Lets Kill Gandhi

by Gandhi, Tushar A.

  Nehru was known to be ambitious, a man eager to become the first prime minister of independent India. Post-independence, he was bogged down by seemingly insurmountable problems: the transfer of power, the tragedy of Partition, the resettlement of millions of refugees, the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir and his continuing internecine war with Patel in the Congress. But as prime minister of India, and as one who enjoyed that privilege solely due to the fact that Gandhi had favoured him, Nehru failed to protect Gandhi. He was also guilty of blatantly discarding Gandhi in the decision-making process while policies were framed for independent India.

  Nehru had been drifting away from Gandhian philosophy and Gandhi in matters of the state and the future of India. For a long time he had considered Gandhi as a role model and father figure, but since the advent of the Mountbattens, Nehru was more influenced by the last viceroy and more so by the vicerine. The shrewd couple had sensed the distancing between Nehru and Gandhi and the rift and rivalry between Nehru and Patel, which they exploited fully. This has been summed up in the following extract from Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Vol. 10, Part II by Pyarelal. 'But whether they knew it or not, the whole galaxy of the Old Guard, like the galactic system in outer space, were imperceptibly being drawn into a different sun-orbit—the orbit of Lord Mountbatten, the coming Viceroy. The different settings in which they and Gandhiji had been functioning of late had differently conditioned their thinking, outlook and approach. Gandhiji's was the redemptive way. He represented the non-violent approach which has its own logic. Unless true repentance manifested itself in Bihar, irrespective of what was happening in other parts of India, the hearts of Hindus and Muslims could not be united and partition of India would be the inevitable result. Sardar Patel, surveying the scene from his orthodox political plane, thought in terms of reciprocity—uniform action in Bihar and Bengal and elsewhere. The League would come to its senses only when it realised that violence was a game "at which both parties can play". Pundit Nehru's was an idealistic approach, but it lacked the sanction which Gandhiji's leadership during the non-violent freedom struggle had provided and which alone could make that idealism effective. Sardar Patel the matter-of-fact realist, was at times very critical of what appeared to him as the disjointed idealism of his colleague. But however much they disagreed with each other neither of them could agree with Gandhiji. They had willy-nilly to obey the dynamics of the machine of which they had become a part—an administration based ultimately upon force—and the inexorable logic of their own policies since coming into power in the Provinces and at the Centre. A widening gulf separated them from their erstwhile oracle. Sardar Patel was the first to recognise it. The recognition came late to Pundit Nehru, and he continued to struggle against it almost to the last'. Pyarelal also writes: 'But Lord Mountbatten found in Congress Leaders apt pupils, who hung on his lips, when he discoursed to them on the problem of defence in the event of India being partitioned or otherwise. They were the ones, the word went round, with whom "business could be done". The impossible old man was put on a pedestal, admired for his genius and "unerring hunch", consulted, listened to with respectful attention and—by-passed. But the more they drifted away from him, the more they needed him. For in the last resort he alone could deliver the goods. Wanting nothing for himself, he was anxious only to give and to serve, knowing no jealousy, giving himself no airs, never resentful ... never rude, claiming no rights for himself, loath to brood over an injury ... slow to expose, eager to believe the best, always hopeful, always patient'.

  At one point Gandhi had blamed Nehru for sabotaging his dream of a united India. In a very emotional statement to Jayprakash Narayan, the leader of the Congress Socialists, in Panchgani in 1946, Gandhi said, 'Jawaharlal has destroyed my dream of an undivided India.' What prompted this statement? As it implies, this was one of the greatest betrayal, faced by Gandhi. This is alluded to in the memoirs of Maulana Azad and in a book written by Minoo Masani titled Bliss Was It In That Dawn. It is a historic fact that Mountbatten first convinced Patel to accept his plan for the division of India; he then convinced Nehru since Patel had already approved of it.

