Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  They immediately sent staff-officers to hurry the men forward, and moved off with their troops at a quick pace in the direction of the enemy. I sent several of my staff with orders to Stewart and Johnson to make all possible haste. Meantime I rode to one side and looked on at Cleburne’s division, followed by the remainder of Cheatham’s corps, as it marched by, seemingly ready for battle.

  Within about one-half hour from the time Cheatham left me skirmishing began with the enemy, when I rode forward to a point nearer the pike, and again sent a staff-officer to Stewart and Johnson to push forward. At the same time I dispatched a messenger to General Cheatham to lose no time in gaining possession of the pike at Spring Hill. It was reported back that he was about to do so.6

  MAP OF THE BATTLE-FIELD OF FRANKLIN, TENNESSEE. FROM THE “BIVOUAC” FOR JUNE, 1865.

  Listening attentively to the fire of the skirmishers in that direction I discovered there was no continued roar of musketry, and being aware of the quick approach of darkness, about 4 o’clock at that season of the year, I became somewhat uneasy, and again ordered an officer to go to General Cheatham, inform him that his supports were very near at hand; that he must attack at once, if he had not already so done, and take and hold possession of the pike. Shortly afterward I intrusted another officer with the same message, and, if my memory is not treacherous, finally requested the governor of Tennessee, Isham G. Harris, to hasten forward and impress upon Cheatham the importance of action without delay. I knew no large force of the enemy could be at Spring Hill, as couriers reported Schofield’s main body still in front of Lee, at Columbia, up to a late hour in the day. I thought it probable that Cheatham had taken possession of Spring Hill without encountering material opposition, or had formed line across the pike, north of the town, and intrenched without coming in serious contact with the enemy, which would account for the little musketry heard in his direction. However, to ascertain the truth, I sent an officer to ask Cheatham if he held the pike, and to inform him of the arrival of Stewart, whose corps I intended to throw on his left, in order to assail the Federals in flank that evening or the next morning, as they approached and formed to attack Cheatham. At this juncture the last messenger returned with the report that the road had not been taken possession of. General Stewart was then ordered to proceed to the right of Cheatham and place his corps across the pike north of Spring Hill.

  By this hour, however, twilight was upon us, when General Cheatham rode up in person. I at once directed Stewart to halt, and, turning to Cheatham, I exclaimed with deep emotion, as I felt the golden opportunity fast slipping from me, “General, why in the name of God have you not attacked the enemy and taken possession of that pike?” He replied that the line looked a little too long for him, and that Stewart should first form on his right.7 I could hardly believe it possible that this brave old soldier, who had given proof of such courage and ability upon so many hard-fought fields, would even make such a report. After leading him within full view of the enemy, and pointing out to him the Federals retreating in great haste and confusion along the pike, and then giving explicit orders to attack, I would as soon have expected midday to turn into darkness as for him to have disobeyed my orders. I then asked General Cheatham whether or not Stewart’s corps, if formed on the right, would extend across the pike. He answered in the affirmative. Guides were at once furnished to point out Cheatham’s right to General Stewart, who was ordered to form thereon, with his right extending across the pike. Darkness, however, which was increased by large shade-trees in that vicinity, soon closed upon us, and Stewart’s corps, after much annoyance, went into bivouac for the night, near, but not across, the pike, at about 11 or 12 o’clock.

  It was reported to me about this hour that the enemy was marching along the road, almost under the light of the camp-fires of the main body of the army. I sent anew to General Cheatham to know if at least a line of skirmishers could not be advanced, in order to throw the Federals in confusion, to delay their march, and allow us a chance to attack in the morning. Nothing was done. The Federals, with immense wagon-trains, were permitted to march by us the remainder of the night, within gunshot of our lines. I could not succeed in arousing the troops to action, when one good division would have sufficed to do the work. One good division, I reassert, could have routed that portion of the enemy which was at Spring Hill; could have taken possession of and formed line across the road; and thus could have made it an easy matter to Stewart’s corps, Johnson’s division, and Lee’s two divisions, from Columbia, to have enveloped, routed, and captured Schofield’s army that afternoon and the ensuing day. General Forrest gallantly opposed the enemy farther down to our right to the full extent of his power; beyond this effort nothing whatever was done, although never was a grander opportunity offered to utterly rout and destroy the Federal army. Had I dreamed for one moment that Cheatham would have failed to give battle, or at least to take position across the pike and force the enemy to assault him, I would myself have ridden to the front and led the troops into action.8

  In connection with this grave misfortune, I must here record an act of candor and nobility upon the part of General Cheatham, which proves him to be equally generous-hearted and brave. I was, necessarily, much pained by the disappointment suffered, and, a few days later, telegraphed to Richmond, to withdraw my previous recommendation for his promotion, and to request that another be assigned to the command of his corps. Before the receipt of a reply, this officer called at my headquarters—then at the residence of Mr. Overton, six miles from Nashville—and, standing in my presence, spoke an honest avowal of his error, in the acknowledgment that he felt we had lost a brilliant opportunity at Spring Hill to deal the enemy a crushing blow, and that he was greatly to blame. I telegraphed and wrote to the War Department to withdraw my application for his removal, in the belief that, inspired with an ambition to retrieve his shortcoming, he would prove in the future doubly zealous in the service of his country. The following are the dispatches above referred to:

  “HEADQUARTERS, six miles from Nashville, on Franklin Pike, “December 7, 1864.

