Inside the Crosshairs

by Col. Michael Lee Lanning

  For the next decade the army continued to leave the formation and training of snipers to individual commanders. A few, like Emerson, actively supported the inclusion of marksmen in their ranks, but most continued to ignore long-range shooting. As they implemented their own programs, new commanders often ceased sniper training established by their predecessors. Such was the case with Emerson’s XVIII Airborne Corps sniper school, which operated only two years and closed when he departed the post.

  The only significant contribution by the Department of the Army to the development of snipers in the late 1970s came from tests to determine the most efficient weapon system. From May through December 1977, the U.S. Army Test Evaluation Command at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, tested seven different rifles for suitability as sniper weapons. Included were the M21, the Remington 700, and the Winchester 70—all used in Vietnam—as well as French, Canadian, and other American rifles. The test report, issued in February 1978, supported the continued use of the M21 as the army’s standard sniper weapon.

  In 1983, the JFK Special Warfare Center and School (SWCS) attempted to renew sniper training at Fort Bragg. Although the center’s leaders knew they wanted and needed snipers, they were unclear about the exact role the marksmen would play in their operations. As a result the school folded after only a few months.

  Over the next year the SWCS staff studied the capabilities of snipers and developed doctrine for their use in special operations. Early in 1985 the SWCS initiated the Special Operations Target Interdiction Course (SOTIC) with sniper training as its core subject. In the July 1988 issue of SWCS’s professional bulletin, Special Warfare, Captain John L. Stanley described the sniper training: “Today, the Special Warfare Center and School operates the SOTIC program with little flim-flam and with low visibility. The cadre members have put a lot of personal experience and knowledge into this course. Their ideas are not found in any army subject schedules, but they are garnered through experience and dedication. These instructors have met some very challenging tasks, developing ideas and techniques where none existed.”

  Many of the cadre members to whom Stanley referred were sniper veterans of Vietnam, and their experience in combat provided the information for the training. Stanley noted, “Little reference material exists on many of the subjects taught in the SOTIC program.” In fact, the only available official doctrine continued to be Training Circular 23-14, “Sniper Training and Employment,” which had not been updated since October 1969.

  Other units also established limited sniper-training programs during the same general period. The 2nd Battalion, 325th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, briefly conducted unit sniper training in late 1985 and early 1986. In Korea, the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division also established a sniper school. Because of its isolation from the rest of the army and the constant threat from the North Koreans, the 2nd Division’s sniper school remained active into the mid-1990s. Other, limited, army sniper courses were also offered during this period at Fort Sherman in the Canal Zone, and at Fort Ord, California.

  Despite those widespread efforts to maintain some level of sniper training, the U.S. Army did not establish its official school until July 1987. With Department of the Army support, the Infantry School at Fort Benning assumed the directorship of the school, with operational responsibility assigned to the post’s 29th Infantry Regiment. The three-week course included 54 hours of marksmanship instruction and 120 hours of fieldcraft classes to produce graduates who could successfully conduct sniper operations and engage targets out to 1,000 meters.†

  While it had been slow to resume an official servicewide sniper school, once committed to that end the army made a concentrated effort to optimize its sniper capacity. In the January-February 1988 edition of Infantry, the chief of the infantry school, Major General Kenneth C. Leuer, explained, “Realizing that modern technology has not diminished the need for snipers, the army recently renewed its interest in them and is revitalizing its sniper program. The Infantry School has taken the lead in these efforts, and we are committed to providing the best sniper organization, equipment, doctrine, and training possible.”

  New weapons were an important part of the army’s emphasis on snipers. The army’s marksmen were to be armed with the M24 modified bolt-action Remington Model 700s with a 10X fixed Leupold M3 Ultra telescope. Delivery of the weapons to the sniper school and to units began in April 1988. The army also provided updated sniper doctrine, releasing a revised version of TC 23-14, “Sniper Training and Employment,” on June 14, 1989.

