War Horse
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The failure of the French cavalry attack wasted the French cavalry, and it also wasted valuable time. The attacks had been a reprieve to the allied center because during the cavalry attacks the French artillery had been unable to fire. The artillery had been doing steady damage to the allied infantry all afternoon, and the infantry actually welcomed the French cavalry attacks because they were much less damaging than the artillery fire. As the hapless cavalry attacked the Mont St. Jean positions, the Prussian army arrived and steadily pushed back the French right flank. This forced Napoleon to move major portions of his Imperial Guard infantry to the right flank to prevent a total disaster from occurring. Thus, by the time the French cavalry failure became apparent, much of the Imperial Guard infantry reserve was committed to the right flank. The critical point in the battle had come, and the French reserve had dwindled to the battalions of the Old Guard—the most distinguished veterans of the Imperial Guard. When these elite troops were pushed up the bloody ridge late in the day and then decimated by allied artillery and musket fire, the battle was lost. A few battalions and squadrons of Imperial Guard infantry and cavalry bought enough time for Napoleon to flee, but the destruction of the Old Guard broke the back of the remaining French infantry formations who crumbled as Wellington ordered a general advance of the allied line and the Prussians enveloped the French right flank. Waterloo was a battle that was Napoleon’s to win until the final hours when the ally’s numbers and persistence overcame the valor of French arms.
The cavalry actions were critical to both the allied victory and the French defeat. The perfect timing and aggressiveness of the charge of the British heavy brigades during the early afternoon saved the allied center. The decisive defeat of d’Erlon’s corps by the two British brigades totally upset the French plan and changed the dynamics of the battle. It destroyed the French of infantry in the center, the sector that Napoleon had chosen as the main effort. Ney’s attempt to continue to attack the allied center with cavalry alone was a demonstration of total tactical incompetence. The ground and the deployment of forces all worked against the prosecution of an effective attack. Most important, there was no chance of creating the psychological conditions required for really effective cavalry action. The failed French cavalry attacks by almost 10,000 horsemen, contrasted with the success of 2,000 British cavalry, demonstrated that numbers alone were only a small element in the complex mixture that included psychology, speed, surprise, aggressiveness, and mass necessary for success. Of the two primary French commanders, Ney and Napoleon, neither developed a feel for the pulse of battle at Waterloo necessary to accurately recognize the window of opportunity when the decisive cavalry charge could win the day. Ney violated Napoleon’s own maximums for the use of cavalry by employing them in frontal attacks against unbroken infantry and without close infantry or artillery support.
Cavalry reached the height of its influence on battle during the period of the Napoleonic wars. Commanders understood that employment of cavalry at the proper moment could achieve decisive battle-winning results. Because of this, and despite the considerable investment of time and expense, the total numbers of cavalry during the Napoleonic period were huge.
Although cavalry was a battle-winning arm, success required that an expert employ it. Inattention to basic horse mastership could have devastating impacts on a campaign. More important, successful employment of cavalry required an intuitive understanding of the complex material and psychological effects of battle. Timing was key to cavalry’s success and required a professional understanding of movement rates, terrain effects, and horsemanship, as well as a feel for the morale of both the friendly and enemy forces. Austrian cavalry, though highly competent throughout the Napoleonic period, rarely had significant battlefield success because the Austrians lacked commanders who could employ the well-trained cavalry effectively. Commanders such as Kellermann of France and Uxbridge of England were worth dozens of regiments in combat.
The French army was the premier army of the period against which all others were measured. Its cavalry served as a similar yardstick. The French army historian John Etling paraphrased Archduke Charles of Austria’s accurate summary of the quality of French cavalry: “The French cavalry was, on the whole, poorly mounted and poorly equipped; its men were awkward horsemen. Yet it outclassed its opponent simply because, when the order ran and the trumpets clarioned ‘Charge!’ it put in its spurs and charged all out, charged home!”70 This critique is generally accurate but overstates French horsemanship, which was rarely well developed enough to charge at the gallop. Still, the archduke does capture the essence of cavalry in the Napoleonic period. What was most important about cavalry in combat was that it could win battles if properly employed. The Napoleonic era was the last era in which cavalry could make such a general claim of importance.
Chapter Eight
INDUSTRIAL WAR AND CAVALRY
There is many a war-horse who is more entitled to immortality than the man who rides him.—GENERAL ROBERT E. LEE
Professional military men only slowly recognized the changes in warfare that followed the Napoleonic period. A relatively long peace followed the 1815 Congress of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris. Armies studied the slowly emerging new technologies, but few had an immediate major military impact. These technologies included the railroad—the first rail lines opened in England in 1825, the telegraph—first successfully set up and used in 1844, and the steam engine adapted to ocean shipping in 1818. Two of the most significant purely military developments were the rifled musket, which first went into service in the early 1850s, and the breechloading rifle, which was issued to troops in Prussia in the early 1840s. After midcentury, several small-scale European conflicts hinted at the changing nature of war: the Crimean War (1853–56), the Italian wars of independence (1848–49; 1859), the wars of German unification (1864; 1866), and the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), but none of them were long enough or large enough to truly demonstrate how significantly warfare had changed. The American Civil War (1861–65) demonstrated the full impact of new technologies on the conduct of war at all levels, tactical through strategic. Unfortunately, except for a few observers, European armies ignored the American Civil War. However, that ignorance does not distract from the Civil War’s importance as a benchmark in military history.
THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR
The American Civil War was the first war where the levee en masse and national-ism of the Napoleonic period combined with the science of the industrial revolution. The physical scope and dimensions of this war rivaled anything fought on the European continent including the Napoleonic wars themselves. The two adversaries fielded armies numbering more than a million combatants, and the theater of operations was of continental dimensions. Despite the size of the war, the fact that it was thousands of miles from Europe, had mostly regional and domestic implications, and was fought by armies that were raised through a combination of volunteers and conscription, caused many European military professionals to dismiss it as unworthy of serious study. Additionally, within a year Europeans had their own war, the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 to study. Thus, Europeans did not seriously study many unique aspects of Civil War operations which indicated future trends, including those relating to cavalry.
The Rifle Musket
Among the important new technologies that effected tactical warfare in the American Civil War was the rifle musket. The rifle musket entered service in a variety of armies in the 1850s. Though hailed as a major leap forward in technology, superficially it did not appear to be much different from the smooth bore musket. The drill and loading procedures for the rifle musket were very similar to those of the smooth bore. The rate of fire of the two weapons was not radically different. The dramatic difference was the range of the weapon. The French issued one of the first rifle muskets, the Minié rifle, to elite French infantry units in 1846. It had a range beyond 1000 yards and was effectively accurate out to at least 600 yards. By 1857, the French army was converting all smoo
th bore muskets to the new Minié design. The British adopted the Enfield rifled musket in 1853. It was effective out to 900 yards. The United States followed with a knockoff of the Enfield design called the Springfield rifle in the late 1850s.1 Many military thinkers believed that the new rifle would completely change the tactics of warfare.
Cavalry in the American Civil War
Cavalry was an important part of both the Northern and Southern forces in the American Civil War. In many ways, the relative performance of the opposing cavalry was a microcosm of the general conduct of the war. At the beginning of the war, Union cavalry was neglected, poorly trained, and hardly a combat force worth mentioning. Southern cavalry, on the other hand, was the pride of the army, well led, and an important part of the Southern war machine. Just as 1863 marked a changing point in the war in general, it also was a watershed in the relative performance of the cavalry forces. Union cavalry were reorganized, found new leadership, received the latest equipment, and individually were more competent horsemen. At the same time, the strains of resource shortages and leadership lapses began to tell on the Southern cavalry.
Organization
Though the Union army possessed a regular army cavalry force of six regiments when the war began, these units were widely scattered and in no position to provide a basis for building a robust cavalry force. Resources to organize a Union volunteer cavalry forces, however, were not lacking. At the end of the first year of the war, on December 31, 1861, the cavalry strength of the Union army was 4,744 regulars and 54,654 volunteers. By the last year of the war, in February 1865, the total strength of the Union cavalry arm was 160,237 men of which 105,434 were present and fit for duty. The size of the cavalry forces in the Civil War rivaled any force seen in Europe.2
A Union cavalry regiment organized into 12 companies. Two companies, commanded by the senior company commander, constituted a squadron. Two squadrons made up a battalion commanded by a major. A colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel, commanded the three battalions of the Union regiment. At the beginning of the war, the Union army assigned cavalry by individual regiments, and sometimes even companies, to infantry divisions and corps. This dispersed organization prevented the Northern cavalry from making significant contributions to battle early in the war. In 1863, the Army of the Potomac formed its own cavalry corps, bringing the cavalry regiments together into brigades (of four regiments) and divisions (of two or three brigades) where they could operate in mass. By the summer of 1863, Union cavalry in the east, organized into a large cavalry corps, was very capable of independent operations. From 1863 on, cavalry on cavalry combat, mounted and dismounted, became much more common, and Union cavalry quickly demonstrated its superiority in these deliberate engagements.3
Southern cavalry typically, though there were many exceptions, organized in a 10-company regiment. The regiment included only three field grade officers and did not break down easily into squadrons. Thus, company grade officers and the company organization was the most important and cohesive. This resulted in a more decentralized approach to operations in Southern regiments.4
Weapons and Equipment
Because the cavalry forces of the Union and of the South were primarily volunteer forces, there was little inherent tradition operating on the forces. If there was any uniquely American mounted military tradition, it was a tradition of the mounted rifleman and dragoon. Because they were free of preconceptions of cavalry, American cavalry were more flexible in terms of incorporating new weapons and tactics into the force than cavalry forces in Europe.
Though the Union forces, including the cavalry, were lavishly equipped, the Union did not master the ability to get the right weapons into the hands of the right troopers until well into the war. The ability to equip the Union cavalry with the proper weapons in the numbers required was achieved in 1863 and was one of the reasons that the effectiveness of Union cavalry increased dramatically in that year. It cost between $500,000 and $600,000 to equip a single Union cavalry regiment.5 The fact that the Union was able to field well over a hundred regiments demonstrates the abundant resources ultimately available once the North fully mobilized its industrial capability and organized its administration. It also demonstrates the investment Union leaders were willing to make in a robust cavalry force.
