Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  MAGRUDER’S MEN BOARDING THE “HARRIET LANE” AT GALVESTON. SEE PREVIOUS PAGE.

  The cavalry was poor, except the six old companies, and was quite insufficient in numbers. Of land and water transportation, both indispensable to any possible operation, there was barely enough for the movement of a single division. In Washington, Banks had been led to expect that he would find in the depots, or in the country, all material required for moving his army; yet the supplies in the depots barely sufficed for the old force of the department, while the country could furnish very little at best, and nothing at all until it should be occupied. Banks had finally to send his chief quartermaster back to Washington before these deficiencies could be supplied.

  Again, Banks had not been informed until he reached New Orleans that the Confederates held in force any fortified place below Vicksburg, yet Port Hudson, 135 miles above New Orleans, was found strongly intrenched, with 21 heavy guns in position, and a garrison of 12,000 men—increased to 16,000 before Banks could have brought an equal number to the attack.

  Banks could not communicate with the commander of the northern column, and knew practically nothing of its movements.

  SHARP-SHOOTERS OF THE 75TH N.Y. VOLUNTEERS PICKING OFF THE GUNNERS OF THE CONFEDERATE GUN-BOAT “COTTON,” IN THE ACTION AT BAYOU TECHE, LA., JANUARY 14, 1863. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  Under these conditions, all concert between the coöperating forces was rendered impossible from the start, and it became inevitable that the expectations of the Government that Banks would go against Vicksburg immediately on landing in Louisiana should be doomed to disappointment.

  The Confederate occupation of Port Hudson had completely changed the nature of the problem confided to General Banks for solution, for he had now to choose among three courses, each involving an impossibility: to carry by assault a strong line of works, three miles long, impregnable on either flank and defended by 16,000 good troops; to lay siege to the place, with the certainty that it would be relieved from Mississippi and the prospect of losing his siege train in the venture; to leave Port Hudson in his rear and go against Vicksburg, thus sacrificing his communications, putting New Orleans in peril, and courting irreparable and almost inevitable disaster as the price of the remote chance of achieving a great success. No word came from Grant or McClernand.

  Meanwhile Banks was trying to find a way of turning Port Hudson on the west by means of the Atchafalaya, the mouth of Red River, and the net-work of bayous, interlacing and intersecting one another, that connect the Atchafalaya with the Mississippi, in time of flood overflowing and fertilizing, at other seasons serving as highways for the whole region between the two rivers. The Mississippi was unusually high, the narrow and tortuous bayous were swollen and rapid; the levees, nearly everywhere neglected since the outbreak of the war, had in some places been cut by the Confederates; a large area of the country was under water; while great rafts of drift-logs added to the difficulty of navigation occasioned by the scarcity of suitable steamers and skilled pilots. Every attempt to penetrate the bayous having failed, Banks was just turning his attention to the preparations for gaining the same end by a movement from Berwick Bay by the Atchafalaya or Teche, when the news came that two of Ellet’s rams, the Queen of the West and Indianola, after successfully running the batteries of Vicksburg, had been captured by the Confederates. These gun-boats must therefore be reckoned with in any movement on or beyond the Atchafalaya, while their presence above Port Hudson as a hostile force, in place of the reënforcement expected from Admiral Porter, greatly increased the anxiety Admiral Farragut had for some time felt to pass the batteries of Port Hudson with part of his fleet, control the long reach above, and cut off the Confederate supplies from the Red River country. General Banks fell in with the admiral’s plans, and, concentrating 17,000 men at Baton Rouge, moved to the rear of Port Hudson on the 14th of March, with the divisions of Augur, Emory, and Grover, for the purpose of coöperating with the fleet by dividing the attention of the garrison and gaining a flank fire of artillery on the lower batteries on the bluff. The field-returns showed 12,000 men in line after providing for detachments and for holding Baton Rouge. Admiral Farragut had intended to pass the batteries on the 15th, in the gray of the morning, but at the last moment saw reason to change this plan and moved to the attack before midnight. In a naval affair like this the coöperation of the army could not have been very effective at best; the change of hour left us little more than spectators and auditors of the battle between the ships and the forts. The Hartford and Albatross passed up comparatively uninjured, but in the smoke and darkness the rest of the fleet could not go by, and the Mississippi, stranding, was set on fire and blown up—the grandest display of fireworks I ever witnessed, and the costliest. [See this page.]

