Inside the Crosshairs

by Col. Michael Lee Lanning

  Major General Kenneth J. Houghton, USMC (Ret.), who commanded the 5th Marine Regiment in 1967, states that his snipers did “a hell of a job” but were not “extra special.” Houghton continues by relating that his regiment’s snipers “were not a player” during his command time because of the nature of warfare and the terrain in which they worked and so they operated mostly as ordinary infantrymen.

  Many other officers, at all levels of command, have little or nothing at all to say about the sniper program. At the highest level, General William C. Westmoreland, USA (Ret.), who headed the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, as well as all U.S. forces in the combat zone from 1964 to 1968, made no mention of snipers in his postwar autobiography, A Soldier Reports. More recently, Westmoreland simply stated, “Snipers did play a role in the war in Vietnam, but there is nothing significant I have to add.”

  General Creighton W. Abrams, who replaced Westmoreland, came from an armor background and had no affinity for special operations units. He left no formal record of his opinion of American snipers in Vietnam before his death in 1974.

  Snipers also made little impression on the last MACV commander, General Fred C. Weyand, who replaced Abrams in June 1972 and supervised the final withdrawal of U.S. combat forces from the war zone. When asked in 1997 about sniper operations in Vietnam, Weyand responded, “There is nothing in my personal experience that would be helpful.”

  Some of the recollections of army and Marine commanders in Vietnam about snipers reflect the time periods they served in-country. Brigadier General Frederick J. Karch, USMC (Ret.), who commanded the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade early in the war, wrote that “no meaningful tasks or duties were available for our sniper platoons.” Another retired Marine, General Raymond G. Davis, wrote about his service with the 3rd Marine Division in 1968 and 1969, saying, “I cannot contribute anything substantial on snipers.” Davis added that he saturated his area of operations with small recon teams with orders not to directly engage the enemy but rather to observe and report so a helicopter reaction force could attack.

  Like the Marine leaders, army commanders had recollections about snipers or their effect on overall operations. Major General Paul F. Smith, USA (Ret.), stated, “During my tour in Vietnam, July 1965–July 1967, and more particularly my time with the 173rd Airborne Brigade, 1966, I had absolutely no experience with snipers. When I took command of the brigade there were no designated snipers nor do I recall my being aware of any brigade personnel who had received such training. Our operations were such that snipers could not have been employed profitably.”

  Smith’s comments provide a good summary of the first several years of involvement by U.S. Army ground units in Vietnam. He concluded, “My other year in Vietnam was spent in two different jobs—establishing as Chief of Staff what later became I Field Force (July 1965–January 1966) and working for the Ambassador in the redevelopment business (January 1967–July 1967). While in those two jobs I do not recall ever hearing anyone mention snipers.”

  Even more telling are the recollections of General W. B. Rosson, who served six years in Vietnam in positions that included command of a division and a field force and deputy commander of MACV. Rosson, one of the better field commanders of the war and a man who has a deep understanding of the conflict, had nothing to say about army snipers, and only stated, “I recall, however, that the 1st and 3rd Marine divisions placed strong emphasis on snipers.”

  Other army generals also have little to say about their snipers. General Michael S. Davison, USA (Ret.), who assumed command of the II Field Force in April 1970, stated, “Sniping was not an issue at my level.”

  Major General A. R. Bolling Jr., USA (Ret.), who commanded the 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division, in 1968, added, “Ninety-nine percent of the time, the 82nd Airborne Division refrained from using snipers. We also found our fights either when we ambushed the NVA or vice versa. Early on, some of our LRRPs tried setting out snipers. They never saw the enemy.”

  These comments must, of course, be taken in context of the great many duties and responsibilities of commanders in Vietnam and the passage of more than twenty-five years since their service. Opinions about snipers in Vietnam, like those about the precision marksmen in previous conflicts, vary greatly. Although their collective impact on the war itself is debatable, the young men who shouldered the special rifles and viewed the enemy through the crosshairs of their scopes were certainly as dedicated, brave, and effective as the shooters who preceded them in earlier wars. Even more important, after Vietnam peace would not bring an end to authorized snipers and sniper units in the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.

