Our Woman in Havana

by Vicki Huddleston

  How many generations will it take to reconcile the Cuban people in the diaspora and in Cuba? Almost sixty years has now passed since the revolution, yet animosity on both sides still drives the relationship. Even President Obama’s opening failed to make lasting inroads into the polarized elite groups in both countries that refuse compromise and reconciliation. Although ordinary Cubans love the United States, and over 1.7 million Cubans now live here, the Cuban government, especially military and intelligence officers, deeply mistrust Cuban Americans. For their part, Cuban Americans who were once part of the island’s elite loath not only Raúl Castro and the Cuban government but everyone associated with it. Cuban American senators Ted Cruz (R-TX) and Marco Rubio (R-FL) persist in urging regime change, even when all evidence indicates that a US invasion would result in chaos on the island and condemnation by the world community—especially within Latin America. These conservative politicians’ obsession with Cuba, like those of hardline Cuban Americans, is not in the best interests of our country, which would profit by a stable and friendly Cuba. But by rejecting engagement with the Cuban government, this influential minority discards the best—and the only peaceful—way of bringing about change in Cuba. After so many decades of revolution, hostility, and estrangement, only a policy of constructive engagement will lead to the resolution of old scores and true reconciliation. Obama put it this way: “So the reconciliation of the Cuban people—the children and grandchildren of revolution, and the children and grandchildren of exile—that is fundamental to Cuba’s future.” Yet our country seems prepared to deny that future.

  It seems strange that Cuban Americans who have already lost the most are so adamantly opposed to normalizing relations, because they stand to gain the most in the future. The story of the secret treasure hidden in the depths of our embassy in Havana best illustrates this conundrum. Hidden within the building’s dark recesses are gold, pearls, rubies, and diamonds left behind in the 1960s by fleeing Cubans. Impulsively, and probably in a spirit of compassion, the Swiss diplomats who maintained a skeleton staff within the closed American embassy provided a service about which the US State Department appears to have been unaware: they allowed departing Cubans to take with them their most valuable possessions.

  On one of my first visits to the embassy building in 1990”, twelve years after President Carter had reestablished limited diplomatic relations and reopened the building by giving it a new name, the US Interests Section. One look at the building showed the significant extent to which it had been neglected. The former embassy was in a state of disrepair—the green glass that lined the facade was a patchwork of shades varying from murky brown to grayish green, each section distinct from the other; the beautiful ivory-colored travertine stone imported from Italy appeared as if it had molted, with large chunks flaking off the facade; and the lone balcony that hung off the fifth floor was clearly unsafe. Facing the Interests Section, an enormous Cuban revolutionary billboard proclaimed, “Señores Imperialistas ¡No les Tenemos Absolutemente Ningún Miedo!” (Imperialists We Have Absolutely No Fear of You!). One could understand why, by simply taking a look at the decrepit building.

  Both the ravages of time and men had ruined parts of the interior. US security personnel wielding large pickaxes had conducted what they accurately termed a destructive search in their effort to locate listening devices, gouging enormous holes in the walls. The US Marines manned two checkpoints that guarded the entrances, but several cameras that monitored the building were not functional. In the basement I found all manner of items jumbled together in total disorder; they had been tossed about and damaged by floodwaters from one of Havana’s frequent hurricanes. In one area there was a 1950s television set, a large safe that had been broken open, many paintings, and several tables scattered with coins, paper currency, and manila envelopes with papers sticking out. I was astonished to learn that this disarray was personal property left behind by departing Cubans.

  When I returned to Washington, DC, from my visit to Havana, I informed the State Department that I had discovered these goods and shared my concern that they were not being properly secured. Initially the State Department considered transporting these items back to the United States in the diplomatic pouch, but decided against doing so because the Cuban government might seize the pouches, claiming they contained Cuban government property. If we had asked permission to ship them to the United States, our request would likely have been denied. The State Department’s solution was to inventory and better secure the property.

