Nelson: Britannia's God of War

by Andrew Lambert

  While Nelson hoped the Austrian and Neapolitan armies would recover Leghorn, and seized on any rumour of allied success,53 the war was moving away from the coast. Bonaparte’s rapid and ruthless advance drove the old-fashioned, slow-moving armies of the ancien régime from post to post. Amidst the confusion Nelson reflected that the King of Naples had been England’s ‘most faithful ally’,54 an opinion that would influence his actions three years later. The Austrians were ‘too inactive. They look to us for impossibilities.’55 Finding the constant diplomatic fencing with the government of the Genoese republic unrewarding, he advocated more extreme measures, and had to be restrained by Elliot and Jervis. The latter, though convinced of Nelson’s zeal and determination, had no evidence of any higher talent for fleet action or politics: he called his commodore ‘an excellent partisan’ who did not ‘sufficiently weigh consequences’.56 It was perhaps fortunate that Jervis had no competent admirals and that Nelson was the senior captain.

  The precarious situation of the small French garrison at Leghorn seemed open for exploitation. Nelson was running a very tight blockade, and local intelligence suggested that the populace might rise against the French, allowing a small British expedition to secure the town. After his experience on Corsica, he was anxious to find a ‘suitable soldier’ – meaning one young enough to be under his command. Elliot dashed his dreams, stressing that General De Burgh, the ranking officer on Corsica, would command.57 The limited British force could only be used to follow up Austrian success in the main theatre, where rumours abounded that Bonaparte had died of his wounds.58

  Such optimism soon dissolved. With Spain about to join the war, Jervis faced the prospect that a powerful Franco-Spanish fleet from Cadiz would attack while he blockaded Toulon. He was caught between two fleets, each numerically superior. To lessen the numerical disadvantage he recalled the two battleships off Leghorn, leaving Nelson with his pendant flying in a frigate to support Elliot with smaller craft.59 With the picture darkening rapidly, Britain’s Mediterranean strategy was on the point of dissolution, and the main players were preparing for the worst.

  Nelson understood the significance of the Corsican presence in the French army, and although he kept a brave face in public, he realised the island must fall if the Austrians were defeated.60 He advised Elliot that the best defence would be to attack the French at Leghorn.61 He was not troubled by the threat of a Spanish fleet, having absolute faith that the tactical skill and seamanship of Jervis would secure a victory over any enemy.62 By the end of August, however, the Leghorn operation had been abandoned, and the troops from Corsica were sent back to Gibraltar.63

  A brief period with the fleet off Toulon convinced Nelson that Jervis had the French under control. He returned to Genoa to withdraw the British merchants, and found himself acting for the British minister. Although this was ‘much against my inclination’,64 he exploited the opportunity to impose a more logical policy on Genoa. The Genoese would not allow him to load a cargo of bullocks bought for the fleet, fearing a French takeover. When the Genoese fired on his squadron he did not dignify the insult with a reply, but used it as a pretext to carry out more useful actions, seizing a French bomb vessel from under batteries at San Pietro d’Arena on 11 September, blockading the harbour and seizing the Genoese island of Capraja on 18 September with Elliot’s concurrence.65 Jervis could not resist sending Nelson’s reports to Spencer: few men were so capable with either the sword or the pen, and none with both.66

  Having played a useful role in the capture of Corsica Nelson was dismayed to find himself preparing to evacuate the British minister, government and troops. The Cabinet had decided to evacuate the Mediterranean in August, unable to spare the necessary naval forces to secure command of the sea when faced by French, Spanish and Dutch fleets, each of which might escort an invasion of the British Isles. Matters became critical when the loss of northern Italy to the French deprived the fleet of vital supplies. If the fleet withdrew, Corsica and Elba would have to be evacuated. Inevitably Jervis selected Nelson, his most dependable, resourceful and independent junior. This prompted a Shakespearian outburst from the Commodore, who quoted from King John on the subject of England meeting the world in arms.67

  With Naples about to make peace, and Spain about to make war, the logistics of the fleet were under serious threat, since Sicily and Barcelona had been vital sources of food.68 On 25 September, Jervis finally received the long-anticipated order to evacuate Corsica: the Mediterranean was to be abandoned. He kept his fleet concentrated to cover the operations while Nelson evacuated the island and Captain Cockburn in the frigate Minerve blockaded Leghorn.69 Jervis planned to join the Viceroy at Bastia once Rear Admiral Man returned from Cadiz with his squadron.70 Shifting his flag into the sixty-four-gun Diadem, Nelson left Leghorn, where a thousand Corsicans were assembling for a landing at Bastia.71 He had to remove the garrison and administration from an island in uproar: the local populace were desperate to appease the returning French by turning on the British.

