Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  THE 29TH PENNSYLVANIA FORMING LINE OF BATTLE ON CULP’S HILL AT 10 A.M., JULY 3.

  Most of the enemy’s projectiles passed overhead, the effect being to sweep all the open ground in our rear, which was of little benefit to the Confederates—a mere waste of ammunition, for everything here could seek shelter. And just here an incident already published may be repeated, as it illustrates a peculiar feature of civil war. Colonel Long, who was at the time on General Lee’s staff, had a few years before served in my mounted battery expressly to receive a course of instruction in the use of field-artillery. At Appomattox we spent several hours together, and in the course of conversation I told him I was not satisfied with the conduct of this cannonade which I had heard was under his direction, inasmuch as he had not done justice to his instruction; that his fire, instead of being concentrated on the point of attack, as it ought to have been, and as I expected it would be, was scattered over the whole field. He was amused at the criticism and said: “I remembered my lessons at the time, and when the fire became so scattered, wondered what you would think about it!”

  I now rode along the ridge to inspect the batteries. The infantry were lying down on its reverse slope, near the crest, in open ranks, waiting events. As I passed along, a bolt from a rifle-gun struck the ground just in front of a man of the front rank, penetrated the surface and passed under him, throwing him “over and over.” He fell behind the rear rank, apparently dead, and a ridge of earth where he had been lying reminded me of the backwoods practice of “barking” squirrels. Our fire was deliberate, but on inspecting the chests I found that the ammunition was running low, and hastened to General Meade to advise its immediate cessation and preparation for the assault which would certainly follow. The headquarters building, immediately behind the ridge, had been abandoned, and many of the horses of the staff lay dead. Being told that the general had gone to the cemetery, I proceeded thither. He was not there, and on telling General Howard my object, he concurred in its propriety, and I rode back along the ridge, ordering the fire to cease. This was followed by a cessation of that of the enemy, under the mistaken impression that he had silenced our guns, and almost immediately his infantry came out of the woods and formed for the assault. On my way to the Taneytown road to meet the fresh batteries which I had ordered up, I met Major Bingham, of Hancock’s staff, who informed me that General Meade’s aides were seeking me with orders to “cease firing”; so I had only anticipated his wishes. The batteries were found and brought up, and Fitzhugh’s, Weir’s, and Parsons’s were put in near the clump of trees. Brown’s and Arnold’s batteries had been so crippled that they were now withdrawn, and Brown’s was replaced by Cowan’s. Meantime the enemy advanced, and McGilvery opened a destructive oblique fire, reënforced by that of Rittenhouse’s six rifle-guns from Round Top, which were served with remarkable accuracy, enfilading Pickett’s lines. The Confederate approach was magnificent, and excited our admiration; but the story of that charge is so well known that I need not dwell upon it further than as it concerns my own command. The steady fire from McGilvery and Rittenhouse, on their right, caused Pickett’s men to “drift” in the opposite direction, so that the weight of the assault fell upon the positions occupied by Hazard’s batteries. I had counted on an artillery cross-fire that would stop it before it reached our lines, but, except a few shots here and there, Hazard’s batteries were silent until the enemy came within canister range. They had unfortunately exhausted their long range projectiles during the cannonade, under the orders of their corps commander, and it was too late to replace them. Had my instructions been followed here, as they were by McGilvery, I do not believe that Pickett’s division would have reached our line. We lost not only the fire of one-third of our guns, but the resulting cross-fire, which would have doubled its value. The prime fault was in the obscurity of our army regulations as to the artillery, and the absence of all regulations as to the proper relations of the different arms of service to one another. On this occasion it cost us much blood, many lives, and for a moment endangered the integrity of our line if not the success of the battle. Soon after Pickett’s repulse, Wilcox’s, Wright’s, and Perry’s brigades were moved forward, but under the fire of the fresh batteries in Gibbon’s front, of McGilvery’s and Rittenhouse’s guns and the advance of two regiments of Stannard’s Vermont brigade, they soon fell back. The losses in the batteries of the Second Corps were very heavy. Of the five battery commanders and their successors on the field, Rorty, Cushing, and Woodruff were killed, and Milne was mortally and Sheldon severely wounded at their guns. So great was the destruction of men and horses, that Cushing’s and Woodruff’s United States, and Brown’s and Arnold’s Rhode Island batteries were consolidated to form two serviceable ones.