  *In 1986 and 1987, while researching what became Inside the LRRPs: Rangers in Vietnam, the author queried more than fifty retired officers who had served as generals in Vietnam. Less than a decade later, because of death or poor health, more than a third of that group was unable to contribute to this book. Many had had significant information to share and great stories to tell, but the long-term disdain of the American publishers for anything related to the Vietnam War and its participants discouraged the recording of that aspect of history. Much is now lost forever.

  †Editors significantly shortened and altered Henderson’s original seven hundred-page manuscript, apparently combining some events and embellishing others to create more dramatic impact for market appeal in an era (1986) when Vietnam War books were usually shunned. Henderson admits in his preface that he took “the liberty of inventing” the dialogue of the VC/NVA; combat veterans and others knowledgeable of the “real” Vietnam War recognize that several operations detailed in the book do not remotely reflect Marine Corps sniper standard operating procedures. Even so, editorial and dramatic considerations in no way diminish the accomplishments of Hathcock.

  ‡Sniper veterans are welcome and encouraged to provide additional information about their own personal experiences as well as those of their units in Vietnam for possible inclusion in future editions of this book. For details, see Appendix G “Information Request.”

  §The number of sniper kills per week, month, or even year varied from unit to unit, depending on the level of enemy activity and the degree of support by individual division, regiment, and battalion commanders. Availability of weapons, particularly the introduction of the M40s, also impacted the pace of sniper kills.

  ‖Interestingly, although there is no substantiation of the rumored bounties announced by the VC/NVA, the Americans and South Vietnamese did issue “wanted posters” for Vietcong leaders in the Mekong Delta as a part of Project Phoenix. The reward announcements, which were counter to provisions of the Geneva Convention, were implemented on an extremely limited basis. Only a few examples are known to have survived, and most remain in the hands of private collectors and Project Phoenix veterans.

  aExcept for the opening scenes of Marine sniper training, the movie adds nothing to the history or understanding of precision marksmen in combat. Later in the film, snipers in the field shout at each other, use nonmatch ammunition, and employ telescopes that resemble nothing in the United States’ or any other country’s inventory.

  bThis reference and the letters and summaries of telephone conversations that follow result from the author’s direct correspondence and conversation with the sources. Original copies are in the author’s files.

  CHAPTER 15

  Vietnam Sniper Legacy

  DESPITE an uneven performance and an incomplete picture of their effectiveness, army and Marine snipers in Vietnam made an impression. For the first time in U.S. history, the military services began to investigate the retention of snipers in the peacetime force, but the decision to do so was not a straight-line action.

  As American combat forces withdrew from Vietnam between August 1969 and June 1972, soldiers and Marines were reassigned Stateside and around the world to prepare for new challenges and emergencies. In an atmosphere in which the American public held the military responsible for the long war in Vietnam and in which their respec
t for those in uniform had reached an all-time low, the services faced budget and personnel cuts that were not conducive to innovation.*

  In the austerity of the post—Vietnam War period and the general disapproval of all things military by the American taxpayer, neither the Marine Corps nor the army was able to take any immediate or direct action to include snipers in the peacetime forces. The army, which had never established an official sniper organization during the war, simply let the marksmen once again fade into obscurity. Their sniper schools in Vietnam had closed with the withdrawal of their senior headquarters and their sniper rifles had been placed in storage. The only semblance of a sniper legacy was the Marksmanship Training Unit at Fort Benning, which resumed its prewar marksmanship training and competitive shooting missions.

  Initially, Marine Corps leaders, although satisfied with the concept and performance of their snipers in Vietnam, did not see a place for the infantry regiment and reconnaissance battalion scout-sniper platoons in the peacetime force organization. When the 3rd Marine Division began its withdrawal from Vietnam in August 1969, Marine Corps commandant General Leonard F. Chapman directed that the platoons be phased out by 1972.

