Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  On the 18th I moved along the Vicksburg road in advance of the troops, and as soon as possible joined Sherman. My first anxiety was to secure a base of supplies on the Yazoo River above Vicksburg. Sherman’s line of march led him to the very point on Walnut Hills occupied by the enemy the December before, when he was repulsed. Sherman was equally anxious with myself. Our impatience led us to move in advance of the column, and well up with the advanced skirmishers. There were some detached works along the crest of the hill. These were still occupied by the enemy, or else the garrison from Haynes’s Bluff had not all got past on their way to Vicksburg. At all events, the bullets of the enemy whistled by thick and fast for a short time. In a few minutes Sherman had the pleasure of looking down from the spot coveted so much by him the December before,—on the ground where his command lay so helpless for offensive action [Chickasaw Bayou]. He turned to me, saying that up to this minute he had felt no positive assurance of success. This, however, he said, was the end of one of the greatest campaigns in history, and I ought to make a report of it at once. Vicksburg was not yet captured, and there was no telling what might happen before it was taken; but whether captured or not, this was a complete and successful campaign. I do not claim to quote Sherman’s language, but the substance only. My reason for mentioning this incident will appear farther on.

  McPherson, after crossing the Big Black, came into the Jackson and Vicksburg road which Sherman was on, but to his rear. He arrived at night near the lines of the enemy, and went into camp. McClernand moved by the direct road near the railroad to Mount Albans, and then turned to the left, and put his troops on the road from Baldwin’s Ferry to Vicksburg. This brought him south of McPherson. I now had my three corps up to the works built for the defense of Vicksburg on three roads,—one to the north, one to the east, and one to the south-east of the city. By the morning of May 19th the investment was as complete as my limited number of troops would allow. Sherman was on the right and covered the high ground from where it overlooked the Yazoo as far south-east as his troops would extend. McPherson joined on to his left, and occupied ground on both sides of the Jackson road. McClernand took up the ground to his left, and extended as far toward Warrenton as he could, keeping a continuous line.

  On the 19th there was constant skirmishing with the enemy while we were getting into better position. The enemy had been much demoralized by his defeats at Champion’s Hill and the Big Black, and I believed would not make much effort to hold Vicksburg. Accordingly at 2 o’clock I ordered an assault. It resulted in securing more advanced positions for all our troops, where they were fully covered from the fire of the enemy.

  The 20th and 21st were spent in strengthening our position, and in making roads in rear of the army, from Yazoo River, or Chickasaw Bayou. Most of the army had now been for three weeks with only five days’ rations issued by the commissary. They had an abundance of food, however, but began to feel the want of bread. I remember, that in passing around to the left of the line on the 21st, a soldier, recognizing me, said in rather a low voice, but yet so that I heard him, “Hard-tack.” In a moment the cry was taken up all along the line, “Hard-tack! Hard-tack!” I told the men nearest to me that we had been engaged ever since the arrival of the troops in building a road over which to supply them with everything they needed. The cry was instantly changed to cheers. By the night of the 21st all the troops had full rations issued to them. The bread and coffee were highly appreciated.

  I now determined on a second assault. Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reënforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he might not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reënforcements, which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was: the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and would not have worked so patiently in the trenches if they had not been allowed to try.

  The attack was ordered to commence on all parts of the line at 10 o’clock A.M. on the 22d with a furious cannonading from every battery in position. All the corps commanders set their time by mine, so that all might open the engagement at the same minute. The attack was gallant, and portions of each of the three corps succeeded in getting up to the very parapets of the enemy, and in planting their battle-flags upon them; but at no place were we able to enter. General McClernand reported that he had gained the enemy’s intrenchments at several points, and wanted reënforcements. I occupied a position from which I believed I could see as well as he what took place in his front, and I did not see the success he reported. But his request for reënforcements being repeated, I could not ignore it, and sent him Quinby’s division of the Seventeenth Corps. Sherman and McPherson were both ordered to renew their assaults as a diversion in favor of McClernand. This last attack only served to increase our casualties, without giving any benefit whatever. As soon as it was dark, our troops that had reached the enemy’s line and had been obliged to remain there for security all day, were withdrawn, and thus ended the last assault on Vicksburg.

