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Lets Kill Gandhi

Page 18

by Gandhi, Tushar A.


  The register at Old Delhi railway station's retiring room showed that Nathuram had booked it after producing a ticket from Gwalior to Delhi on 29 January and one from Poona to Delhi. He had confessed that he procured a gun in Gwalior with Parchure's help. On 14 February, Deputy Superintendent of Bombay CID, N.Y. Deulkar arrived in Gwalior to arrest Parchure. He discovered that Parchure was being held in the Gwalior Fort under the military's custody. The reason? Parchure had celebrated Gandhi's murder by distributing sweets and boasting that he knew the killers. He had publicly referred to Gandhi as the reincarnation of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb, who was known to be a religious fanatic and had tormented the Hindus during his reign. Parchure had told his elder brother on 29 January (after Nathuram and Apte had left for Delhi), that the people staying at their home the previous day were on a mission to murder Gandhi and that he had helped them to acquire a gun. He also told someone called Ram Dayal Singh that a good deed had been done; 'the opponent of the Hindu religion had been killed'. He added that the killer was one of their own men. When all this was reported to Home minister Dhule, of the newly appointed Congress government in Gwalior, he immediately ordered Parchure's arrest under the Maintenance of Public Security Ordinance.

  U.H. Rana also got into the act. He arrived in Gwalior and along with Deulkar demanded that Parchure be handed over to them.

  On 17 February, Nagarvala received an order from Delhi appointing him as the officer heading the investigation of the Gandhi murder case. Inefficiency did fetch rewards.

  On 18 February, Parchure expressed his intention to confess. R.B. Atal, a first class Magistrate, was summoned to Gwalior Fort, which was under the command of the Army. Access to Parchure was only possible after getting permission of the military commandant. Atal was accompanied by Senior Superintendent of Police Gwalior, Dinkar P. Thorat Patil.

  On reaching the fort they were first taken to the office of the Commanding Officer Major Chhatrey. Accompanied by Chhatrey, Atal proceeded to the cell where Parchure was detained. The cells were situated at a higher level in the fort, which had been built by the Mughals to house their prisoners. On coming face-to-face with Parchure, Atal asked him if he had expressed a desire to make a confessional statement. Parchure replied in the affirmative. Atal then took Parchure to the rear veranda of the cell and asked for a table and two chairs. He also asked Chhatrey to place two military sentries in the back compound abutting the veranda, who would stand at a distance of fifty yards from them.

  For the next hour Atal explained to Parchure the legal ramifications and implications of making a sworn confession. Under the prevalent laws the conviction of a person making a sworn confession was certain. Atal informed him that nobody could force him to make a confession. Parchure persisted and only after he was convinced, did Atal ask him to begin. For the next forty-five minutes Parchure explained all that had transpired on the 27th and 28th of January when Nathuram and Apte had come to his house. After listening to Parchure, Atal gave him half an hour to make up his mind and then asked him a few questions. After this long drawn-out process Atal recorded verbatim Parchure's confession in English as instructed by him.

  Atal then read out the statement to Parchure, made him sign every page and ensured that he very carefully exercised every legal procedure of recording a confession so that it would not be dismissed due to any technical or procedural mistake.

  Parchure's confession was more than enough to nail him for his role in the Gandhi murder conspiracy.

  On 26 February 1948, Apte and Karkare led a police party to the woods behind the Hindu Mahasabha Bhavan in Delhi. Apte pointed out the spot where a pistol had been tested at noon on the 30th. He pointed out a tree which had four bullet holes. Three portions of the bark were cut and an empty cartridge case that was found near the spot were taken as evidence. The next day, Apte, went along with the police to Parchure's residence in Gwalior. Here he pointed out the wall where a pistol had been tested. A number of bullet marks were found on the wall, and a spent bullet found there was taken as evidence.

  By the time Nagarvala was appointed the chief investigating officer, the police had the prime accused in hand. His job now was to tie up the loose ends, which comprised going over the legal procedures of conducting identification parades, matching the handwritings and building up a case which could not be demolished by the defence lawyers. A number of identification parades of the accused were conducted in Delhi and Bombay, which were supervised by a magistrate: in Delhi, they were conducted under the supervision of Magistrate First Class Kishen Chand, and in Bombay, under Chief Presidency Magistrate Oscar H. Brown.