  During the next few years the army continued to study and experiment with its sniper program and to make changes and adjustments in equipment, organization, and training. In 1989, the army awarded all graduates of the sniper school, retroactive to its opening in 1987, the additional skill identifier of “B4.” On October 1, 1990, the army issued DA Pamphlet 351-4, “Army Formal Schools Catalog,” which detailed the physical, mental, and other requirements for sniper school attendance.

  On August 17, 1994, the Department of the Army published FM 23-10, “Sniping,” which replaced early editions of TC 23-14 and provided the most detailed and official instructions and authorization for snipers in U.S. Army history. The introduction section of FM 23-10 described snipers as similar to marksmen of earlier wars but revealed the mission and profile of the modern long-range shooter: “The sniper has special abilities, training, and equipment. His job is to deliver discriminatory, highly accurate rifle fire against enemy targets, which cannot be engaged successfully by the riflemen because of range, size, location, fleeting nature, or visibility. Sniping requires the development of the basic infantry skills to a high degree of perfection. A sniper’s training incorporates a wide variety of subjects designed to increase his value as a force multiplier and to ensure his survival on the battlefield. The art of sniping requires learning and repetitiously practicing these skills until mastered. A sniper must be highly trained in long-range rifle marksmanship and fieldcraft skills to ensure maximum effective engagements with minimum risks.”

  FM 23-10 also provided the first official authorization for snipers other than as an additional duty of an ordinary squad rifleman. According to the FM’s paragraph 1–2, “In light infantry divisions, the sniper element is composed of six battalion personnel organized into three 2-man teams. The commander designates missions and priorities of targets for the team and may attach or place the team under the operational control of a company or platoon. In the mechanized infantry battalions, the sniper element is composed of two riflemen (one team) located in a rifle squad. In some special units,‡ snipers may be organized according to the needs of the tactical situation.”

  The Marine Corps’s FMFM 1–3B and the army’s FM 23-10 provided the basis of today’s U.S. sniper organization, training, and equipment. A large part of those developments is a direct result of the lessons learned in combat against the Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars in Southeast Asia.

  However, not all of the advances in the army and Marine sniper programs in the 1980s and 1990s came as a result of the war in Vietnam. American snipers had several opportunities to practice their skills in live action during subsequent conflicts of various magnitude and length.

  Both Marine and army snipers deployed with their units on October 25, 1983, as a part of Operation Urgent Fury to liberate the Caribbean island of Grenada from its Soviet- and Cuban-supported Communist government. Snipers from the army’s Ranger battalions, trained in their own unit programs and at the USMC sniper school at Quantico, saw the most action during the brief operation. Shortly after their arrival by parachute on the island, the Rangers were threatened by a Cuban mortar crew. As the Cubans attempted to man their mortar tubes, the Ranger snipers began dropping them one by one. The survivors quickly surrendered.

  Marine and army snipers also participated in Operation Just Cause to neutralize the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) and to arrest Panamanian dictator Manuel Noriega, in December 1989. A sniper team in the Scout Platoon, Head
quarters Company, 3rd Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division, composed of a sniper sergeant and his observer, joined an infantry platoon to provide overwatching fires during an attack on a PDF-fortified building on the first night of the operation.

  The sniper sergeant, a graduate of the Fort Benning 29th Infantry Regiment Sniper School, established a well-concealed position that provided a clear field of fire for the 500 meters to the objective. He assumed a prone position with his M24 sniper rifle braced on his rucksack. “A few minutes later,” the sniper recalled, “the third platoon opened up on the back side of the building for about thirty seconds and then moved their clearing teams forward. Suddenly the front door of the building burst open and slammed against the opposite wall with a loud crack. Out ran a single soldier spraying the advancing platoon with Swedish-K 9-mm automatic gunfire.

  “ ‘Eleven o’clock, four hundred and fifty meters, person running!’ reported my observer. I knew it was hard for him not to just scream out the target location to me but he stayed cool. ‘Got it,’ I replied.

