The Games That Changed the Game

by Ron Jaworski

  Walsh realized that L.T. could not be blocked with tight ends or backs, and left tackle Dan Audick didn’t match up well physically with Taylor. So Bill turned to left guard John Ayers to stop the rookie linebacker. Ayers was instructed by line coach Bobb McKittrick to “Molly” block, a technique that asked the guard to pull, or pop up from his interior line position to ward off an outside pass rusher. Cross knew that Ayers was the right man for the job. “John was a guy who was country strong, had unbelievable strength in his legs, and was an extremely good pass blocker,” he praised. “He was from West Texas and spent his off-seasons branding cattle, so wrestling with Taylor might not have seemed so tough by comparison. As the game wore on, Ayers turned out to be the kryptonite to L.T’s Superman.” Sam Wyche knew that if the Molly worked, then San Francisco’s passing game would be operating at full strength: “The uncovered offensive lineman, usually Ayers, would do a double-read. First he’d read the linebacker over him, his primary responsibility, since he was the guy with the shortest route to the quarterback. If he didn’t come, then the lineman could pull out and help somewhere else.”

  The ‘81 Giants played a standard Cover-Two behind a base 3–4 defense, which meant that inside linebackers Brian Kelley and Harry Carson rarely blitzed. Taylor was almost always the fourth pass rusher in what was predominantly a four-man rush concept. Whenever they got solid pressure up front, this was an extremely effective design. But the defense itself was built on the talent of a great individual and solid supporting players, not a sophisticated and complex scheme. “Conceptually, the Giants weren’t difficult to figure out,” stated Redskins quarterback Joe Theismann, who faced New York twice a year in division games. “It was blocking Taylor that became an issue. And if you became overly concerned with him, you had Carson or George Martin to deal with. Their front seven was almost like playing against seven defensive linemen. They were big, active, and physical. There was no comparison between playing against them and the Cowboys. I could play Dallas, and then on Monday go out and do whatever I wanted. After playing the Giants, it wasn’t until Thursday before I felt like doing anything.”

  The 49ers believed that field conditions would pose major footing problems for the big and physical New York defense. “That fall we had a lot of rain, and the field was miserable all year,” recalled Dwight Clark. “The playing surface at Candlestick is under sea level to begin with, and when the tide comes in from the bay, the water just rises right up through the ground. We’d play our games and rip things up, so they constantly had to put new sod in. They had groundskeeper guys wearing special jackets that said ‘Sod Squad’ on them. Of course, that new sod never did hold. But I think that wet surface actually helped us because we got used to it.

  “The league called in George Toma from Kansas City to try and put his magic to work and see if something could be done.” Toma, regarded as the sports world’s premier groundskeeper, worked full time for baseball’s Royals but rented his artistry to other organizations. “I think he changed the sod and threw some kitty litter out there to dry up the water,” said Clark. “By Sunday, it was decent enough for us to play, but the surface was still really soft.”

  Beyond Walsh’s strategic surprises and a sloppy turf, the 49ers had one more advantage in their favor: the motivation to prove that their coach’s innovative ideas were valid. “We knew we were different,” snapped Cross. “We’d get people looking at what we did and ask, ‘What is that?’ But we made it work. To this day, there are people who still don’t understand it. And they never will, because it’s out of their box, out of their comfort zone. Damn it, in 1981 the NFL was ‘smash-mouth.’ Real football was the NFC East. It meant coming off the ball and beating people up. And if you didn’t play to that style, it wasn’t really football. Bill presented playing the Giants as a challenge. He reviewed what they did well, what they didn’t do well, and where we were going to take advantage of them. He was almost like a surgeon in a preoperation meeting saying, ‘Here’s what we’re going to cut out, and here’s how we’re going to do it.’ ”

  49ers Series No. 1

  1st Quarter, 14:50 Remaining: San Francisco 0, New York 0

  The Giants weren’t all that disappointed when they lost the coin toss, because head coach Ray Perkins believed his team could more easily set the game’s tempo with its defense. He was wrong. The 49ers’ offense took control early, and it would be a long time before New York regained its equilibrium. San Francisco set the tone from the very first play with a three-step drop from Montana and a bullet throw to Dwight Clark for a 16-yard gain. Because Joe’s drop was so short and he got rid of the ball quickly, it was feasible for fullback Johnny Davis to block Lawrence Taylor coming in off the edge, and Davis did. But Davis, in his first and only season in San Francisco, was just one of several 49ers in a “blocking by committee” corps that would be handling Taylor all afternoon.

