Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  I naturally expected that Pemberton would endeavor to obey the orders of his superior, which I have shown were to attack us at Clinton. This, indeed, I knew he could not do, but I felt sure he would make the attempt to reach that point. It turned out, however, that he had decided his superior’s plans were impracticable, and consequently determined to move south from Edwards’s Station, and get between me and my base. I, however, had no base, having abandoned it more than a week before. On the 15th Pemberton had actually marched south from Edwards’s Station; but the rains had swollen Baker’s Creek, which he had to cross, so much that he could not ford it, and the bridges were washed away. This brought him back to the Jackson road, on which there was a good bridge over Baker’s Creek. Some of his troops were marching until midnight to get there. Receiving here early on the 16th a repetition of his order to join Johnston at Clinton, he concluded to obey, and sent a dispatch to his chief, informing him of the route by which he might be expected.

  About 5 o’clock in the morning (16th) two men who had been employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg Railroad were brought to me. They reported that they had passed through Pemberton’s army in the night, and that it was still marching east. They reported him to have 80 regiments of infantry and 10 batteries; in all about 25,000 men.

  I had expected to leave Sherman at Jackson another day in order to complete his work. But, getting the above information, I sent him orders to move with all dispatch to Bolton, and to put one division, with an ammunition train, on the road at once, with directions to its commander to march with all possible speed until he came up to our rear. Within an hour after receiving this order, Steele’s division was on the road. At the same time I dispatched to Blair, who was near Auburn, to move with all speed to Edwards’s Station. McClernand was directed to embrace Blair in his command for the present. Blair’s division was a part of the Fifteenth Army Corps (Sherman’s); but as it was on its way to join its corps, it naturally struck our left first, now that we had faced about and were moving west. The Fifteenth Corps, when it got up, would be on our extreme right. McPherson was directed to get his trains out of the way of the troops, and to follow Hovey’s division as closely as possible. McClernand had two roads, about three miles apart, converging at Edwards’s Station, over which to march his troops. Hovey’s division of his corps had the advance on a third road (the Clinton) still farther north. McClernand was directed to move Blair’s and A. J. Smith’s divisions by the southernmost of these roads, and Osterhaus and Carr by the middle road. Orders were to move cautiously, with skirmishers in the front to feel for the enemy. Smith’s division, on the most southern road, was the first to encounter the enemy’s pickets, who were speedily driven in. Osterhaus, on the middle road, hearing the firing, pushed his skirmishers forward, found the enemy’s pickets, and forced them back to the main line. About the same time Hovey encountered the enemy on the northern or direct wagon road from Jackson to Vicksburg. McPherson was hastening up to join Hovey, but was embarrassed by Hovey’s trains occupying the roads. I was still back at Clinton. McPherson sent me word of the situation and expressed the wish that I was up. By 7:30 I was on the road and proceeded rapidly to the front, ordering all trains that were in front of troops off the road. When I arrived Hovey’s skirmishing amounted almost to a battle.

  McClernand was in person on the middle road, and had a shorter distance to march to reach the enemy’s position than McPherson. I sent him word by a staff-officer to push forward and attack. These orders were repeated several times without apparently expediting McClernand’s advance.

  Champion’s Hill, where Pemberton had chosen his position to receive us, whether taken by accident or design, was well selected. It is one of the highest points in that section, and commanded all the ground in range. On the east side of the ridge, which is quite precipitous, is a ravine, running first north, then westerly, terminating at Baker’s Creek. It was grown up thickly with large trees and undergrowth, making it difficult to penetrate with troops, even when not defended. The ridge occupied by the enemy terminated abruptly where the ravine turns westerly. The left of the enemy occupied the north end of this ridge. The Bolton and Edwards’s Station road turns almost due south at this point, and ascends the ridge, which it follows for about a mile, then, turning west, descends by a gentle declivity to Baker’s Creek, nearly a mile away. On the west side the slope of the ridge is gradual, and is cultivated from near the summit to the creek. There was, when we were there, a narrow belt of timber near the summit, west of the road.

