.106 After a siege of three days Bilbais was taken, the city plundered and the inhabitants massacred. Amalric then marched on to Cairo but, according to Ibn al-Athir, before he reached it, Shawar ordered Fustat or ‘Old Cairo’ to be set on fire and its contents plundered, starting a conflagration that lasted for fifty-four days and destroyed the city almost completely. ‘All this was because of the fear that the Franks would seize it.’107 Shawar had no real means of resistance, so he tried to gain time by offering a huge sum of money to Amalric, while simultaneously sending to Nur al-Din for help. William of Tyre says that he promised Amalric 2 million dinars, while Ibn al-Athir puts the figure at a million. Either way these are fantasy sums; as William puts it, ‘the entire resources of the kingdom would scarcely have sufficed.’

  William must be repeating a view of some of the participants when he says that Cairo could have been taken at this point, especially as the Christian fleet had now arrived, taken Tinnis and was attempting to block the Nile below the city. Shawar, however, after having paid a first instalment of 100,000 dinars, managed to persuade Amalric to retreat to a position a few miles away, ostensibly to give him time to collect the remainder. Meanwhile, he did all he could to strengthen the city's defences and to stiffen the morale of the population. Ibn al-Athir says that their determination to resist was increased when they heard the fate of the inhabitants of Bilbais. Nevertheless, William ascribes the failure to take the city to the king's avarice, in which he was encouraged by the seneschal, Miles of Plancy. If Cairo had been stormed, it would have been open to plunder, whereas all the tribute money would end up in the royal treasury.

  Whatever his motives, Amalric's decision was fatal to the campaign. On 2 December, Shirkuh set out from Damascus with 8,000 cavalry, 2,000 of them selected from the standing army, paid for by Nur al-Din, who granted a sum of 200,000 dinars together with equipment.108 News of his imminent arrival led Amalric to return to Bilbais, but he did not meet Shirkuh, who appears to have bypassed him and established himself on the other bank of the Nile. The king now decided that to challenge Shirkuh would be too dangerous and, on 2 January, the army set out for home. The fiasco of the campaign was compounded by the fact that Shirkuh was left unopposed in Egypt and, for the first time, was in a position to take over. ‘He [Nur al-Din] dispatched messengers far and wide to spread the good news of that, for it was a reconquest of Egypt and a preservation of all Syrian and other lands.’109

  Shawar did what he could to survive, but when the caliph bestowed a robe of honour upon Shirkuh he knew he was in great danger. Ibn al-Athir says that he plotted to invite Shirkuh and his emirs to a banquet and then arrest them, but that the plan was blocked by his son, al-Kamil. Thereafter, Shawar's end was not long in coming: he was murdered by Saladin and ‘Izz al-Din Jurdik, one of the mamluk emirs, either by their own hands or through a manoeuvre that left Shirkuh no alternative but to have him put to death.110 Shirkuh was appointed vizier in his place, and ‘thus, strong through the power of the sword, Shirkuh became master of all Egypt’. In later reflections on these events, probably in 1182, William of Tyre attributes the ills of the kingdom to the outcome of the campaign
of 1168–9. Cupidity had lost the political and commercial advantages that had previously prevailed, plunging the kingdom into ‘a state of turbulence and anxiety’.111

  However, Amalric had not mounted this expedition merely to engage in extortion. The agreement with the Hospital and the deployment of the fleet confirm his intention to gain control of Egypt and it is not surprising to find that in the summer of 1169 he began preparations for a fifth expedition. Aware that the forces of the kingdom alone had not proved sufficient in the past, he once more sought help in the West, sending letters to the emperor, the kings of France, England and Sicily, and the counts of Flanders, Troyes and Chartres. He was undeterred when the first embassy was forced back by storms, appointing new envoys for a second attempt, led by Frederick, archbishop of Tyre, and John, bishop of Banyas. William of Tyre is dismissive of this embassy. Bishop John died in Paris, while Frederick of Tyre was away two years but accomplished nothing.112

  The kingdom was by means ignored in the West during Amalric's reign, but the Franks were unable to persuade either Louis VII or any other kings to come to their aid, while, among several high-profile visitors, only Thierry of Flanders made any actual military contribution. There were, however, expeditions led by Stephen of Perche, chancellor of the kingdom of Sicily and archbishop-elect of Palermo, and William, count of Nevers, in the summer of 1168, as well as by three leading French lords, Stephen of Sancerre, brother of Theobald V, count of Blois, Stephen, count of Saône, and Hugh, duke of Burgundy, in 1171. Henry the Lion, duke of Saxony and Bavaria, more powerful than all three of them, also visited the holy places the following year. However, their help was quite limited: both Stephen of Perche and William of Nevers died in the East, while the arrivals of 1171 and 1172 saw themselves as pilgrims rather than warriors and stayed only a short time.113 Even had they been inclined to fight, an expedition to Egypt was such a major undertaking that it is unlikely that any of them would have been willing to participate.