I began to do some digging to find out why the guard force was treated so poorly and had to live in something similar to a refugee camp. As I spoke with the military personnel responsible for overseeing the guard contract, I found that there was no lack of money provided for the guard force. In fact, the contract (paid for by the U.S.) appeared adequate in a monetary sense. Obviously, there was a breakdown somewhere in the financial chain. Although the guard force contract was held by a British contracting company, they were simply a go-between. I discovered that the money allotted for food, clothing, shelter and other basic necessities was given directly to Masoud each month, by the contracting company site manager (a South African). Masoud was responsible for providing the necessary supplies for the guard force, including food, drinks, uniforms, weapons and vehicles. The truth became immediately obvious.
Masoud was pocketing a majority of the money that was supposed to go towards providing for his guard force. Even more surprising was the fact that two of Masoud’s brothers worked as guards. Masoud had no qualms about stealing from his own family members and letting them suffer in harsh conditions. Reportedly, Masoud was pocketing at least $15,000 per month. That is an obscene amount of money for any Afghan. Unfortunately, despite the obvious corruption, the U.S. military representatives could do nothing about the situation. It was up to the contracting company to try and remove Masoud from his position. But, I suspect they were up against some political red tape, due to Masoud’s ties to the presidential family.
Masoud was not only in charge of logistics for the guard force, but also recruiting capable men to serve on the force. Not surprisingly, he consistently failed to provide enough men to meet the company’s minimum allowable number of employees. Never did the guard force actually have enough men to meet the promises of eight hour shifts and time off each month. Most of the guards worked twelve hours a day, seven days per week, for weeks on end. They were rarely allowed to leave the base to see their families. At best, they might have been permitted a couple days off every couple of months. This clearly wore down the guards, but also presented a security issue for the base. One’s mind can only remain sharp and alert for so many hours at a time, before complacency set in. It was a definite vulnerability to our perimeter security. At the beginning of Masoud’s recruiting campaign, he required each recruit to supply their own weapon for the job. This relieved him of having to spend the money to buy weapons and ammunition for the guard force. Many of the young men seeking a job were forced to scrape money together to purchase a weapon, in order to begin work. In some cases, they took their family’s only weapon, leaving their family residence unprotected. The problems with this weapon requirement did not end there. Many recruits could not afford a reliable, working rifle and, therefore, armed themselves with substandard machinery. Many of their weapons were poorly-made knock-offs, and were probably only one bullet away from a detrimental incident. Eventually, the weapons policy changed and Masoud was forced to supply AK-47s to every guard on his force. Naturally, he took the cheapest route possible and he bought many inferior replicas, which often failed to fire when tested on the range. Masoud pocketed a substantial portion of the money that had been intended for the purchase of quality weapons and ammunition.
Several months into Masoud’s reign, it was discovered that hundreds of gallons of fuel, provided by the U.S. military, were being stolen, on a regular basis. An informal investigation was launched by the contracting company overseeing the guard force. Incidentally, fuel theft is a problem encountered country-wide on Coalition bases in Afghanistan. So, although this was not a unique problem, our base commander certainly had a financial interest in finding the culprit. After a couple of months, it was discovered that Masoud’s brothers were responsible for the theft of much of the fuel. Because they were allowed access to the guard force vehicles, and free reign of base, they could fill the tanks of the vehicles at will. They would then drive off base, under the guise of delivering food or supplies to the outposts (guard shacks situated outside the base perimeter). Once at the outpost, they would siphon the fuel out of the vehicle and into another container. They could then sell that fuel at the market downtown and keep the money for themselves. Fuel is sometimes a rare commodity in the local communities, so having access to an unlimited supply was certainly lucrative. Eventually, the base regulation changed with regards to access to fuel and the theft was reduced significantly.
As a result of the substandard food, horrible living conditions and long hours, it was no wonder the turnover rate of the guard force was so high. I spoke with many of the guards as they quit their jobs to make note of their reasons. The brutally long days, lack of time off, and insufficient food were the top reasons they provided for leaving the job. In addition to this, many informed me that they feared for their lives by quitting, as Masoud had made threats towards them and their families, in the event they decided to quit the job.
To combat the high attrition rate, the contracting company, itself, attempted to recruit a few dozen guards, without the assistance or approval of Masoud. They brought approximately thirty men from Jalalabad, located in north-eastern Afghanistan, to undergo the standard interview process for jobs. My team completed each and every interview of these men. We liked what we saw. The men were better educated and had no allegiance to Masoud Khan or the local community. They appeared to be hard workers and many had experience in previous security positions. In addition, the background checks we conducted found no derogatory information or links to possible insurgents, which was pleasantly unusual.
