Why the Allies Won

by Richard Overy

  Allied propaganda de-humanised the enemy. This Soviet cartoon ridiculing Nazi race theory encourages the reader to see the enemy in animal terms.

  Saving Mother Russia: here Soviet propaganda married together the drive against the German invader in 1942 and the legendary defeat of the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century by Prince Alexander Nevsky.

  When the German war effort turned sour in 1943, Goebbels played upon popular fears of Bolshevism – portrayed here with a Jewish face – to keep the population fighting.

  NOTES

  * * *

  1 Unpredictable Victory

  EXPLAINING WORLD WAR II

  1 R.A.C, Parker, Struggle for Survival: The history of the Second World War (Oxford, 1989), p. 86.

  2 G.T. Eggleston, Roosevelt, Churchill and World War II Opposition (Old Greenwich, Conn., 1979), p. 127.

  3 B.B. Berle, T.B. Jacobs (eds), Navigating the Rapids 1918–1971: From the papers of Adolph A. Berle (New York, 1973), pp. 374–5, diary entry for 31 July 1941.

  4 M. Ferro, The Great War 1914–1918 (London, 1973), p. 129.

  5 Imperial War Museum, Speer Collection, Box 368, Report 67, p. 14.

  6 R.L. DiNardo, A. Bay, ‘Horse-Drawn Transport in the German Army’, Journal of Contemporary History 23 (1988), pp. 130-9.

  7 G. Weinberg, World in the Balance (New England University Press, 1981), p. 7.

  8 W. Maser (ed.), Hitler’s Letters and Notes (New York, 1974), pp. 52–6, 94. On the continuity of Hitler’s outlook on the world, compare Maser (ed.), Hitler’s Letters, esp. pp. 212–49 (speeches from 1920), and pp. 279–83 (synopsis for the ‘monumental history of mankind’) with the ideas expressed in 1936 on the coming war reproduced in W. Treue (ed.), ‘Der Denkschrift Hitlers über die Aufgaben eines Vierjahrsplan’, Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte 3 (1954). On the formation of Hitler’s world outlook, see G. Stoakes, Hitler and the Quest for World Dominion (Leamington Spa, 1986).

  9 The ‘waiter’ quotation is in M. Kater, ‘Hitler in a Social Context’, Central European History 14 (1981), p. 247. There are good accounts of Hitler’s ‘split personality’ in A. François-Poncet, The Fateful Years: Memoirs of a French Ambassador in Berlin 1931–1938 (London, 1949), pp. 236–8, 289–92 and W. Schellenberg, The Schellenberg Memoirs (London, 1956), pp. 110–12.

  10 H. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (3 vols, London, 1955), III, p. 37.

  11 F.C. Jones, Japan’s New Order in East Asia (Oxford, 1954), p. 469.

  12 W. Boelcke (ed.), The Secret Conferences of Dr Goebbels, October 1939 to March 1943 (London, 1967), p. 184.

  13 J. Toland, Adolf Hitler (New York, 1976), p. 685; H. K. Smith, Last Train from Berlin (London, 1942), pp. 60–4.

  14 Akten zur Deutschen auswärtigen Politik 1918–1945, series D, vol. XIII, pp. 839–40, discussion between Ribbentrop and ambassador Oshima, 23 August 1941, appendix 4.

  15 J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street diaries 1939–1955 (London, 1985), p. 347, entry for 26 January 1941.

  16 Colville, Fringes of Power, p. 382, diary entry for 2 May 1941.

  17 M. Toscano, The Origins of the Pact of Steel (Baltimore, 1967), p. 378.

  18 A. Salter, Slave of the Lamp: A public servant’s notebook (London, 1967), pp. 151–2.

  19 W. Averell Harriman with E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 (London, 1976), p. 67.

  20 E. O’Ballance, The Red Army (London, 1964), p. 164.

  21 J. Barber, ‘The Moscow Crisis of October 1941’ in J. Cooper, M. Perrie and E. A. Rees (eds), Soviet History 1917–1953: Essays in Honour of R. W. Davies (London, 1995), pp. 201–18; M. M. Gorinov ‘Muscovites’ Moods, 22 June 1941 to May 1942’ in R. Thurston, B. Bonwetsch (eds), The People’s War: Responses to World War II in the Soviet Union, pp. 122–5.