  From Raymond there is a direct road to Edwards’s Station, some three miles west of Champion’s Hill. There is one also to Bolton. From this latter road there is still another, leaving it about three and a half miles before reaching Bolton, and leading direct to the same station. It was along these two roads that three divisions of McClernand’s corps, and Blair, of Sherman’s, temporarily under McClernand, were moving. Hovey, of McClernand’s command, was with McPherson, farther north on the road from Bolton, direct to Edwards’s Station. The middle road comes into the northern road at the point where the latter turns to the west, and descends to Baker’s Creek; the southern road is still several miles south and does not intersect the others until it reaches Edwards’s Station. Pemberton’s lines covered all these roads and faced east. Hovey’s line, when it first drove in the enemy’s pickets, was formed parallel to that of the enemy, and confronted his left.

  By eleven o’clock the skirmishing had grown into a hard-contested battle. Hovey alone, before other troops could be got to assist him, had captured a battery of the enemy. But he was not able to hold his position, and had to abandon the artillery. McPherson brought up his troops as fast as possible—Logan in front—and posted them on the right of Hovey and across the flank of the enemy. Logan reënforced Hovey with one brigade from his division; with his other two he moved farther west to make room for Crocker, who was coming up as rapidly as the roads would admit. Hovey was still being heavily pressed, and was calling on me for more reënforcements. I ordered Crocker, who was now coming up, to send one brigade from his division. McPherson ordered two batteries to be stationed where they nearly enfiladed the enemy’s line, and they did good execution.

  From Logan’s position now a direct forward movement would carry him over open fields in rear of the enemy and in a line parallel with them. He did make exactly this move, attacking, however, the enemy through the belt of woods covering the west slope of the hill for a short distance. Up to this time I had kept my position near Hovey, where we were the most heavily pressed; but about noon I moved with a part of my staff by our right, around, until I came up with Logan himself. I found him near the road leading down to Baker’s Creek. He was actually in command of the only road over which the enemy could retreat; Hovey, reënforced by two brigades from McPherson’s command, confronted the enemy’s left; Crocker, with two brigades, covered their left flank; McClernand, two hours before, had been within two and a half miles of their center with two divisions, and two divisions—Blair’s and A. J. Smith’s—were confronting the rebel right; Ransom, with a brigade of McArthur’s division, of the Seventeenth Corps (McPherson’s), had crossed the river at Grand Gulf a few days before and was coming up on their right flank. Neither Logan nor I knew that we had cut off the retreat of the enemy. Just at this juncture a messenger came from Hovey, asking for more reënforcements. There were none to spare. I then gave an order to move McPherson’s command by the left flank around to Hovey. This uncovered the Confederate line of retreat, which was soon taken advantage of by the enemy.5

  During all this time Hovey, reënforced as he was by a brigade from Logan and another from Crocker, and by Crocker gallantly coming up with two other brigades on his right, had made several assaults, the last one about the time the road was opened to the rear. The enemy fled precipitately. This was between 3 and 4 o’clock. I rode forward, or rather back, to where the middle road intersects the north road, and found the skirmishers of Carr’s division just coming in. O
sterhaus was farther south, and soon after came up with skirmishers advanced in like manner. Hovey’s division, and McPherson’s two divisions with him, had marched and fought from early dawn, and were not in the best condition to follow the retreating foe. I sent orders to Osterhaus to pursue the enemy, and to Carr, whom I saw personally, I explained the situation, and directed him to pursue vigorously as far as the Big Black, and to cross it if he could, Osterhaus to follow him. The pursuit was continued until after dark.