  While budget and political restraints ended the scout-sniper platoons that had evolved in Vietnam, Chapman and other Marine leaders intended to restructure the program so that the snipers did not completely disappear. In addition to proclaiming that snipers had a future in the Marine Corps, Chapman also directed that studies continue to determine their proper organization and to develop the most efficient weapon system.

  Chapman detailed his directions in a letter to the Marine Corps Development and Education Command (MCDEC) on August 2, 1971, writing, “The capability will be maintained in the Marine division. It is envisioned that the sniper squads will be formed in infantry and reconnaissance battalions with Marines assigned on an additional-duty basis.”

  The commandant also directed that sniper training be conducted at the division level and stated that detailed training guidance would be forthcoming. More important, Chapman concluded, “It is deemed prudent at this time to continue evaluation of candidate sniper weapons systems and to develop a specific operational requirement for a sniper rifle and telescope.”

  Over the next five years various Marine commands conducted studies and tests to determine the most effective sniper organization, training, and weapons. That work produced an improved sniper rifle system, an updated sniper manual, an authorization for sniper units, and provisions for the reopening of a sniper-training school.

  Experience in Vietnam had shown that the Marine Corps’s M40, based on the Remington 700, and the army’s M21, based on the M14, were the best available sniper rifles. After additional tests, Marine ordnance experts determined that the bolt-action M40, although needing improvements, continued to meet their requirements better than the gas-operated M21.

  In 1976, the Marine Corps approved funding for improvements to the M40. The resulting M40A1 retained the Remington 700 receiver group but had a heavy twenty-six-inch-long barrel and a fiberglass/epoxy stock. Other modifications included the addition of a steel trigger guard and magazine cover to increase durability. By 1977 the Marines began delivering the rebuilt M40A1s to field units and training centers. The only other major modification to the M40A1 came in 1980, when the Unertl 10X telescope replaced the Redfield 3X–9X variable scopes. By 1983 all M40A1s were equipped with the Unertl 10X scope.

  While the weapon studies continued, other sections of the MCDEC worked on updating sniper doctrine. On April 7, 1976, the Marine Corps issued FMFM 1–3B, “Sniping,” replacing the 1969 edition used in Vietnam and laying out the techniques and procedures for selecting, training, and employing scout-snipers. With minor changes in 1981, the manual remains even today the primary Marine sniper document.

  Other updates to Marine manuals of the period reconfirmed the military occupation specialty of scout-snipers and authorized their inclusion in infantry units. MCO P1200.7, “Military Occupational Specialties Manual,” assigns MOS 8541 (military operational specialty, i.e., military for “job”) to “Scout-Sniper.” The manual’s summary of the mission of scout-snipers differs little from that of Vietnam and previous conflicts. “Scout-snipers participate in activities designed to deny the enemy freedom of movement by shooting enemy leaders, crew-served weapons operators, radiomen, observers, messengers, and other key personnel with single, well-aimed shots. Scout-snipers also engage vital materiel targets such as command and control equipment, air defense radars, and missile launchers, which require precision fire to neutralize. Scout-snipers also provide close reconnaissance and surveillance to the infantry battalion.”

  Along with the 1976 FMFM and MOS assignments came changes in the division table of authorization and equipment, establishing an eight-man scout-sniper section in the infantry battalion’s surveillance and target acquisition (STA) platoon. STAs had originally been established in 1973 with ground-surveillance radar, night observation devices, and scout sections. By 1977 the scouts had been replaced by eight-man scout-sniper sections.

  That organizational structure remained until 1992, when the Marine Corps eliminated the maintenance-intensive and largely ineffective ground radar and night observation sections from the STA. It added four scout-sniper teams and relabeled the STA as the scout-sniper platoon. The platoon, with one officer and seventeen enlisted snipers, formally became part of the infantry battalion intelligence (S-2) section.