  “Hon. J. A. Seddon:

  “I withdraw my recommendation in favor of the promotion of Major-General Cheatham, for reasons which I will write more fully.

  “J. B. HOOD, General.”

  “HEADQUARTERS, six miles from Nashville, on Franklin Pike, “December 8, 1864.

  “Hon. J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War; General G. T. Beauregard, “Macon, Ga.:

  “A good lieutenant-general should be sent here at once to command the corps now commanded by Major-General Cheatham. I have no one to recommend for the position.

  “J. B. HOOD, General.”

  “HEADQUARTERS, six miles from Nashville, on Franklin Pike, “December 8, 1864.

  “Hon. J. A. Seddon:

  “Major-General Cheatham made a failure on the 30th of November which will be a lesson to him. I think it best he should remain in his position for the present. I withdraw my telegrams of yesterday and to-day on this subject.

  “J. B. HOOD, General.”

  On the 11th of December I wrote the Hon. Mr. Seddon:

  “Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches much blame to himself. While his error lost so much to the country, it has been a severe lesson to him, by which he will profit in the future. In consideration of this, and of his previous conduct, I think that it is best that he should retain for the present the command he now holds.”9

  The best move in my career as a soldier I was thus destined to behold come to naught. The discovery that the army, after a forward march of one hundred and eighty miles, was still, seemingly, unwilling to accept battle unless under the protection of breastworks, caused me to experience grave concern. In my inmost heart I questioned whether or not I would ever succeed in eradicating this evil. It seemed to me I had exhausted every means in the power of one man to remove this stumbling-block to the Army of Tennessee. On the morning of the 30th of Nov
ember, Lee was on the march up the Franklin pike, when the main body of the army, at Spring Hill, awoke to find the Federals had disappeared.

  I hereupon decided, before the enemy would be able to reach his stronghold at Nashville, to make that same afternoon another and final effort to overtake and rout him, and drive him into the Big Harpeth River at Franklin, since I could no longer hope to get between him and Nashville, by reason of the short distance from Franklin to that city, and the advantage which the Federals enjoyed in the possession of the direct road.

  At early dawn the troops were put in motion in the direction of Franklin, marching as rapidly as possible to overtake the enemy before he crossed the Big Harpeth, eighteen miles from Spring Hill. Lieutenant-General Lee had crossed Duck River after dark the night previous, and, in order to reach Franklin, was obliged to march a distance of thirty miles. The head of his column arrived at Spring Hill at 9 A.M. on the 30th, and, after a short rest, followed in the wake of the main body.

  MAJOR-GENERAL PATRICK R. CLEBURNE, C.S.A., KILLED AT FRANKLIN, NOVEMBER 30, 1864. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  Stewart’s corps was first in order of march; Cheatham followed immediately, and Lieutenant-General Lee in rear. Within about three miles of Franklin, the enemy was discovered on the ridge over which passes the turnpike. As soon as the Confederate troops began to deploy, and skirmishers were thrown forward, the Federals withdrew slowly to the environs of the town.

  It was about 3 P.M. when Lieutenant-General Stewart moved to the right of the pike and began to establish his position in front of the enemy. Major-General Cheatham’s corps, as it arrived in turn, filed off to the left of the road, and was also disposed in line of battle. The artillery was instructed to take no part in the engagement, on account of the danger to which women and children in the village would be exposed.10 General Forrest was ordered to post cavalry on both flanks, and, if the assault proved successful, to complete the ruin of the enemy by capturing those who attempted to escape in the direction of Nashville. Lee’s corps, as it arrived, was held in reserve, owing to the lateness of the hour and my inability, consequently, to post it on the extreme left. Schofield’s position was rendered favorable for defense by open ground in front, and temporary intrenchments which the Federals had had time to throw up, notwithstanding the Confederate forces had marched in pursuit with all possible speed. At one or two points, along a short space, a slight abatis had been hastily constructed, by felling some small locust saplings in the vicinity.

  Soon after Cheatham’s corps was massed on the left, Major-General Cleburne came to me where I was seated on my horse in rear of the line, and asked permission to form his division in two, or, if I remember correctly, three lines for the assault. I at once granted his request, stating that I desired the Federals to be driven into the river in their immediate rear, and directing him to advise me as soon as he had completed the new disposition of his troops. Shortly afterward Cheatham and Stewart reported all in readiness for action, and received orders to drive the enemy from his position into the river at all hazards. About that time Cleburne returned, and, expressing himself with an enthusiasm which he had never before betrayed in our intercourse, said, “General, I am ready, and have more hope in the final success of our cause than I have had at any time since the first gun was fired.” I replied, “God grant it!” He turned and moved at once toward the head of his division; a few moments thereafter he was lost to my sight in the tumult of battle. These last words, spoken to me by this brave and distinguished soldier, I have often recalled; they can never leave my memory, as within forty minutes after he had uttered them he lay lifeless upon or near the breastworks of the foe.

