Hearts Touched by Fire

by Harold Holzer

  In accordance with these convictions I ordered the army to move forward on the 1st of December in the direction of Nashville; Lee’s corps marched in advance, followed by Stewart’s and Cheatham’s corps, and the troops bivouacked that night in the vicinity of Brentwood. On the morning of the 2d the march was resumed, and line of battle formed in front of Nashville. Lee’s corps was placed in the center and across the Franklin pike; Stewart occupied the left and Cheatham the right—their flanks extending as near the Cumberland as possible, whilst Forrest’s cavalry filled the gap between them and the river.

  General Rousseau occupied Murfreesboro’ in rear of our right, with about eight thousand men, heavily intrenched. General Bate’s division and Sears’s and Brown’s brigades were ordered, on the 5th, to report at that point to General Forrest, who was instructed to watch closely that detachment of the enemy. The same day information was received of the capture of 100 prisoners, two pieces of artillery, 20 wagons and teams by Forrest’s cavalry at La Vergne; of the capture and destruction of three block houses on the Chattanooga Railroad by Bate’s division; and of the seizure the day previous by Chalmers of two transports on the Cumberland River with 300 mules on board.

  We had in our possession two engines and several cars, which ran as far south as Pulaski. Dispatches were sent to Generals Beauregard and Maury to repair the railroad from Corinth to Decatur, as our trains would be running in a day or two to the latter point. This means of transportation was of great service in furnishing supplies to the army. When we reached middle Tennessee our troops had an abundance of provisions, although sorely in need of shoes and clothing.

  General Bate’s division was ordered to return to the army; Forrest was instructed to direct Palmer’s and Mercer’s infantry brigades to thoroughly intrench on Stewart’s Creek, or at La Vergne, according as he might deem more judicious, to constitute, with these troops and his cavalry, a force in observation of the enemy at Murfreesboro’, and, lastly, to send a brigade of cavalry to picket the river at Lebanon.

  The Federals having been reported to be massing cavalry at Edgefield, Forrest was instructed to meet and drive them back, if they attempted to cross the Cumberland. The same day, the 10th of December, Generals Stewart and Cheatham were directed to construct detached works in rear of their flanks, which rested near the river, in order to protect these flanks against an effort by the Federals to turn them. Although every possible exertion was made by these officers, the works were not completed when, on the 15th, the Federal army moved out and attacked both flanks, whilst the main assault was directed against our left. It was my intention to have made these defenses self-sustaining, but time was not allowed, as the enemy attacked on the morning of the 15th. Throughout that day they were repulsed at all points of the general line with heavy loss, and only succeeded toward evening in capturing the infantry outposts on our left, and with them the small force together with the artillery posted in these unfinished works. Finding that the main movement of the Federals was directed against our left, the chief engineer was instructed carefully to select a line in prolongation of the left flank; Cheatham’s corps was withdrawn from the right during the night of the 15th and posted on the left of Stewart—Cheatham’s left resting near the Brentwood Hills. The men were ordered to construct breastworks there during that same night.

  The morning of the 16th found us with Lee’s right on Overton’s Hill. At an early hour the enemy made a general attack along our front, and were again and again repulsed at all points with heavy loss, especially in Lee’s front. About 3:30 P.M. the Federals concentrated a number of guns against a portion of our line, which passed over a mound on the left of our center, and which had been occupied during the night. This point was favorable for massing troops for an assault under cover of artillery. Accordingly the enemy availed himself of the advantage presented, massed a body of men—apparently one division—at the base of this mound, and, under the fire of artillery, which prevented our men from raising their heads above the breastworks, made a sudden and gallant charge up to and over our intrenchments. Our line, thus pierced, gave way; soon thereafter it broke at all points, and I beheld for the first and only time a Confederate army abandon the field in confusion. I was seated upon my horse not far in rear when the breach was effected, and soon discovered that all hope to rally the troops was vain.