  After halfback Ricky Patton broke out of a Harry Carson tackle to pick up 5 yards, the Niners went back to the air. A play-action fake sent Patton and guard Randy Cross running right to simulate a sweep. Taylor followed the fake, then Patton blocked him, allowing Montana to make a full seven-step drop with minimal pressure. He threw it deep and within reach of Freddie Solomon, but Freddie was unable to hang on. No matter. Walsh had made an early statement. He was going to stretch the field vertically, and the Giants would have to respect that capability.

  The next play was the first time John Ayers was called on to Molly block Taylor. L.T. beat him to the outside and moved toward the pocket but arrived too late. The ball was already out of Montana’s hands and in the clutches of a wide-open Patton in the right flat. Ricky gathered it in and raced 64 yards for a touchdown. But beyond the Niners’ lightning-quick execution, there was another reason why no Giants were nearby: Solomon had clipped New York corner Mark Haynes, which wiped out the score and put the ball back near mid-field. The penalty allowed New York to collect itself, and the defense responded by shutting down a run and sacking Montana for a big loss after a fake reverse. On third-and-long, Montana looked and found Patton open again, but the pass caromed off his shoulder pad. It appeared that the Giants had weathered San Francisco’s opening assault, but a disastrous holding penalty on Haynes during the punt gave the Niners an automatic first down.

  Even at this early stage in Joe Montana’s career, it was not a good idea to give him a second chance. From his own 41, Joe play-faked to Patton, freezing New York’s linebackers. After a three-step drop, the QB hit receiver Mike Wilson for 15 yards. “One of the things Bill liked about Joe was that his passes had a ‘nose up’ flight of the ball,” said Wyche. “This way the ball always arrived very soft; it was never a hard catch. A ball traveling nose down comes in heavily and can shoot right through you, down your chest, and near the ground if you don’t get your fingers on it.” Joe then lofted another beauty, a quick-out to Dwight Clark for 11 more. On the Clark play I saw Ayers pop out to block Taylor, but this time Lawrence wasn’t rushing. If the Giants wanted L.T. in pass coverage, well, that was just fine with Walsh. In fact, Taylor rushed only twice on the opening series. It was Clark again on the next snap, a hook route between two defensive backs for 22.

  San Francisco was now inside the 10, but was pushed back when center Fred Quillan was flagged for holding. Facing second-and-18, Montana play-faked, then ran a sprint-right option away from Taylor, who was blitzing from the other side. Solomon caught the pass to move the ball to the 8-yard line on third down. Anticipating a blitz from New York’s 3–4 front, Walsh had tight end Charle Young align on the line of scrimmage. He then moved Solomon in as a wing tight end on Taylor’s side of the field. But neither Taylor nor inside backer Brian Kelley blitzed—a huge break for San Francisco. If both had rushed, the Niners’ protection schematically could not have handled it. When neither of the linebackers came, it allowed Ayers to help the left tackle, Audick, block end Gary Jeter. Montana completed his five-step drop, sliding to his left, then found Young in the back of the end zon
e for the touchdown.

  This illustrated the high-quality pocket mobility that became a Montana trademark and the kind of movement we’ve come to expect from such current stars as Tom Brady and Peyton Manning. “Bill was so big on footwork, which got you into a rhythm when you passed,” said Montana. “It all depended on how far you were going to throw the ball. He’d want you to make your drop, then push yourself back up into the pocket. This avoided a lot of sacks and took pressure away from the offensive line.”

  Because of the two San Francisco penalties, Joe’s stats on the touchdown drive were seven of nine passes completed for 111 yards—not a bad feat considering the whole field is only 100 yards to begin with! Maybe the most impressed person was New York’s sidelined quarterback Phil Simms, who couldn’t play because of a separated shoulder. “I’m thinking, God, they’re making it look so easy, just moving right down the field,” he recalled. “It seemed like they were throwing at will.”