  “This is it, I thought. This is the end of the road of all my training. I had a great bead on the target’s stomach, and I knew at this range the bullet would strike high. Crack! I saw the round bulldoze right into the upper body of the target. It was just like all of the movies with the person falling back, arms flailing, with blood spraying out and behind. Then there was nothing; just the ringing in my ears, the sound of my breathing and my observer whispering, ‘Holy shit, right in the chest … nice shot.’ ”

  During the next few minutes two more PDF soldiers ran from the building firing at the advancing platoon. The sergeant fired two more rounds from his rifle. Three shots, three kills; more important, his marksmanship had protected his fellow soldiers. Similar scenes played out at other objectives across Panama to ensure the rapid success of the operation with minimal friendly casualties.

  While the Marines were happy with the performance of the M40A1 rifle and the army was satisfied with the M24 system in Panama and other missions, operations in the late 1980s displayed the need for added range and penetrating power. To meet that requirement, the army, the Marine Corps, and the navy began purchasing a variety of .50-caliber rifles including the Barrett Model 82A1, the McMillan M1987R, and the RAI Model 500.§

  These rifles were not intended to replace the M40A1 or the M24 but rather to add a secondary, special-purpose weapon to the sniper’s arsenal. With the .50-caliber weapon, in addition to engaging enemy soldiers at ranges in excess of 1,000 meters, the sniper could also use the .50 calibers to fire through walls or light armor.

  American snipers soon had the opportunity to use all of their weapon systems, when they assisted in liberating Kuwait from Iraqi invaders. On February 24, 1991, after forty-three days of air strikes on the Iraqi front lines and rear areas, the U.S.-led Coalition Forces began their ground attack. After only 100 hours of ground combat, Iraq surrendered and evacuated Kuwait.

  The Gulf War, or Operation Desert Storm, has been portrayed by many historians as the turning point in modern warfare, where the sophisticated technology of smart bombs, long-range missiles, and fast-moving mechanized ground forces replaced the importance of the individual soldier, including the sniper. Nothing could be further from the truth. The individual foot soldier and Marine in the Gulf War once again proved that no territory is secure without the infantryman’s boots firmly planted upon it. The vast, open spaces of the desert also provided a virtual shooting gallery for American snipers.

  Figures for the number of successful engagements by American snipers in the Gulf War, as well as in Grenada and Panama, are extremely difficult to document. The U.S. military, avoiding the controversial “body count” policy of the Vietnam War, does not release specific claims of enemy casualties. The limited information available, however, confirms that the “one-shot, one-kill” dogma of the Vietnam sniper has found a comfortable place in the ranks of today’s snipers.

  The American-led coalition victory in Desert Storm, combined with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union, has left the United States as the single world power. No nation, or group of countries, offers a reasonable threat to U.S. national security and America’s place as the world’s dominant economic and military force.

  A conflict of the magnitude of World War II is simply not visible in the foreseeable future. There also is no current threat of a guerrilla conflict on the scale of Vietnam or a conventional war to equal Operation Desert Storm. In this environment, the missions of the U.S. military become not fewer but more numerous and complex.

  Since Desert Storm, the U.S. armed forces have deployed around the world in a multitude of missions in what have become known as “operations short of war.” Those operations have been defined as “peace building,” “peace keeping,” “democracy reinforcing,” “regional stability,” and “stability.” Some of the deployments were bloodless; others have pushed right up to the edge of “short of war.”

  All of the developments escalated the importance of trained long-range marksmen. Modern “operations short of war” call for snipers to neutralize opposing marksmen as well as to provide a deterrent to possible enemies by their presence.

  While the United States still possesses large numbers of aircraft, helicopters, and artillery, many of the targets in today’s limited engagements are in the middle of areas populated by noncombatants. The sniper, with his single well-aimed shot, engages only the intended target with minimal or no collateral damage. Instead of leveling a city block, killing innocent civilians, and destroying property, the sniper eliminates a target cleanly and efficiently.

