Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  His confidence was justified. At last on the 7th of July, when the sap-head was within 16 feet of the priest-cap, and a storming party of 1000 volunteers had been organized, led by the intrepid Birge, and all preparations had been made for springing two heavily charged mines, word came from Grant that Vicksburg had surrendered. Instantly an aide was sent to the “general-of-the-trenches” bearing duplicates in “flimsy” of a note from the adjutant-general announcing the good news. One of these he was directed to toss into the Confederate lines. Some one acknowledged the receipt by calling back, “That’s another damned Yankee lie!” Once more the cheers of our men rang out as the word passed, and again the forest echoed with the strains of the “Star-spangled Banner” from the long-silent bands. Firing died away, the men began to mingle in spite of everything, and about 2 o’clock next morning came the long, gray envelope that meant surrender.

  Formalities alone remained; these were long, but the articles were signed on the afternoon of the 8th; a moment later a long train of wagons loaded with rations for the famished garrison moved down the Clinton road, and on the morning of the 9th a picked force of eight regiments, under Brigadier-General George L. Andrews, marched in with bands playing and colors flying; the Confederates stacked arms and hauled down their flag, and the National ensign floated in its stead. By General Banks’s order, General Gardner’s sword was returned to him in the presence of his men in recognition of the heroic defense—a worthy act, well merited.

  But, stout as the defense had been, the besiegers had on their part displayed some of the highest qualities of the soldier; among these valor in attack, patient endurance of privation, suffering, and incredible toil, and perseverance under discouragement. And to defenders and besiegers it is alike unjust to say, even though it has been said by the highest authority, that Port Hudson surrendered only because Vicksburg had fallen. The simple truth is that Port Hudson surrendered because its hour had come. The garrison was literally starving. With less than 3000 famished men in line, powerful mines beneath the salients, and a last assault about to be delivered at 10 paces, what else was left to do?

  With the post there fell into our hands 6340 prisoners, 20 heavy guns, 31 field-pieces, about 7500 muskets, and two river steamers.6 Many of the guns were ruined, some had been struck over and over again, and the depots and magazines were empty. The garrison also lost about 500 prisoners or deserters before the surrender, and about 700 killed and wounded. Our loss was 707 killed, 3336 wounded, 319 missing,—total, 4362.

  The army was greatly assisted by Admiral Farragut’s fleet above and below Port Hudson, and directly by two fine batteries forming part of the siege-works, manned by seamen under Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry.

  While the ceremonies of capitulation were going on, Weitzel led Augur’s division aboard the transports and hastened to Donaldsonville to drive Taylor out of the La Fourche. Grover followed. On the 13th, at Koch’s plantation, Green and Major suddenly fell upon Weitzel’s advance, composed of Dudley’s brigade and Dwight’s under Colonel Joseph S. Morgan, and handled them roughly. We lost 50 killed, 223 wounded, 186 missing,—total, 465,—as well as 2 guns, while Green’s loss was 3 killed and 30 wounded. As the gun-boats could not be got round to Berwick Bay in time to cut off Taylor, he crossed Berwick Bay on the 21st with all his spoils that he could carry away and took post on the lower Teche, until in September the Nineteenth Corps, reorganized and placed under the command of Franklin, once more advanced into the Teche country and drove him back toward Opelousas.

  After the fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson, Grant sent Herron’s division, and the Thirteenth Corps under Ord, to report to Banks. Banks went to Vicksburg to consult with Grant, and Grant came to New Orleans; together they agreed with Admiral Farragut in urging an immediate attack on Mobile. This was the only true policy; success would have been easy and must have influenced powerfully the later campaigns that centered about Chattanooga and Atlanta; but for reasons avowedly political rather than military, the Government ordered, instead, an attempt to “plant the flag at some point in Texas.” The unaccountable failure at Sabine Pass followed,7 then the occupation of the Texan coast by the Thirteenth Corps. So the favorable moment passed and 1863 wore away.

  THE BAGGAGE TRAIN OF GENERAL AUGUR’S DIVISION CROSSING BAYOU MONTECINO ON THE MARCH TO PORT HUDSON. FROM A SKETCH MADE AT THE TIME.

  * * *

  1 These reënforcements finally included 39 regiments of infantry (of which 22 were 9-months’ men), six batteries of artillery, and one battalion of cavalry.