  I did not, I might say, anticipate a break at that time, as our forces up to that moment had repulsed the Federals at every point, and were waving their colors in defiance, crying out to the enemy, “Come on, come on.” Just previous to this fatal occurrence I had matured the movement for the next morning. The enemy’s right flank, by this hour, stood in air some six miles from Nashville, and I had determined to withdraw my entire force during the night, and attack this exposed flank in rear. I could safely have done so, as I still had open a line of retreat.

  The day before the rout, the artillery posted in the detached works had been captured; a number of guns in the main line were abandoned for the reason that the horses could not be brought forward in time to remove them. Thus the total number of guns captured amounted to fifty-four. We had fortunately still remaining a sufficient number of pieces of artillery for the equipment of the army, since, it will be remembered, I had taken with me at the outset of the campaign a large reserve of artillery to use against gun-boats. Our losses in killed and wounded in this engagement were comparatively small, as the troops were protected by breastworks.

  Order among the troops was in a measure restored at Brentwood, a few miles in rear of the scene of disaster, through the promptness and gallantry of Clayton’s division, which speedily formed and confronted the enemy, with Gibson’s brigade and McKenzie’s battery, of Fenner’s battalion, acting as rear-guard of the rear-guard. General Clayton displayed admirable coolness and courage that afternoon and the next morning in the discharge of his duties. Gibson, who evinced conspicuous gallantry and ability in the handling of his troops, succeeded, in concert with Clayton, in checking and staying the first and most dangerous shock which always follows immediately after a rout. The result was that even after the army passed the Big Harpeth, at Franklin, the brigades and divisions were marching in regular order.

  General S. D. Lee displayed his usual energy and skill in handling his troops on the 17th, whilst protecting the rear of our army. Unfortunately, in the afternoon he was wounded and forced to leave the field. General C. L. Stevenson then assumed command of Lee’s corps, and ably discharged his duties during the continuance of the retreat to and across the Tennessee River.

  General Walthall, one of the most able division commanders in the South, was here ordered to form a rear-guard with eight picked brigades and Forrest’s cavalry; the march was then resumed in the direction of Columbia, Stewart’s corps moving in front, followed by those of Cheatham and Stevenson. The army bivouacked in line of battle near Duck River on the night of the 18th.

  The following day we crossed the river and proceeded on different roads leading toward Bainbridge on the Tennessee. I entertained but little concern in regard to being further harassed by the enemy. I therefore continued to march leisurely, and arrived at Bainbridge on the 25th of December. The following day the march was continued in the direction of Tupelo, at which place Cheatham’s corps, the last in the line of march, went into camp on the 10th of January, 1865.

  On the 13th of January I sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War: “I request to be relieved from the command of this army.”

  Upon General Beauregard’s arrival at Tupelo, on the 14th of January, I informed him of my application to be relieved from the command of the army. I again telegraphed the authorities in Richmond, stating that the campaigns to the Alabama line and into Tennessee were my own conception; that I alone was responsible; that I had striven hard to execute them in such manner as to bring victory to our people, and at the same time repeated my desire to be relieved. The President finally complied with my request, and I bade farewell to the Army of Tennesse
e on the 23d of January, 1865, after having served with it somewhat in excess of eleven months, and having performed my duties to the utmost of my ability.

  * * *

  1 Taken by permission (and condensed) from General Hood’s work, “Advance and Retreat,” published by General G. T. Beauregard for the Hood Orphan Memorial Fund: New Orleans, 1880.

  2 On the 28th of September General Beauregard had been placed in control of the operations in the departments commanded by Generals Hood and Taylor.—EDITORS.

  3 “RICHMOND, NOVEMBER 7TH, 1884.

  “VIA MERIDIAN.

  “General J. B. Hood:

  “No troops can have been sent by Grant or Sheridan to Nashville. The latter has attempted to reënforce the former, but Early’s movements prevented it. That fact will assure you as to their condition and purposes. The policy of taking advantage of the reported division of his [Sherman’s] forces, where he cannot reunite his army, is too obvious to have been overlooked by you. I therefore take it for granted that you have not been able to avail yourself of that advantage during his march northward from Atlanta. Hope the opportunity will be offered before he is extensively recruited. If you keep his communications destroyed, he will most probably seek to concentrate for an attack on you. But if, as reported to you, he has sent a large part of his force southward, you may first beat him in detail, and, subsequently, without serious obstruction or danger to the country in your rear, advance to the Ohio River.

