In addition to the adverse health effects, the Afghan economy would suffer as well. The citizens could not bear the burden of the increased healthcare and medications. Scores of workers would be forced to quit work after the radiation effects set in. The inability to work equates with the inability to provide for one’s family. Theft, and crime overall, would likely increase rapidly. In addition, Afghanistan could not afford the expected massive influx of Pakistani refugees who would probably flee across the border. Finally, the government of Afghanistan, and other neighboring countries would find themselves in a scenario of having to choose sides between Pakistan and India. Aligning oneself with either country could be an invitation for more attacks. Even without its own ongoing war, Afghanistan lies in an extremely volatile part of the world and is land-locked between battling countries.
Most of the men I interviewed were ignorant of this information. A nuclear bomb meant nothing to them because they had never been taught the devastating affects this type of bomb can have. Their only experiences with the effects of a bomb were the traditional type: those that devastate the immediate area in which they explode and nothing else. How I would have loved to have tapped into the brains of Afghans concerning a potential nuclear war, but it was above their level of knowledge. I found I had to keep political discussions to simpler topics.
In exploring the current political situations with local Afghans, several gave me some remarkable insight about the differences they witnessed between the Taliban regime and the current (Karzai) government. Some of the older men I spoke with could vividly recall the Taliban era when the country was forced to follow a myriad of rules, or risk being beaten or killed. Many expressed thanks for the personal freedoms currently afforded to them, including the right to shave their facial hair and the right to send their children to public (non-religious) schools. One man’s comment was in line with this as well when he told me “I like the current government because they don’t hit us when we smoke.” According to him, he was unable to smoke in public during the Taliban era and was actually being beaten several times by Taliban members for doing so. One time, he was indulging in a cigarette in his own yard, but visible from the street, when he was spotted and punished. He seemed thrilled to be able to partake in tobacco use anywhere he pleased now.
Some I spoke with felt the current government was just as corrupt as the former Taliban regime, although in different ways. Widespread embezzlement is one of the main issues at the core of the current government’s corruption woes. With foreign aid flowing into the country like a tidal wave, government officials have suddenly had access to money like never before. On top of this, for years, there was little oversight of the distribution of this aid money to its intended sources. Bribery is another issue plaguing the Afghan government, especially within its justice system. I heard dozens of stories of persons sent before a court judge and/or to prison, for illegal activity, only to be released shortly after, by paying a fee to the court or jail officials. In Afghanistan, money seems to hold a spell over many, leading them to engage in greedy behavior they might not have considered in the past.
While I was in Afghanistan, President Karzai’s brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai, was murdered in Kandahar, located the southern part of the country. Many Pashtuns I spoke with had little knowledge of the assassination, but the country, as a whole, was divided over the influence Ahmad had. Ahmad was Chairman of the Kandahar Council, and considered a prominent tribal elder, at the time of his death. Some felt he was responsible for bringing stability to the Kandahar area, while others described him as a corrupt, drug lord, who was heavily involved in the opium trade. Additional reports indicated that Ahmad may have been involved in helping to rig the 2009 election of his brother, but no solid evidence was ever found to support this claim. Naturally, President Karzai vehemently denied the latter allegations.
The Taliban claimed responsibility for Ahmad’s death, although most speculated that is was an act of personal revenge. One of his longtime trusted bodyguards, who was also head of his security detail, was responsible for his death. This fact provided weight to the argument that Ahmad was assassinated out of personal spite. The assassin was killed immediately by other bodyguards and, thus, there was no way to prove or disprove the motivation for the attack. Despite the lack of motive, one man I interviewed had certainly made up his mind about Ahmad. He told me, “I am glad Karzai’s brother was killed because he was a criminal and a drug dealer.”
Afghanistan’s massive opium and hashish production provides illegitimate funding not only to The Taliban, but certainly also lines the pockets of government officials. When he took office, President Karzai vowed to address the country’s drug problem and make strides to eradicate it. It appears any such efforts have failed, as opium production has flourished since The Taliban was ousted from power in 2001. I do realize that security problems and reconstruction rank at the top of the priority list for the country’s leaders, however disallowing the Taliban immersion in the drug trade would surely increase the security in many areas. I will also point out here that eliminating poppy fields could potentially put thousands of Afghan farmers out of business and unable to provide for their families. However, there are other crops, such as wheat or corn, which farmers can profit from just as easily. Granted, the income from these alternative crops is surely less than that from poppy-derived opium, but I am certain the profit would still be sufficient to support one’s family.
In certain areas of the country, government officials are actually fueling the local drug trade as a means of collecting unsanctioned “taxes” and bribes. Drug traffickers may be able to bribe a police officer and/or judge out of an arrest or prison sentence. Farmers routinely bribe local counter-narcotic investigators to turn their heads and leave them alone. These illicit profits likely make their way up the government chain of command, although to which level, I will not speculate. However, the examination of the death of President Karzai’s brother leads one to believe the profits soar quite high up the totem pole.
