Our Woman in Havana

by Vicki Huddleston

  The January 9 Senate hearing chaired by Marco Rubio further politicized the issue. Acting Secretary of State Francisco Palmieri intensified Rubio’s demonization of Cuba by testifying that “Cuba is a security state. The Cuban government in general has a very tight lid on everything and anything that happens in that country.” His boss, Undersecretary of State Steve Goldstein was more circumspect pointing out that “we are not much further ahead than we were in finding out what occurred.” Still, he insisted that Raúl Castro “knows what happened.” These statements by US government officials reinforce the idea that the Cuban government must come clean about what happened before semi-normal relations are restored. This assumes they even know why the injuries occurred. Given the current impasse, and the control Rubio and hardliners are exercising over US policy toward Cuba, it is unlikely that either side will admit any fault. And, just to complicate matters, Senator Jeff Flake—long an advocate for engagement—confirmed an AP story that an FBI report concluded that evidence is insufficient to support a sonic attack theory. Adding more muddle to the mystery, Todd Brown from State’s Diplomatic security posed the possibility that someone deliberately infected the diplomats with a virus.

  The unfortunate fact is that even if a culprit is identified and Cuba takes action to rectify and compensate for the injuries, conservative Cuban Americans who now have gained the upper hand in US–Cuba relations, will not willingly cede control over policy. Rather, they will use their power to demand that the embassies continue with skeleton staffs and that the US government tighten the embargo. As former Secretary Gutierrez put it, “The conservative diaspora doesn’t like stability in our relationship. To them it means we accept the regime.”

  Senator Rubio and Representative Mario Díaz-Balart (R-FL) already have complained that the new embargo regulations which were published on November 8, 2018 are insufficient. As Trump promised in his Miami speech, the regulations further restrict travel by individual Americans, but visits by people-to-people groups engaged in cultural, religious, or humanitarian activities are still permitted. The Treasury Department now prohibits Americans from engaging in financial transactions with 180 Cuban government entities that are substantially run by Cuban military or intelligence agencies. Among the business placed on a “restricted list” are hotels, such as Ambos Mundos (Two Worlds) where Ernest Hemingway lived when he arrived in Havana and businesses that serve the tourist industry by selling jewelry, flowers, and photographic services.

  We can expect that Rubio, Díaz-Balart, and Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) will continue to press their advantage, insisting the Treasury Department issue additional sanctions, further limiting contact with Cuba. Once again—as during George W. Bush’s administration—conservative Cuban American legislators will attempt to force regime change by reducing US contact with the island to an absolute minimum. Their next target most likely will be people-to-people visits and educational travel. As in the past they may also attempt to reduce travel and money transfers by the Cuban diaspora—many of whom are US citizens—whose visit family and friends and provide over one billion dollars in remittance. Even the two dozen bilateral agreements will not be immune from the efforts to constrain cooperation between the US and Cuban governments.

  As has been the case in the past, the Cuban people will suffer most from these new measures. The travel warning has already reduced the number of American visitors, harming the small family businesses that sprung up as a result of Castro’s privatization reforms and the influx of American visitors. The closure of the Consular section of the American embassy means that Cubans can no longer obtain visas for travel to the United States, whether to visit friends, for medical care, for business, or for cultural, religious, and sports exchanges. Although the State Department has said that it will provide a means for family reunification, as of January 16, 2018 the US embassy in Havana is not issuing visas of any type, neither for those hoping to join family in the US or escape persecution, nor for those who simply wish to visit or participate in cultural exchanges.

  The poor state of US-Cuban relations may have contributed to Raúl Castro’s decision to delay stepping down as the President of Cuba. The February 24, 2018 date was scrapped, according to the Cuban government because of devastation wrought by Hurricane Irma that delayed local and regional elections. The new date for handing over power, is on or shortly after the National Assembly is constituted on April 19, 2018. Castro has confirmed his intention to serve his “second and last mandate” and that Cuba “will have a new president.” Whatever the reason, the additional seven weeks in office will allow Castro more time to stabilize relations with the United States and assess his successor’s ability to ensure the country’s internal stability.

