Nelson: Britannia's God of War

by Andrew Lambert

  Nelson had not enjoyed the brief period when Vice Admiral Sir Hyde Parker held the command: Parker ‘did not treat me very well … and I should be sorry to put it in his power again’, he observed later that season.15 His third year in the Mediterranean began with reflections on the subjects that would dominate the following twelve months. Personally, as he told Fanny, he was anxious to go home, and his worn-out ship was only fit to escort the next convoy. Yet he remained intellectually committed to the war, anticipating that the French must attack to plunder the ‘gold mine’ that was Italy, and he expected them to come by the coast road with transport shipping. Blocking such operations had been his mission in 1795. The only way he could reconcile these conflicting concerns for home and glory was to hope for an early peace.16

  His future was settled by his first meeting with Jervis. He had declined a written offer of a larger, better-paid ship but he was not prepared for the personal touch of a man he had met but once, and then briefly many years before. Jervis understood the man, and won his loyalty by making him feel special:

  I found the Admiral anxious to know many things which, I was not a little surprised, had not been communicated to him from others in the fleet, and it would appear that he was so well satisfied with my opinions of what is likely to happen, of the means of prevention etc., that he had no reserves with me of his information, opinions and thoughts of what is likely to be done, and concluded by asking me if I should have any objection to serve under him with my flag.

  Nelson hedged a little, promising to stay if his flag came before Agamemnon went home, declaring that he would be proud to hoist it under Jervis’s command.

  The object of this letter was to persuade Fanny that his decision to remain on station was inevitable, reflecting merit, possibilities and rewards rather than his own desire. Jervis had won his heart. Nelson would not abandon anyone who was prepared to invest so much charm, flattery and genuine esteem in retaining his services. Subconsciously he hoped that retailing Jervis’s compliments would satisfy Fanny and enable him to remain on station until the peace. Desperate for glory, and fancying the chances improved by the new admiral, he concluded, ‘my health was never better than at the moment of writing’.17

  Jervis, too, was satisfied to have confirmed what he had heard of this remarkable officer and secured his services for the foreseeable future. He informed the First Lord that he would send Nelson back to the Gulf of Genoa ‘where he has so eminently distinguished himself’.18 He was anxious that Spencer should recognise the name when the time came to ask for something more. This was significant as Spencer had just refused Nelson’s request for a commodore’s pendant, arguing that there were already too many flag officers in the theatre.19 Spencer had missed the point: there were indeed many flags, but few of them belonged to admirals capable of independent command.

  Fresh detached service occasioned a little jealousy on the part of fellow captains, but Nelson, confident he had earned the compliment, gave them a straight answer. The mission remained unaltered, blocking any small-scale seaborne movements.20 He continued to be impressed by Jervis, who refused to go ashore at Leghorn, where his predecessor had lingered too long and where, as Nelson knew, many an officer was indulging his vices. He was a ‘man of business’ who would make short work of the French fleet. Having read the King’s speech at the opening of Parliament on 27 October Nelson could see little hope of a just peace – France had not been beaten enough to concede.21

  From the outset, Jervis treated Nelson as a trusted confidant, a close colleague and a fellow flag officer. He sent him to report on the condition of the French fleet at Toulon: there were five new ships of the line, so Jervis could spare none to go home. To reconcile Fanny to this new delay, Nelson retailed further flattery. ‘Sir John from his manner I plainly see does not wish me to leave this station. He seems at present to consider me as an assistant more than a subordinate, for I am acting without orders.’ He also reported Jervis’s response to a query about Nelson’s promotion prospects: ‘You must have a larger ship for we cannot spare you either as admiral or Captain.’ The older man had won the heart of his brightest subordinate by treating him as an equal, by concurring in his own estimate of his worth.22 Until his flag arrived Nelson was anxious to have a commodore’s pendant as symbol of his authority over his squadron, a higher rank to help his discussions with the Austrians and a record of his achievements.

