Why the Allies Won

by Richard Overy

  10 Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, p. 243.

  11 Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945: A general outline (Moscow, 1970), p. 117; G. K. Zhukov, Marshal Zhukov’s Greatest Battles (New York, 1960), pp. 154–15,127.

  12 Zhukov, Greatest Battles, pp. 132–3; G. K. Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections (Moscow, 1985), pp. 86–7.

  13 O.P. Chaney, Zhukov (Norman, Oklahoma, 1972), chs 1–4.

  14 Zhukov, Reminiscences, pp. 96–7, 119; Zhukov, Greatest Battles, pp. 139–44.

  15 On the role of artillery, engineer and supply services see L. Rotundo (ed.), Battle for Stalingrad: The 1943 Soviet General Staff study (Washington, 1989), chs 9–12.

  16 V. I. Chuikov, The Beginning of the Road: The story of the battle for Stalingrad (London, 1963), pp. 14–27; Werth, Russia at War, pp. 559–60.

  17 W. Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad (London, 1963), pp. 4–6, 24–7, 47–8; M. Middlebrook, ‘Paulus’ in C. Barnett (ed.), Hitler’s Generals (London, 1989), pp. 361–5.

  18 Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, p. 78.

  19 Werth, Russia at War, pp. 454–5; Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, pp. 94–9.

  20 Cited in Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, p. 132.

  21 Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, p. 191.

  22 S. J. Zaloga, J. Grandsen, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles of World War Two (London, 1984), pp. 152–4.

  23 Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The rise of Soviet air power (London, 1982), pp. 97–104; The Soviet Air Force in World War II (London, 1974, from the Russian original), pp. 114–34. J. S. Hayward Stopped at Stalingrad: The Luftwaffe and Hitler’s defeat in the East 1942–1943 (Lawrence, Kans., 1998), pp. 322–3.

  24 Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, pp. 272–3.

  25 Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, pp. 217–18.

  26 Great Patriotic War, pp. 161–2; D. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II (London, 1978), pp. 435–9.

  27 Great Patriotic War, p. 161; Zhukov, Greatest Battles, pp. 157–9.

  28 Zhukov, Reminiscences, pp. 124–5.

  29 J. Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Stalin’s war with Germany: Vol. II (London, 1983), pp. 1–6; ‘Stalingrad, a brief survey in retrospect by Field Marshal Paulus’, reproduced in Goerlitz, Paulus and Stalingrad, pp. 283–5.

  30 Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, p. 277.

  31 J. Fischer, ‘Über den Entschluss zur Luftversorgung Stalingrads. Ein Beitrag zur militärischen Führung im Dritten Reich’, Militärgeschichtliche Mittellungen 6 (1969); R. Suchenwirth, Command and Leadership in the German Air Force, USAF Historical Study no. 179 (New York, 1969), pp. 77–80.

  32 W. Murray, Luftwaffe (London, 1985), pp. 141–4.

  33 Details in D. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr (London, 1991), pp. 41–73; Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 15–31; E. von Manstein, Verlorene Siege (Bonn, 1955), pp. 359–80.

  34 Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, p. 254. On the conditions facing German soldiers, see the account in J. Wieder, Stalingrad und die Verantwortung des Soldaten (Munich, 1962), esp. pp. 42–6.

  35 Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, p. 284.

  36 Erickson, Road to Berlin, p. 114.

  37 Werth, Russia at War, pp. 537–8.

  38 Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, p. 284. On the intelligence errors, see Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 47–9.

  39 Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, pp. 258–9.

  40 Werth, Russia at War, pp. 540–1; Middlebrook, ‘Paulus’, pp. 371–2.

  41 Werth, Russia at War, p. 543.

  42 Zhukov, Greatest Battles, p. 192. The figures for tanks and aircraft are almost certainly too high. The Luftwaffe lost almost 500 transport aircraft to the airlift, against a Soviet estimate of 676. Total German losses on the eastern front from September to January were 1,646 aircraft, while large numbers were rendered unserviceable. See Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, p. 110, and Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 107, 138, 142–4.

  43 Werth, Russia at War, pp. 560–3.

  44 Cassidy, Moscow Dateline, p. 222; A. Calder, The People’s War: Britain, 1939–1945 (London, 1969), pp. 401–2.

  45 W.S. Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols, London, 1948–54), IV, p. 661.

  46 M. Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diary, 1939–1943 (London, 1947), p. 555.

  47 F. Gilbert (ed.), Hitler Directs His War: The secret record of his daily military conferences (New York, 1950), pp. 19–22.