  The two corps advanced in battle array at about 4 P.M., and soon swept away the first line of the Federals, who were driven back upon the main line. At this moment resounded a concentrated roar of musketry, which recalled to me some of the deadliest struggles in Virginia, and which now proclaimed that the possession of Nashville was once more dependent upon the fortunes of war. The conflict continued to rage with intense fury; our troops succeeded in breaking the main line at one or more points, capturing and turning some of the guns on their opponents.

  FROM THE “BIVOUAC” FOR AUGUST, 1885.

  Just at this critical moment of the battle, a brigade of the enemy, reported to have been Stanley’s,11 gallantly charged, and restored the Federal line, capturing at the same time about one thousand of our troops within the intrenchments. Still the ground was obstinately contested, and at several points upon the immediate sides of the breastworks the combatants endeavored to use the musket upon one another, by inverting and raising it perpendicularly, in order to fire; neither antagonist, at this juncture, was able to retreat without almost a certainty of death. It was reported that soldiers were even dragged from one side of the breastworks to the other by men reaching over hurriedly and seizing their enemy by the hair or the collar.

  Just before dark Edward Johnson’s division of Lee’s corps moved gallantly to the support of Cheatham; although it made a desperate charge and succeeded in capturing three stand of colors, it did not effect a permanent breach in the line of the enemy. Unfortunately, the two remaining divisions could not become engaged owing to the obscurity of night. The struggle continued with more or less violence until 9 P.M., when skirmishing and much desultory firing followed until about 3 A.M. the ensuing morning. The enemy then withdrew, leaving his dead and wounded upon the field. Thus terminated one of the fiercest conflicts of the war.

  Nightfall, which closed in upon us so soon after the beginning of the battle, prevented the formation and participation of Lee’s entire corps on the extreme left. This, it may safely be asserted, saved Schofield’s army from destruction. I might, with equal assurance, assert that had Lieutenant-General Lee been in advance at Spring Hill the previous afternoon Schofield’s army never would have passed that point.

  Major-General Cleburne had been distinguished for his admirable conduct upon many fields, and his loss at this moment was irreparable. He was a man of equally quick perception and strong character, and was, especially in one respect, in advance of many of our people. He possessed the boldness and the wisdom earnestly to advocate, at an early period of the war, the freedom of the negro and the enrollment of the young and able-bodied men of that race. This stroke of policy and additional source of strength to our armies would, in my opinion, have given us our independence.

  After the failure of my cherished plan to crush Schofield’s army before it reached its strongly fortified position around Nashville, I remained with an effective force of only 23,053.12 I was therefore well aware of our inability to attack the Federals in their new stronghold with any hope of success, although Schofield’s troops had abandoned the field at Franklin, leaving their dead and wounded in our possession, and had hastened with considerable alarm into their fortifications—which latter information, in regard to their condition after the battle, I obtained through spies. I knew equally well that in the absence of the prestige of complete victory I could not venture with my small force to cross the Cumberland River into Kentucky, without first receiving reënforcements from the Trans-Mississippi Department. I felt convinced that the Tennesseans and Kentuckians would not join our forces, since we had failed in the first instance to defeat the Federal army and capture Nashville. The President was still urgent in his instructions relative to the transference of troops to the Army of Tennessee from Texas, and I daily hoped to receive the glad tidings of their safe passage across the Mississippi River.

  MAJOR-GENERAL J. B. STEEDMAN. FROM A PHOTOGRAPH.

  Thus, unless strengthened by these long-looked-for reënforcements, the only remaining chance of success in the campaign, at this juncture, was to take position, intrench about Nashville, and await Thomas’s attack, which, if handsomely repulsed, might afford us an opportunity to follow up our advantage on the spot, and enter the city on the heels of the enemy.

  I could not afford to turn southward, unless for the special purpo
se of forming a junction with the expected reënforcements from Texas, and with the avowed intention to march back again upon Nashville. In truth, our army was in that condition which rendered it more judicious the men should face a decisive issue rather than retreat—in other words, rather than renounce the honor of their cause, without having made a last and manful effort to lift up the sinking fortunes of the Confederacy.

  I therefore determined to move upon Nashville, to intrench, to accept the chances of reënforcements from Texas, and, even at the risk of an attack in the meantime by overwhelming numbers, to adopt the only feasible means of defeating the enemy with my own reduced numbers, viz., to await his attack, and, if favored by success, to follow him into his works. I was apprised of each accession to Thomas’s army, but was still unwilling to abandon the ground as long as I saw a shadow of probability of assistance from the Trans-Mississippi Department, or of victory in battle; and, as I have just remarked, the troops would, I believed, return better satisfied even after defeat if, in grasping at the last straw, they felt that a brave and vigorous effort had been made to save the country from disaster. Such, at the time, was my opinion, which I have since had no reason to alter.