  I now determined upon a regular siege,—to “out-camp the enemy,” as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defenses and approaches with a will. With the navy holding the river the investment of Vicksburg was complete. As long as we could hold our position, the enemy was limited in supplies of food, men, and munitions of war, to what they had on hand. These could not last always.

  The crossing of troops at Bruinsburg commenced April 30th. On the 18th of May the army was in rear of Vicksburg. On the 19th, just twenty days after the crossing, the city was completely invested and an assault had been made: five distinct battles—besides continuous skirmishing—had been fought and won by the Union forces; the capital of the State had fallen, and its arsenals, military manufactories, and everything useful for military purposes had been destroyed; an average of about 180 miles had been marched by the troops engaged; but 5 days’ rations had been issued, and no forage; over 6000 prisoners had been captured, and as many more of the enemy had been killed or wounded; 27 heavy cannon and 61 field-pieces had fallen into our hands; 250 miles of the river, from Vicksburg to Port Hudson, had become ours. The Union force that had crossed the Mississippi River up to this time was less than 43,000 men. One division of these—Blair’s—only arrived in time to take part in the battle of Champion’s Hill, but was not engaged there; and one brigade—Ransom’s—of McPherson’s corps reached the field after the battle. The enemy had at Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, Jackson, and on the roads between these places, over sixty thousand men. They were in their own country, where no rear-guards were necessary. The country is admirable for defense, but difficult to conduct an offensive campaign in. All their troops had to be met. We were fortunate, to say the least, in meeting them in detail: at Port Gibson, 7000 or 8000; at Raymond, 5000; at Jackson, from 8000 to 11,000; at Champion’s Hill, 25,000; at the Big Black, 4000. A part of those met at Jackson were all that were left of those encountered at Raymond. They were beaten in detail by a force smaller than their own, upon their own ground. Our loss up to this time was:

  Of the wounded many were but slightly so, and continued on duty. Not half of them were disabled for any length of time.8

  After the unsuccessful assault on the 22d, the work of the regular siege began. Sherman occupied the right, starting from the river above Vicksburg; McPherson the center (McArthur’s division now with him); and McClernand the left, holding the road south to Warrenton. Lauman’s division arrived at this time and was placed on the extreme left of the line.

  In the interval between the assaults of the 19th and 22d, roads had been completed from the Yazoo River and Chickasaw Bayou, around the rear
of the army, to enable us to bring up supplies of food and ammunition; ground had been selected and cleared, on which the troops were to be encamped, and tents and cooking utensils were brought up. The troops had been without these from the time of crossing the Mississippi up to this time. All was now ready for the pick and spade. With the two brigades brought up by McArthur, which reached us in rear of Vicksburg, and Lauman’s division brought from Memphis, and which had just arrived, we had now about forty thousand men for the siege. Prentiss and Hurlbut were ordered to send forward every man that could be spared. Cavalry especially was wanted to watch the fords along the Big Black, and to observe Johnston. I knew that Johnston was receiving reënforcements from Bragg, who was confronting Rosecrans in Tennessee. Vicksburg was so important to the enemy that I believed he would make the most strenuous efforts to raise the siege, even at the risk of losing ground elsewhere.

  My line was more than fifteen miles long, extending from Haynes’s Bluff to Vicksburg, thence south to Warrenton. The line of the enemy was about seven. In addition to this, having an enemy at Canton and Jackson, in our rear, who was being constantly reënforced, we required a second line of defense facing the other way. I had not troops enough under my command to man these. But General Halleck appreciated the situation, and, without being asked, forwarded reënforcements with all possible dispatch.

  HEADQUARTERS OF THE UNION SIGNAL CORPS, VICKSBURG. FROM A WAR-TIME PHOTOGRAPH.