  Nagarvala, shuttling between Delhi and Bombay, built up a massive dossier of evidence against each of the accused over the next two months. The one person against whom he could not find much hard evidence other than the confession of Badge—where he had given many details about the gang's interactions with Savarkar, particularly those of Nathuram and Apte—and circumstantial evidence, was Savarkar. Just the fact that a phone call had been made to Savarkar Sadan from the Hindu Mahasabha office in Delhi on the morning of 19 January was not enough to nail Savarkar. Here it must be remembered that on 15 August 1947, when the entire nation was celebrating India's new-found independence, the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha had called for a boycott of the celebration and had prohibited their members from hoisting the tricolour of independent India. Savarkar, the founder of Hindu Mahasabha, had defied the ban and hoisted the flag on the terrace of Savarkar Sadan. This had angered the Hindu fanatics and for the past few months he had been facing a boycott by his colleagues. There was no reason, therefore, for anybody from the Delhi Mahasabha office to call Savarkar that morning. Apte had a reason and he was at the Mahasabha office at the time the call was booked. Among the documents seized from Savarkar Sadan during the raid on 31 January, many letters written by Nathuram and Apte to Savarkar were found, confirming the close relationship between the three.

  Dr. Jain had also mentioned about Karkare taking Madanlal to meet Savarkar and the latter congratulating and blessing Madanlal.

  The very dramatic and emotional statement that Nathuram Godse read out first at the Red Fort Trial and then during the hearing of the mercy petition in the West Punjab high court is surely Savarkar's writing. During their incarceration in the Red Fort Prison, the prisoners had been regularly getting messages and notes from outside and were able to pass them to one another. A prison guard Lance Naik Kadam was suspended after being caught carrying letters and documents to and from the accused. During the trial Nathuram had appealed to Judge Atmacharan that the police should be prohibited from seeing the notes they made in court or in their cells. The judge too was aware of this interaction between the prisoners.

  Both Savarkar and Nathuram knew that the spotlight would be on Nathuram and they decided to utilise that brief period to broadcast their message of hate. The two spent almost eight months in the Red Fort Prison, in very close proximity to one another. Savarkar was a gifted writer and knew how to use it to incite his readers. His History of the First War of Freedom in 1857, and the Marathi songs he wrote, display his ability to arouse passions. Nathuram was not known either for his writing or oratory skills, except for using rabid and abusive language. For the next five decades, the Hindu Right-wing used this speech to brainwash new generations of Indians to believe that Gandhi was responsible for the division of the country, was partial to the Muslims and by murdering him, Nathuram Godse had done a great service to the country and its people.

  The police filed the chargesheet in the Gandhi murder case on 27 May 1948.

  By the time the trial started, Nagarvala and his team of investigators had gathered enough evidence to prove the involvement of each of the accused. If they had shown half the speed while investigating the failed attempt of 20 January, as they showed in investigating the murder, the history of India might have been different.

  The main accused in the Gandhi murder case according to the chargesheet were 'Accused No. 1' Nathuram V
inayak Godse; 'Accused No. 2' Narayan Dattatreya Apte; 'Accused No. 3' Vishnu Ramkrishna Karkare; 'Accused No. 4' Madanlal Kashmirilal Pahwa; 'Accused No. 5' Shankar Kistayya; 'Accused No. 6' Gopal Vinayak Godse; 'Accused No. 7' Vinayak Damodar Savarkar; 'Accused No. 8' Dattatreya Sadashiv Parchure; 'Accused No. 9, 10 and 11' Gangadhar S. Dandavate, Gangadhar Jadhav and Suryadeo Sharma were declared absconders. The last three were not apprehended by the police till the end of the trial. Badge had been granted a judicial pardon in return for the deal he had struck with the court by becoming an 'approver' in the case.

  THE CHARGESHEET

  (a) Nathuram Vinayak Godse, Narayan Dattatreya Apte, Vishnu Ramkrishna Karkare, Madanlal Kashmirilal Pahwa, Shankar Kistayya, Gopal Vinayak Godse, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and Dattatreya Sadashiv Parchure were charged under section 120-B I.PC. (conspiracy) read with section 302 I.PC. (Indian Penal Code) (murder).