  Another less well-known reason for the delay is that it gives Castro the opportunity to confirm Russia as Cuba’s closest patron and ally, a critical realignment away from impoverished Venezuela. On December 16, 2017 Russia, Venezuela, and Cuba struck a deal in which Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil company, will take over Venezuela’s stake in the Cienfuegos oil refinery. By delaying his departure until April, Castro will have time to sign the agreement, thereby confirming Russia as Cuba’s newest benefactor before his successor assumes the presidency.

  The succession from a Castro to a non-Castro will be facilitated by the fact that Raúl has been Cuba’s leader for a relatively brief reign of ten years, and Fidel, who ruled for forty-nine years, will have been dead for more than a year. In any case, it is unlikely that we will see overt division among the government elite. Raúl will retain his role as the first secretary of the Communist Party, which means that he will continue to determine the ideological direction of the revolution. He also will retain considerable influence within the two powerful institutions he once headed, Cuba’s Revolutionary Armed Forces and its Interior Ministry, which together provide for the country’s external and internal defense. Should he have any concerns, Raúl has wide latitude to shape the succession by limiting the power he confers upon his successor. He could remain as chief of the armed forces. All he has to do is submit a referendum to the voters to change the constitution, just as Fidel did in 2002 when he made the constitution “irrevocable.”

  Still, nothing can be taken for granted. If there is indeed a hardline element—as I speculate—that carried out the sonic attacks on American diplomats, the transition may be postponed or result in an internal coup. In either of these scenarios, the probable outcome would be that the new government would reinforce the status quo by pausing, if not stopping internal reforms. Although Cuban leaders must reform the economy if the country is to prosper, many are hesitant because they fear disruptive change.

  There has been some speculation that someone other than Díaz-Canel, a 57-year old party stalwart born after the Cuban revolution, might be chosen to lead Cuba, but whoever leads the government will be completely loyal to Raúl and the revolution. All of the potential candidates would broaden the Castro family’s hold on power. Three of the four are family members: Raúl’s son Alejandro Castro Espín, a colonel in the Ministry of the Interior who participated in negotiations with the United States; Raúl’s daughter Mariela Castro Espín, a less likely candidate, but well known for establishing the Cuban National Center for Sex Education, which advocates on behalf of LGBTQ persons; and General Luis Alberto Rodríguez, and General Luis Albert Rodrìguez, Raúl’s son-in-law and head of a business conglomerate managed by Cuba’s armed forces.. Another possibility sometimes mentioned is Cuba’s foreign minister, Bruno Rodríguez. But if Raúl were to pass over Díaz-Canel, he would most likely choose a family member.

  Cuba being Cuba, there is no guarantee that Castro will give up the presidency. He can change his mind at any time and, like Fidel, remain in power until he dies or becomes too ill to rule. It would be prudent, however, to provide a transitional period, as Fidel unintentionally did by surviving several life-threatening operations. Without question, Raúl would be ready to resume power or replace his successor should
he perceive any serious threat to the power of the Castro family, the military, or the party.

  One sure prediction is that no matter who is president, Cubans will be poorer and have less opportunity so long as the Trump administration continues to tighten the embargo. Fewer American visitors will harm those entrepreneurial Cubans—many of whom are dissidents or disaffected—who make their living through independent activities. But the ban on Americans engaging in financial transactions with the Cuban intelligence and military services will not damage these powerful institutions. Investors from other countries will continue to patronize and invest in their tourist facilities and holding companies. The Spanish companies that have built most of Cuba’s luxury hotels, will continue to do so, and China will move ahead with plans to build 108,000 new hotel rooms. American tour groups, unable to stay in military-run hotels, will be replaced by Canadian, European, and Latin American visitors.