  With a squadron of ten warships and thirty transports under his orders, Nelson was in his element. At last he had a major task, albeit a negative one, in which he could show his worth. The operation proceeded better than anyone except he might have expected. The Corsicans at Bastia tried to stop the evacuation and seize the British stores, but when Nelson arrived on 14 October he took his ships close to the town, sent for the local Council and threatened to bombard. This enabled the army and British merchants to remove their stores, cannon and equipment unhindered, while the rest of the island was changing allegiance.72 The moral courage Nelson displayed at Bastia secured his place in Elliot’s affections, and marked him as the man for a crisis. Jervis already knew this; he relaxed once he knew Nelson had reached Bastia.73

  Belated orders from London to reverse the evacuation could have thrown the situation into confusion, but Jervis had the wisdom to ignore them.74 It was now too late: the strategic picture was so changed by the hostility of Spain that the island would be invaded as soon as the fleet was drawn out of position, and could not be defended once the enemy were established ashore.75 Nelson took his convoy to Elba, where the troops landed. Always the optimist, he concluded that possession of the tiny island had saved the Smyrna convoy and his own fleet from attack. It promised to be a useful base.76

  He left Bastia on 19 October, ‘rich in the praise of my Admiral and the Viceroy’, and all the more satisfied as others had declared that it could not be done. The timing was perfect: twenty-six Spanish battleships appeared off Cape Corse the following day, heading for Toulon. Now all that was required was to bring the Spanish to battle: he was confident the fleet was ready, with an admiral ‘fit to lead them to glory’.77 Jervis agreed that he could beat them ‘with such stuff as I have in this fleet’.78 He praised Nelson’s contribution to the evacuation, but did so within the context of a wider effort by the fleet: Nelson did not evacuate the island single-handedly.79

  *

  In early November Nelson rejoined the fleet, finding the leisure to catch up with his correspondence. He told Locker that the Franco-Spanish combined fleet was large, but ill-manned and worse commanded, while the British were small, but of unequalled quality.80 But he had reckoned without the incompetence of Man, whose squadron had rejoined the fleet without replenishing stores: Jervis had to send him back to Gibraltar to remedy the oversight. Once there, Man had a crisis of confidence, or perhaps a nervous breakdown, and headed back to England after consulting his captains – something Jervis had specifically ordered him not to do. Man was the only admiral sent on detached duty in 1796, and he had failed. Having lost a third of his fleet, Jervis had to abandon the Mediterranean in some haste. On 22 October the fleet set course for the Straits, taking ships of the Smyrna convoy in tow, in vile, tempestuous weather. This chain of events depressed Nelson, but his spirits were cheered by Jervis’s very public demonstration of confidence, the presence of Elliot and a charming letter from Spencer praising his ‘spirited, dignified
and temperate conduct at Leghorn and Genoa’.81 This was the elixir of his genius.

  After a few days anchored off Gibraltar, Nelson was ordered on ‘an arduous and most important mission’. He was to shift his flag from the Captain into the frigate Minerve, and recover the garrison of Elba.82 This was a hazardous task, requiring him to cross a sea controlled by over forty enemy battleships to the only remaining post under British control, and remain there long enough to embark the naval and military establishment. While Nelson was honoured by the trust, it is unlikely Jervis would have sent anyone else. Jervis ended his instructions with a telling passage: ‘Having experienced the most important effects from your enterprise and ability, upon various occasions since I have had the honour to command the Mediterranean, I leave entirely to your judgement, the time and manner of carrying this critical service into execution.’83 He told Elliot, the operation ‘cannot be in better hands’.84 Jervis himself, meanwhile, retreated to Lisbon, the closest secure anchorage, to refit, replenish his stores and wait for reinforcements. While he waited for Nelson to return, he had to keep the enemy inside the Straits and defend Portugal, Britain’s last ally.

  Back in London the crisis was deepening. The naval threat had reached an unprecedented level, Britain’s allies had collapsed and the French appeared irresistible. Only a victory at sea could break the ever-tightening circle of events that threatened to strangle Britain. Spencer emphasised the point to Jervis: ‘a good hard blow struck now or soon will be worth twenty a little later’.85

  Sailing from Gibraltar on 15 December, in company with the Blanche, Nelson encountered two Spanish frigates off Cartagena late on the 19th. Immediately Minerve engaged and took the Santa Sabina, after a skilful action of slightly over two hours. Unable to resist the chance to show off his seamanship and tactical acumen, last seen in Hotham’s action, Nelson took over from Captain Cockburn, fought the ship and wrote up the log entry. The next morning two Spanish battleships appeared, forcing him to relinquish his prize and escape. Fortunately for Nelson the Spanish were distracted by the prize crew of the Santa Sabina, led by lieutenants Culverhouse and Hardy.86 Both Cockburn and Hardy were notable additions to his school, and Nelson was quick to exchange Hardy for the captured Spanish captain, Don Jacobo Stuart, a great-grandson of James II.87 On Christmas Eve, Minerva took a six-gun French privateer, looking for intelligence rather than fiscal reward. The squadron arrived at Porto Ferraio on the 26th, where Nelson was anxious to consult Elliot on the political situation, but unfortunately he was absent in Italy. General De Burgh had no orders to evacuate and lacked the political courage to act on those Jervis had sent, as Nelson observed. Now that Naples had made peace with the enemy England had no source of supplies and was therefore finished with Italy. He left De Burgh in no doubt that Jervis’s command no longer extended inside the Straits.88