  Back at Genoa Nelson resumed his military and political work, liaising with the British ministers, developing a strategic view and pressing for allied cooperation to recover the vital water barrier at Vado Bay. The threat was obvious: he saw the French fleet preparing for sea, the weakness of the various Italian governments, and the inevitable attack. After all Italy was ‘a gold mine’ and the French were short of funds. Although the Government of Tuscany was increasingly pro-French, he hoped the Neapolitans would provide a flotilla for coastal operations, as the British fleet lacked the spare manpower for any small craft. However, he was convinced the sea was the essential avenue for any major advance from France into Northern Italy. After two years of small-scale advances on the Riviera he expected the French would use their fleet to land behind the Sardinian and Austrian forces at Genoa or Leghorn.23 General Bonaparte had other ideas, recognising the option of leaving the coast and avoiding the naval threat. He could not entirely ignore the coastal route for logistics and heavy equipment, but he did not base his campaign on the Riviera.

  Bonaparte’s Italian campaign of 1796 would take all the Italian states out of the war, destroy the logistical base of the British fleet and outflank the blockade of Toulon, already complicated by a French squadron at Cadiz. The most effective British response would have been to adopt a genuine maritime strategy, securing Corsica with a significant military force, developing the embryonic naval base at Ajaccio and controlling all offshore territory. Trade could be sustained, a blockade imposed and Spain may have been deterred. The British government was unable to follow this strategy because it had failed to deal with any of the naval threats that it faced – from the Dutch fleet in the Texel to the French at Toulon – before Spain entered the war in late 1796. The addition of Madrid to the list of hostile powers complicated the arithmetic of naval power. Although the British retained a working command of the sea, and were qualitatively superior to their foes, they had not imposed their dominance in battle, and could not risk large detachments to the Mediterranean when the British Isles were threatened with invasion from several quarters.

  The problem only arose because the largely static war on the Franco-Italian frontier was suddenly transformed. The latest round of an age-old contest between land power and sea power for the Italian peninsula was won by Bonaparte’s army. Hitherto, naval control of the Riviera had been enough to block the advance of an army from France into Italy, or to facilitate an attack from Italy into France. Even in 1795, Nelson’s squadron at Vado had been enough. But 1796 would be different. The French changed their strategy, and their command, adopting methods that made naval control irrelevant. Bonaparte, a keen student of military history, may have been inspired by Hannibal, in addition to the more recent work of Bourcet. Whatever the origins of his ideas, his appointment to command the Army of Italy in March 1796 transformed the outlook in the Mediterranean. French strategy was directed by Lazare Carnot, the ‘Organiser of Victory’. Carnot had created the mass-conscript armies and the offensive approach that exploited these human resources. Well aware that Austria was France’s main military opponent, his plan for 1796 was for the army on the Rhine to attack Austria, while the Army of Italy launched a diversionary offensive. If successful, the latter would take Piedmont-Sardinia out of the war, defeat the Austrian armies and drive them across the Tyrolean Alps into Austria, where they would join their colleagues from the Rhine to impose peace.24

  In effect Italy was a side-show, although plunder from northern Italy was a major attraction to the cash-strapped, economically chaotic Republic.25 Unaware of the new French p
olicy, the British continued to view the theatre in isolation. This may explain why they consistently misread the object of the French campaign.

  Nelson expected the French to use their naval assets to outflank the Austrians, but despite his success in blocking this route, seizing a siege train and Bonaparte’s library, the French had abandoned this route. Their fleet remained in harbour, locked up by Jervis while the coastal route was insecure. To avoid using the sea Bonaparte risked advancing through the narrow Alpine passes, in effect outflanking the fleet. This was successful because the lightly equipped French soldiers lived off the land and did not need magazines and depots. This radical new method allowed them to outmarch the supply-obsessed Austrians. Led by young, aggressive, battle-hardened generals, the French soon knocked Piedmont out of the war, before turning on the Austrians, who were unable to resist the onset. Yet French victory at Castiglione was by no means a foregone conclusion: the unique talents of General Buona Parti, as Nelson initially named him, were critical. Equally important, the Italian states made only feeble efforts to save themselves: Piedmont-Sardinia had a mere fifteen thousand troops in the field, instead of the fifty thousand that were funded by the subsidy treaty with Britain.26 The 1796 campaign was a major lesson in higher strategy. It seemed to confirm Nelson’s view that Britain would be well advised to operate without allies, and rely on the sea. It would be his life’s work to ensure this approach was successful.