  The degree to which the Cuban government can diminish the impact of our sanctions will depend on its success in seeking political and economic alliances. Raúl Castro has done a good job of reaching out to Latin America, linking Cuba with regional organizations that have expanded his influence beyond the leftist governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela. Brazil provided financing for extensive renovations of the Port of Mariel and participates in a variety of joint ventures with the Cuban government. Since 2008 Raúl has instituted economic reforms, which are popular at home as well as with the European Union, which is Cuba’s second-largest trading partner and foreign investor after China. But Cuba’s most important relations are with Russia and China.

  By derailing the Obama-Castro opening, President Trump has given Vladimir Putin the opportunity to become the predominant foreign power in Cuba by replacing Venezuela as the island’s major source of oil. The deal Castro struck, which he is expected to sign before leaving the presidency, puts Russian oil giant Rosneft in charge of the Cienfuegos oil refinery and awards it two gas-exploration contracts. Russia has waived $29 billion in Soviet-era debt, will invest $4 billion in Cuban infrastructure, and recently sent a tanker carrying 250,000 barrels of much-needed oil. In December 2016 Russia signed a military cooperation arrangement under which it will modernize Cuba’s armed forces until 2020. President Vladimir Putin closed the Lourdes Signals Intelligence facility in 2002, hoping to improve relations with the United States. Fifteen years later, Russian officials are talking about reopening the facility, which intercepts US satellite communications.

  China, too, has considerable influence in Cuba. Following the Chinese prime minister’s visit to Cuba in September 2016, Raúl Castro made a state visit to China in March 2017, during which China and Cuba announced that they would deepen military ties. China is Cuba’s principal trading partner; in 2016 this trade amounted to $1.8 billion, principally in communications, transportation, and machinery. Nevertheless, given the long history of Cuban-Soviet relations, it seems likely that Russia’s political influence will over-shadow China’s.

  Cuba’s growing ties with China and Russia diminish the opportunity for a strategic alliance between the United States and Cuba and reduce potential US political and economic influence. By the time the United States again attempts to improve relations, China and Russia will likely have consolidated their military partnerships with Cuba. In addition, as US sanctions are enhanced, Cuba will look to other countries for investment and trade. This will result in substantial missed opportunities for US industry, which could amount to losses of billions of dollars in revenue and thousands of American jobs. Ben Rhodes, one of the architects of Obama’s opening, laid out the case for good relations: “Engagement helps empower the Cuban people and the private sector, people-to-people travel brings new ideas. Good relations with Cuba advances our relations with Latin America and prevents Russia and China from exploiting their relations with Cuba to our disadvantage. And it would be costly in trade, investment and services to reverse the Obama-Castro opening. Squeezing Cuba is not constructive to opening space. A collapse would be negative—possibly the right wing (in Cuba) would win.”

  Raúl Castro and Cuba’s government elite will do only what is in their interests. If they feel threatened or fear that their power is being undermined, they will allow fewer freedoms. Maintaining the US embargo will not change the Cuban government, improve human rights, or promote democracy in Cuba. In fact, it will continue to delay positive change on the island by making Cubans poorer and less inclined to confront the repressive powers of their government. Our concerns about the lack of freedom in the country will be ignored, and we will have little economic or political leverage as Russia and China consolidate their positions on the island. Trump’s Cuba policy will have satisfied his political base at the expense of our national interests.

  Given President Trump’s apparent preference for authoritarian rulers in Egypt, the Philippines, and Saudi Arabia, he would likely welcome Raúl Castro to the White House were it not for his conservative supporters within the Cuban American community. Perhaps that wouldn’t be such a bad idea, if the invitation were issued after Castro steps down as president of Cuba. Then we can engage with Cuba’s new leaders, seek reconciliation between our nations and regain the influence that we lost as a result of the Cuban revolution.