  2 On the 21st of December three companies of the 42d Massachusetts, under Colonel Isaac S. Burrell, were dispatched from New Orleans, without disembarking. Holcomb’s 2d Vermont battery was sent with them, but, waiting for its horses to arrive, did not go ashore. Burrell landed at Kuhn’s wharf on the 24th, took nominal possession of the town, but really occupied only the wharf itself, protected by barricades and the 32 guns of the fleet under Commander W. B. Renshaw. Major-General J. B. Magruder, who had been barely a month in command of the district of Texas, had directed his attention as soon as he arrived to the defenseless condition of the coast, menaced as it was by the blockading fleet; thus it happened that Burrell’s three companies found themselves confronted by two brigades (Scurry’s and Sibley’s, under Colonel Reily), an artillery regiment, 14 heavy guns, and 14 field-pieces. Magruder had also caused two improvised gun-boats to be equipped under an old California steamboat man, Captain Leon Smith; these were the Bayou City, Captain Henry Lubbock, and Neptune, Captain Sangster. Early in the morning of the 1st of January Magruder, having perfected his plans, under cover of a heavy artillery fire, assaulted the position of the 42d Massachusetts with two storming parties of 300 and 500 men respectively, led by Colonels Green, Bagby, and Cook, with the remainder of the troops under Brigadier-General W. R. Scurry in support. A sharp fight followed, but the defenders had the concentrated fire of the fleet to protect them; the scaling-ladders proved too short to reach the wharf, and as day began to break the assailants were about to draw off, when suddenly the Confederate gun-boats appeared on the scene, and in a few moments turned the defeat into a signal victory. The Neptune was disabled and sunk by the Harriet Lane; the Harriet Lane herself was boarded and captured by the Bayou City; the Westfield ran aground and was blown up by her gallant commander, and soon the white flag, first displayed on the Harriet Lane, was flying from all the fleet. Thereupon Burrell surrendered. The Confederates ceased firing on him as soon as they perceived his signal; but the navy, observing that the firing on shore went on for some time, notwithstanding the naval truce, thought it had been violated; accordingly the Clifton, Owasco, and Saxon put to sea, preceded by the army transport steamers, the Saxon, which had brought the three unlucky companies of the 42d, and the Mary A. Boardman, with Holcomb’s 2d Vermont battery still aboard. The Confederates lost 26 killed and 117 wounded; the Union troops 5 killed and 15 wounded.

  —R.B.I.

  3 A Union gun-boat captured by the Confederates and afterward set on fire and destroyed by them, as mentioned above.—EDITORS.

  4 Augur lost 15 killed, 71 wounded, 14 missing,—total, 100; the Confederates, 89.

  5 Aided by the gun-boats Princess Royal, Commander M. B. Woolsey, and Winona, Lieutenant-Commander A. W. Weaver.

  6 Starlight and Red Chief, found aground in Thompson’s Creek, floated and brought into the river by the ingenuity and skill of Major Joseph Bailey, 4th Wisconsin, whose success here led to its repetition on the Red River the next year, when Admiral Porter’s fleet was rescued.—R.B.I.

  7 In September a detachment of the Nineteenth Corps, under Franklin, convoyed by the navy, was sent by sea to effect a landing at Sabine Pass, and thence operate against Houston and Galveston; but the gun-boats meeting with a disaster in an encounter with the Confederate batteries, the expedition returned to New Orleans without having accomplished anything.—R.B.I.

  CHAPTER 11

  CHICKAMAUGA—tHE GREAT BATTLE OF THE WEST.1r />
  Daniel H. Hill, Lieutenant-General, C.S.A.

  On the 13th of July, 1863, while in charge of the defenses of Richmond and Petersburg and the Department of North Carolina, I received an unexpected order to go West. I was seated in a yard of a house in the suburbs of Richmond (the house belonging to Mr. Poe, a relative of the poet), when President Davis, dressed in a plain suit of gray and attended by a small escort in brilliant uniform, galloped up and said: “Rosecrans is about to advance upon Bragg; I have found it necessary to detail Hardee to defend Mississippi and Alabama. His corps is without a commander. I wish you to command it.” “I cannot do that,” I replied, “as General Stewart ranks me.” “I can cure that,” answered Mr. Davis, “by making you a lieutenant-general. Your papers will be ready to-morrow. When can you start?” “In twenty-four hours,” was the reply. Mr. Davis gave his views on the subject, some directions in regard to matters at Chattanooga, and then left in seemingly good spirits.2

  CONFEDERATE LINE OF BATTLE IN THE CHICKAMAUGA WOODS.