  Gandhi had tried to avoid partition. When all his efforts had failed he had broached the idea that partition be considered after independence, without any interference from the British. But it was an exercise in futility. The ageing trio of Jinnah, Patel and Nehru were impatient for power and they could not wait any longer. Jinnah knew he had very little time left. It was a statement made by Nehru as the president of the Congress in Bombay on 10 July 1946 that pushed Jinnah and the Muslim League into becoming more rabid in their demand for Pakistan. Addressing journalists Nehru had said, 'The Congress will enter the National Government unfettered by any previous pact or understanding. The Congress will be free to frame its policies and actions according to the situations and ground realities. The Congress has agreed to be a member of the Constitution Committee. The Congress will be free to change and alter the Cabinet Mission Plan according to its requirements.' The Congress, like the Muslim League, had previously agreed to abide by the Cabinet Mission Plan and this statement by the Congress president was like a bolt out of the blue. As expected Jinnah and the Muslim League reacted vehemently and called an emergency session. There Jinnah declared that 'in the wake of the Congress President's statement the only option available to the League is to revive vociferously the demand for Pakistan'. At the end of the session, the League backtracked on its previous approval to the Cabinet Mission Plan and rejected it. The Congress was caught in a bind. It had previously accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan, but its president had publicly declared his intension of subverting it. Finally, they reacted to the resolution of the Muslim League and issued a face-saving but ambiguous statement and appealed to the League to cooperate with the Congress in drafting the Constitution of India and in the transfer of power talks. Jinnah rejected the CWC's statement and said that what had been implied by the president was the Congress' real policy.

  When the CWC met to approve of the Mountbatten Plan to divide India, Jayprakash Narayan and Dr. Ram Manohar Lohiya were invited as special invitees. In his book Guilty Men of Partition Lohiya describes the meeting: 'Gandhi, the Frontier Gandhi Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan*, Jayprakash Narayan and I were the only four to oppose the plan to partition India, no one else uttered a word of protest against the plan to divide India'. He further writes: 'Gandhiji interrupted the discussion, he lamented that before approving the Partition Plan neither Nehru nor Sardar Patel had briefed him. He had been kept in the dark. An angry Nehru interrupted Gandhiji and said that he had been informing Gandhiji about the developments, When Gandhiji reiterated that he had been kept in the dark about the Partition Plan before it was accepted by Sardar Patel and Nehru, Nehru demurred and admitted that since at that time Gandhiji was touring the riot affected district of Noakhali it was not possible for them to inform him about the Partition Plan'.

  D.G. Tendulkar in volume 7 of his book Mahatma has described the meeting and it tallies almost entirely with the version given by Dr. Lohiya. Tendulkar writes: 'At the meeting Gandhiji further said that since the Congress Leaders had pledged their acceptance of the Partition Plan it was binding on the party to accept the Partition as a face saving exercise for their leaders. After the acceptance of the Partition Plan by the Congress and the Muslim League the Viceroy and the British Government should step aside and the Congress and the League should without outside influence or pressure chalk out a plan for the partition of India'. Here the words 'since the leaders had given their word' and 'as a face-saving exercise' become very important. It proves that Patel and Nehru had, without consulting or briefing the party or Gandhi, unilaterally agreed to the partition of India. Yet the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha blamed Gandhi for the vivisection of India.

  Gandhi first heard of the Congress resolution demanding the division of Punjab through a press report in March 1947, while he was touring riot ravaged Bihar. Pyarelal writes in Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase Vol. 10, Part II: 'It wa
s the month of March, 1947. Gandhiji had been in Bihar nearly a week, battling with all his strength to bring together the sundered hearts of Hindus and Muslims in that riot torn Province so that they could once again live together as brothers in the land of their birth, when by a stroke of irony he saw in the papers the Congress resolution demanding the Partition of the Punjab. It was as if the abyss had suddenly opened under his feet. He had not been consulted or even forewarned. "I think I did not know the reason behind the Working Committee resolution," he wrote to Nehru on 20th March, "I cannot understand it," he wrote to Sardar Patel.

  'The Congress resolution on the demand for dividing the Punjab stated:

  'During the past seven months India has witnessed many horrors and tragedies which have been enacted in the attempt to gain political ends by brutal violence, murder and coercion....

  'The Punjab ... became six weeks ago the scene of an agitation, supported by some people in high authority, to coerce and break a popular Ministry which could not be attacked by constitutional methods. A measure of success attended this, and an attempt was made to form a Ministry dominated by the group that had led the agitation. This was bitterly resented and has resulted in increased and widespread violence....

  'The tragic events have demonstrated that there can be no settlement of the problem in the Punjab by violence and coercion, and that no arrangement based on coercion can last. Therefore it is necessary to find a way out which involves the least amount of compulsion. This would necessitate a division of the Punjab into two Provinces, so that the predominantly Muslim part may be separated from the predominantly non Muslim part'.

  By formally asking for a division of Punjab on religious lines the Congress gave the Muslim League a legitimate right to demand a separate Pakistan. The British administration and the Muslim League were waiting for just such an opportunity. Gandhi immediately realised the danger behind the Congress' demand, but unfortunately learnt of it only when it was too late. This was how the country was divided: by a mix of political terror, chicanery and a conniving colonial power on one side, and a morally bankrupt and cowardly political leadership on the other.

  To Nehru, Gandhi wrote: 'I would like you ... to tell me what you can about the Punjab tragedy. I know nothing about it save what is allowed to appear in the Press which I thoroughly distrust. Nor am I in sympathy with what may be termed by the old expression of "hush hush policy". It is amazing how the country is adopting almost the very measures which it criticised during British administration. Of course, I know the reason behind it. It makes no appeal to me'. Was Gandhi subtly warning the Congress leadership that they were not only pursuing the British policy of withholding information from its citizens but was also pursuing the age old divide and rule policy of the colonial power?

  The Congress passed the resolution demanding the partition of Punjab on religious lines in the first week of March 1947 without informing or consulting Gandhi. Even after passing the resolution neither Nehru nor Patel saw it fit to inform him. After a fortnight of the resolution being adopted, on 20 March, Gandhi wrote to Nehru: 'I have long intended to write to you asking you about the Working Committee resolution on the possible partition of the Punjab. I would like to know the reason behind it. I have to speak about it. I have done so in the absence of full facts with the greatest caution. Kripalani said in answer to a question in Madras that it was possible that the principle might be applied to Bengal also. I was asked by a Muslim Leaguer of note ... if it was applicable to the Muslim-majority Provinces, why it should not be so to Congress-majority Provinces like Bihar. I think I did not know the reason behind the Working Committee's resolution. Nor had I the opportunity. I could only give my own view which was against any partition based on communal grounds and the two-nation theory. Anything was possible by compulsion. But willing consent required an appeal to reason and heart. Compulsion or show of it had no place in voluntariness'. On the same day he wrote to Patel: 'Try to explain to me your Punjab resolution if you can. I cannot understand it'. Patel replied on the 24th: 'It is difficult to explain to you the resolution about Punjab. It was adopted after the deepest deliberation. Nothing has been done in a hurry or without full thought. That you had expressed your views against it, we learnt only from the papers. But you are, of course, entitled to say what you feel right.

  'The situation in the Punjab is far worse than in Bihar.... The military has taken over control. As a result, on the surface things seem to have quietened down somewhat. But no-one can say when there may be a burst-up again. If that happens, I am afraid, even Delhi will not remain unaffected. But here of course we shall be able to deal with it'. Patel was going to be proved wrong even in Delhi. They required Gandhi to ensure peace in the national capital. Nehru responded to Gandhi's letter the day after Patel wrote: 'About our proposal to divide Punjab, this flows naturally from our previous discussions. These were negative previously but now a time for decisions has come and mere passing of resolutions giving expression to our views means little. I feel convinced and so did most of the members of the Working Committee that we must press for this immediate division so that reality might be brought into the picture. Indeed this is the only answer to partition as demanded by Jinnah. I found people in the Punjab agreeable to this proposal—except Muslims as a rule. For the present it means an administrative decision without any change in law'.

  How could both Nehru and Patel fail to recognise that any demand for division on the basis of religion only legitimised the League's demand for a Muslim nation? But Gandhi's protégés had emerged from his shadow, and now considered their mentor to be a burden they reluctantly had to carry along. Pyarelal writes: 'Such a thing would have been inconceivable in olden days. Even when he was ranging over the length and breadth of India, they did not fail to consult him before taking any vital decision'.

  Speaking at a prayer meeting Gandhi had said, 'If Partition is unavoidable it should not be at the hands of the British, the division of the country should not be considered while the British still rule over India. Let the British grant Independence and then the Congress and Muslim League will sit together and decide about the division of the country, I suggested this to the Viceroy, Pandit Nehru and Sardar Patel did not like my suggestion. Let them do what they wish, but let nobody say that Gandhi was a partner to the division of the country. Everyone is in a hurry to achieve independence at any cost.'

  The Congress high command had discarded Gandhi and they would regret it. After independence, when the horrors of the post partition massacres blew up in their faces, all the top leaders of the Congress wrung their hands in despair and cried themselves hoarse that they had not expected such a horrifying result. Two years later, on 16 October 1949, Nehru declared before an audience in New York that, if they had known the terrible consequences of partition, they would have resisted the division of India. 'It was a big mistake on our part not to have listened to Gandhi at that time,' confessed Maulana Azad, 'If we had only known!' exclaimed Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Acharya Kripalani, who as president of the Congress at the time of partition, had alleged that Gandhi was groping in the dark, as there was no alternative to partition, used to in his later life reserve the choicest epithets for those in the Congress high command whom he blamed for the partitioning of India, forgetting his own advocacy of the partition plan at the AICC convention.

  It is almost sixty years since Gandhi's murder. The principal players of that time are no more. For the past fifty years and more, many lies have been propagated about the reason for the murder and about Gandhi's role in the tragic events during the last year of his life. Followers of Gandhi and the subsequent leaders of the Congress have failed to counter the disinformation campaign of Hindu Right-wing organisations. The Hindu extremists have recently adopted Patel as their icon, perhaps unaware that he was the one who first accepted the British plan to partition India. He was also one of the signatories to the treaty which agreed to unconditionally give Pakistan Rs. 55 crores.

  Patel had been upset
by Gandhi's stand on this issue. At the time of independence, the cash balance of undivided India had to be divided between the two countries according to the size of their territory and population; the debt was also thus divided between them. The cash balance of undivided India was Rs. 375 crores. It was decided that Pakistan would be paid Rs. 20 crores on the day it came into being, i.e. 14 August. After negotiations a bilateral treaty was signed between the two independent nations and Pakistan's share was set at Rs. 75 crores. Deducting the Rs. 20 crores already paid, India owed Pakistan Rs. 55 crores. According to a treaty, India agreed to pay Pakistan the balance amount at a later date or when Pakistan demanded payment. Patel and Nehru were signatories to this treaty. The Muslim League ministers went public about having signed this treaty to garner popularity. In India the news caused a lot of resentment. Worried about the backlash Congress leaders publicly stated that they had mentioned that the balance amount would be paid when all the unresolved issues between India and Pakistan were sorted out. The treaty was signed when the incursion into Kashmir had already started. But neither did the Muslim League ever accept this 'when all issues are resolved' condition, nor were the Congress leaders ever able to prove that this 'condition' had been taken note of. The treaty document did not mention any such condition.

  When the refugees poured in from West Pakistan and the atrocities began to be committed there by Pakistan, the Indian Cabinet decided that India would withhold the payment of the balance amount of Rs. 55 crores. But this would have violated the treaty. If challenged— and Pakistan would definitely have challenged India's stand—the Indian Cabinet's stand was not defensible. They had signed a treaty with another sovereign nation and the treaty did not have any clause for withholding of the payment. Not only would India have been branded as an untrustworthy nation, but also be guilty of breach of contract. The Indian Cabinet was trying to take a populist stance but were jeopardising the reputation of the country internationally. When news of the decision made by the Cabinet reached Governor General Lord Mountbatten he became worried. Since he was technically the head of the government he would be party to any decision taken by the Cabinet.