  (b) Nathuram V Godse, Narayan D. Apte, Vishnu R. Karkare, Madanlal S. Pahwa, Shankar Kistayya and Gopal V. Godse were also charged under Section 19 (D), Indian Arms Act and Sectionl9 (D) Indian Arms Act read with Section 109 and 114 I.P.C., Section 19 (F), Indian Arms Act, and Section 19 (F) Indian Arms Act, read with Section 114 I.P.C., Section 4 (B), Explosive Substances Act, and Section 4 (B), Explosive Substances Act, read with Section 6 of said Act; Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act; and Section 5 of the Explosive Substances Act read with Section 6 of the said Act.

  (c) Madanlal S. Pahwa was separately charged under Section 3 of the Explosive Substance Act. Nathuram V. Godse, Narayan D. Apte, Vishnu R. Karkare, Shankar Kistayya and Gopal V. Godse were also charged under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act, read with Section 6 of the said Act.

  (d) Nathuram V Godse, Narayan D. Apte, Vishnu R. Karkare, Madanlal S. Pahwa, Shankar Kistayya, Gopal V. Godse and V.D. Savarkar were further charged under Section 115 I.P.C., read with Section 302 I.P.C.

  (e) Nathuram V. Godse and Narayan D. Apte were also charged under Section 19 (C) of the Indian Arms Act.

  (f) Nathuram Godse, Narayan D. Apte and Dattatreya S. Parchure were further charged under Section 19 (C) of the Indian Arms Act, read with Section 114 I.P.C.

  (g) Nathuram Godse was separately charged under Section 19 (F) of the Indian Arms Act.

  (h) Narayan D. Apte and Vishnu R. Karkare were charged under Section 19 (F) of the Indian Arms Act, read with Section 114 I.P.C.

  (i) Nathuram Godse was also separately charged under Section 302 I.P.C. for the murder of Gandhi.

  (j) Narayan D. Apte and Vishnu R. Karkare were further charged under Section 302 I.P.C. (murder) read with Section 114 I.P.C. (abetment by presence).

  (k) Madanlal K. Pahwa, Shankar Kistayya, Gopal V. Godse, Vinayak D. Savarkar and Dattatreya S. Parchure were also charged under Section 302 I.P.C., read with Section 109 I.P.C.

  5

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  MENTOR BETRAYED

  'They were the ones, the word went round with whom business could be done'. The impossible old man was put on a pedestal, admired for his genius and 'unerring hunch', consulted, listened to with respectful attention and—by-passed.'

  - Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. 10, Part II

  by Pyarelal Nayyar

  If the Godse-Apte gang and the bungling policemen were instrumental in Gandhi's murder, the role of the politicians was no less nefarious. Whether intentional or circumstantial, they played a very important role in making it easier for the murderers to succeed. The others made the act possible by discarding Gandhi's ideals and publicly distancing themselves. As per Apte's and Karkare's escape plans after the murder, they were confident of getting aid from some very powerful ministers in Delhi. After the murder, a lot of criticism was directed towards the Iron Man of India, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Home minister. He has been credited with having successfully convinced and coerced almost all the princes and kings of the princely states to merge into the Indian Union. Credit for the rebuilding of the Somnath temple in Kathiawad, very close to Porbandar the birth place of Gandhi, destroyed by the invader Mahmud Ghazni, also goes to him. But Gandhi's murder is a great blemish on his record. As Home minister he was in charge of the police and Intelligence departments. J.C. Jain had provided vital clues to the chief minister of the Bombay province, B.G. Kher and to the home minister of Bombay province, Morarji Desai, a staunch Gandhian and a very close confidante of Patel. Desai claimed that he passed on the information to Patel immediately on meeting him in Ahmedabad. However, the Delhi police never acted on that information. Jain was never called in for questioning by the police. The Delhi police maintained throughout that they were never told about the information that Jain had provided. Why did Patel not see the necessity in informing Sanjevi, who was overseeing Madanlal's investigation and interrogation in Delhi? This remains a mystery

  Patel did report the threat to Gandhi and advised that his security be increased and all who came to meet him should be frisked. It was a forgone conclusion, however, that Gandhi would refuse any such request. Surprisingly, Patel gave in and left the matter of Gandhi's safety in the hands of destiny. One can understand that all the ministers were scared of the fact that any action of theirs might displease Gandhi and make him go on another fast, but Patel did not even think it fit to personally oversee the investigation into the failed attempt of the 20th. Patel was known to be sympathetic towards the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha and referred to their members as 'true patriots' albeit misguided at times. Even after the murder of Gandhi and the proven involvement of the two organisations in the conspiracy, Patel had put forward a proposal to amalgamate the RSS into the Congress as its youth wing.