  With a new sniper rifle system fielded, doctrine written, and personnel authorizations approved, all the Marine Corps sniping program lacked was a central training facility. On June 1, 1977, the USMC Scout-Sniper Instructor School opened at Quantico, Virginia. Veteran snipers of the Vietnam War, including Jim Land and Carlos Hathcock, took charge of establishing the school and conducting the training.

  The Quantico Scout-Sniper Instructor School has, since its inception, served two purposes: to train infantrymen as snipers and to train qualified snipers as instructors. The trained instructors then return to their parent divisions to teach in additional sniper schools and to conduct refresher training. In 1979, trained instructors opened the 2nd Marine Division’s Scout-Sniper School at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and the 1st Marine Division established its school at Camp Pendleton, California, a short time later.

  The three schools operate to train new snipers to fill the 420 authorized scout-sniper positions in today’s Marine Corps. The Quantico school also continues to train sniper instructors as well as being responsible for the development and testing of new sniper doctrine, equipment, and weapons.

  In the years following Vietnam, the U.S. Navy recognized the value of snipers and added the specialty to its SEAL teams. The first SEAL snipers and sniper instructors attended the Marine scout-sniper schools before the SEALs developed a nine-week training course to hone individual marksmanship skills and train snipers as forward observers for naval gunfire, artillery, and air support.

  Postwar, the U.S. Army, although satisfied with the performance of snipers in Vietnam, renewed its focus on mechanized, and possibly nuclear, warfare on the plains of Western Europe. Funding and priorities went to the development of a new main battle tank and an improved infantry tracked fighting vehicle. Developing handheld or crew-served weapons capable of destroying tanks and other mechanized vehicles of the Soviet Union was given a higher priority than small arms and long-range marksmanship.

  During the final months of U.S. ground involvement in Vietnam and for several years afterward, the army conducted only a few staff studies on sniper capabilities and the possibility of authorizing positions for marksmen at battalion and division levels. None of the studies resulted in action. After limited investigation, the U.S. Army Infantry School announced that, on the future of snipers, it stood by its pre-Vietnam position: “A concept of small, hard-hitting units, moving almost continuously in armored personnel carriers throughout the extended distances envisioned for atomic-threatened battlefields, visualizes little
use for the slow, patient, stealthy stalking tactics which are the trademark of the sniper.”

  In the post-Vietnam era, army personnel manning documents continued to exclude authorization for snipers, and the infantry school did not see the marksmen as having a role on the battlefield of the future. Yet both veteran snipers and sniper instructors were still on active duty, and many were serving in the Army Marksmanship Training Unit (AMTU). Major Willis Powell and the members of his staff, who had established sniper training in Vietnam, continued to assist in regular marksmanship training. They also resumed representing the army in marksmanship competition, using the M21 sniper rifle among other weapons.

  The major mission of the AMTU in the early 1970s was not to train soldiers but to provide instruction and advice to civilian law enforcement officials in training their own snipers and SWAT teams. Fortunately, the veteran combat snipers maintained their personal efficiency and continued to record and disseminate their experiences and opinions on the need for specially trained, long-range marksmen.

  The first substantial support for renewing sniper training in the post-Vietnam army came from Lieutenant General Hank Emerson, the commanding officer of the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, that included the 82nd Airborne and the 101st Air Assault divisions. Those two infantry divisions had parachutes and helicopters for their delivery but once on the battlefield would fight as conventional infantry.

  Emerson, a former brigade commander in the 9th Infantry Division who had supported David Hackworth’s formation of night hunter sniper teams, knew the advantages of long-range marksmen from firsthand combat experience. In early 1976, Emerson requested the AMTU to deliver 342 M21 sniper rifles to Fort Bragg and to train armorers in maintaining the weapon systems. By April the XVIII Airborne Sniper School was training future snipers from the two divisions as well as personnel from the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center.