  The ground about Vicksburg is admirable for defense. On the north it is about two hundred feet above the Mississippi River at the highest point, and very much cut up by the washing rains; the ravines were grown up with cane and underbrush, while the sides and tops were covered with a dense forest. Farther south the ground flattens out somewhat, and was in cultivation. But here, too, it was cut by ravines and small streams. The enemy’s line of defense followed the crest of a ridge, from the river north of the city, eastward, then southerly around to the Jackson road, full three miles back of the city; thence in a south-westerly direction to the river. Deep ravines of the description given lay in front of these defenses.

  As there is a succession of gullies, cut out by rains, along the side of the ridge, the line was necessarily very irregular. To follow each of these spurs with intrenchments, so as to command the slopes on either side, would have lengthened their line very much. Generally, therefore, or in many places, their line would run from near the head of one gully nearly straight to the head of another, and an outer work, triangular in shape, generally open in the rear, was thrown up on the point; with a few men in this outer work they commanded the approaches to the main line completely.

  The work to be done to make our position as strong against the enemy as his was against us, was very great. The problem was also complicated by our wanting our line as near that of the enemy as possible. We had but four engineer officers with us. Captain F. E. Prime, of the Engineer Corps, was the chief, and the work at the beginning was mainly directed by him. His health soon gave out, when he was succeeded by Captain Cyrus B. Comstock, also of the Engineer Corps. To provide assistants on such a long line, I directed that all officers who had been graduated at West Point, where they had necessarily to study military engineering, should, in addition to their other duties, assist in the work.

  The chief quartermaster and the chief commissary were graduates. The chief commissary, now the commissary-general of the army [General Robert Macfeely], begged off, however, saying that there was nothing in engineering that he was good for, unless he would do for a sap-roller. As soldiers require rations while working in the ditches as well as when marching and fighting, and we would be sure to lose him if he was used as a sap-roller, I let him off. The general is a large man,—weighs two hundred and twenty pounds, and is not tall.

  We had no siege-guns except six 32-pounders, and there were none in the West to draw from. Admiral Porter, however, supplied us with a battery of navy-guns, of large caliber, and with these, and the field-artillery used in the campaign, the siege began. The first thing to do was to get the artillery in batteries, where they would occupy commanding positions; then establish the camps, under cover from the fire of the enemy, but as near up as possible; and then construct rifle-pits and covered ways, to connect the entire command by the shortest route. The enemy did not harass us much while we were constructing our batteries. Probably their artillery ammunition was short; and their infantry was kept down by our sharp-shooters, who were always on the alert and ready to fire at a head whenever it showed itself above the rebel works.

  In no place were our lines more than six hundred yards from the enemy. It was necessary, therefore, to cover our men by something more than the ordinary parapet. To give additional protection sand-bags, bullet-proof, were placed along the tops of the parapets, far enough apart to make loop-holes for musketry. On top of these, logs were put. By these means the men were enabled to walk about erect when off duty, without fear of annoyance from sharp-shooters. The enemy used in their defense explosive musket-balls, thinking, no doubt, that, bursting over the men in the trenches, they would do some execution; but I do not remember a single case where a man was injured by a piece of one of the shells. When they were hit, and the ball exploded, the wound was terrible. In these cases a solid ball would have hit as well. Their use is barbarous, because they produce increased suffering without any corresponding advantage to those using them.

  The enemy could not resort to the method we did to protect their men, because we had an inexhaustible supply of ammunition to draw upon, and used it freely. Splinters from the timber would have made havoc among the men behind.

  There were no mortars with the besiegers, except what the navy had in front of the city; but wooden ones were made by taking logs of the toughest wood that could be found, boring them out for six or twelve pounder shells, and binding them with strong iron bands. These answered as coehorns, and shells were successfully thrown from them into the trenches of the enemy.