  To persuade his star officer to remain in the difficult inshore post, Jervis kept up the praise – this time for his handling of diplomatic negotiations at Genoa – and promised to write to Spencer to secure him a commodore’s pendant. Unlike Hood, Jervis did write, and acted before he had heard from Spencer.

  Captain Nelson, whose merits are well known to your lordship, is very ambitious of becoming a flag officer, which does him the greatest credit, because of his having the Marines. Should the event happen he is also very desirous to hoist his flag in the Mediterranean. As he will hold a very important trust during the ensuing campaign, I hope you will not disapprove my giving him an order to wear a distinguishing pendant.27

  Jervis would command the main body of the fleet, keeping Toulon closely blockaded. He took a firm grip on his squadron, quickly sorting the professionals from the lightweights, the reliable from the inconsistent, and transformed Hotham’s force into the best-disciplined fleet ever sent to war. A new navy was being built, one ready for the demands of the total war: it would be self-sufficient, healthy, well drilled in seamanship and gunnery, exercised in squadron tactics and the school of the service. Some officers were beyond hope and were sent home, others with potential could be trained. A few needed no further education. First among these was Nelson, who knew that Jervis was ‘using every influence both public and private with Lord Spencer for my continuance on this station’.

  Nelson had been told that he would command a division of the fleet in battle, the highest honour anyone could pay a captain.28 He quickly used his pendant to browbeat the Genoese authorities. When they complained that he had fired on their territory, he dismissed their protest on the grounds that Genoa was an occupied country, and he had only engaged the occupying French forces after they had fired on his ships. He kept Jervis, Elliot and Spencer informed of his proceedings.29 Spencer used these naval successes to keep up morale at home despite a succession of disasters on land.30

  Once again Nelson’s hopes were no sooner raised than they were dashed. After three days of battle in the hills the Austrians were beaten everywhere, losing ten thousand prisoners, and between four and five thousand killed and wounded. ‘The French fight on shore like our seamen’, Nelson reported, ‘they never stop and know not the word halt.’31 This was grudging admiration, but it reflected the reality: Bonaparte’s half-starved troops had carried the day. Naval support had been limited by the lack of flotilla craft, Jervis could not afford to risk a battleship close inshore, as he was already inferior in strength to the French. Nelson’s squadron managed to cut out some French store ships at Loano on 23 April, but it was not enough. The Austrians retreated from the coast.32

  By the end of April Piedmont-Sardinia was making peace, and the Austrian army was in full retreat.33 The French now occupied Genoa. A depressed Nelson asked Jervis if his squadron would not be of more use elsewhere in the Mediterranean. Britain was running out of allies: it appeared inevitable that Spain would declare war, ending any chance of saving Italy. He hoped Corsica could be held, and asked for leave to take the baths at Pisa.34 His mood mirrored the state of his beloved Agamemnon, now ‘a mere tub’ floating on the water, in desperate need of a major dockyard overhaul and without the stores to keep her patched up.35

  From his blockade station off Toulon, Jervis recognised the impending collapse of Nelson’s morale. He administered the necessary tonic: a mixture of praise for the operation at Loano, news that there would not be a third flag officer in the fleet and that Spencer had been asked to give Nelson his pendant, or his flag. Little more than a week later he asked Nelson to serve out the rest of the war and offered him leave to go to Pisa.36 This was the treatment he needed. Nelson was immediately restored, abandoning the trip to Pisa and turning his thoughts to the political situation.37 He was astonished by French demands that Parma, Modena and the Papacy hand over art treasures as well as money to secure peace: ‘The Louvre is to be the finest art gallery of pictures in the world.’ Having promised to see out the war he explained his choice to Fanny by stressing what a compliment it would be to hoist his flag on this station. With that they would have to ‘rest contented’. Peace seemed to be coming closer: Italy was lost, Corsica hardly worth holding, while the fleet would be more usefully employed elsewhere. His views were imperial: he was anxious that Britain keep her conquests in India and elsewhere.38