  The condition of our railroads even in 1863 was wretched, so bad that my staff and myself concluded to leave our horses in Virginia and resupply ourselves in Atlanta. On the 19th of July I reported to General Bragg at Chattanooga. I had not seen him since I had been the junior lieutenant in his battery of artillery at Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1845. The other two lieutenants were George H. Thomas and John F. Reynolds. We four had been in the same mess there. Reynolds had been killed at Gettysburg twelve days before my new assignment. Thomas, the strongest and most pronounced Southerner of the four, was now Rosecrans’s lieutenant. It was a strange casting of lots that three messmates of Corpus Christi should meet under such changed circumstances at Chickamauga.

  My interview with General Bragg at Chattanooga was not satisfactory. He was silent and reserved and seemed gloomy and despondent. He had grown prematurely old since I saw him last, and showed much nervousness. His relations with his next in command (General Polk) and with some others of his subordinates were known not to be pleasant. His many retreats, too, had alienated the rank and file from him, or at least had taken away that enthusiasm which soldiers feel for the successful general, and which makes them obey his orders without question, and thus wins for him other successes. The one thing that a soldier never fails to understand is victory, and the commander who leads him to victory will be adored by him whether that victory has been won by skill or by blundering, by the masterly handling of a few troops against great odds, or by the awkward use of overwhelming numbers. Long before Stonewall Jackson had risen to the height of his great fame, he had won the implicit confidence of his troops in all his movements. “Where are you going?” one inquired of the “foot cavalry” as they were making the usual stealthy march to the enemy’s rear. “We don’t know, but old Jack does,” was the laughing answer. This trust was the fruit of past victories, and it led to other and greater achievements.

  I was assigned to Hardee’s old corps, consisting of Cleburne’s and Stewart’s divisions, and made my headquarters at Tyner’s Station, a few miles east of Chattanooga on the Knoxville railroad. The Federals soon made their appearance at Bridgeport, Alabama, and I made arrangements to guard the crossings of the Tennessee north of Chattanooga.3 On Fast Day, August 21st, while religious services were being held in town, the enemy appeared on the opposite side of the river and began throwing shells into the houses.4 Rev. B. M. Palmer, D.D., of New Orleans, was in the act of prayer when a shell came hissing near the church. He went on calmly with his petition to the Great Being “who rules in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of earth,” but at its close, the preacher, opening his eyes, noticed a perceptible diminution of his congregation. Some women and children were killed and wounded by the shelling. Our pickets and scouts had given no notice of the approach of the enemy. On Sunday, August 30th, we learned through a citizen that McCook’s corps had crossed at Caperton’s Ferry, some thirty-five miles below Chattanooga, the movement having begun on the 29th. Thomas’s corps was also crossing at or near the same point.

  The want of information at General Bragg’s headquarters was in striking contrast with the minute knowledge General Lee always had of every operation in his front, and I was most painfully impressed with the feeling that it was to be a hap-hazard campaign on our part.5 Rosecrans had effected the crossing of the river (Thomas’s corps) and had occupied Will’s Valley, between Sand and Lookout mountains, without opposition, and had established his headquarters at Trenton. Lookout Mountain now interposed to screen all the enemy’s movements from our observation.6

  On the 7th of September Rosecrans sent McCook to cross Lookout Mountain at Winston’s Gap, forty-six miles south of Chattanooga, and to occupy Alpine, east of the mountains. Thomas was ordered to cross the mountain at Stevens’s and Cooper’s gaps, some twenty-five miles from Chattanooga, and to occupy McLemore’s Cove on the east, a narrow valley between Lookout and Pigeon mountains. Pigeon Mountain is parallel to the former, not so high and rugged, and does not extend so far north, ending eight miles south of Chattanooga. Crittenden was left in Will’s Valley to watch Chattanooga.