  In 1999, when I returned to Cuba as chief of the US Interests Section, the building had been renovated and a special vault-like room secured by a combination safe door had been built to secure the valuables. What at the time had appeared to be a disorderly jumble turned out to be a treasure of significant value. No one could enter the vault without signing a register. Inside, metal shelving units five to six feet long and six to seven feet high completely filled the cave-like room, which was illuminated by a single light bulb at the ceiling. Carefully placed on the shelves were bankers’ boxes of corrugated cardboard; tied to each box was a tag that indicated its contents and the owner. On one shelf, a pearl necklace and other jewels spilled out of a velvet bag, but everything else appeared to be in perfect order.

  Those who left their valuables with the Swiss diplomats could still recover them, yet it seems that even after Fidel Castro’s death they prefer to continue a nearly six-decades long standoff with Raúl Castro. If US-Cuba relations were better, it might also be possible for Cubans to be compensated for the loss of their homes, businesses, and land. Negotiations had begun on settling the official claims of American citizens (at the time of the taking) during the Obama opening. If these negotiations were to continue and succeed, then there would be precedent for resolving the claims of Cuban citizens who lost their property as well.

  Cubans who fled—with the exception of those who turned their valuables over to the Swiss—will never recuperate their personal property. In the early 1990s the Cuban government managed stores where they sold jewelry, silverware, furniture, and art confiscated from the wealthy elite. In many cases, the Cubans who fled faced a stark choice: either leave behind their material goods or stay behind and lose their liberty and possibly even their lives. East Germans, English, French, Spanish, and Soviets—and even Americans—were tempted by diamond rings, beautiful brooches of gold and silver, and necklaces of ruby or pearl; all of which could be bought for a small fraction of their real value. I once visited a government store where these goods were sold; there were many beautiful things on display, but I didn’t buy anything. It simply didn’t feel right.

  While I was chief of the Interests Section, from 1999 to 2002, Cuban officials never mentioned the cache of valuables, although I cannot imagine that they were unaware of it. Neither do Cuban Americans usually talk about the fortune they left behind, although they lament the loss of homes, ranches, and businesses. Only once did a Cuban American raise with me the issue of his family’s valuables. Sitting beside me at a luncheon in Miami, the wealthy businessman whispered that his family had left their jewelry with the Swiss diplomats. Then sadly, he said, “Ambassador, all I really care about are five gold rings; they are a family heirloom passed down from one generation to the next.” I could only sympathize. No one can touch the treasure until it is conclusively determined to whom it belongs today, and that will only occur when relations improve.

  Carlos Gutierrez, President Bush’s former adviser on Cuba, told me that he, like many prominent Cuban Americans, had come to realize that engagement, not hostility, would bring about change in Cuba. He had moved from advocating an isolationist policy to joining Obama on his visit to Havana and attending his speech at the Gran Teatro Nacional. He told me that the audience was optimistic, hopeful, and pleased that Obama acknowledged their yearning for change. As the president wound up his stirring speech he declared, “It is time now for us to leave the past behind. It is time for us to look forward to the future to
gether.” Some of his listeners feared that this might mean we would forget that Cubans had suffered greatly during the Special Period in Time of Peace, which the United States in part had imposed on Cuba by tightening the embargo when the Soviets withdrew their financial support. Many Cubans do not want Americans to forget that we contributed to their suffering. Still, Cubans must at least forgive, if not forget, if we are to achieve Obama’s dream for reconciliation between “the children and grandchildren of the revolution and the children and the grandchildren of exile.”

  Raúl responded to President Trump’s taunts in a measured way, saying that “Cuba and the United States can cooperate and live side by side, respecting their differences. But no one should expect that for this, one should have to make concessions inherent to one’s sovereignty and independence.” Were Fidel Castro still alive he would have immediately and harshly denounced Trump, the Cuban diaspora, and the United States. Still, both Castro brothers share the unbreakable conviction that Cuba’s independence will not be compromised. Raúl put it like this, “But it should not be hoped that to achieve this [cooperation with the US] Cuba will make concessions inherent to its independence and sovereignty.” If only we believed them, perhaps we would stop making the mistake of attempting to “get a better deal,” as Trump has promised.