  The labor of building the batteries and intrenching was largely done by the pioneers, assisted by negroes who came within our lines and who were paid for their work, but details from the troops had often to be made. The work was pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and when an advanced position was secured and covered from the fire of the enemy, the batteries were advanced. By the 30th of June there were 220 guns in position, mostly light field-pieces, besides a battery of heavy guns belonging to, manned, and commanded by the navy. We were now as strong for defense against the garrison of Vicksburg as they were against us. But I knew that Johnston was in our rear, and was receiving constant reënforcements from the east. He had at this time a larger force than I had prior to the battle of Champion’s Hill.

  WOODEN COEHORN ON GRANT’S LINES. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  As soon as the news of the arrival of the Union army behind Vicksburg reached the North, floods of visitors began to pour in. Some came to gratify curiosity; some to see sons or brothers who had passed through the terrible ordeal; members of the Christian and Sanitary Commissions came to minister to the wants of the sick and the wounded. Often those coming to see a son or brother would bring a dozen or two of poultry. They did not know how little the gift would be appreciated; many soldiers had lived so much on chickens, ducks, and turkeys, without bread, during the march, that the sight of poultry, if they could get bacon, almost took away their appetite. But the intention was good.

  Among the earliest arrivals was the Governor of Illinois [Yates], with most of the State officers. I naturally wanted to show them what there was of most interest. In Sherman’s front the ground was the most broken and most wooded, and more was to be seen without exposure. I therefore took them to Sherman’s headquarters and presented them. Before starting out to look at the lines—possibly while Sherman’s horse was being saddled—there were many questions asked about the late campaign, about which the North had been so imperfectly informed. There was a little knot about Sherman and around me, and I heard Sherman repeating in
the most animated manner what he had said to me, when we first looked down from Walnut Hills upon the land below, on the 18th of May, adding: “Grant is entitled to every bit of the credit for the campaign; I opposed it. I wrote him a letter about it.” But for this speech it is not likely that Sherman’s opposition would have ever been heard of. His untiring energy and great efficiency during the campaign entitled him to a full share of all the credit due for its success. He could not have done more if the plan had been his own.

  POSITION OF QUINBY’S DIVISION OF MCCLERNAND’S CORPS. FROM A LITHOGRAPH.

  On the ridge in the background are Confederate forts connected by breastworks, and on the right is pictured the blowing up, June 25th, of the Confederate works on the Jackson road, in front of General Logan’s division. The Union rifle-pits are at the farther edge of the ravine, in which the troops were protected. On the left is Battery Archer, 2 siege-guns; center, 12th Wisconsin Battery; right, 6th Wisconsin Battery. The trees in front of the explosion mark the scene of the conference between Grant and Pemberton.

  On the 26th of May I sent Blair’s division up the Yazoo to drive out a force of the enemy supposed to be between the Big Black and the Yazoo. The country was rich, and full of supplies of both fruit and forage. Blair was instructed to take all of it. The cattle were to be driven in for the use of our army, and the food and forage to be consumed by our troops or destroyed by fire; all bridges were to be destroyed, and the roads rendered as nearly impassable as possible. Blair went forty-five miles, and was gone almost a week. His work was effectually done. I requested Porter at this time to send the Marine brigade—a floating nondescript force which had been assigned to his command, and which proved very useful—up to Haynes’s Bluff to hold it until reënforcements could be sent.

  On the 26th I also received a letter from Banks, asking me to reënforce him with ten thousand men at Port Hudson.9 Of course I could not comply with his request, nor did I think he needed them. He was in no danger of an attack by the garrison in his front, and there was no army organizing in his rear to raise the siege. On the 3d of June a brigade from Hurlbut’s command arrived, General Nathan Kimball commanding.10 It was sent to Mechanicsburg, some miles north-east of Haynes’s Bluff, and about midway between the Big Black and the Yazoo. A brigade of Blair’s division and twelve hundred cavalry had already, on Blair’s return from up the Yazoo, been sent to the same place—with instructions to watch the crossings of the Big Black River, to destroy the roads in his (Blair’s) front, and to gather or destroy all supplies.