  The battle of Champion’s Hill lasted about four hours of hard fighting, preceded by two or three hours of skirmishes, some of which rose almost to the dignity of battle. Every man of Hovey’s division and of McPherson’s two divisions was engaged during the battle. No other part of my command was engaged at all, except that (as described before). Osterhaus’s and A. J. Smith’s had encountered the rebel advanced pickets as early as 7:30. Their positions were admirable for advancing upon the enemy’s line. McClernand, with two divisions, was within a few miles of the battle-field long before noon, and in easy hearing. I sent him repeated orders by staff-officers fully competent to explain to him the situation. These traversed the road separating us, without escort, and directed him to push forward, but he did not come.6 Instead of this he sent orders to Hovey, who belonged to his corps, to join on to his right flank. Hovey was bearing the brunt of the battle at the time. To obey the order he would have had to pull out from the front of the enemy and march back as far as McClernand had to advance to get into battle, and substantially over the same ground. Of course, I did not permit Hovey to obey the order of his intermediate superior.

  We had in this battle about fifteen thousand men actually engaged. This excludes those that did not get up—all of McClernand’s command except Hovey. Our loss was 410 killed, 1844 wounded, and 187 missing. Hovey alone lost twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing,—one-third of his division.

  Had McClernand come up with reasonable promptness, or had I known the ground as I did afterward, I cannot see how Pemberton could have escaped with any organized force. As it was he lost over 3000 killed and wounded, and about 3000 captured in battle and in pursuit. Loring’s division, which was the right of Pemberton’s line, was cut off from the retreating army, and never got back into Vicksburg. Pemberton himself fell back that night to the Big Black River. His troops did not stop before midnight, and many of them left before the general retreat commenced, and no doubt a good part of them returned to their homes. Logan alone captured 1300 prisoners and 11 guns. Hovey captured 300, under fire, and about 700 in all, exclusive of 500 sick and wounded, whom he paroled, thus making 1200.

  McPherson joined in the advance as soon as his men could fill their cartridge-boxes, leaving one brigade to guard our wounded. The pursuit was continued as long as it was light enough to see the road. The night of the 16th of May found McPherson’s command bivouacked from two to six miles west of the battle-field, along the line of the road to Vicksburg. Carr and Osterhaus were at Edwards’s Station, and Blair was about three miles south-east. Hovey remained on the field where his troops had fought so bravely and bled so freely. Much war material abandoned by the enemy was picked up on the battle-field, among it thirty pieces of artillery. I pushed through the advancing column with my staff, and kept in advance until after night. Finding ourselves alone we stopped and took possession of a vacant house. As no troops came up we moved back a mile or more, until we met the head of the column just going into bivouac on the road. We had no tents, so we occupied the porch of a house which had been taken for a rebel hospital, and which was filled with wounded and dying who had been brought from the battle-field we had just left.

  While a battle is raging one can see his enemy mowed down by the thousand and the ten thousand, with great composure. But after the battle these scenes are distressing, and one is naturally disposed to do as much to alleviate the suffering of an enemy as of a friend.

  We were now assured of our position between Johnston and Pemberton, without the possibility of a junction of their forces. Pemberton might indeed have made a night march to the Big Black, crossed the bridge there, and, by moving north on the west side, have eluded us, and finally returned to Johnston. But this would have given us Vicksburg. It would have been his proper move, however, and the one Johnston would have made had he been in Pemberton’s place. In fact, it would have been in conformity with Johnston’s orders to Pemberton.

  Sherman left Jackson with the last of his troops about noon on the 16th, and reached Bolton, twenty miles west, before halting. His rear-guard did not get in until 2 A.M. the 17th, but renewed their march by daylight. He paroled his prisoners at Jackson, and was forced to leave his own wounded,—in care of surgeons and attendants however. At Bolton he was informed of our victory. He was directed to commence the march early next day, and to diverge from the road he was on, to Bridgeport, on the Big Black River, some eleven miles above where we expected to find the enemy. Blair was ordered to join him there with the pontoon train as early as possible.

  This movement brought Sherman’s corps together, and at a point where I hoped a crossing of the Big Black might be effected, and Sherman’s corps used to flank the enemy out of his position in our front, and thus open a crossing for the remainder of the army. I informed him that I would endeavor to hold the enemy in my front while he crossed the river.