  RETURN OF A FORAGING PARTY OF THE 24TH CONNECTICUT VOLUNTEERS TO BATON ROUGE. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  This gave the navy command of the mouth of Red River, and, accordingly, Banks at once reverted to the execution of his former plan,—a turning movement by the Atchafalaya. That involved disposing of Taylor’s force of about 4000 or 5000 men encamped and intrenched on the Teche below Franklin. Our force was so much stronger than Taylor’s as to suggest the idea of capturing him in his position, by getting in his rear, simultaneously with a front attack; and this was particularly to be desired, as otherwise he might retire indefinitely into the vast open country behind him and return at his leisure at some inopportune moment. So perfectly was the movement masked that Taylor was actually preparing to attack the force in his front (Weitzel) when the main army began crossing Berwick Bay.

  Weitzel crossed on the 9th; Emory followed; they then bivouacked on the west bank to wait for Grover’s movement. So few were the facilities that it took Grover two days to embark. Six hours more were lost by a dense fog, and four by the stranding of the Arizona. When the proposed landing-place at Madame Porter’s plantation was reached after dark, the road was found to be under water and impassable, but a practicable way was discovered six miles farther up the lake, at McWilliams’s plantation. There the landing began early on the 13th, and with great difficulty, owing to the shallowness of the water, was completed by 4 o’clock in the afternoon. Favored by the woods and undergrowth, which concealed their numbers, Vincent’s 2d Louisiana and Reily’s 4th Texas Cavalry, with a section of Cornay’s battery, delayed the advance until Dwight’s brigade, supported by two regiments of Birge’s and by Closson’s battery, went out and drove them away. At 6 the division took up the line of march to the Teche and bivouacked at nightfall on Madame Porter’s plantation, five miles distant.

  MARCH OF THE NINETEENTH ARMY CORPS BY THE BAYOU SARA ROAD TOWARD PORT HUDSON, SATURDAY, MARCH 14, 1863. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  Meanwhile Banks had moved Emory and Weitzel slowly up the Teche, seeking to hold Taylor’s forces in position until Grover could gain their rear. Taylor fell back behind the intrenched lines below Centreville known as Fort Bisland, and there a brisk engagement took place on the 13th, Banks only seeking to gain a good position on both sides of the bayou, and to occupy the enemy’s attention, while he listened in vain for Grover’s guns, which were to have been the signal for a direct and determined attack in front.

  At night, knowing that Grover’s movement must certainly have been seen and reported during his passage up Grand Lake and surmising some miscarriage, Banks gave orders to carry the works by assault at daylight. However, early in the night, Taylor ordered his whole force to fall back on Franklin; the sounds of the movement were heard, and toward daylight reconnoitering parties discovered the evacuation. Banks’s whole force at once moved in pursuit.

  Early in the morning Taylor met Grover advancing against his line of retreat, which here follows the great bow of the Teche, known as Irish Bend, struck Birge’s brigade in flank, forced Grover to develop, and with the assistance of the Diana3 held him just long enough to make good the retreat.

  Taylor had made a gallant fight and had extricated h
imself cleverly. His reports show his whole force to have been 5000. Grover had about the same. We lost at Bisland 40 killed and 184 wounded,—total, 224; at Irish Bend, 49 killed, 274 wounded, 30 missing,—total, 353. The losses of the Confederates are not reported, but they destroyed their two gun-boats and all their transport steamers except one, which we captured, and their troops began to disperse soon after passing Franklin. We captured many prisoners on the march. Their gun-boats came down the Atchafalaya too late to dispute Grover’s landing, were defeated by our flotilla, under Lieutenant-Commander A. P. Cooke, and the Queen of the West was destroyed. On the 20th Butte-à-la-Rose, with sixty men and two heavy guns, surrendered to Cooke, and the same day Banks occupied Opelousas.