  22 O. Bartov, Hitler’s Army: Soldiers, Nazis and war in the Third Reich (Oxford, 1991), p. 96. In addition to the deaths some 420,000 were imprisoned. The figure for British forces was only forty deaths.

  23 Runciman Papers, Newcastle University Library, letter from Arthur Murray to Walter Runciman, 5 September 1939.

  24 F. von Papen, Memoirs (London, 1952), p. 453.

  25 B. Bond (ed.), Chief of Staff: The diaries of Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Pownall: Vol. I, 1933–1940 (London, 1972), p. 221, entry for 29 August 1939.

  2 Little Ships and Lonely Aircraft

  THE BATTLE FOR THE SEAS

  1 H.V. Morton, Atlantic Meeting (London, 1943), pp. 23–8, 35–7; D. Dilks (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan (London, 1971), pp. 395–6.

  2 W. Averell Harriman with E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 (London, 1976), p. 75.

  3 Morton, Atlantic Meeting, pp. 48–9; T. A. Wilson, The First Summit: Roosevelt and Churchill at Placentia Bay (London, 1969), pp. 75–6.

  4 E. Roosevelt (ed.), The Roosevelt Letters: Vol. III, 1928–1945 (London, 1952), p. 364, Roosevelt to Churchill, 4 May 1941; W. Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: the complete correspondence: Vol. I, Alliance Emerging (Princeton, 1984), p. 103, Churchill to Roosevelt, 7 December 1940.

  5 Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 75.

  6 Dilks (ed.), Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan, p. 402; Morton, Atlantic Meeting, pp. 132–5.

  7 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols, London, 1948–54), III, p. 551.

  8 See generally P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London, 1976); C. Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely: The Royal Navy in the Second World War (London, 1991).

  9 F. Ruge, Der Seekrieg: The German Navy’s story 1939–1945 (US Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1957), p. 46.

  10 C.S. Thomas, The German Navy in the Nazi Era (London, 1990), p. 187.

  11 H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives (London, 1964), p. 64, Directive no. 9, ‘Instructions for warfare against the economy of the enemy’.

  12 M.A. Bragadin, The Italian Navy in World War II (US Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1957), pp. 365–6.

  13 K. Poolman, Focke-Wulf Condor: Scourge of the Atlantic (London, 1978); E. van der Porten, The German Navy in World War II (London, 1969), pp. 174–8.

  14 S.W. Roskill, The Navy at War 1939–1945 (London, 1960), pp. 110–11, 127–37.

  15 Ruge, Der Seekrieg, pp. 43–4; S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939–1945 (3 vols, London, 1961), III (part ii), p. 479, appendix ZZ; on German decrypts see D. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German military intelligence in World War II (London, 1978), pp. 218–19. The German naval decrypting office, the B-Dienst, lost access to the British codes in August 1940, but regained it after only seven weeks, and could read most of what was needed down to the middle of 1943.

  16 J. Rohwer, The Critical Convoy Battles of March 1943 (London, 1977), pp. 15–18; K. Dönitz, Memoirs: Ten years and twenty days (London, 1959), pp. 118–23, 127–30 on the organisation of submarine warfare in 1941.

  17 J. Colville, The Fringes of Power: 10 Downing Street diaries 1939–1955 (London, 1985), p. 358, entry for 26 February 1941; On the import crisis, C.B.A. Behrens, Merchant Shipping and the Demands of War (London, 1955), pp. 190–7; M. Olson, The Economics of Wartime Shortage (Durham, North Carolina, 1963), pp. 125–8.

  18 Colville, Fringes of Power, p. 372, diary entry for 9 April 1941; Churchill, Second World War, III, pp. 107–9.

  19 P. Beesly, Very Special Intelligence: The story of the Admiralty’s Operational Intelligence Centre 1939–1945 (London, 1977), pp. 88–95; J. Winton, Ultra at Sea (London, 1988), pp. 96–101.