Many men I spoke with raved about the positive changes the American military had brought to their country. They often cited paved roads, hospitals, schools and water wells as signs of progress and appeared genuinely thankful for our help. I mentioned the scheduled 2014 departure of NATO forces from Afghanistan to one man I interviewed and he became upset, saying this would be detrimental to his country. He asked if I could send a message to the U.S. President for him. Curious as to what he wanted to say, I told him I would do my best. He said, “Tell President Bush I am asking him to send more troops over here!” Despite the fact that it was 2011, I guessed he was unaware of our election results from 2008. When I pointed out his mistake, he laughed and told me he understood, but thought George Bush would respond to this request and Obama would not. Like many American soldiers I know, it appeared this man felt President Bush was more attentive to the U.S. military than our current President was. It was discerning to see that a local Afghan man had picked up on this and arrived at the same conclusion.
CORRUPTION
Corruption runs rampant throughout the Afghan government, not unlike dozens of other countries around the world. The level of corruption was surprising, at least to me, because of the fact that the United States was overseeing the establishment of a democratic Afghan government and the reconstruction of the country. Prior to traveling to Afghanistan, I imagined President Karzai to be a man of integrity and of respectable stature. I pictured pockets of corruption existing throughout the Afghan government, but assumed an adequate justice system existed to swiftly investigate and administer appropriate punishment of these acts. My expectations were anything but correct.
The Afghan justice system, such as it is, is modeled off the American justice system (which, I might add, is quite broken itself, but in different ways). In theory, police officers and federal agents investigate criminal activity, arrest perpetrators, send them before a judge and administer appropriate punishments. Historically, however Afgha
ns have never had lawful power over other Afghans. Historically, family members and tribes handled the punishment for offenders. After 9/11, when the new justice system began to form, Afghans were not prepared to handle such positions of authority and influence. It was a foreign concept to them. Instead, the instincts of survival and “each man for himself”, passed throughout previous centuries, became immediately prevalent.
Often times, if a police officer, politician or other government figure could find a way to put any extra dollar in his pocket, or provide preferential treatment to one of his own tribesman, he would. They did not seem to care how their deception and fraud affected other Afghans, let alone their government as whole.
I remember a conversation I had with a local Afghan interpreter who was assigned to a U.S. military unit that routinely conducted liaison with Afghan police departments throughout the province. He told me the story of one of the police chiefs, whose corruption scheme had been uncovered by the U.S. military. Reportedly, this police chief was tasked to hire a certain number of new police officers. He falsely reported the hiring numbers, as there was no oversight on this district’s hiring process. For many months, or more, this chief received paychecks for all of his “new hires”. In addition, he ordered tens of thousands of dollars’ worth of equipment for his fabricated new police officers, including uniforms, weapons and radios. He pocketed the paycheck money for himself, and sold the equipment (possibly to insurgents), pocketing the proceeds from those sales as well. According to the interpreter who told me this story, there was no repercussion or penalty for the police chief. In fact, he remained in his position, even after the discovery of his corruption schemes. How can we expect the country, and its mentality, to change, if behavior such as this is allowed and simply overlooked?
Yet another local Afghan military commander was granted a large sum of money to buy several generators, weapons and ammunition for his soldiers. Many of his soldiers worked at tiny, rural outposts, often consisting of just one concrete building. Their task was to guard the area, report suspicious activity and respond to military-related events when ordered to. However, the outposts did not have heat and it was brutally cold in the winter months. This was the reason their commanding officer was told to order generators for them. Instead of making the order for the various logistics items, the commander kept the money and submitted a fake receipt for the purchases. He obviously had no qualms about leaving his soldiers in the cold, with too few weapons. His only priority was to line his own pockets. Eventually, he was found out and removed from his position, but I am certain this scenario replayed itself around the country.
By and large, the Afghan police departments were more unethical and fraudulent than their military counterparts. I often asked our local Afghan workers why they thought their country’s police officers, in particular, were so corrupt. I heard many varying opinion on this, but many felt the police were corrupt because the opportunity to be so presented itself on a daily basis. Historically, Afghans were not used to having any sort of power over others. When many graduated the police academy, they discovered this new found power and used it (wrongly) to their personal advantage. For example, police officers were often tasked to guard certain roads and/or checkpoints, in an effort to prevent insurgents from entering neighborhoods and disturbing the peace. However, this task presented an opportunity for the police officers to search residents’ vehicles and take items of value, to keep for themselves. Or, it allowed the police to demand a monetary fee to allow the vehicle to pass through the checkpoint. This fee inevitably went straight into the pocket of the police officer(s) on site. One might wonder why the police supervisor (if there was one present) allowed this type of behavior to exist. Unfortunately, even many of the highest ranking officers were engaged in some form of corruption.