  “JEFFERSON DAVIS.”

  4 In the “Southern Bivouac” for April, 1885, General Cheatham, in an article dated November 30th, 1881, says, in reply to the above paragraph:

  “General John C. Brown states that ‘at or near Bear Creek the commanding general, apprehending an attack on our left flank, ordered your (Cheatham’s) corps, in its march from that point, to move in two parallel columns, so that it could come instantly into action in two lines of battle.’ General Brown’s division marched ‘five or six miles through fields and woods and over rough ground’ some four hundred yards to the right of the road, necessarily causing more or less delay. General Brown further states that ‘about the commencement of this movement, or soon afterward, by the orders of the commanding general in person, the whole of Gist’s and about one-half of Strahl’s brigade were detached for picket duty.’ ”—EDITORS.

  5 “At the hour named, 3 P.M., there was no movement of ‘wagons and men’ in the vicinity of Spring Hill. Moreover, from the crossing at Duck River to the point referred to by General Hood, the turnpike was never in view, nor could it be seen until I had moved up to within three-quarters of a mile of Spring Hill. Only a mirage would have made possible the vision.”

  —GENERAL CHEATHAM, in the “BIVOUAC.”

  6 “General Hood conveniently forgot to mention, in his account of this affair, the facts as to his orders to me at Rutherford’s Creek. And he also forgot that, at the very moment he claims to have sent staff-officers to the rear with orders to Stewart and Johnson to make all possible haste, Stewart was forming line of battle on the south side of Rutherford’s Creek, in pursuance of orders from him; nor did he remember that Stewart’s corps was not ordered forward until about dusk.”—GENERAL CHEATHAM, in the “BIVOUAC.”

  7 “Here, again, General Hood’s memory proved treacherous. As to the preliminary statements of this paragraph, I refer to that portion of my account which covers the doings of the hours from 4 to 6 P.M., during most of which time General Hood was on the ground and in frequent personal communication with me. The dramatic scene with which he embellishes his narrative of the day’s operations only occurred in the imagination of General Hood.”—GENERAL CHEATHAM, in the “BIVOUAC.”

  8 “The next order, in the shape of a suggestion that I had better have my pickets fire upon straggling troops passing along the pike in front of my left, was received and was immediately communicated to General Johnson, whose division was on my left and nearest the pike. This note from Major Mason, received about midnight, was the only communication I had from General Hood after leaving him at his quarters at Captain Thompson’s.”—GENERAL CHEATHAM, in the “BIVOUAC.”

  9 “In order to make clear what I have to say in this connection I will quote Governor Isham G. Harris:

  “ ‘Governor James D. Porter.

  “ ‘DEAR SIR:…General Hood, on the march to Franklin, spoke to me, in the presence of Major [Lieut.-Colonel A. P.] Mason [Assistant Adjutant-General, Army of Tennessee], of the failure of General Cheatham to make the night attack at Spring Hill, and censured him in severe terms for his disobedience of orders. Soon after this, being alone with Major Mason, the latter remarked that “General Cheatham was not to blame about the matter last night. I did not send him the order.” I asked if he had communicated the fact to General Hood. He answered that he had not. I replied that “it is due General Cheatham that this explanation should be made.” Thereupon Major Mason joined General Hood and gave him the information. Afterward General Hood said to me that he had done injustice to General Cheatham, and requested me to inform him that he held him blameless for the failure at Spring Hill, and on the day following the battle of Franklin I was informed by General Hood that he had addressed a note to General Cheatham assuring him that he did not censure him with the failure to attack.

  “ ‘VERY RESPECTFULLY,

  ISHAM G. HARRIS.

  “ ‘MEMPHIS, TENNESSEE, MAY 20, 1877.’