  49ers Series No. 2

  1st Quarter, 5:16 remaining: San Francisco 7, New York 0

  During the bulk of the first quarter, the Giants exerted very little pressure on Montana. This allowed Joe to develop his rhythm and timing without much harassment. The Niners got their chance to pad the lead when they took over at their own 46 after a defensive takeaway. But they promptly put themselves in a hole when Solomon committed his second clipping penalty of the quarter. The Niners could not recover from the long-yardage deficit and punted, but the offense would be back on the field barely a minute later. Giants quarterback Scott Brunner, substituting for the injured Simms, drilled a bull’s-eye on a slant pass to Earnest Gray, who slipped past free safety Dwight Hicks’s tackle for a 72-yard touchdown. Even so, the shock of New York’s sudden score eased a bit when 49ers special-teamer “Famous” Amos Lawrence ran the kickoff across midfield into Giants territory.

  49ers Series No. 3

  1st Quarter, 2:45 remaining: San Francisco 7, New York 7

  Throughout the first half, the 49ers’ offense came out on a variety of formations, rarely repeating any of these looks over consecutive plays. To start the drive, Clark lined up as a tight end across from Taylor. Bill did this to put bodies in front of L.T.; to get him thinking rather than allow him to play instinctively. “You use these different formations because you know they will force adjustments from your opponent,” said Walsh. “This will help you for the remainder of the game, to see how they adjust to what you do.”

  Confusion with San Francisco’s multiple formations was one Giants problem. Dealing with Candlestick’s muddy turf was also troublesome, and Randy Cross couldn’t have been happier about it. “That’s why they call it ‘home field advantage,’ “ he said with a laugh. “A lot of what we did was to capitalize on that kind of surface. We’d wear long cleats, and I guess they didn’t. Well, that’s their problem. If it takes you a quarter or a half to get the right shoes on, we just might score a bunch on you.” The Giants were literally out of their element. “We were a team accustomed to playing on an artificial surface,” admitted Carson. “Once you got on slow, wet natural turf, you get slower yourself. You feel bogged down and don’t have the same kind of quickness you’d have on a dry or artificial field.”

  The slippery surface was also affecting how their secondary covered San Francisco’s receivers. Even though the rain had tapered off by game time, the grass remained slick all day. The Giants didn’t want to get burned for a cheap score, so they gave huge cushions to Niners receivers, coverage clearly evident on this first play. Solomon ran a short pattern largely undisturbed by Haynes, and Montana easily hit his wide-open target for 11 yards. On the next snap, most of that yardage was given right back, however, after Patton caught his spikes in the grass. Ricky pulled up a chunk of turf, losing his footing—and 7 yards to boot.

  After an incomplete pass, San Francisco faced third-and-17. Anticipating pressure, the Niners kept Young and fullback Earl Cooper in to protect, but Taylor once again dropped into coverage. Against New York’s Cover-Two, Montana made a seven-step drop, then avoided defenders by sliding up in the pocket. “A play like this is what made Montana so great,” stated Walsh. “His focus is down the field—he doesn’t see these pass rushers at all. He feels them. Guys like Joe, who have the nerve and focus, can do this. Other quarterbacks can’t help but take their eye off the receivers and look at the men rushing him. A lot of people go through their entire career without mastering this. But Joe had this gift, plus he’d done this thousands of times in practice, so it came very naturally to him.”

  Having eluded the rush, Montana threw to Clark, who, surprisingly, was open on the right sideline. The third-year receiver out of Clemson had initially been bumped by Haynes, then broke free. Haynes wasn’t too concerned at first, because he expected safety help from Larry Flowers. But here’s another example of Walsh’s creative design: He had Patton run a seam route in the middle of the field, and Montana looked briefly in his direction. Joe’s body movement also indicated that he might be throwing over the middle. Flowers saw this, knew he had to respect Patton’s route, and briefly hesitated. He was now too far away to come over and give Haynes deep help on Clark. Dwight made the easy catch and ran all the way down to the 5—a 39-yard gain. From there, the Giants held, and San Francisco came away with a Ray Wersching field goal.