  48 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 250–1: ‘Our enemies rightly regarded this disaster at Stalingrad as a turning point in the war. But at Hitler’s headquarters the only reaction was a temporary numbness followed by a rush of feverish staff work …’

  49 W. Keitel, The Memoirs of Field Marshal Keitel (London, 1965), p. 182.

  50 K. Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty (Moscow, 1970), pp. 175–7.

  51 Glantz, Role of Intelligence, pp. 80–2.

  52 Cooper, German Army, p. 452.

  53 P. Carell, Hitler’s War on Russia (2 vols, London, 1970), doc. 1, ‘Operation Order No. 6 (Citadel) of 15.4.1943’, pp. 564–8; von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 473–95: H. Guderian, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten (Heidelberg, 1951), pp. 280–2.

  54 S.M. Shtemenko, The Soviet General Staff at War (Moscow, 1970), pp. 152–61; Glantz, Role of Intelligence, pp. 84–5, 93–7. On improvements in Soviet intelligence gathering for Kursk, see T. P. Mulligan, ‘Spies, ciphers and “Zitadelle”: Intelligence and the Battle of Kursk 1943’, Journal of Contemporary History 22 (1987), pp. 246–50. Soviet forces conducted 105 reconnaissance-in-force operations, 2,600 night raids and 1,500 ambushes to obtain detailed information from captives.

  55 Andrew, Gordievsky, KGB, pp. 246–9; Zhukov, Greatest Battles, pp. 207–9, 214–22.

  56 Rokossovsky, Soldier’s Duty, pp. 186–90.

  57 Zaloga, Grandsen, Soviet Tanks, pp. 131–7.

  58 P. Rotmistrov, ‘Tanks against Tanks’ in Main Front: Soviet leaders look back on World War II (London, 1987), pp. 109–10; Zaloga, Grandsen, Soviet Tanks, p. 166.

  59 Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, pp. 152–8; on Soviet use of radio at Kursk, see D.R. Beachley, ‘Soviet Radio-Electronic Combat in World War II’, Military Review 61 (1981), pp. 66–72.

  60 Zhukov, Reminiscences, p. 166, 179.

  61 Mulligan, ‘Spies, ciphers’, pp. 238–9; Glantz, Role of Intelligence, pp. 100–3.

  62 Glantz, Role of Intelligence, pp. 103–4; Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 130–1. On the Voronezh front a smaller artillery barrage had already been released at 10.30 p.m. on the 4th, following exploratory attacks by German aircraft and tanks from Belgorod earlier in the day.

  63 Zhukov, Reminiscences, p. 183.

  64 Rokossovsky, Soldier’s Duty, pp. 199–202.

  65 C. Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division, 1933–1945 (Princeton, 1977), pp. 283–8; Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 137–40.

  66 Rotmistrov, ‘Tanks against Tanks’, pp. 109–10.

  67 Ibid., pp. 112–13.

  68 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, pp. 288–90; Rotmistrov, ‘Tanks against Tanks’, pp. 114–18; Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 144–7.

  69 Sydnor, Soldiers of Destruction, pp. 290-1; F. W. von Mellenthin, Panzer-Schlachten (Neckargemünd, 1963), pp. 163–5; ‘our tank forces were almost bled white’.

  70 Guderian, Erinnerungen, p. 283; Zaloga, Grandsen, Soviet Tanks, p. 166.

  71 Zhukov, Greatest Battles, pp. 245–6.

  72 Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff, pp. 177–84.

  73 Ibid., pp. 190–2, 193–4.

  74 Churchill, Second World War, V, p. 321; Shtemenko, Soviet General Staff, p. 197.

  75 Zhukov, Reminiscences, p. 226.

  76 Von Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 508; von Mellenthin, Panzer-Schlachten, p. 257; K. Zeitzler, ‘Stalingrad’ in W. Richardson, S. Freiden (eds), The Fatal Decisions (London, 1956), pp. 118–19.

  77 Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, p. 304.

  78 Soviet losses in G.F.
Krivosheev (ed.) Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London, 1997), p. 85–91; see too B. Sokolov ‘The Cost of War: Human Losses for the USSR and Germany 1939–1945’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies 9 (1996), pp. 152–93.

  79 Zhukov, Greatest Battles, pp. 256–7; Zhukov, Reminiscences, pp. 195–226. See too the discussion in J. Erickson, ‘New Thinking about the Eastern Front in World War II’, Journal of Military History 56 (1992), pp. 284–92; J. F. Gebhardt, ‘World War II: The Soviet side’, Military Review 72 (December 1992), pp. 91–3.

  80 I. Ehrenburg, Men, Years – Life: Vol. V, The War 1941–45 (London, 1964), p. 107.

  81 Werth, Russia at War, p. 414.

  82 Chuikov, Beginning of the Road, p. 78.

  4 The Means to Victory

  BOMBERS AND BOMBING

  1 A. Werth, Russia at War, 1941–1945 (London, 1964), p. 485.

  2 USSR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Correspondence between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941 to 1945: Correspondence with Winston S. Churchill and Clement R. Attlee (Moscow, 1957), doc. 56: for Churchill’s reply, W.F. Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: The complete correspondence (3 vols, Princeton, 1984), I, 529–32.