  20 Roskill, War at Sea, III (part ii), p. 479; Behrens, Merchant Shipping, p. 178. The loss rate of crewmen on torpedoed ships was 53.9 per cent in 1941.

  21 Harriman, Special Envoy, pp. 111–12; J.G. Winant, A Letter from Grosvenor Square (London, 1977), pp. 198–200.

  22 Lord Ismay, Memoirs (London, 1960), p. 241.

  23 Cited in Barnett, Engage the Enemy More Closely, p. 440.

  24 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Pacific Theatre, Report 7
3, ‘The Campaigns of the Pacific War’ (Washington, 1946), pp. 38–9. Allied losses totalled 34 naval vessels from December 1941 to March 1942, including 1 battleship, 1 battlecruiser, 5 cruisers and 13 destroyers.

  25 M. Ugaki, Fading Victory: the Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki 1941–1945 (Pittsburgh, 1991), p. 65, entry for 1 January 1942; USSBS, Pacific Theatre, Report 72, ‘Interrogation of Japanese Officials’, vol. II (Washington, 1946), pp. 318–20, interrogation of Admiral Toyoda (Chief of Naval Staff, 1945).

  26 S. E. Morison, Coral Sea, Midway and Submarine Actions May 1942–August 1942, History of US Naval Operations, vol. IV (New York, 1950), pp. 4–6; M. Fuchida, M. Okumiya, Midway: The battle that doomed Japan (US Naval Institute, Annapolis, 1955), pp. 68–77.

  27 J. Dower, War Without Mercy: Race and power in the Pacific War (New York, 1986), pp. 20–41 for an excellent account of this transition.

  28 M. Matloff, E. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare (2 vols, Washington, 1953–9), I, pp. 60–2, 97–119; R. M. Leighton, R. W. Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy (2 vols, Washington, 1955–68), I, p. 716.

  29 Morison, Coral Sea, pp. 11–13; P. S. Dull, A Battle History of the Imperial Japanese Navy 1941–1945 (Cambridge, 1978), pp. 115–22.

  30 Morison, Coral Sea, p. 60.

  31 Ugaki, Fading Victory, p. 122, diary entry for 3 May 1942; E. P. Hoyt, Japan’s War: The great Pacific conflict (London, 1986), pp. 282–3.

  32 Fuchida, Okumiya, Midway, pp. 92–100; R. Lewin, The Other Ultra (London, 1982), p. 109.

  33 Dower, War Without Mercy, p. 36; Morison, Coral Sea, p. 81.

  34 E.J. King, W.M, Whitehill, Fleet Admiral King: A naval record (New York, 1952), pp. 147–9, 243; on US naval aviation, see N. Polmar, Aircraft Carriers (London, 1969), pp. 40–51.

  35 Lewin, Other Ultra, pp. 85–106.

  36 Morison, Coral Sea, pp. 81–2.

  37 Details from Ugaki, Fading Victory, pp. 130–8; Fuchida, Okumiya, Midway, pp. 94–7.

  38 Morison, Coral Sea, pp. 97–104; Fuchida, Okumiya, Midway, pp. 170–80.

  39 J. S. Thach, ‘A Beautiful Silver Waterfall’, in E.T. Wooldridge (ed.), Carrier Warfare in the Pacific: an oral history collection (Washington, 1993), p. 58.

  40 Fuchida, Okumiya, Midway, pp. 180–91; Ugaki, Fading Victory, pp. 151–3; D. van der Vat, The Pacific Campaign (London, 1992), pp. 192–3.

  41 USSBS, Report 72, ‘Interrogation of Japanese Officials’, vol. I, p. 266, interrogation of Admiral Takata (Naval General Staff), and vol. II, p. 331, interrogation of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai.

  42 USSBS, Report 72, vol. I, p. 262, interrogation of Admiral Takata, and Report 73, ‘The Campaigns of the Pacific War’, p. 60.