  Recent events had upset Patel. One was that Gandhi had commenced on a fast which had embarrassed and angered Patel. As Home minister he was responsible for providing security to the citizens of the country, but Gandhi had gone on a fast because he felt that the Muslims of India were not receiving their share of protection. Patel's detractors in the Congress had launched an attack on him for failing in his duties as Home minister and providing a reason to Gandhi to go on a fast. Patel had made his displeasure known in no uncertain terms. At a time when the entire Cabinet of independent India operated from Birla House during Gandhi's last fast, Patel left New Delhi to visit Bombay and Ahmedabad.

  When the Union Cabinet decided not to withhold the balance payment of Rs. 55 crores to Pakistan, Patel was very annoyed. According to Pyarelal, this was the proverbial last straw on the camel's back. 'Increasingly he had had to defer with his Cabinet colleagues on matters of importance and although Gandhi differed on many issues from the stand taken by Patel, he had defended the latter in the face of attacks from the pro-Nehru factions of the Cabinet.' Patel did not like to be defended by anybody.

  Patel had a very simplistic view of things and was very extreme in his actions. A story made very famous about his strength and will power throws light on his attitude towards vexing issues. It is said that in his early youth, Patel developed an abscess in his armpit. As the treatment failed to provide relief, he picked up a knife, heated it over the glowing coals on his mother's kitchen stove and plunged it into the abscess.

  He used the same kind of reasoning for the partition of India. During the transfer of power talks, when an interim Cabinet of the Muslim League and the Congress was formed, Patel and Nehru thought that the Home ministry would be vital for a newly formed nation. Patel took charge of the Home ministry while, surprisingly, Nehru decided to take the lame duck Foreign Affairs ministry, leaving the vital Finance ministry for the Muslim League. The Muslim League was determined to achieve a division of the country. They had terrorised the nation during the League-sponsored 'Direct Action Day' and now found another weapon to harass Congress ministers of the interim government. The interim prime minister and Home minister had to wait for budgetary approval for days on end for trivial items like furniture in their offices or appointments of clerks. Even in the negotiations on the division of wealth and assets of undivided India, members of the League were known to hag
gle. They would argue over the most trivial of issues like the division of chairs, desks, office cabinets and fans. Patel and other Congress leaders were at their wit's end. Finally, when the time came to decide between an undivided India and the formation of Pakistan, Patel and Nehru immediately opted for partition for several reasons including the desire to just be rid of the harassment of the Muslim League and its ministers.

  Was this same attitude becoming apparent in the lackadaisical approach to the protection of Gandhi's life by the Home minister's police department?

  Patel wasn't the only leader to opt for partition; almost the entire Congress leadership, with the exception of Maulana Abul Kalam Azad and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan, opted for partition and abandoned Gandhi. Acharya Kripalani, the Congress president, had justified his support for partition saying, 'The Hindu and Muslim communities have vied with each other in the worst orgies of violence. I have seen a well where women with their children, 107 in all, threw themselves to save their honour. In a place of worship, fifty young women were killed by their menfolk for the same reason. These ghastly experiences have no doubt affected my approach to the question. Some members have accused us that we have taken the position out of fear. I must admit the truth of their charge. The fear is if we go on like this we will reduce ourselves to a state enslavement and worse. I have been with Gandhiji for the past thirty years. Why then am I not with him? It is because I feel that he has as yet found no way of tackling the problem on a mass basis.' Patel said, 'I agreed to partition as a last resort when we would have lost all.'

  The strategy of the Muslim League ever since Direct Action Day was to terrorise and intimidate the Indian people and the Congress leadership into conceding to Pakistan; the Congress leaders walked right into the trap. Gandhi was the only one who was willing to fight against the terror tactics and thwart the designs of the League, but he was left with no supporters. If it can be said that Patel was angry with Gandhi and let his anger cloud his judgement; the 'jawahar' of Gandhi's eye, Nehru, as prime minister, also failed to support and protect Gandhi.

 

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