  In late 1993 and early 1994, Marine and army snipers provided covering fire to protect U.S. forces securing relief efforts in Somalia. When opposing bandit groups in the Somalian city of Mogadishu began sporadic fire at American troops, snipers became an important factor in restabilizing the area. Performing mostly in a countersniper role, U.S. marksmen successfully neutralized more than 100 targets during the operation.

  The only two Medals of Honor, America’s highest award for combat valor, presented for actions in Somalia went to a two-man sniper team assigned to the U.S. Army Special Operations Command’s Task Force Ranger. On October 3, 1993, Master Sergeant Gary I. Gordon of Lincoln, Maine, and Sergeant First Class Randall D. Shughart of Newville, Pennsylvania, volunteered to be inserted by helicopter to secure the crash site and survivors of another helicopter shot down by enemy fire in the streets of Mogadishu.

  Using their sniper rifles and side arms, and later other weapons taken from the downed helicopter, the two snipers secured the crash site while fighting off intensifying attacks from automatic weapons and rocket-propelled grenade fire. Both snipers continued their resistance after suffering fatal wounds and sacrificed themselves to save the helicopter pilot.

  American snipers also played an important role in the more recent stabilization efforts in Haiti and Bosnia. Army and Marine marksmen have been in the leading elements of those operations, providing observation and covering fire as needed for the arriving forces, discouraging potential opposition by their mere presence.

  For nearly half a century after the end of World War II, nuclear weapons remained the focus of the Cold War between East and West. With the threat of nuclear war greatly diminished and the United States occupying the position of single world power, future military missions will likely continue to fall in the category of “operations short of war.” Just as the nuclear bomb characterized the Cold War, the sniper may very well become the symbol of those future conflicts.

  At the end of 1997, snipers in the Marine Corps total approximately 340, and the army has nearly 500. Many of those young men, not born until after the Vietnam War, carry forward the concept honed during that conflict. Their rifles, training, operations—and, indeed, the very existence of their specialty—can be largely attributed to the long conflict in Southeast Asia. The legacy and the most important accomplishments of the Vietn
am snipers are the marksmen behind the crosshairs who today stand as an integral part of the keepers of the peace and the guardians of freedom and democracy around the world.

  *Many accounts of the time, and even some today, emphasize the defeat of the Americans in Vietnam at the hands of the Vietcong. In reality, the VC ceased to exist as a viable military organization as a result of their catastrophic defeat in the Tet Offensive of 1968. It was North Vietnamese operating Soviet-built tanks who led the capture of Saigon—from the South Vietnamese, not the Americans. Only a few hundred U.S. military personnel in administrative positions had remained in Vietnam after 1972, and although their departure from the American embassy roof is one of the popular images of the fall of Saigon, no significant number of U.S. combat troops had been in Vietnam for more than three years—and none were involved in combating the final North Vietnamese offensive.

  †In 1995, the army increased its sniper training to 332 hours.

  ‡Such as Special Forces, Ranger, and Long-Range Surveillance Units (LRSUs).

  §For additional information on these and other sniper rifles, see Appendix A.

  APPENDIX A

  Sniper Rifle Systems Used in Vietnam (And More Recent Models Influenced by the War)

  U.S. M1903 Springfield

  Cartridge .30 cal. (7.62 × 63 mm)

  Operation Manual, bolt action

  Weight 8.75 pounds

  Length 43.25 inches

  Feeding Device 5-round integral with cutoff

  Effective Range 500 meters

  Muzzle Velocity 2,805 fps (feet per second)

  Scope A3 Model: 8X Unertl; A4 Model: 3.5X Weaver

  Comments: Introduced in 1903 as the standard U.S. infantry weapon, its A3 and A4 Models served as sniper rifles in both world wars and in Korea. A few special operations and infantry units in Vietnam used the A4 Model prior to the official establishment of sniper schools and units.