  [TOP] MENCHEY’S SPRING, BETWEEN CULP’S HILL AND THE CEMETERY GATE. [BOTTOM] SPANGLER’S SPRING, EAST OF CULP’S HILL.

  The advance of the Confederate brigades to cover Pickett’s retreat showed that the enemy’s line opposite Cemetery Ridge was occupied by infantry. Our own line on the ridge was in more or less disorder, as the result of the conflict, and in no condition to advance a sufficient force for a counter-assault. The largest bodies of organized troops available were on the left, and General Meade now proceeded to Round Top and pushed out skirmishers to feel the enemy in its front. An advance to the Plum Run line, of the troops behind it, would have brought them directly in front of the numerous batteries which crowned the Emmitsburg Ridge, commanding that line and all the intervening ground; a farther advance, to the attack, would have brought them under additional heavy flank fires. McCandless’s brigade, supported by Nevin’s, was, however, pushed forward, under cover of the woods, which protected them from the fire of all these batteries; it crossed the Wheat-field, cleared the woods, and had an encounter with a portion of Benning’s brigade, which was retiring. Hood’s and McLaws’s divisions were falling back under Longstreet’s orders to their strong position, resting on Peach Orchard and covering Hill’s line. It needs but a moment’s examination of the official map to see that our troops on the left were locked up. As to the center, Pickett’s and Pettigrew’s assaulting divisions had formed no part of A. P. Hill’s line, which was virtually intact. The idea that there must have been “a gap of at least a mile” in that line, made by throwing forward these divisions, and that a prompt advance from Cemetery Ridge would have given us the line, or the artillery in front of it, was a delusion. A prompt counter-charge after a combat between two small bodies of men is one thing; the change from the defensive to the offensive of an army, after an engagement at a single point, is quite another. This was not a “Waterloo defeat” with a fresh army to follow it up, and to have made such a change to the offensive, on the assumption that Lee had made no provision against a reverse, would have been rash in the extreme. An advance of 20,000 men from Cemetery Ridge in the face of the 140 guns then in position would have been stark madness; an immediate advance from any point, in force, was simply impracticable, and before due preparation could have been made for a change to the offensive, the favorable moment—had any resulted from the repulse—would have passed away.

  PICKETT’S CHARGE, I.—LOOKING DOWN THE UNION LINES FROM THE “CLUMP OF TREES.”

  General Hancock and staff are seen in the left center of the picture.—This and the two pictures that follow are from the Cyclorama of Gettysburg, by permission of the National Panorama Company.

  PICKETT’S CHARGE, II.—THE MAIN COLLISION TO THE RIGHT OF THE “CLUMP OF TREES.” FROM THE CYCLORAMA OF GETTYSBURG.

  In this hand-to-hand conflict General Armistead, of Pickett’s Division, was killed, and General Webb, of Gibbon’s Division, was wounded.

  Whilst the main battle was raging, sharp cavalry combats took place on both flanks of the army. On the left the principal incident was an attack made by order of General Kilpatrick on infantry and artillery in woods and behind stone fences, which resulted in considerable losses, and especially in the death of General Farnsworth, a gallant and
promising officer who had but a few days before been appointed brigadier-general and had not yet received his commission. On the right an affair of some magnitude took place between Stuart’s command of four and Gregg’s of three brigades; but Jenkins’s Confederate brigade was soon thrown out of action from lack of ammunition, and two only of Gregg’s were engaged. Stuart had been ordered to cover Ewell’s left and was proceeding toward the Baltimore pike, where he hoped to create a diversion in aid of the Confederate infantry, and in case of Pickett’s success to fall upon the retreating Federal troops. From near Cress’s Ridge, two and a half miles east of Gettysburg, Stuart commanded a view of the roads in rear of the Federal lines. On its northern wooded end he posted Jackson’s battery, and took possession of the Rummel farm-buildings, a few hundred yards distant. Hampton and Fitzhugh Lee were on his left, covered by the wood, Jenkins and Chambliss on the right, along the ridge. Half a mile east on a low parallel ridge, the southern part of which bending west toward Cress’s Ridge furnished excellent positions for artillery, was the Federal cavalry brigade of McIntosh, who now sent a force toward Rummel’s, from which a strong body of skirmishers was thrown to meet them, and the battery opened. McIntosh now demanded reënforcements, and Gregg, then near the Baltimore pike, brought him Custer’s brigade and Pennington’s and Randol’s batteries. The artillery soon drove the Confederates out of Rummel’s, and compelled Jackson’s Virginia battery to leave the ridge. Both sides brought up reënforcements and the battle swayed from side to side of the interval. Finally the Federals were pressed back, and Lee and Hampton, emerging from the wood, charged, swords in hand, facing a destructive artillery fire—for the falling back of the cavalry had uncovered our batteries. The assailants were met by Custer’s and such other mounted squadrons as could be thrown in; a mêlée ensued, in which Hampton was severely wounded and the charge repulsed. Breathed’s and McGregor’s Confederate batteries had replaced Jackson’s, a sharp artillery duel took place, and at nightfall each side held substantially its original ground. Both sides claim to have held the Rummel house. The advantage was decidedly with the Federals, who had foiled Stuart’s plans. Thus the battle of Gettysburg closed as it had opened, with a very creditable cavalry battle.