  EPILOGUE

  IN OCTOBER 2017, I VISITED CUBA AS A LECTURER FOR THE PHILADELPHIA World Affairs Council, on a tour that visited Havana, Pinar del Río, Cienfuegos, Trinidad, Santa Clara, and Camaguey. We arrived in Havana a month after Hurricane Irma, a Category 5 storm that struck Cuba’s north coast and two weeks after the Department of State warned Americans against travel to the island because our diplomatic personnel had been attacked and “U.S. citizens may also be at risk.” This advisory was put out though no visitors to the island had been affected and it is unknown who perpetrated the attacks, most of which occurred from November 2016 to February 2017. At the urging of Cuban American Senator Marco Rubio, the State Department reduced the American staffing at the U.S. embassy by more than half and ordered an equivalent drawdown of Cuban diplomats resident in Washington DC.

  I can unequivocally affirm that the Cuba I knew when I left the island after a three-year tour as head of our diplomatic mission in 2002 is far different from the Cuba of 2017. There have been substantial changes that have improved the lives of many Cubans. On July 20, 2015, the U.S. Interests Section was upgraded to the level of an embassy. After fifty-four years, the elegant glass building located along Havana’s seafront Malecón was restored to its rightful place in the long, painful, history of our two governments. The most remarkable change I observed, however, was in the numbers of American visitors in Havana’s streets, and the city’s transformation as its lovely historic buildings that had long been falling into disrepair have been turned into elegant new hotels.

  After Raúl Castro officially assumed power in 2008 from his ailing brother Fidel, more than a half million Cubans entered the private sector. The repressed entrepreneurial instincts of Cubans were unleashed resulting in a profusion of private enterprises, such as family-owned restaurants, rooms-for-rent, and Cuba’s ubiquitous fifties American cars, have been waxed, polished, and repaired, to serve as taxis for American visitors.

  Cubans have also gained a number of freedoms. They can now travel outside the country without the government’s permission, returning from visits to Miami with all manner of consumer goods, including computers, radios, and televisions. Cuban artists, are acclaimed throughout the United States and the world for their painting, photography, dance, and musical performances. In central Havana, people on the streets were better dressed and those with wealthy relatives or some money of their own were staying in hotels and frequenting restaurants that formerly catered only to foreign tourists.

  What has not changed is that a Castro still leads Cuba’s Communist government, but as stated earlier in this book if Raúl fulfills his promise, he will step down as president on February 24, 2018. The Cuban government remains authoritarian and soc
ialist, providing free education and health care and making decisions from the top down. The government continues to restrict individual freedoms, especially those of opposition groups such as the “Ladies in White,” and dissidents like Elizardo Sánchez, Marta Beatriz Roque, Guillermo Farinos, and the noted blogger Yoani Sánchez. Unauthorized public gatherings and publication of opposition manifestos is still illegal, although the government now tolerates gentle criticisms of its policies in state-run media.

  The Cuba that has emerged in the last fifteen years is filled with energy, initiative, and hope. But what shocked and saddened me during my recent visit was that Cubans were frightened and worried that their newly found prosperity and greater freedom would be lost. This was in stark contrast to my visit in May 2016, when Cubans were excited and enthusiastic about their growing economic prosperity. I was then part of a visit by the Board of Directors of Finca Vigía (Lookout House), which has helped the Cuban Ministry of Culture preserve Ernest Hemingway’s documents and his gracious home—Finca Vigía—set on a small hill in San Francisco de Paula about thirty minutes from Havana. Then, Cubans believed that their long years of suffering and deprivation were coming to a close, as a result of the emerging détente between our countries. They never imagined that on June 16, 2017 their hopes would be shattered by President Donald Trump, when he cancelled President Obama’s opening and a few months later took measures that have sent relations into a Cold War freeze. In 2016 the name on every Cuban’s lips was “Obama,” now I heard President Trump’s name spoken by Cubans in sadness and despair.