  3 M. Matloff, E. M. Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare: 1941–1942 (Washington, 1953), pp. 177–87.

  4 W. Averell Harriman with E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin 1941–1946 (London, 1976), p. 151; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War (6 vols, London, 1948–54), IV, pp. 428–9.

  5 Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 152.

  6 Ibid., p. 153.

  7 Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, I, p. 561, letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, 13 August 1942.

  8 Harriman, Special Envoy, p. 157.

  9 For accounts of the final meeting: Churchill, Second World War, IV, pp. 448–9; A. H. Birse, Memoirs of an Interpreter (London, 1967), pp. 101–4. On the return journey, R. Beaumont, ‘The Bomber Offensive as a Second Front’, Journal of Contemporary History 22 (1987), p. 11.

  10 J. Sweetman, ‘Crucial Months for Survival: The Royal Air Force 1918–1919’, Journal of Contemporary History 19 (1984), pp. 530–40.

  11 Churchill, Second World War, II, p. 567.

  12 Beaumont, ‘Bomber Offensive as a Second Front’, p. 12.

  13 ‘Report by Mr Justice Singleton on the Bombing of Germany, 20 May 1942’, appendix 17 in C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany (4 vols, London, 1961), IV, pp. 231–8.

  14 A. van Ishoven, The Fall of an Eagle: The life of fighter ace Ernst Udet (London, 1977), pp. 159–71.

  15 R.J. Overy, ‘From “Uralbomber” to “Amerikabomber”: The Luftwaffe and strategic bombing’, Journal of Strategic Studies 1 (1978), pp. 156–7, 167–70.

  16 H.G. Wells, The War in the Air (London, 1908), pp. 352–4.

  17 Liberty, 5 December 1931, p. 52.

  18 R.J. Overy, ‘Air Power and the Origins of Deterrence Theory before 1939’, Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1992).

  19 The use of biological metaphor was widespread. It can even be found in the official manual of the RAF, War Manual: Part I, Operations, May 1935, p. 57, ‘nerve centres, main arteries, heart and brain …’

  20 Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London, AIR 9/102, Air Targets Intelligence, Germany File, 13 October 1938.

  21 N. Gibbs, Grand Strategy: Vol. I, Rearmament Policy (London, 1976), p. 598; J. Slessor, The Central Blue (London, 1956), pp. 203–5.

  22 D. Richards, Royal Air Force 1939–1945: Vol. 1, The Fight at Odds (London, 1974), p. 124.

  23 Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, I, p. 57, letter of 31 July 1940.

  24 K. Maier et al., Germany and the Second World War: Vol. II, Germany’s Initial Conquests in Europe (Oxford, 1991), p. 386.

  25 Details in F.J. Assersohn, ‘Propaganda and Policy: The presentation of the strategic air offensive in the British mass media 1939–1945’, Leeds University M.A. thesis, 1989.

  26 M. Sherry, The Rise of American Air Power: The creation of Armageddon (New Haven, 1987), pp. 95–8.

  27 H.L. Ickes, The Secret Diary of Harold L. Ickes (2 vols, London, 1955), II, p. 37.

  28 Library of Congress, Arnold Papers, Box 246, G2 report, 22 January 1941, ‘British Estimates of German Military Power’; G2 Report 16 January 1941: ‘Germany was capable of much greater aircraft production’ (italic in original).

  29 Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, I, p. 224, letter from Churchill to Roosevelt, 25 July 1941.

  30 ‘Report by Mr Butt to Bomber Command on his Examination of Night Photographs, 18 August 1941’, appendix 13 in Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, pp. 205–13.

  31 Churchill, Second World War, III, p. 451.

  32 Air Ministry, The Rise and Fall of the German Air Force 1933–1945 (London, 1947, reprinted 1983), pp. 185–8.

  33 Richards, Royal Air Force, p. 381.

  34 A. Harris, Bomber Offensive (London, 1947), chs 1–2. According to this account, Harris ‘could see only one possible way of bringing serious pressure to bear on the Boche, and certainly only one way of defeating him; that was by air bombardment’ (p. 15).

  35 ‘Memorandum by Lord Trenchard on the Present War Situation, 19 May 1941’, appendix 10 in Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, pp. 194–7.

  36 ‘Air Ministry directif, 14 February 1942’, appendix 8, xxii, in Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, pp. 143–5.