  During the campaign of 1796 Jervis and Nelson built a strong mutual respect and understanding. This was remarkable, given that Nelson spent relatively little time under Jervis’s direct command. The key to their relationship was trust, allied to the sheer professionalism that Jervis insisted on; the result, for Nelson, was an ‘unequalled’ fleet, drilled and disciplined beyond anything the Royal or indeed any other Navy had ever seen. It was the tool that Nelson’s genius required if it was to unfold its full potential, to exploit those sublime qualities of vision, judgement and daring that he had developed under Hood’s tutelage.

  Notes – CHAPTER VI

  1 Thorne, R. G. History of Parliament 1790–1820. Members G–P, pp. 305–6

  2 Jervis to Spencer 18.7.1796; Corbett, J. (ed.), The Spencer Papers vol. II (henceforth Sp. II) p. 37

  3 Jervis to Spencer 18.5.1796; Sp. II p. 23

  4 Jervis to Spencer 29.12.1796; Sp. II p. 84

  5 Nelson to Wife 14.12.1796; Naish pp. 310–11

  6 Jervis to Spencer 29.7.1796; Sp. II p. 43

  7 Jervis to Spencer 8.1796; Sp. II p. 48

  8 Jervis to Spencer 11.11.1796; Sp. II p. 72

  9 Jervis to Spencer 22.5.1797; Sp. II p. 403

  10 Berckman, Nelson’s Dear Lord; A Portrait of St Vincent, p. 196

  11 See BL Add. 34, 918 f. 50 for an example.

  12 Arthur, The Remaking of the English Navy by Admiral St Vincent, 1986 provides a useful treatment of the Ear’s contribution.

  13 For Cornwallis see Lambert in Lefevre and Harding.

  14 Minto II pp. 278–81, 345–51

  15 Nelson to Wife 23.8.1796; Naish pp. 301–2. This may explain the initially cold relationship between the two men in the spring of 1801.

  16 Nelson to Wife 6 and 14.1.1796; Naish pp. 233–4

  17 Nelson to Wife 20.1.796; Naish pp. 281–2

  18 Jervis to Spencer 24.1.1796 Spencer Papers II pp. 10–12

  19 Spencer to Nelson 15.1.1796; Naish pp. 333–4

  20 Nelson to Wife 27.1.1796; Naish p. 282

  21 Nelson to Wife 12.2.1796; Naish p. 283

  22 Nelson to Wife 28.1.1796; Naish pp. 284–5

  23 Nelson to Trevor 2.3.1796; to Locker 4.3.1796; to Elliot 10.3.1796; to Hamilton 11.3.1796; to Jervis 16.3.1796; Nicolas pp. 128–38. Nelson to Wife 11.3.1796; Naish pp. 285–6

  24 Chandler, D. The Campaigns of Napoleon, pp. 41, 47

  25 Ibid. p. 47

  26 Sherwig, p. 76

  27 Jervis to Spencer 28.3.1796; Sp. II p. 21

  28 Nelson to Wife 24.4.1796; Naish pp. 290–1

  29 Nelson to Wife 1 and 9.4.1796, Jervis to Elliot 5.4.1796; Naish pp. 287–8, 338–9. Nelson to Drake 6 and 11.4.1796;, to Jervis 8, 9 and 13.4.1796; Nicolas II pp. 142–52. Nelson to Spencer 11.4.1796; Nicolas VII p. xlvii.

  30 Spencer to Nelson 26.5.1796; Naish p. 335

  31 Nelson to Wife 19.4.1796; Naish p. 289

  32 Nelson to Jervis 25.4.1796; Nicolas II pp. 161–2

  33 Nelson to Jervis 26.4.1796; Nicolas II pp. 162–3

  34 Nelson to Jervis 1, 8, 15, 18.5.1796; Nelson to Elliot 16.5.1796; Nicolas II pp. 164–73

  35 Nelson to Jervis 14.5.1796; Nicolas VII p. lxix

  36 Jervis to Nelson 11 and 22.5.1796; Naish pp. 336–7

  37 Nelson to Jervis 23.5.1796; Nicolas II p. 174

  38 Nelson to Wife 20 and 27.5.1796; Naish pp. 292–5

  39 Cockburn was one of Hood’s protégés, and Nelson’s dispatch was carefully shaped to secure his place in Jervis’s affections.