  Fidel never caved in when threatened, and he retaliated by taking actions that were more painful for the United States than for Cuba. For example, when the Bush administration restricted the travel of Cuban diplomats in 2002, as it began to revert to a hostile policy, Cuba did the same to our diplomats. A few years later, when the State Department realized that the restriction damaged our interests more than Cuba’s, we suggested mutually rescinding the rule, but Castro was unwilling to do so, and it remained in place for over a decade until the Obama opening. Similarly, in 2001 the FBI refused to approve a visa for the new deputy of the Cuban Interests Section in Washington, DC. The Cuban government retaliated by refusing visas for my deputy at our Interests Section in Havana, as well as for our public diplomacy officer. This two-for-one reprisal strategy made the situation considerably more difficult for me than for my Cuban counterpart. It seems that the Trump administration will have to learn for itself that negative actions against Cuba seldom produce the desired results and often generate reactions that are detrimental to US interests.

  For a few months following President Trump’s Miami speech, there was hope that the US-Cuban diplomatic relationship would survive, if not prosper. But that expectation was crushed by the strange case of injuries suffered by American and Canadian diplomats. In August 2017, the media revealed that American diplomats had suffered hearing loss, nausea, and traumatic brain injuries from some sort of sonic attack. A number of the incidents occurred in the homes of diplomats responsible for security and intelligence between November of 2016 and January of 2017. However, a few took place subsequent to February, including the one that became public in August. According to the State Department, injuries also occurred at the Hotel Nacional and the Hotel Capri. None of the attacks, which now number twenty-four against American diplomats and five against Canadian diplomats, were directed at the American embassy.

  When the injuries first occurred the American and Cuban governments attempted to deal with them in a responsible manner. Raúl Castro sought out the embassy’s Charge d’Affairs, Jeffrey DeLaurentis, to assure him that Cuba was not responsible, and he invited the FBI to visit Havana; which it did several times to investigate. The State Department expelled two diplomats from the Cuban embassy in Washington D.C., presumably to balance staffing as American diplomats had been forced to leave their post in Havana as a result of their ailments.

  When the diplomats’ injuries became public in August 2017, conservative Cuban Americans led by Senator Marco Rubio used the incidents to demand that the United States retaliate against Cuba. Ignoring the American Foreign Service Association’s public statement that the diplomats were prepared to remain in Cuba and continue their work, the Trump administration cut the American embassy staff by more than half and sent all dependents home. Bowing to Rubio’s demands, the administration ordered the Cuban embassy to reduce its staff by an equivalent number of diplomats. In addition, the State Department issued an aggressive travel warning, advising American visitors to avoid the island, despite that fact that only diplomats had been affected by the sonic incidents.

  On October 16, 2017 President Trump added his voice to the growing tensions. At a Rose Garden new conference, he said, “I do believe Cuba’s responsible. I do believe that.” He did not cite any evidence for his belief. The State Department continues to assert that it neither knows who is responsible for the attacks or the type of device that caused the ailments. Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez Padilla rejected Trump’s accusation, saying that “There is no evidence, there is no evidence whatsoever, of the occurrence of the alleged incidents or the cause or origin of these ailments reported by US diplomats.” He then added, “Neither is there any suggestion that these health problems have been caused by an attack of any sort during their stay in Cuba.” Castro’s daughter Mariela chimed in by claiming that “Even Star Wars didn’t contain such fantasies.”

  To restore relations to at least a modicum of civility, the US and Cuba must discover what’s happened and who was behind the attacks, but it has become more difficult as rhetoric from each side has become increasingly uncivil. Nevertheless, we can assume that each government—together or separately—is seeking the culprit or culprits by examining who had motive, means, and opportunity. The possible perpetrators are: the Cuban government, a rogue faction within the government, a foreign power such as Russia or China—with North Korea an outside possibility—conservatives and/or militants in the Cuban diaspora, the America government, or malfunctioning listening devices. The possible explanations, such as our own government and malfunctioning listening devices, may seem farfetched, but this is what the Cuban government now seems to believe.