  43 USSBS, Report 72, vol. II, item 86, ‘Naval aircraft strength and wastage’; USSBS, Pacific Theatre, Report 46, ‘Japanese Naval Shipbuilding’ (Washington, November 1946), p. 2; Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, p. 753. From 1942 onwards there developed a remarkable disparity in the losses of Japanese and American aircraft, 25,744 Japanese planes lost for 2,421 American.

  44 Van der Vat, Pacific Campaign, pp. 383–4.

  45 Leighton, Coakley, Global Logistics and Strategy, I, p. 638.

  46 M. A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front: American military planning and diplomacy in coalition warfare, 1941–1943 (Westport, Conn., 1977), pp. 34–6.

  47 H. Payton-Smith, Oil: A study in wartime policy and administration (London, 1971), pp. 103, 322. Some 60 per cent of oil imports into Britain came from the eastern United States ports, and 40 per cent from the Caribbean.

  48 M. Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London, 1968), pp. 30–40; Matloff, Snell, Strategic Planning, I, pp. 322–7.

  49 E. Raeder, Mein Leben (2 vols, Tübingen, 1957), II, p. 277; Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs 1939–1945 (London, 1948, reissued 1990), p. 273, conference of 13 April 1942, and p. 285, conference of 15 June 1942.

  50 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, pp. 281–2, conference of 13–14 May 1942.

  51 Dönitz, Memoirs, p. 235.

  52 P. Padfield, Dönitz: The last Führer (London, 1984), chs 2–4.

  53 Dönitz, Memoirs, p. 479, appendix 1.

  54 Ruge, Der Seekrieg, pp. 252–5; Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 102–10; M. L. Hadley, U-Boats against Canada (London, 1990), pp. 52–81; M. Milner, ‘Anglo-American Naval Co-operation in the Second World War’, in J. Hallendorf, R. S. Jordan (eds), Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power (London, 1989), pp. 252–4.

  55 D. Kahn, Seizing the Enigma: The race to break the German U-boat codes (Boston, 1991), pp. 214–17; Winton, Ultra at Sea, pp. 103–7.

  56 Churchill, Second World War, II, p. 529; on oil, see J. Terraine, Business in Great Waters: The U-boat wars 1916–1945 (London, 1989), pp. 514–15.

  57 M. Milner, ‘The Battle of the Atlantic’, Journal of Strategic Studies 13 (1990), pp. 46, 54–5; B. B. Schofield, ‘The Defeat of the U-Boats during World War II’, Journal of Contemporary History 16 (1981), pp. 120–4.

  58 Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles, p. 36; Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, p. 182.

  59 Dönitz remark in Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, p. 294, conference of 28 September 1942; J. Buckley, ‘Air Power and the Battle of the Atlantic’, Journal of Contemporary History 28 (1993), pp. 146–50.

  60 Details from B. Johnson, The Secret War (London, 1978), pp. 250–55; Buckley, ‘Air Power’, pp. 147–8.

  61 D. Howse, Radar at Sea: The Royal Navy in World War 2 (London, 1993), pp. 99–109, 132–143, 149; Johnson, Secret War, pp. 231–5; G. Hartcup, The Challenge of War: Scientific and engineering contributions to World War II (Newton Abbot, 1970), pp. 91–2.

  62 Johnson, Secret War, pp. 237–8.

  63 Dönitz, Memoirs, pp. 253, 315.

  64 Bragadin, Italian Navy, pp. 365–6; Polmar, Aircraft Carriers, p. 124; W. Adair, ‘The War in the Mediterranean’, in Viscount Cunningham of Hyndhope, A Sailor’s Odyssey (London, 1951), pp. 673–4.

  65 Bragadin, Italian Navy, pp. 238–49; Roskill, War at Sea, II, pp. 342–5.

  66 On Torch convoys, see Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 148–51.

  67 W. S. Chalmers, Max Horton and the Western Approaches (London, 1954), pp. 150–62.

  68 Ibid., pp. 163–74.

  69 Dönitz, Memoirs, pp. 321–2.

  70 Beesly, Very Special Intelligence, pp. 154–6; Winton, Ultra at Sea, pp. 108–9; F. H. Hinsley et al., British Intelligence in the Second World War: Vol. II (London, 1981), pp. 548–53.