  General Bragg had had some inclosed works constructed at Chattanooga, and the place could have been held by a division against greatly superior forces. By holding Chattanooga in that way, Crittenden’s corps would have been neutralized, and a union between Rosecrans and Burnside would have been impossible. Moreover, the town was the objective point of the campaign, and to lose it was virtually to lose all east Tennessee south of Knoxville. If Bragg knew at the time of the prospective help coming to him from the Army of Northern Virginia, it was of still more importance to hold the town, that he might be the more readily in communication with Longstreet on his arrival. Under similar circumstances General Lee detached Early’s division to hold the heights of Fredericksburg, and neutralized Sedgwick’s corps, while he marched to attack Hooker at Chancellorsville. Bragg, however, may have felt too weak to spare even one division from his command. Whatever may have been his motive, he completely abandoned the town by the 8th, and Crittenden took possession of it next day. My corps,7 consisting of Breckinridge’s and Cleburne’s divisions, had led in the withdrawal, and was halted at Lafayette, twenty-two miles from, and almost south of, Chattanooga, and east of Pigeon Mountain, which separates it from McLemore’s Cove, into which the columns of Thomas began to pour on the 9th. I placed Breckinridge in charge of the Reserve Artillery and the wagon-train at Lafayette, while Cleburne was sent to hold the three gaps in Pigeon Mountain, Catlett’s on the north, Dug in the center, and Blue Bird on the south. Cleburne pitched his tent by the road leading to the center gap. Notwithstanding the occupation of Chattanooga, Rosecrans did not attempt to concentrate his forces there, but persisted in pushing two of his corps to our left and rear.

  As the failure of Bragg to beat Rosecrans in detail has been the subject of much criticism, it may be well to look into the causes of the failure. So far as the commanding general was concerned, the trouble with him was: first, lack of knowledge of the situation; second, lack of personal supervision of the execution of his orders. No general ever won a permanent fame who was wanting in these grand elements of success, knowledge of his own and his enemy’s condition, and personal superintendence of operations on the field.8

  The failure to attack Negley’s division in the cove on September 10th9 was owing to Bragg’s ignorance of the condition of the roads, the obstructions at Dug Gap, and the position of the enemy. He attributed the failure to make the attack on the same force on the 11th to the major-general [Hindman] who had it in charge,—whether justly or unjustly, I do not know.10 All day of the 11th my signal corps and scouts at Blue Bird Gap reported the march of a heavy column to our left and up the cove. These reports were forwarded to the commanding general, but were not credited by him.

  On the morning of the 13th I was notified that Polk was to attack Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, and the Reserve Artillery and baggage trains were specially intrusted to
my corps. Breckinridge guarded the roads leading south from Lafayette, and Cleburne guarded the gaps in Pigeon Mountain. The attack was not made at Lee and Gordon’s Mills, and this was the second of the lost opportunities. Bragg in his official report, speaking of this failure, quotes his first order to Polk to attack, dated 6 P.M. September 12th, Lafayette, Ga.:

  “GENERAL: I inclose you a dispatch from General Pegram. This presents you a fine opportunity of striking Crittenden in detail, and I hope you will avail yourself of it at daylight to-morrow. This division crushed, and the others are yours. We can then turn again on the force in the cove. Wheeler’s cavalry will move on Wilder so as to cover your right. I shall be delighted to hear of your success.”

  This order was twice repeated at short intervals, the last dispatch being:

  “The enemy is approaching from the south—and it is highly important that your attack in the morning should be quick and decided. Let no time be lost.”

  The rest of the story is thus told by General Bragg:

  “At 11 P.M. a dispatch was received from the general [Polk] stating that he had taken up a strong position for defense, and requesting that he should be heavily reënforced. He was promptly ordered not to defer his attack,—his force being already numerically superior to the enemy,—and was reminded that his success depended upon the promptness and rapidity of his movements. He was further informed that Buckner’s corps would be moved within supporting distance the next morning. Early on the 13th I proceeded to the front, ahead of Buckner’s command, to find that no advance had been made upon the enemy and that his forces [the enemy’s] had formed a junction and recrossed the Chickamauga. Again disappointed, immediate measures were taken to place our trains and limited supplies in safe positions, when all our forces were concentrated along the Chickamauga threatening the enemy in front.”