  Raúl Castro’s government had means and opportunity, but they do not appear to have motive. The attacks began shortly after Trump won the election and continued until February, while only a few took place subsequently. Given that Castro was the coarchitect of Obama’s opening, it seems unlikely that he would deliberately destroy the détente with the United States. Moreover, Castro cooperated with the United States in the aftermath of the sonic attacks, reinforcing the idea that his government wanted to amicably resolve the puzzling incidents.

  As Cuba approaches its first transition in over a half century, it is possible that factions within the government are jockeying for position. A hardline faction associated with Fidel Castro, who denigrated the opening before his death in November 2016, would have motive, means, and opportunity. And, if Raúl Castro discovered that an element within his own government was responsible, he might seek to cover it up in order to demonstrate that the country is united as it prepares for a new president.

  As to foreign powers, it seems likely that only Russia and China—an outside possibility is North Korea—would have had means and opportunity, and even then, they might well have required some cooperation from someone within the Cuban government. Russian military and civilian leaders continue to urge reopening the Lourdes Signals Intelligence base, which until it was closed by the Russians in 2002 intercepted US satellite communications. For its part, China might seek to use Cuba as a pawn in its discussions with the Trump administration about North Korean. Still, I am not convinced that Russia or China would consider an alliance with Cuba worth the risks inherent in attacking American diplomats.

  Conservatives and/or militants within the Cuban diaspora may have motive, given their extreme opposition to improved relations. And, in the past Cuban militants have carried out attacks against Cuba and Fidel Castro. In addition, conservative Cuban Americans have used the diplomats’ injuries to criticize US–Cuban relations. But they do not appear to have had the means and opportunity, unless we can imagine them cooperating with hardli
ners in Cuba who also oppose better relations.

  Another possibility is that this was not a deliberate attack against the American and Canadian diplomats, but listening devices that malfunctioned. The Guardian newspaper suggested “mass hysteria” based on the opinion of senior neurologists who claimed that they know of no sonic device that could cause the range of injuries suffered by the diplomats, but Dr. Charles Rosenfarb, the State Department’s medical director, debunked the idea of “mass hysteria” by pointing out that “exact findings” on medical tests couldn’t be easily faked. Perhaps then the headaches, nausea, and temporary loss of hearing were caused by the sounds that were described as “high-pitched,” and causing “baffling sensations.” Conceivably, the more serious injuries might have been caused by complications from an illness not discovered until following exposure to the unusual sound. For example, a diplomat who suffered minor symptoms from what seemed to have been a “sonic attack” might later have contracted a virus that led to more serious ailments, including what the State Department is now labeling “mild traumatic brain injury. Still, this explanation is not entirely satisfactory as it does not explain why so many devices would malfunction or why the malfunction would occur only in those devices aimed at American and Canadian diplomats.”

  Even without knowing who or what caused the ailments, it is hard to escape the conclusion that those in the United States and Cuba who opposed engagement have gotten exactly what they wanted. The embassy is barely functioning with the drawdown of half of its American staff, and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson says that he is unconvinced that the alleged attacks are over. Josefina Vidal, a high-level Cuban official, who negotiated the details of the Obama opening with American diplomats, says that the Trump administration is simply engaged in an irresponsible effort to advance anti-Cuban politics. Unhappily, for Cubans who were hoping for more economic freedom, the Cuban government is circling the wagons, clamping down on critics and reversing reforms. This should come as no surprise because as has been shown throughout this book, when the United States threatens Cuba, Cuba’s leaders become more repressive. This was the case in 2003 when Fidel Castro jailed seventy-five dissidents in response to George W. Bush’s return to a punitive policy. The bottom line is that given the current state of relations, we are unlikely to discover the perpetrator or the cause of the injuries.