  37 Harris, Bomber Offensive, p. 80.

  38 On the build-up of the 8th air force see W. F. Craven, J.L. Cate, The Arrny Air Forces in World War II (6 vols, Washington, 1948–55, reissued 1983), I, pp. 612–54. On the B–17 bomber, see USAF Historical Study no. 6, The Development of the Heavy Bomber 1918–1944 (Maxwell, Alabama, August 1951) and R.W. Krauskopf, ‘The Army and the Strategic Bomber, 1930–1939’, Military Affairs 22 (1958–9).

  39 Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, I, p. 664.

  40 Ibid., pp. 242–73.

  41 R.E. Sherwood, The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins (2 vols, London, 1949), II, pp 665–70.

  42 Details of the directive in ‘The Combined Bomber Offensive from the United Kingdom (Pointblank) as approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 14 May 1943, in Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, pp. 273–83.

  43 Air Ministry, Rise and Fall, pp. 191–2.

  44 F. Gilbert (ed.), Hitler Directs His War: The secret record of his daily military conferences (New York, 1950), meeting of 25 July 1943, pp. 41–2.

  45 R. V. Jones, Most Secret War: British scientific intelligence 1939–1945 (London, 1978), pp. 297–9.

  46 H.E. Nossack The End: Hamburg 1943 (Chicago, 2004), p. 12.

  47 A. Speer, Inside the Third Reich (London, 1971), p. 284. On the effects on Hamburg see U. Büttner, ‘Hamburg im Luftkrieg: Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Folgen des “Unternehmens Gomorrha”’, in A. Hiller et al (eds), Städte im 2. Weltkrieg (Essen, 1991), pp. 272–94.

  48 C. Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries (London, 1967), pp. 400–1.

  49 Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, III, pp. 162–3.

  50 Ibid., pp. 193, 208–9.

  51 A. Galland, The First and the Last (London, 1955), p. 185; Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, II, pp. 681–3; F. Golücke, Schweinfurt und der strategische Luftkrieg 1943 (Paderborn, 1980).

  52 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 286; Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, II, pp. 665–9.

  53 Craven, Cate, Army Air Forces, III, p. 8.

  54 Ibid., pp. 217–20 on the development of the P–51. See too S.L. McFarland, ‘The Evolution of the American Strategic Fighter in Europe, 1942–44’, Journal of Strategic Studies 10 (1987).

  55 W. Murray, Luftwaffe: Strategy for Defeat (London, 1985), pp. 211–15.

  56 Galland, First and the Last, p. 201.

  57 H.H. Arnold, Second Report of the
Commanding General of the United States Army Air Forces (London, 1945), p. 36.

  58 H. Knoke, I Flew for the Führer (London, 1953), p. 139.

  59 On oil, see R.C. Cooke, R.C. Nesbit, Target: Hitler’s Oil: Allied attacks on German oil supplies 1939–1945 (London, 1985); on the railway network, A.C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy 1944–1945: Allied air power and the German national railway (Chapel Hill, North Carolina, 1988), esp. pp. 194–8.

  60 Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 424. See too the evaluation in H.S. Hansell, The Strategic Air War against Germany and Japan (Office of Air Force History, Washington, 1986), pp. 119–30.

  61 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Pacific Theatre, ‘Summary Reports’ (Washington, 1 July 1946), pp. 16–18, 20.

  62 Background in Sherry, Rise of American Air Power, pp. 316–30; R. Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York, 1986), pp. 679–91.

  63 G.H. Roeder, The Censored War: American visual experience during World War Two (New Haven, 1993), p. 86.

  64 USSBS, Pacific Theatre, ‘The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale’ (Washington, June 1947), pp. 35–6.

  65 USSBS, ‘Summary Report’, pp. 22–4; USSBS, ‘Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japanese Morale’, pp. 91–3.

  66 On the work of the Survey team see J.K. Galbraith, A Life In Our Times: Memoirs (London, 1981), pp. 209–40. His very negative conclusions on the effects of bombing influenced the tone of the Bombing Survey report, The Effects of Strategic Bombing on the German War Economy, USSBS Report 3, 31 October 1945.

  67 On Italy see S.J. Harvey, ‘The Italian War Effort and the Strategic Bombing of Italy’, History 70 (1985), pp. 40–41.

  68 PRO, Kew, AIR 10/3866, British Bombing Survey Unit, “The Strategic Air War Against Germany 1939–1945’, pp. 38–9. This figure covered the whole war period; for the last two years of war the bombing offensive took 12 per cent of the war effort (measured in terms of production and combat man-hours).

  69 S. Harvey, ‘The Italian War Effort and the Strategic Bombing of Italy’, History 70 (1985), pp. 32–45.

  70 On the diversion of resources, Beaumont, ‘Bomber Offensive as a Second Front’, pp. 14–15; Air Ministry, Rise and Fall, pp. 283–6. On German aircraft production, Webster and Frankland, Strategic Air Offensive, IV, appendix 49, xxii, pp. 494–5.