In an effort to reduce corruption amongst the Afghan military (but not the police), soldiers are not allowed to work within the province they are from. Inevitably, upon joining the Afghan National Army, a new recruit knew he would be sent to another part of the country for his duty. There was a very valid thought process behind this strategy. It was believed that if one were working amongst villagers who were from a different tribe, and who he did not know personally, the soldier would be less susceptible to bribes and other types of corruption or coercion. Overall, I consider this to hold true. I heard significantly fewer accounts of corrupt soldiers than police officers. On the flip side of the coin, this rule led to many soldiers simply quitting their jobs. In Afghanistan, there is no punishment for being Absent Without Leave (AWOL) from the military. Therefore, aside from a meager monthly paycheck, the incentive was not very high for military men to remain in their positions, far away from their families. The average enlisted soldier made approximately $150 per month, a sum that could often be matched by selling crops from the family farm. Patriotism and loyalty to one’s country are personality traits that are rarely found among Afghans.
I often wished the companies hiring local Afghan men for jobs on the base followed the same strategy as the Army, i.e. hiring from other areas of the country. Not only did I believe this would lower the incidents of corruption, but I felt it would protect the safety of the men as well. It was difficult for local Afghans working on our base, to travel back and forth between their village and the base each day, without eventually drawing attention to themselves. Other villagers, who did not support the Coalition Forces, would keep watch and determine who was working on the base. Those with a watchful eye would sometimes report the names of these men to local insurgent groups. This chain of information often had several complicated layers to it, as insurgent groups would usually either pay or threaten local villagers for this information. Armed with specific names of workers, insurgent groups would attempt to scare the person into quitting their job on base, by threatening them or their family. In other situations, an attack would actually be carried out, sometimes injuring or killing the person and/or their family members.
I believed if men were hired from other regions of the country, they would be better protected, as they would not be traveling in and out of their village every day. However, with this strategy, a logistical headache would occur, as hundreds of Afghan men would need to be housed on the base each night. This, in turn, could create a security and/or criminal problem inside the base. There was no easy answer.
For whatever reason, the strategy of hiring outside the local area was not instituted for the Afghan police. Most of the police officers patrolled the area in which they lived and went home to their families during their time off. Therefore, they worked in a position of authority over their fellow villagers and often used this to their benefit. Reports of theft, brutality and rape, by the police were common. If a police officer stole money from a passerby, who could that person report the crime to? But, the fraud worked both ways. Because the local villagers had some sort of personal connection/relationship to the police officers, in their area, they knew they had an advantage. Police officers could be easily bribed to turn their head or to actually engage in criminal activity themselves. Because of this never-ending vicious circle, there was very little respect, among average Afghan citizens, for their police force. Without some level of respect, how can one expect a police force to actually uphold the Constitution and laws?
I asked nearly everyone I interviewed for their interpretation and opinion on corruption throughout the Afghan government. One man I spoke with summed it up beautifully. He told me “With all the money that has been spent in Afghanistan, the streets should be lined with gold.” He was correct. At the time of the writing of this book, the U.S. has spent approximately $602 billion [3] on this war. And yet, there seems little to show for all that spending. Yes, schools, hospitals and paved roads are more commonplace throughout Afghanistan, but not more than a half a trillion dollars’ worth.
Someone once opined to me that as much as fifty percent of that money was lost to corruption throughout Afghanistan. Unfortunately, those are American ta
xpayer dollars that have been subject to fraud and abuse. It is a wonder that there is not some better “checks and balances” system in place, to track this massive amount of funding. Outward appearances are that the U.S. has essentially handed over blank checks to President Karzai and his government. It is obvious that the relationship between the U.S. and Afghan governments has strained over the past few years. Further efforts on behalf of the U.S. to push for prosecution of high-ranking corruption cases, in Afghanistan, would probably put additional strain on the two countries’ relations.
I witnessed an ongoing case of corruption first-hand, while working in Afghanistan. Our Afghan guard force, responsible for helping to secure the perimeter of the base, was headed by a local man, whom I will call Masoud Khan. Masoud had no prior experience relevant to coordinating a force of 150 guards and I am still unsure as to how he achieved his position. He was essentially a local warlord and his presence filled a room. He insisted he be addressed by both his first and last name, instead of simply Masoud, or Mr. Khan. He was tall and commanded respect from his guards, simply with his presence. The guards were petrified of him, based simply off reputation. Rumors constantly swirled about Masoud’s vicious family and his government connections. Reportedly, he was good friends with one of President Karzai’s brothers.
For as long as Masoud was head of the guard force (approximately eighteen months), his guards nearly starved and lived in squalor conditions. I saw many of the guards on a daily basis. As they came to know me, they often approached me and showed me the stale bread and rice provided to them for meals. They never had fresh fruit or vegetables and rarely had meat. One day, one of the guards brought a metal pot to my office to show me the food they had been given for lunch. He pointed inside the pot which contained some measly amount of rice and nothing else. In very broken English, he announced “Look, there is no goat!” He was upset because he and his fellow guards were rarely provided any kind of meat (goat meat is the most common animal source to eat in Afghanistan). It broke my heart to know that these men worked twelve hours a day protecting us and had such sub-standard nutrition. In addition, they lived in tents that were infested with mice and snakes. Periodically, the septic tank at their camp would overflow and stream right past the outdoor “kitchen”, likely contaminating their food. There was no form of refrigeration at the camp, so in the staggering heat of summer, the guards were forced to drink hot water.
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