Southern cavalry, from the start, operated at a major equipment disadvantage. Southern cavalry came to war with a variety of personal weapons including muskets, double-barreled shotguns, pistols, fowling pieces, carbines, and sabers. Efforts to manufacture pistols, carbines, and sabers in the South were generally unsuccessful. Southern-produced weapons were inferior to Northern products and were often dangerous to the trooper. In mid-1864, a Southern commander commented, “nearly all my men were armed with captured arms.” The government first discouraged this practice but eventually embraced it to the point that Southern munitions factories made ammunition for Union weapons.6 A mixture of weapons within Southern cavalry regiments was the norm—some captured from the enemy, some government issued, and some brought from home. This resulted in huge, almost insurmountable problems of ammunition resupply.
Two weapons appeared during the American Civil War that made a mark on American cavalry and differentiated it from European cavalry until the end of the century. The two weapons were the revolver and the carbine. The revolver became a standard piece of individual equipment in the Civil War cavalry forces. In Union forces it supplemented the saber, while in the case of the Southern cavalry, it ended up replacing the saber in most cases. The carbine became the standard dismounted weapon of Civil War Union cavalry, and in some leaders minds, it also came to represent the cavalry’s primary role in battle.
The pistol had been a standard arm of American cavalry since the formation of the first regular dragoon regiment in 1833. Samuel Colt developed the most effective version of the revolving cylinder pistol—the revolver. In 1854, the Colt .36-caliber model 1851 navy revolver replaced the single-shot 1842 pistol in the American army. The U.S. cavalry discarded the saddle holster, and troopers carried the weapon in a holster on their belt. By the time of the Civil War, the model 1860 Colt army .44-caliber revolver was the most popular pistol with the troopers. The army issued over 145,000 Colt army revolvers during the war. They also issued 130,000 of the popular Remington .44-caliber army revolvers.7
Revolvers were exceptionally easy to use while mounted, and it was relatively easy to switch between sword and pistol. The acceptance of the pistol by the American cavalry resulted in a tactic known as the “pistol charge” in which cavalry attacked with drawn pistols. The tactic became a unique characteristic of American cavalry never copied by Europeans. In a charge, the pistol was a simple and effective way to engage the enemy. It took almost no training to get an individual to be competent with the revolver. At Murfreesboro, Tennessee, the Southern cavalry brigade of the Army of Tennessee, under General John A. Wharton, charged Union cavalry relying almost exclusively on pistols. In minutes, the 2,000 Southern troopers routed the Union force.8 Some Southern cavalry, Texas cavalry in particular, relied almost exclusively on the revolver for their combat power. Many, especially rank-and-file Southern cavalrymen, considered the revolver far superior to the saber. The major shortcoming of the revolver was the difficulty of reloading while riding. It was a paper-wrapped cartridge weapon, the six cartridges, along with percussion caps, required careful loading into the revolver cylinder. The complicated loading system prevented reloading the weapon while riding. The Remington pistols had an advantage over the Colts because extra cylinders could be preloaded and the entire cylinder exchanged fairly easily while mounted. However, since the cylinder contained six shots, reloading was not a major drawback. Another disadvantage of the revolvers was their expense. A pistol cost the army from $14 to $20.
The Union cavalry were armed with the Model 1860 light cavalry saber. By the end of the war, the Union had a very powerful affection for the saber and respected its effectiveness in the melee. Most Northern officers were a
damant that the weapon gave the Northern cavalry a decisive superiority over the South in the cavalry melee. Southern cavalrymen were not fond of sabers. They considered it a terror weapon. Former regular army Southern commanders such as Stuart disagreed with this sentiment but were unable to override the prejudice of their troops.9 Sabers, regardless of the weapon’s actual effectiveness, had a psychological effect, particularly if one side had them and the other did not.
Though commanders on both sides of the conflict disagreed on the various merits of the pistol and the saber, there was almost no disagreement on the effectiveness of the new breechloading carbines. The breechloading carbine became the Civil War cavalryman’s most important weapon, particularly among the Union cavalry. The Union cavalry issued a variety of carbines—in total 32 different types.10 However, two types had the greatest success and became standard issue in the North: the Sharps and the Spencer. Modern firing tests demonstrated that the Sharps carbine was extremely accurate at 100 yards and effective out to 200 yards. The Spencer, less accurate than the Sharps, was only highly accurate at 50 yards and effective to about 100 yards.11
The simplest, most reliable, and the most available carbine in the early years of the war were the various models of the Sharps breechloading carbine. By 1865, the Sharps Company had delivered 77,330 carbines to the government. The Sharps used paper cartridges and still required manually emplacing a percussion cap to ignite the cartridge. The carbine was a .52-caliber weapon; it weighed 7 3/4 pounds and was 39 inches long.12