  40 Nelson to Jervis 4.6.1796; Nicolas VII p. lxxix

  41 Nelson to Colonel Graham 19.6.1796; Nicolas VII pp. lxxxiii–iv

  42 Nelson to Jervis 20.6.1796; Nicolas VII p. lxxxv

  43 Jervis to Nelson 1.6.1796; Nicolas II pp. 335–6. Nelson to Jervis 4 and 9.6.1796; Nicolas VII p. lxxix–lxxxii. Nelson to Wife 13.6.1796; Naish pp. 295–6

  44 Nelson to Jervis 28.6.1796; Nicolas II pp. 194–5

  45 Nelson to Wife 21.6.1796; Naish p. 296

  46 Nelson to Jervis 23, 24 and 28.6.1796; Nicolas II pp. 189–95

  47 Jervis to Nelson 29.6.1796; Brenton I pp. 176–7

  48 Nelson to Elliot 2.7.1796; Nicolas II pp. 198–200. Elliot to Nelson 6.7.1796; Naish p. 341

  49 Nelson to Neutral Consuls at Leghorn 7.7.1796; Nicolas II p. 206. Nelson to Wife 7.7.1796; Naish pp. 296–7

  50 Nelson to Jervis 9 and 10.7.1796; Nicolas II pp. 207–9

  51 Jervis to Nelson 13 and 14.7.1796, Jervis to Elliot 14.7.1796; Naish pp. 337–9

  52 Elliot to Nelson 17.7.1796; Naish pp. 341–2

  53 Nelson to Wife 21–3.7.1796; Naish pp. 297–8

  54 Nelson to Clarence 20.7.1796; Nicolas II pp. 218–9

  55 Nelson to Jervis 23.7.1796; Nicolas VII p. xlii

  56 Jervis to Elliot 25.7.1796; Naish p. 339. Jervis to Spencer 18 and 27.7.1796; Spencer II pp. 37 and 42

  57 Nelson to Elliot 5.8.1796; Elliot to Nelson 6.8.1796; Naish pp. 341–2. Nelson to Elliot 10 and 11.8.1796; Nicolas II pp. 238–40

  58 Jervis to Nelson 31.7.1796; Brenton I pp. 192–3. Nelson to Jervis 15.8.1796; Nicolas VII p. xlix

  5
9 Jervis to Spencer 11.8.1796; Spencer II pp. 46–7. Jervis to Elliot 12.8.1796; Naish p. 339.

  60 Nelson to Father 19.8.1796; Nicolas II pp. 244–5

  61 Nelson to Elliot 25.8.1796; Nicolas II. pp. 253–5

  62 Nelson to Clarence 19.8.1796; Nicolas II pp. 245–6

  63 Elliot to Nelson 30.8.1796; Naish pp. 344–5

  64 Nelson to Wife 10.9.1796; Naish p. 303

  65 Nelson to William Wyndham 3.9.1796; Nicolas VII pp. cvii–cx. Nelson to Jervis 11, 14 and 19.9.1796; Nelson to Elliot 21.9.1796; Nicolas II pp. 262–74

  66 Jervis to Spencer 27.9.1796 enclosing Nelson –Jervis 15.9.1796; Spencer II PP. 54–7

  67 White, 1797: Nelson’s Year of Destiny, pp. 16–17

  68 Jervis to Spencer 15.9.1796; Spencer II pp. 52–4

  69 Jervis to Nelson 25.9.1796; Naish p. 338

  70 Jervis to Elliot 26.9.1796; Naish p. 340

  71 Nelson to Jervis 26 and 28.9.1796; Nicolas II pp. 282–5

  72 Nelson to Jervis 19.10.1796; Nicolas II pp. 291–4

  73 Jervis to Nelson 13.10.1796; Naish p. 338

  74 Rose, p. 77

  75 Jervis to Elliot 17.10.1796; Naish p. 340

  76 Nelson to Jervis 15 and 17.10.1796; Nicolas II pp. 288–9

  77 Nelson to Wife 13 and 24.10.1796; Naish pp. 30–6

  78 Jervis to Spencer 2.10.1796; Spencer II p. 58

  79 Jervis to Spencer 23.10.1796; Spencer II pp. 61–4

  80 Nelson to Locker 5.11.1796; Nicolas II pp. 298–9

  81 Nelson to Collingwood 20.11.1796; Nelson Suckling 29.11.1796; Nicolas II pp. 304–7. Nelson to Wife 22.11.1796; Naish pp. 308–9

  82 Nelson to Collingwood 1.12.1796; Nicolas II p. 307. Nelson to Wife 1, 9 and 12.12.1796; Naish pp. 309–10