  Here he received his first communication from General Grant, dated before Vicksburg, March 23d, and sent through Admiral Farragut. This opened a correspondence, the practical effect of which was to cause General Banks to conform his movements to the expectation that General Grant would send an army corps to Bayou Sara to join in reducing Port Hudson.

  Banks moved on to Alexandria, on the Red River, to push Taylor farther out of the way. Taylor retired toward Shreveport. On the 14th of May the whole command marched on Simsport, crossed the Atchafalaya, and moved to Bayou Sara, where the advance of the army crossed the Mississippi on the night of the 23d and moved immediately to the rear of Port Hudson.

  There communication was made with Augur’s two brigades, which had established themselves in position on the 21st, after a brisk engagement, known as the battle of Plains Store,4 just in time, apparently, to prevent the evacuation, which had been ordered by General Johnston and afterward countermanded by President Davis. With Augur we found T. W. Sherman and two brigades from New Orleans.

  When the investment was completed on the 26th, we had about 14,000 men of all arms in front of the works, and behind them the Confederates had about 7000, under Major-General Frank Gardner. Part of the garrison (three brigades, as it proved) was known to have gone to succor Vicksburg, and all reports, apparently confirmed by the comparative feebleness of the attack on Augur at Plains Store, indicated a reduction even greater than had actually taken place. Nothing was known, of course, of the phenomenal success of Grant’s operations, nor could it have been surmised, while his precarious position in the event of a defeat or even a serious check was obvious enough; the magnitude of the Confederate forces in Mississippi and the energy habitual to their commanders everywhere, added an additional reason against delay. Finally the troops themselves, elated by their success in the Teche campaign, were in the best of spirits for an immediate attack. For these reasons General Banks, with the full concurrence of all his commanders, save one, ordered a general assault to be made on the morning of the 27th of May.

  Early in the morning Weitzel, who commanded the right wing on this day, moved to the attack in two lines, Dwight at first leading, and steadily drove the Confederates in his front into their works. Thus unmasked, the Confederate artillery opened with grape and canister, but our batteries, following the infantry as closely as possible, soon took commanding positions within 200 and 300 yards of the works that enabled them to keep down the enemy’s fire. The whole fight took place in a dense forest of magnolias, mostly amid a thick undergrowth, and among ravines choked with felled or fallen timber, so that it was difficult not only to move but even to see; in short, in the phrase of the day, the affair was “a gigantic bush-whack.” Soon after Weitzel’s movement began Grover, on his left, moved to the attack at two points, but only succeeded in gaining and holding commanding positions within about two hundred yards of the works. This accomplished, and no sound of battle coming from his left, Grover determined to wait where he was for the attack that had been expected in that quarter, or for further orders, and Weitzel conformed his action to Grover’s: properly in both cases, although it was afterward made apparent that had Weitzel continued to press his attack a few minutes longer he would probably have broken through the Confederate defense and taken their whole line in reverse. To make a diversion, Dwight caused the two colored regiments on the extreme right to form for the attack; they had hardly done so when the extreme left of the Confederate line opened on them, in an exposed position, with artillery and musketry and forced them to abandon the attempt with great loss. In Augur’s front the Confederate works were in full view, but the intervening plain was obstructed by tangled abatis of huge trees felled with their great branches spread as if to receive us with open arms, and these obstructions were commanded by the fire of nearly a mile of the works. His movement had therefore been meant for a demonstration, mainly in aid of Sherman, to be converted into a real attack if circumstances should favor; but as the morning wore away and no sound came from Sherman, General Banks rode to the left and gave fresh orders for that assault; then, returning to the center about two o’clock, he ordered Augur to attack simultaneously. At the word Chapin’s brigade moved forward with great gallantry, but was soon caught and cruelly punished in the impassable abatis. Sherman gallantly led his division on horseback, surrounded by his full staff, likewise mounted, but though the ground in his front was less difficult than that which Augur had to traverse, it was very exposed, and the formation was, moreover, broken by three parallel lines of fence. No progress was possible, and when night fell the result was that we had gained commanding positions, yet at a fearful cost.