  “The first intimation made to me, from any source, that my conduct at Spring Hill, on the 29th of November, 1864, or during the night of that day, was the subject of criticism, was the receipt of a note from General Hood, written and received on the morning of the 3d of December. This is the communication referred to in the letter of Governor Harris, above quoted. This note was read, so far as I know, by only four persons besides myself—my chief-of-staff, James D. Porter, Governor Isham G. Harris, Major J. F. Cumming, of Georgia, and John C. Burch. Not having been in the habit of carrying a certificate of military character, I attached no special value to the paper, and it was lost somewhere during the campaign in North Carolina. Governor Porter and Major Cumming agree with me that the following was the substance of the note:

  “ ‘DECEMBER 3D, 1864.

  “ ‘MY DEAR GENERAL:

  “I do not censure you for the failure at Spring Hill. I am satisfied you are not responsible for it. I witnessed the splendid manner in which you delivered battle at Franklin on the 30th ult. I now have a higher estimate of you as a soldier than I ever had. You can rely upon my friendship.

  “YOURS VERY TRULY, J. B. HOOD, GENERAL.

  “ ‘To General B. F. Cheatham.’

  “On the morning of the 4th of December I went to the headquarters of General Hood, and, referring to his note and the criticism of my conduct that had evidently been made by some one. I said to him: ‘A great opportunity was lost at Spring Hill, but you know that I obeyed your orders there, as everywhere, literally and promptly.’ General Hood not only did not dissent from what I said, but exhibited the most cordial manner, coupled with confidence and friendship. The subject was never again alluded to by General Hood to myself, nor, so far as I know, to any one. When he wrote, under date of December 11th, 1864, to Mr. Seddon, that ‘Major-General Cheatham has frankly confessed the great error of which he was guilty, and attaches much blame to himself,’ he made a statement for which there was not the slightest foundation.”

  —GENERAL CHEATHAM, in the “BIVOUAC.”

  10 General J. D. Cox has pointed out that the reports confirm his own observation that Hood’s artillery was used in the battle.—EDITORS.

  11 Opdycke’s brigade of Stanley’s Fourth Corps, and the second line of Reilly’s brigade of Cox’s Twenty-third Corps.—EDITORS.

  12 As shown by Colonel Mason’s official report, made on the 10th of December, ten days after the battle, our effective strength was: Infantry, 18,242; artillery, 2465; cavalry, 2306,—total, 23,053. This last number, subtracted from 30,000, the strength of the army at Florence, sh
ows a total loss from all causes of 7547, from the 6th of November to the 10th of December, which period includes the engagements at Columbia, Franklin, and of Forrest’s cavalry. The enemy’s estimate of our losses, as well as of the number of Confederate colors captured, is erroneous, as will be seen by my telegram of December 15th to the Secretary of War:

  “The enemy claim that we lost thirty colors in the fight at Franklin. We lost thirteen, capturing nearly the same number. The men who bore ours were killed on or within the enemy’s interior line of works.”

  —J.B.H.

  General J. D. Cox states in his “Franklin and Nashville” that the capture of 22 colors by Reilly and 10 by Opdycke was officially reported and verified at the time.—EDITORS.

  CHAPTER 12

  SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

  Wesley Merritt, Major-General, U.S.V., Brigadier-General, U.S.A.

  Up to the summer of 1864 the Shenandoah Valley had not been to the Union armies a fortunate place either for battle or for strategy. A glance at the map will go far toward explaining this. The Valley has a general direction from south-west to north-east. The Blue Ridge Mountains, forming its eastern barrier, are well defined from the James River above Lynchburg to Harper’s Ferry on the Potomac. Many passes (in Virginia called “gaps”) made it easy of access from the Confederate base of operations; and, bordered by a fruitful country filled with supplies, it offered a tempting highway for an army bent on a flanking march on Washington or the invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania. For the Union armies, while it was an equally practicable highway, it led away from the objective, Richmond, and was exposed to flank attacks through the gaps from vantage-ground and perfect cover.