The thirty men were housed in temporary tents, outside of our main gate, until they were given final approval to begin work. This was a policy of the base commander, that no Afghan stay overnight on base, unless properly vetted and gainfully employed.
The afternoon before these men were due to begin work and become employees of the guard force, Masoud showed up. One of his brothers had tipped him off that the company was hiring guards without his approval. He marched into the tent, where the applicants were staying, and proceeded to belittle and threaten them. He informed them that they were not welcome in the local area, because they were outsiders and were not from his tribe. He advised them that they would pay the price if they chose to take a job with the guard force. Masoud explained that he had employees who would notify him when these men, from Jalalabad, left the base, to travel north to visit their families. He continued, saying that he could not “guarantee their safety” once they left the security of the base, insinuating that he would have them killed. An hour after this tirade, all thirty men quit their job, before even starting, and returned to Jalalabad.
I was not necessarily surprised at the outcome of the situation, although my team and I were very frustrated at how much time and energy we had devoted to expedite the hiring of these new guards. The managers of the contracting company were furious, to say the least. Their company had spent quite a bit of money for the transportation of these men, medical exams for each, and several days of food. In addition, they were under the thumb of Masoud Khan and could not seem to convince their higher-ranking bosses to fire him. Again, I suspect Masoud’s political ties allowed him to continue his corrupt and manipulative ways.
After this incident, the contracting company began to form a plan to replace Masoud. Their bosses finally agreed to allow Masoud to be removed, if the site managers could find a suitable replacement for him. Naturally, candidates for this job were brought to my office and subjected to the standard background checks, a lie detector test and an in-depth interview. One man we interviewed for the job, who I will call Ismael, admitted to us that he had known Masoud for many years and they were amicable. This concerned me for two reasons: (1) Ismael man might be just as corrupt as Masoud, or (2) Masoud might have Ismael killed if he found out he was being replaced by his “friend”. I addressed the latter concern with Ismael himself. He insisted that Masoud would have no problem with it. I highly doubted this, knowing Masoud’s personality and track r
ecord. But, we could find no derogatory information on this man, so we gave the company the go-ahead to hire him. Ismael was offered the job and he accepted. About a week later, he called the company site manager and rescinded his acceptance of the job, but gave no reason for his change of heart. Although I had no proof, I was sure Masoud had threatened Ismael, once he found out he was being replaced. The guard force was back at square one, with too few guards and a narcissistic warlord for a leader.
As the months wore on, my team and I began to suspect Masoud might not only be a corrupt warlord, but might also be in bed with the insurgents. This made an already disturbing situation into a frightening one. We knew how much influence Masoud had over his guards. In addition, he had intimate knowledge of the base and its daily security operations. If he were involved with an insurgent group, this could be detrimental to the safety of everyone on the base.
Prior to my arrival in Afghanistan, the base was infiltrated in the summer of 2010. Three suicide bombers managed to breach the perimeter fence, run across our air strip, circumvent the guard towers and make it into the central part of the base. Fortunately, U.S. forces shot and killed all three before they could inflict any damage or casualties. However, it was curious that the bombers managed to run across our airfield, on foot, completely exposed, and avoid injury or death by the several Afghan guards in the nearby watch towers. Many people wondered if members of the guard force might have been involved in the plot. Suspicions fell upon Masoud, as well, but no solid proof of his involvement was found. However, we knew the influence he had over his guards and felt he was capable of forcing them into providing the information needed to plan an attack. We also felt that, even if the guards were not willing participants, Masoud could manipulate or force them into playing a part in the attack. The mastermind(s) behind the attack were never discovered and the entire incident remains a mystery to this day.
In addition to suspected insurgent ties, another alarming incident occurred involving Masoud’s brother, Latif (not his real name), who was employed as the Head Supervisor of the guard force. Latif lived on the base, with the rest of the guard force and had been appointed by Masoud to oversee operations. Mind you, there was no supervision or true responsibility exerted by Latif. He was simply a figure head, and an intimidating one at that. He stood approximately 6’4” tall and was rather stocky. He had long, black hair that reached past his shoulders. Despite contract rules, Latif refused to wear the guard force uniform and, instead, strode around in white traditional Afghan garb. This way, he was easily recognizable and stood out from the rest of the guards he was in charge of supervising. It also sent a message that he was above the rules and could do as he pleased.
The guards feared Latif and there were rumors that he abused some of the guards if he thought they were acting out or disobeying him. It was clear he exploited his authority and provided minimal support or assistance to the guard force. In addition, Latif commandeered one of the guard force vehicles for himself, using it to enter and exit the base as he pleased. When he was supposed to be checking on guard towers or delivering meals to the guards, he was nowhere to be found. It drove the contracting Site Manager crazy, but he was powerless as long as Masoud was still in the picture.
When Latif came to my office for his bi-annual interviews, he was arrogant and made it clear we were a bore and nuisance to him. We suspected he, too, had ties to insurgents, but could not dig up any solid proof. It was clear he believed he was untouchable due to his brother’s position and political ties. Following the incident with the threatening of the Jalalabad guard recruits, we recommended that Latif be fired from his position on the grounds that he failed to meet the standards of his assigned position and routinely disobeyed contract rules. The base commander appeared supportive of the recommendation, but soon realized this action was much more difficult than originally thought.
Somehow, Masoud caught wind of the plan to oust his brother from the Head Supervisor position. He called the Site Manager asking for a meeting with him and the military commander of the base. Much to my surprise, the requested parties agreed and met with Masoud the next day. Their plan was to explain to Masoud that his brother was being relieved of his position for dereliction of duty and refusal to follow contract rules. Instead, Masoud turned the tables and blackmailed the military and contracting company into retaining Latif as Head Supervisor. Masoud threatened to have the entire guard force walk off the job, if his brother was not allowed to stay. I believed Masoud was bluffing, because I knew many of the guards did not truly respect him. In addition, the guards desperately needed their jobs to support their families. I felt very few would actually quit, if told to by Masoud and most would be thrilled to continue working without having to worry about Masoud any longer. But, the base commander refused to take the risk of losing his Afghan guards and leaving the base perimeter relatively unguarded. From a security viewpoint, I understood his decision, but it was extremely frustrating to watch this local warlord manipulate and blackmail the American military.
My concerns about Masoud and Latif grew after this botched meeting. They obviously now knew the Americans were not happy with them and were looking to replace them. If, in fact, they were involved with the insurgency, now would be the time for them to do something drastic, knowing their stint in their current positions was probably limited. My suspicions about Masoud’s involvement in the attack the previous year only added to my unease. Many of the military commanders on base agreed with the idea that Masoud might attempt some sort of attack against the base, knowing he was on his way out. However, their options for preventing such an attack were few. Even if Masoud could be fired immediately, he still had intimate knowledge of the layout of the base and its security procedures. In addition, he had relatives still working on the base, who could provide him more information and support, if needed.
With the assistance of the U.S. Military Police unit, we decided the next best step was to thoroughly search the guard force compound. Technically our military was not allowed to search their “counterparts”, meaning any Afghan security unit, whether it be their military, police or an independent guard force. However, we had verbal statements from some guards that Latif had possession of many contraband items, including unauthorized cellular phones and hashish. This gave the Military Police enough evidence to justify a search of the compound. I expected them to find quite a bit of nuisance contraband, but I was horribly astounded at the result of their search.
Not only did the Military Police find the cell phones and drugs, but they found a plethora of other alarming items. Under Latif’s bed were four unauthorized weapons, none of which were AK-47s, as used by the guard force. They also found approximately 500 rounds of ammunition, some of it .556 caliber, which is the type the U.S. military uses in their service-issued weapons. There were numerous Taskeras (Afghan identification papers), none of which belonged to Latif, and the equivalent of approximately one thousand U.S. dollars. The strangest item discovered was a well-used whip. I suspected the whip was one of Latif’s torture methods used upon the guards, although none would ever admit to having been abused by him.
The positive outcome of this frightening situation was that our base commander had grounds to have Latif immediately fired and removed from base. In addition, if Latif had been planning an attack within the base, the Military Police had thwarted it, by searching the guard compound. That was a relief to everyone, but questions circled as to how Latif was able to bring so much weaponry into the base undetected. It was a wake-up call for many and base access policies for the guard force became more stringent after that incident. However, we knew that if Latif had been planning an attack, he likely had others involved in the planning process. The problem was the weapons and ammunition had only been found in Latif’s living area, and no one else’s. So, there was no indication as to who else might have been involved, but was still working on the base. It was a constant guessing game.
It was my pleasure to see Latif go, especial
ly when his own guards had to search him on the way out of the gate. However, his departure was not without a fight from his brother Masoud. Masoud claimed he needed time to arrange a security escort to pick up Latif and escort him to their residence. Because of their notoriety in the local area, they claimed they were targets for kidnappings and extortion. I suspected just the opposite to be true and that Masoud was simply attempting another delay tactic. This one did not work and Latif was required to leave immediately.
A couple of months later, Masoud was finally forced out of his position, although he was never officially fired. The prospect of retaliation from him was still fresh in our minds but, fortunately, it never occurred. The last I heard, he was put in charge of a different private security group (not affiliated with U.S. forces or facilities) in Kabul. I imagine he continued his embezzlement and corruption in much the same manner with the new company. The one consolation was that he no longer had any direct involvement with U.S. or Coalition bases.
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