  49ers Series No. 4

  2nd Quarter, 13:11 remaining: San Francisco 10, New York 7

  San Francisco’s defense forced its second turnover of the game when Brunner’s deep pass was tipped by Dwight Hicks, who, during the regular season, had intercepted nine passes and returned them for an NFL-best 239 yards. This time, however, the ball landed in the hands of corner Ronnie Lott. The offense took over at its own 32, and once again Walsh lined up Clark as a tight end across from Taylor. Solomon ran a Go route down the sideline, but Haynes had him blanketed in man coverage, so the pass fell incomplete. On second down, Ayers displayed his run-blocking chops by turning Kelley inside, creating a hole for Cooper to pick up 10 yards. “These runs were all part of Walsh’s scripted plays,” explained Cross. “And here’s why: They were there to help set up our play-action. We had to make these running plays work, because the play-actions looked really dumb without a decent ground game. Look, we weren’t a running juggernaut. We didn’t have any runners who gained a lot of yards. But we did run effectively. We were a ‘movement’ team; a team that relied on pulling guards and play-action. Bill always said we were going to hit harder than anybody and move quicker than anybody.”

  Following Cooper’s run, Montana signaled for a time out and went over to Walsh to make sure he had the correct call for the next play. Not only was the play correct, it was the perfect call. The Niners broke the huddle in a balanced set with two backs and two tight ends. There’d be no Dwight Clark lining up close this time—it was legit tight ends Young and Eason Ramson aligned next to their tackles. Freddie Solomon was San Francisco’s only wide receiver on the field. The Giants reacted by putting eight men in the box with a single high safety, which left Terry Jackson in man-to-man outside coverage against Solomon.

  At first, it appeared that New York had guessed correctly. The initial look of the play was an inside run, with the line firing forward, as opposed to standing up to pass block. To the Giants, it clearly looked as if a running play was coming. I have to give special credit to Joe on this one, because he really sold the idea that he was going to hand off to Patton. This was even more misleading than his earlier play-fakes. Following the snap, Solomon ran in a straight line, with no variation on the pattern whatsoever. He simply blew past the much slower Jackson. Joe delivered the ball right on the money, and Solomon had himself a 58-yard touchdown. Freddie had clearly atoned for those two costly clipping penalties he’d committed in the first quarter. Later on, when I watched the CBS broadcast, I noticed that their cameraman was as badly fooled as the Giants. He too was convinced the play was a run, so he kept his camera trained on the line of scrimmage and nearly missed the action downf
ield. By the time he recovered, Solomon was gathering in the pass just a few yards away from the goal line. After the game, Montana told reporters, “We had to get respect from their defensive backs, and that’s why we went long. They were playing a lot of zone defense, and we were guessing right.”

  This score was the payoff for all the time that Walsh’s team had spent perfecting this play on the practice field. Even today, Clark still remembers his coach’s classroom mantra: “He’d tell the receiver, ‘This is the play we’re going to run at this time against this defense. You’ll be wide open.’ Or ‘we’re going to use this in such-and-such a situation, because they’ll be in man coverage and will leave this guy open here.’ He just had such a great ability to look at tape and come up with the other team’s holes and weaknesses, then just starting pounding on ‘em.”

  49ers Series No. 5

  2nd Quarter, 11:46 remaining: San Francisco 17, New York 7

  Montana and his teammates barely had time to gulp down their Gatorade before they were back on the field. The Giants fumbled on their first play from scrimmage, and the Niners’ defense recovered, giving the offense terrific field position at the New York 42. Taylor rushed the pocket, but Ayers pulled out and easily shoved him aside, giving Montana more than enough time to hit Young on a 14-yard slant pass. “If you look at a lot of the movement we were doing,” noted Cross, “it was always the back-side guard who was pulling out. We went full speed, balls to the wall. And by the time we got a guy like L.T. on play-action, the Giants might have known it was ‘pass,’ but they believed it could be ‘run’ just long enough that we could deal with them.”