  PICKETT’S CHARGE, III.—(CONTINUATION OF THE PICTURE ON this page). FROM THE GETTYSBURG CYCLORAMA.

  General Lee now abandoned the attempt to dislodge Meade, intrenched a line from Oak Hill to Peach Orchard, started all his impedimenta to the Potomac in advance, and followed with his army on the night of July 4th, via Fairfield. This compelled Meade to take the circuitous routes through the lower passes; and the strategic advantage to Lee and disadvantage to Meade of Gettysburg were made manifest.

  General Meade has been accused of slowness in the pursuit. The charge is not well founded; he lost no time in commencing, or vigor in pushing, it. As early as the morning of the 4th he ordered French at Frederick to seize and hold the lower passes, and he put all the cavalry except Gregg’s and McIntosh’s brigades in motion to harass the enemy’s anticipated retreat, and to destroy his trains and bridges at Williamsport. It stormed heavily that day, and the care of the wounded and burial of the dead proceeded whilst the enemy’s line was being reconnoitered. As soon, on the 5th, as it was certain that Lee was retreating, Gregg was started in pursuit on the Chambersburg pike, and the infantry—now reduced to a little over 47,000 effectives, short of ammunition and supplies—by the lower passes. The Sixth Corps taking the Hagerstown road, Sedgwick reported the Fairfield pass fortified, a large force present, and that a fight could be had; upon which, on the 6th, Meade halted the rest of the infantry and ordered two corps to his support, but soon learning that although the pass could be carried it would cause too much delay, he resumed the march, leaving McIntosh and a brigade of the Sixth Corps to follow the enemy through the Fairfield pass. On the evening of the 4th—both armies being still in position at Gettysburg—Kilpatrick had a sharp encounter with the enemy in Monterey pass, and this was followed by daily cavalry combats on the different routes, in which much damage was done to trains and many captures of wagons, caissons, and prisoners effected. On the 5th, whilst Lee was moving through the passes, French destroyed the pontoon-bridge at Falling Waters. On the 6th—as Meade was leaving Gettysburg—Buford attacked at Williamsport and Kilpatrick toward Hagerstown, on his right, but as Imboden’s train guard was strong, Stuart was up, and Longstreet close by, they had to withdraw. [See this page.] The enemy proceeded to construct a new bridge and intrench a strong line covering Williamsport and Falling Waters. There were heavy rains on the 7th and 8th, but the infantry corps reached Middleton on the morning of the 9th, received supplies, crossed the mountains that day, and at its close the right was at Boonsboro’, and the left at Rohrersville, on the roads to Hagerstown and Williamsport. By this time the Potomac was swollen and impassable. On the 10th Meade continued his advance, and received information that the enemy had occupied a line extending from near Falling Waters, through Downsville to Funkstown, which he was intrenching. This at 1 P.M. he reported to Halleck, informing him at the same time that his cavalry had driven that of Lee to within a mile of Funkstown, and that he would next day move cautiously until he had developed the enemy’s force and position. Halleck, at 9 P.M., sent him a cipher dispatch as follows: