During my time in Afghanistan, the Kabul Bank defaulted on millions of dollars and essentially collapsed. It appears many poor decisions and corrupt acts led to the bank’s failure. Some of the highest-ranking officials in charge of the bank had little to no experience running such a large financial institution. This, paired with the combination of several pyramid schemes, embezzlement, bogus loans and insider trading led to the bank’s demise. According to the United Kingdom newspaper, The Guardian, to rescue the bank and bail it out, the Afghan government would need to provide the equivalent of approximately 820 million U.S. dollars, a staggering amount of the 12 billion dollar annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country [1].
In the true Pashtun fashion of passing off the responsibility, President Karzai blamed western officials for not alerting him to the bank’s problems before they escalated, causing the near collapse. I am not sure why he feels it is another country’s responsibility to keep track of his banking institutions. In reality, Karzai’s own brother, Mahmoud Karzai should have been able to provide advance notice of impending doom, since he was fingered as one of the key players in the bank’s scandals. After all, he was the bank’s third largest share owner. Ironically, he attained this share owner status as a result of massive loans from the bank itself, reportedly totaling hundreds of millions of dollars. With no collateral to back up these loans, he defaulted and was unable to repay the money contrary to his claims. Following an investigation launched by Hamid Karzai, Mahmoud was relieved of any wrongdoing with regards to the bank’s default. Not surprising.
The downfall of the bank manifested effects reaching far and wide, both within Afghanistan and around the globe. At the time, Kabul Bank was responsible for transferring the salaries for the Afghan security forces, from the government to each individual’s bank account. In my opinion, it is these men, fighting for their country, who may suffer the most as a result of the blatant corruption and insider trading. There is a definite risk that, at some point, the bank may be unable to pay these men their salaries, as there are not sufficient funds to do so.
Some of the executives who took out fraudulent loans from the bank bought lavish vacation homes in other countries. The fall of the bank resulted in real estate fraud and foreclosures. Several “shell companies” were created to give the appearance of the loans going to legitimate companies. However, none of these “shell companies” actually existed to the money was loaned, and then spent, with no hope of ever being repaid, as the businesses had no income. Furthermore, the previous Chairman of the Board of Supervisors of Kabul Bank, Sherkhan Farnood, was also a manager for a bank in Dubai. He transferred millions of dollars illegally out of Afghanistan and into the bank in Dubai, taking the corruption to an international level.
Unfortunately, the inner workings of a bank system were well above the comprehension of most the local Afghans I spoke with. A majority of men I came into contact with had never stepped foot in a bank and had no idea what the purpose of one even was. So, it was not a topic I could use for conversation during most of my interviews. I do, however, remember one man telling me the Kabul Bank disaster taught him not to trust his own government. It was distressing that this was the example being set for the citizens by persons tasked with achieving financial success for the country.
With the deadline of 2014 looming, for the official handover of responsibility from U.S. and NATO forces to Afghan security forces, I was interested to find out how the Afghans felt about our impending departure. Most understood that we would not simply pack up and abandon Afghanistan in one day. Several did not even believe we would ever leave. Most did not understand the concept of “Coalition Forces”, which encompasses all the various allied forces fighting for a peaceful Afghanistan. So, I usually referred to them as simply the “Americans” or “U.S. military” to simplify things.
Generally, I asked everyone, “What do you think will happen when the Americans leave your country?” Nearly everyone thought we should stay for many more years, even decades. At a minimum, they loved our money. Overall, the general consensus was that The Taliban would return, backed by Pakistan, and take over Afghanistan once again. This, in spite of the 350,000 or so Afghan security forces who would be charged with security for their country.
Many believed, without adequate air power, Afghanistan could not keep The Taliban at bay. They felt this was the main military attribute, possessed by the U.S., which held the upper hand against The Taliban. Technically, Afghanistan does have an Air Force, whose official name is the Afghan National Army Air Force. However, it is sparse, having only about one hundred aircraft and 5,000 personnel. Few Afghans I spoke with even knew this branch of their military existed. The locals believed The Taliban were better trained and more vigilant than the Afghan National Police or Army. Some felt it was okay for us to leave, but that we should help establish a full-fledged Air Force before we did so. One man, in particular told me the United States should foot the entire bill for an Air Force before we left the country. I felt snubbed that so many Afghan citizens felt it was the responsibility of other countries to continue to finance their government.
A few understood that once Coalition Forces left, thousands of jobs would be lost as well, leaving many people without the steady source of income they had grown accustomed to. Countrywide, tens of thousands of Afghans were employed on Coalition bases. They were aware that most of those jobs would cease to exist after 2014. Here is yet another reason I believe the Afghan government needs to tap into those natural resources and create jobs for its citizens. Without jobs, people turn to crime in time of need. If they cannot provide for their families and put food on the table, many will engage in illegal acts to accomplish this.
Many Pashtuns I spoke with had little idea as to the underlying reasons why the American military first came to their country, i.e. to oust The Taliban from power and search for Osama bin Laden. Most believed the American forces came to their country to simply build it up and oversee massive construction and re-construction projects. I guess it did not seem strange to them that a foreign country decided to just suddenly take pity on them and come help them out for no reason. One man informed me that the reason the Americans had arrived in Afghanistan ten years prior was “To build it up.” Another told me the reason for our arrival was “To give us jobs.” A large percentage admitted to me they really did not know why the U.S. and other countries’ militaries were in Afghanistan. They had never thought to even question our presence.
The rural, isolated landscape coupled with a lack of technology and accurate news reporting has left millions of Afghans in the dark about current affairs. One man I remember distinctly arrived at the base having never seen an American soldier before. Mind you, this was ten years after our arrival in Afghanistan. He had been directed to the base by a friend, who informed him of the job opening, but the man had never left his village prior to that. Because he lived in such a rural and apparently peaceful area, NATO forces had never patrolled or visited his village. Before that day, he literally had no idea what a military base was, what an American looked like, or that the Americans were even in his country. As one might suspect, it was extremely difficult to carry on any kind of logical intelligent conversation with this man. It was as if he had been plucked from the seventeenth century and thrown on our doorstep.
In late 2011, while being interviewed by a private Pakistani television station, President Karzai stated he would stand behind Pakistan if they ever went to war with the U.S. Reportedly, the comment was made in an attempt to maintain a friendly relationship and ease tensions between the two countries, but the backlash and controversy surrounding his remarks, were incredible. Once news of Karzai’s inflammatory statements spread, everyone I spoke with was angry, especially the American soldiers I knew on base. Many of these soldiers wondered what the point of our presence was anymore, if Karzai did not support us. They felt insulted, knowing they risked their lives each day for a country whose president seemed not to care. It felt
like a knife in the back and was another hit on the already low morale of our troops.
Not only were the Americans angry, but so were the local Afghans. Those who had heard the news about the President’s comments were upset and questioned his intentions. Others had not heard the news and were confused when I told them about the situation. None could understand why their President would say such a thing and several expressed emotions of disbelief, outrage and, in some cases, embarrassment. Pakistan and Afghanistan have never been amicable and the local Afghans knew this.
Later in the same speech, Karzai added that Afghanistan and Pakistan were like brothers. I, and many others, knew this delusion was far from reality. For years, even decades, Pakistan had caused a myriad of problems for Afghanistan. Although most Afghans I spoke with had little understanding of current politics, one consensus was shared by nearly all of them: Pakistan was the number one enemy. There was no argument from anyone about this.
Relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan have been strained for years, even decades. Although Pakistan welcomed millions of Afghan refugees during the Russian invasion and Taliban regime, the two countries seem to only to tolerate each other, at best. A main source of contention for both countries is the disputed Durand Line, which was originally established in 1893. This 1,640 mile length of land is technically within Afghan territory, but was created as a buffer zone between Afghanistan and then British-India (what is now Pakistan). The area was inherited by Pakistan when their country was formed in 1947 and is now comprised mainly of the Pashtun-dominated Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), an extremely volatile, dangerous area. There has never been a formal agreement or handover between the two countries, leading to current disputes over the area’s righteous owner. Most Afghans who have knowledge of the Durand Line’s establishment believe the original agreement was intended as a temporary, 100-year contract. These men are certain the land belongs to Afghanistan, but believe Pakistan will not return the territory out of spite and because they feel it will make them look weak.
In addition to the ongoing Durand Line arguments, the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) seems to constantly meddle in matters that lead to more controversy. Suspicions abound that the Pakistani ISI support al-Qaeda, The Taliban and other insurgent groups fighting against Afghan and NATO forces. The publicized purpose of the ISI is to gather information critical to the national security of Pakistan. However, the agency appears to have stepped way beyond this advertised mission and operates with no control from the President and government of Pakistan. In fact, the organization answers only to the Pakistani Army and Chief of Army Staff. Additionally, there is widespread speculation that the ISI was aware of Osama bin Laden’s presence for several years in Pakistan. Although Pakistan is America’s ally on paper, the ISI holds more control over the country than the traditional government. In addition, they certainly do not have our, or Afghan, interests at the forefront of their mission. It is nearly a state within a state and has its own agenda, independent of that held by the official Pakistan government.
My team and I always looked for signs that a local Afghan might have ties to the ISI. We knew the ISI had agents throughout Afghanistan, posing as local citizens, collecting information about security and military operations. The man I remember most vividly, who I suspected was an ISI agent, showed up to apply for a job with the local guard force. The normal applicant for the guard force was an uneducated, poorly dressed man who was in desperate need of a shower. This particular man was exquisitely dressed in a suit, with polished shoes and modern-looking eyeglasses. Incidentally, I do not remember a single guard who wore glasses, although I am sure many of them were in need. His hair was combed and styled and he absolutely did not fit the typical mold for a guard force applicant.
The reasons I believe he had ties to ISI were many. First, though he spoke Pashtu, his accent was of Pakistani origin. My interpreter picked up on this discrepancy immediately. For native Pashtuns, it is easy to decipher those who learned the language outside of Afghanistan. I can analogize it to an American hearing the accent of a British citizen speaking English. This is not always a red flag, as many local Afghans spent years in Pakistan as refugees. In this case, however, the numerous inconsistencies were too many to ignore. In addition to his strange accent, the man could not (or would not) tell us how he obtained the information on how to apply for the guard force. He seemed to just magically appear at the front gate to apply for a job. This was unheard of as job openings on the base were passed only through word of mouth. Third, his style of dress and grooming clearly did not fit with the local population and he had obviously bathed himself recently. We were constantly trying to find ways to ventilate and air out our interview rooms, which often reeked of body odor. This man stunk up the room with his cologne. Finally, his personal background and residence history did not match up and it was obvious he was trying to conceal pertinent information about himself.
When we sent this possible ISI agent on his way and informed him he would not be working on the base, he tried desperately to change our minds. Suddenly, he claimed to have information about possible insurgents and other personalities who were in the local jail. I did not buy it. I believe he was tasked with obtaining a job on our base, so he could collect information about the American military and base security operations. However, he obviously did not receive adequate training on how to alter his grooming and clothing style to fit in with the local population. In addition, his “cover story” (i.e. his false employment and residence history) had too many discrepancies and it was not well rehearsed. If all ISI agents were trained in such a poor manner, they would be a highly unsuccessful agency. However, I know this not to be true, based off its long reaching tentacles that seem to be behind countless corruptive acts and insurgent-backed attacks in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.
I heard many heated statements about Pakistan during my interviews. Some men were truly passionate about their dislike for their neighboring country and felt Pakistan was one of the main reasons for the lack of progression in Afghanistan. One vented his long term hate for Pakistan, by going on a bit of a verbal tirade when I asked him his feelings about the country. He believed Pakistan (directly or indirectly) caused most of the deaths of Afghan citizens over the past decades and purposely engaged in activities that continued to cause strain between the two countries. I posed a scenario to him in which he was President of Afghanistan and asked what he would do to solve the problem. He retorted, “Pakistan is the biggest son of a bitch. I would bomb the whole country during the daylight.” I found this interesting for two reasons: (1) he was willing to kill innocent Pakistani citizens, just as had happened to citizens of his own country and (2) he wanted to complete this task during the day, instead of at night. I asked what the purpose of completing such a bombing campaign during the daylight hours was. He told me that way Pakistan would know where the attack came from and it would be more courageous than doing it at night, under the cover of darkness. Interesting and nonsensical rationale, I thought.
Despite the widespread hate for Pakistan, I did have a laugh with one man when we began discussing the names of his family members. According to him, his father’s name was Pakistan and his uncle’s name was Islamabad (the capital of Pakistan). I found this quite curious, knowing the dislike most Afghans held for Pakistan. I asked him how his family members came to have these names. He shrugged and told me he was not sure, but believed “My grandfather could not come up with anything better.” Even he found it humorous, but told me he did not like his father and uncle having such controversial names. He felt it was somewhat embarrassing.
Afghan relations with Pakistan are further strained when India is thrown into the mix. Pakistan and India, who share a common border, have been engaged in numerous military conflicts and have carried out terrorist attacks on each other’s soil. Most readers probably remember the well-planned Mumbai attacks in 2008 which resulted in the deaths of 166 innocent civilians. This highly effective att
ack was carried out on Indian soil by Pakistani militants. The one attacker who was captured alive admitted the group was funded and trained by the Pakistani ISI on Pakistani soil. An attack such as this cannot exactly be advertised an intelligence-gathering mission, which is what ISI is supposed to be doing with their money and resources.
To this day, the two countries view each other with suspicion and hostility. India has provided billions of dollars worth of aid to Afghanistan. Certainly, this contribution has assisted with reconstruction efforts throughout Afghanistan. However, I also suspect the large monetary support may be an underlying effort to sway Afghan government officials to side with India, if they engage in another war with Pakistan. Obviously, Pakistan has the same suspicion about their neighboring country, leading to more animosity between the two. It is clear Pakistan feels threatened by the amicable relationship between Afghanistan and India. I believe one of the ISI’s main missions is to thwart any alignment between the two countries. They likely fear that this sort of alliance may further threaten Pakistan, if another conflict erupts in the region.
The scariest reality about the situation is that both Pakistan and India possess nuclear weapons and may very well be willing to use them against each other if tensions become unbearable. A nuclear war would devastate Afghanistan as well. Even though the likely target(s) of a nuclear attack would fall within the Pakistan and/or Indian border, Afghanistan would bear the brunt of the nuclear fallout. Because of the earth’s prevailing winds and counter-clockwise rotation, the nuclear airborne radiation and dust that results from a nuclear blast would blanket Afghanistan. Most Afghan citizens would not likely suffer immediate death, but the long-term effects would be devastating. Young children and the elderly would be affected first and foremost due to their naturally weakened immune systems. Cancer rates would skyrocket throughout the country over the coming years and the wildlife population would be ravaged by disease. Water and crop sources would be permanently contaminated.
there is no goat Page 6