  However, there was a still a war to be fought, and Nelson was far happier after capturing a French convoy off Oneglia on 30 May. His squadron took two small warships and five store ships, the latter loaded with guns and stores for the siege of Mantua. Captain George Cockburn was specially noticed.39 The mortars and guns were sent to Corsica, but there were more interesting items of cargo.

  I have got the charts of Italy, sent by the Directory to Buonaparte, also Maillebois’ Wars in Italy, Vauban’s Attack and Defence of Places, Prince Eugene’s History; all sent for the General. If Buona Parti is ignorant the Directory, it would appear, wish to instruct him; pray God he may remain ignorant.40

  Further inspection turned up Hannibal’s March over the Alps, and lives of the Duke of Berwick, Marshal Vendôme and Marshal Catinat. All were good editions, with plates.41 Bonaparte did not need the books, he knew them well enough, but the guns were a serious loss and the siege had to be abandoned. While Nelson could not save Italy, he could make the French work much harder for their conquests. The books might have been a useful education for Nelson, but he sent most of them to Jervis, keeping only the Vauban for his own edification.42

  This might have been the final event of his Mediterranean command, since Jervis’s plan to keep him when the Agamemnon went home had run into problems. Fortunately another captain wanted to go home, and on 11 June Nelson shifted his pendant to the seventy-four HMS Captain. He had been anxious to stay, suggesting his local knowledge might be cited as a reason to retain him; in private he was also anxious to exploit his local reputation, rather than join another fleet.43 Now confirmed as a commodore, Nelson was entitled to have a junior captain command the ship, and he chose Ralph Miller, an American-born rising star who would be a key player in three major battles. He also transferred a number of his followers into the Captain, which was ‘well-manned, although not active’.44

  Nelson was immediately sent back to the service at Genoa, although he commanded the van division of the fleet, which was the post of honour for a junior flag officer. This required him to have an intimate understanding of his admiral’s signals, plans and ideas. The war was going from bad to worse: now it was the turn of Naples to make peace with
the ubiquitous French – ‘these fellows multiply like locusts,’ he lamented.45 At least he was able to take a tough stand at Genoa, dismissing local protests as ridiculous, although he also produced a detailed refutation for Jervis to send back to the Foreign Office. Ordered to evacuate British merchants and stores from Leghorn, he arrived to find the French had taken control the previous day, but not before Thomas Fremantle had skilfully carried out the task.46 Nelson was assembling a constellation of followers on whom he could rely, some from Hood’s command, others brought on by Jervis.

  He had also been ordered to ensure there were sufficient transports in hand to evacuate Corsica.47 With Bonaparte at Leghorn with his fellow Corsican, the political agent Saliceti, the French threat to Corsica was greatly increased. Small bodies of men were landed to sow dissension among the populace. Nelson recognised the danger, advising Elliot to seize the island of Elba and the key harbour of Porto Ferraio from the Tuscans. Elliot agreed, urging Nelson to act without waiting for Jervis’s sanction.48 Meanwhile Jervis had ordered him to institute a close blockade of Leghorn, which could not be considered a neutral harbour while under French occupation. After spending so much time in the city he was distressed by the suffering of the evacuees, although it would appear that Adelaide Correglia was not among them.49 Nelson and Elliot quickly concocted plans to seize Elba, writing to Jervis to report the bloodless seizure of the harbour on 10 July.50

  Jervis was delighted – doubly so, since Spencer had confirmed Nelson as a commodore. He also advised Elliot to rely on Nelson’s advice when handling troublesome Corsican privateers operating under British authority, because ‘he is a reasonable and disinterested man in money matters’.51 Elliot needed no prompting: after thanking Nelson for his action at Elba he asked him to handle complex financial transactions at Genoa.52