  The advanced division, Carr’s (McClernand’s corps), resumed the pursuit at 3:30 A.M. on the 17th, followed closely by Osterhaus; McPherson bringing up the rear with his corps. As I expected, the enemy was found in position on the Big Black. The point was only six miles from that where my advance had rested for the night, and was reached at an early hour. Here the river makes a turn to the west, and has washed close up to the high land. The east side is a low bottom, sometimes overflowed at very high water, but was cleared and in cultivation. A bayou runs irregularly across this low land, the bottom of which, however, is above the surface of the Big Black at ordinary stages. When the river is full, water runs through it, converting the point of land into an island. The bayou was grown up with timber, which the enemy had felled into the ditch. All this time there was a foot or two of water in it. The rebels had constructed a parapet along the inner bank of this bayou, by using cotton bales from the plantation close by and throwing dirt over them. The whole was thoroughly commanded from the height west of the river. At the upper end of the bayou there was a strip of uncleared land, which afforded a cover for a portion of our men. Carr’s division was deployed on our right, Lawler’s brigade forming his extreme right, and reaching through these woods to the river above. Osterhaus’s division was deployed to the left of Carr, and covered the enemy’s entire front. McPherson was in column on the road, the head close by, ready to come in whenever he could be of assistance.

  GENERAL BLAIR’S DIVISION CROSSING BIG BLACK RIVER. FROM A WATER-COLOR.

  While the troops were standing as here described, an officer from Banks’s staff7 came up and presented me with a letter from General Halleck, dated the 11th of May. It had been sent by the way of New Orleans to Banks to forward to me. It ordered me to return to Grand Gulf, and to coöperate from there with Banks, against Port Hudson, and then to return with our combined forces to besiege Vicksburg. I told the officer that the order came too late, and that Halleck would not give it then if he knew our position. The bearer of the dispatch insisted that I ought to obey the order, and was giving arguments to support his position, when I heard great cheering to the right of our line, and, looking in that direction, saw Lawler, in his shirt-sleeves, leading a charge upon the enemy. I immediately mounted my horse and rode in the direction of the charge, and saw no more of the officer who delivered the dispatch, I think not even to this day.

  The assault was successful. But little resistance was made. The enemy fled from the west bank of the river, burning the bridge behind them, leaving the men and guns on the east side to fall into our hands. Many tried to escape by swimming the river. Some succeeded and some were drowned in
the attempt. Eighteen guns were captured, and 1751 prisoners. Our loss was 39 killed, 237 wounded, and 3 missing. The enemy probably lost but few men except those captured and drowned. But for the successful and complete destruction of the bridge, I have but little doubt that we should have followed the enemy so closely as to prevent his occupying his defenses around Vicksburg.

  As the bridge was destroyed and the river was high, new bridges had to be built. It was but little after 9 o’clock A.M. when the capture took place. As soon as work could be commenced, orders were given for the construction of three bridges. One was taken charge of by Lieutenant Peter C. Hains, of the Engineer Corps, one by General McPherson himself, and one by General Ransom, a most gallant and intelligent volunteer officer. My recollection is that Hains built a raft-bridge; McPherson a pontoon, using cotton bales in large numbers for pontoons; and that Ransom felled trees on opposite banks of the river, cutting only on one side of the tree, so that they would fall with their tops interlacing in the river, without the trees being entirely severed from their stumps. A bridge was then made with these trees to support the roadway. Lumber was taken from buildings, cotton-gins, and wherever found, for this purpose. By 8 o’clock on the morning of the 18th all three bridges were complete and the troops were crossing.

  Sherman reached Bridgeport about noon of the 17th, and found Blair with the pontoon train already there. A few of the enemy were intrenched on the west bank, but they made little resistance, and soon surrendered. Two divisions were crossed that night, and the third the following morning.