  OPENING OF THE NAVAL ATTACK ON PORT HUDSON, MARCH 13, 1863.

  The next day a regular siege was begun. Grover was assigned to the command of the right wing, embracing his own and Paine’s divisions and Weitzel’s brigade; while Dwight was given command of Sherman’s division, raised to three brigades by transferring regiments. From left to right, from this time, the lines were held in the order of Dwight, Augur, Paine, Grover, and Weitzel.

  On the 14th of June, time still pressing, the lines being everywhere well advanced, the enemy’s artillery effectually controlled by ours, every available man having been brought up, and yet our force growing daily less by casualties and sickness, Taylor menacing our communications on the west bank of the Mississippi, and the issue of Grant’s operations before Vicksburg in suspense, Banks ordered a second assault to be delivered simultaneously at daybreak on the left and center, preceded by a general cannonade of an hour’s duration. Dwight’s attack on the left was misdirected by its guides and soon came to naught. Paine attacked with great vigor at what proved to be the strongest point of the whole work, the priest-cap near the Jackson road. He himself almost instantly fell severely wounded at the head of his division, and this attack also ended in a disastrous repulse, our men being unable to cross the crest just in front of the work, forming a natural glacis so swept by the enemy’s fire that in examining the position afterward I found this grass-crowned knoll shaved bald, every blade cut down to the roots as by a hoe.

  Our loss in the two assaults was nearly 4000, including many of our best and bravest officers. The heat, especially in the trenches, became almost insupportable, the stenches quite so, the brooks dried up, the creek lost itself in the pestilential swamp, the springs gave out, and the river fell, exposing to the tropical sun a wide margin of festering ooze. The illness and mortality were enormous. The labor of the siege, extending over a front of seven miles, pressed so severely upon our numbers, far too weak for such an undertaking, that the men were almost incessantly on duty; and as the numbers for duty diminished, of course the work fell the more heavily upon those that remained. From first to last we had nearly 20,000 men of all arms engaged before Port Hudson, yet the effective strength of infantry and artillery at no time exceeded 13,000, and at the last hardly reached 9000, while even of these every other man might well have gone on the sick-report if pride and duty had not held him to his post.

  Meanwhile Taylor with his forces, reorganized and reënforced until they again numbered four or five thousand, had crossed the Atchafalaya at Morgan’s Ferry and Berwick Bay, surprised and captured the garrisons at Brashear City and Bayou Bœuf almost with
out resistance, menaced Donaldsonville, carried havoc and panic through the La Fourche, and finally planted batteries on the Mississippi to cut off our communication with New Orleans. At Donaldsonville, however, an assault by about 1500 Texans was repulsed by about 200 men, including convalescents, under Major J. D. Bullen, 28th Maine,5 and at La Fourche Crossing Taylor’s forces suffered another check at the hands of a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Stickney, 47th Massachusetts. Otherwise Taylor, whose operations were conducted with marked skill and vigor, had everything his own way. In New Orleans great was the excitement when it was known that the Confederate forces were on the west bank within a few miles of the city; but fortunately the illness that had deprived Emory’s division of its commander in the field had given New Orleans a commander of a courage and firmness that now, as always, rose with the approach of danger, with whom difficulties diminished as they drew near, and whose character had earned the respect of the inhabitants. Still by the 4th of July things were at such a pass that General Emory plainly told General Banks he must choose between Port Hudson and New Orleans. However, Banks was convinced that Port Hudson must be in his hands within three days.