  71 Details in Rohwer, Critical Convoy Battles; Roskill, Navy at War, pp. 272–5; Dönitz, Memoirs, pp. 328–30.

  72 Roskill, Navy at War, p. 224; Dönitz, Memoirs, pp. 330–1; Terraine, Business in Great Waters, p. 569.

  73 Chalmers, Max Horton, pp. 186–94; Roskill, War at Sea, II, pp. 363–4, 366–7.

  74 Howse, Radar at Sea, pp. 143–9, 132–42.

  75 Roskill, Navy at War, p. 276; Dönitz, Memoirs, pp. 339–40; S. E. Morison, The Atlantic Battle Won, History of US Naval Operations, vol. X (New York, 1956), pp. 76–80.

  76 Fuehrer Conferences on Naval Affairs, pp. 331–2, conference of 31 May 1943. Dönitz reported that loss rates of operational boats were running at 30 per cent a month.

  77 Chalmers, Max Horton, p. 203.

  78 On air power, see Buckley, ‘Air Power’, p. 155.

  79 Churchill, Second World War, II, p. 524.

  80 Behrens, Merchant Shipping, p. 178.

  81 Chalmers, Max Horton, p. 106.

  82 Bragadin, Italian Navy, pp. 365–6; USSBS, Pacific Theatre, Report 48, ‘Japanese Merchant Shipbuilding’ (Washington, January 1947), pp. 18–20.

  83 Roskill, War at Sea, III (part ii), pp. 439–42, appendix T, ‘Nominal List of British Commonwealth Major Warship Losses’.

  84 Ibid., appendix ZZ, table II, ‘Annual Allied Merchant Ship Losses’.

  85 Kennedy, Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, p. 300; F. C. Lane, Ships for Victory: A history of shipbui
lding under the US Maritime Commission in World War II (Baltimore, 1951), pp. 5–7; S. E. Morison, History of United States Naval Operations: Vol. XV, Supplement (Washington, 1962), ‘Ships of the United States Navy 1940–45’. In August 1945 the United States still had in commission 100 aircraft carriers, 23 battleships, 74 cruisers, 475 destroyers, 402 destroyer escorts, 253 submarines and 345 minelayers/minesweepers. Some of the smaller vessels had been converted by 1945 to auxiliary roles of one kind or another.

  86 D. M. McKale, Hitler: The survival myth (New York, 1981), pp. 137–8; Morison, Atlantic Battle, pp. 360–1.

  87 Morison, Atlantic Battle, p. 361.

  3 Deep War

  STALINGRAD AND KURSK

  1 H.C. Cassidy, Moscow Dateline 1941–1943 (London, 1944), pp. 220–1; A. Seaton, Stalin as Warlord (London, 1976), p. 39.

  2 I. Deutscher, Stalin: A political biography (London, 1966), p. 476.

  3 H. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives 1939–1945 (London, 1964), pp. 178–83, Directive no. 41, ‘Our aim is to wipe out the entire defence potential remaining to the Soviets’.

  4 C. Andrew, O. Gordievsky, KGB: The inside story (London, 1990), pp. 224–5; D. M. Glantz, The Role of Intelligence in Soviet Military Strategy in World War II (Novato, California, 1990), pp. 49–51.

  5 W. Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters (London, 1964), pp. 246–7; D. Irving (ed.), Adolf Hitler: The medical diaries (London, 1983), pp. 98–100.

  6 Trevor-Roper (ed.), Hitler’s War Directives, pp. 193–7, Directive no. 45, ‘Operation Brunswick’.

  7 Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, p. 248; M. Cooper, The German Army 1933–1945 (London, 1978), pp. 416–20.

  8 A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1970), pp. 237–8.

  9 A. Werth, Russia at War 1941–1945 (London, 1964), pp. 409–13; J. Barber, M. Harrison, The Soviet Home Front 1941–1945 (London, 1991), pp. 31–2, 72.