The Games That Changed the Game

by Ron Jaworski

  Already tentative and confused, the Giants defenders could only scratch their heads in disbelief at Walsh’s next formation. On the TV broadcast, announcer John Madden identified it as a four-wide-receiver set, but it certainly wasn’t what we’d commonly recognize as a four-wide set in today’s NFL. Walsh had Wilson and backup Mike Shumann split out as conventional receivers, and put Solomon and Clark behind Montana in a two-back set! I can’t imagine what must have been going through L.T.'s mind when he saw this. In the end, the play was only a 3-yard toss to Solomon out of the backfield. But it was yet another different look; one more exotic formation for New York to worry about.

  Walsh had told Madden the night before the game, “I’m going to try to hide my players so it’ll be tougher for the Giants to plan against them.” That approach was working flawlessly during the first half. The Niners featured constant backfield movement on their running plays to create hesitation and indecision—exactly what Walsh wanted from a defense as reactive and quick flowing as that of the Giants. The next play provided a perfect example of this.

  The Niners came out with Cooper aligned directly behind Montana, with Patton offset to the left, favoring Taylor’s side. The play appeared as if it would be a counter, away from L.T.'s area. After the snap, left tackle Audick pulled completely across the formation, leading Patton to the right. What I found fascinating was that instead of pairing Audick with the fullback Cooper to lead the blocking—the conventional way you run the counter—Walsh had Cooper attack L.T. head-on to prevent him from running Patton down from behind. You just never saw that kind of scheme back then. This was clearly a tactic designed to account specifically for Taylor, to negate his unique ability to run down ballcarriers behind the line of scrimmage. Once the play started, Audick cleared out two Giants to spring Patton. Ricky had a clear path from there and sped the final 25 yards for the touchdown.

  “Walsh went off of a script, and the thing about his scripts were that there’s no rhyme or reason as to when they’d run particular plays,” admitted a frustrated Carson. “They didn’t show tendencies. Montana kept us off balance. We expected one thing, and he’d run another. You had to hold on to your hat and just do your best to defend it. If, by the end of their script, they’re up a few touchdowns, then it may already be too late. It’s tough to come back in a playoff game from that far back.”

  49ers Series No. 6

  2nd Quarter, 5:32 remaining: San Francisco 24, New York 10

  After coughing up the ball on successive possessions, the Giants were a little more careful on their series. Although they burned nearly five minutes off the clock on a solid drive, they weren’t able to close the deal and had to be content with a 48-yard field goal from kicker Joe Danelo. San Francisco had more than enough time to tack on another score before halftime—and nearly did. On the second play from scrimmage, Ayers popped out, looking for Taylor again, but L.T. was in coverage. Montana ran a double-pump fake and then completed his pass to Solomon for 17 yards. Joe’s fakes were confusing enough, but an additional weapon he used to torment the Giants was designed movement that continuously varied the launch point of his passes. They seemed to change on every play, and for a defense—even one as good as New York’s—this had to be terribly frustrating. It kept their pass rush from generating any kind of rhythm or timing.

  That wasn’t the only variable tilting in Montana’s favor. “I think the flexibility Joe had in ‘81 worked hand in hand with the West Coast offense,” said Clark. “The play would be called to go against a certain coverage. If Joe saw that coverage was different before the snap, then he could change the play. Of the seventy-five to one hundred plays we’d have in a game, maybe thirty percent of those had audibles to them.” Cross took it a step further: “From an improvisational standpoint, when you talk about Montana, it’d be like comparing your average comedian to Robin Williams. Joe could riff on the field and ‘improv’ amazingly. He could take a lot of what Bill wanted to do and sort of put his own spin on it while he was doing it.”

  A run by Cooper was stopped after just a couple of yards, and then Joe threw again. Ayers successfully Molly blocked the onrushing Taylor, and Solomon hauled in a 7-yard pass. Third-and-1 from the 46 suggested that the Niners would run, and they did—no trickery this time. From their two-back set, Ayers pulled out, and Patton provided the lead block. It was your garden-variety power running play. But it wouldn’t have picked up big yardage without Ramson manhandling Taylor: He washed L.T. inside and eliminated him from the play. Cooper found open space and ran for 20 before Flowers finally caught up to him. In 1981 the 49ers ranked near the bottom in yards-per-rush average, but in the playoffs, against one of the league’s most physical defenses, they were running with surprising efficiency.

  In the closing moments, the Giants kept the Niners from going any farther, forcing a 50-yard field goal attempt. It would have been a challenge even on a dry field, but on Candlestick’s slippery surface Wersching was unable to maintain his footing and slipped as he approached the football. The kick was both wide and short, keeping San Francisco’s two-touchdown lead unchanged at halftime. Even with the missed scoring opportunity, the Niners had to be extremely pleased with what they’d done in the first thirty minutes. Anyone who’d thought that the glare of the playoffs would expose the “Finesse 49ers” to a trampling by Big Blue had just received a rude awakening. Walsh’s offense was making one of the league’s most feared defenses look tentative. Both Clark and Solomon had already accumulated over 100 receiving yards each. San Francisco’s running game was averaging nearly 5 yards a carry with its emphasis on sweeps and toss plays. Joe Montana was playing a mistake-free game, and his three-and five-step drops had all but neutralized New York’s ferocious pass rush.

  The key, of course, was shutting down Lawrence Taylor. “We slid the offensive line to him on one snap, then on the next we’d keep a back in to help the left tackle,” explained Wyche. “Then we lined up in a formation so that the tight end was on Taylor’s side. He’d either stay in to block or would run through Taylor, chip him, then let the tackle pick him up. We had about three or four different ways to block him that day. The mistake we’d seen other teams make was settling on just one way to account for him, then work hard on that in practice. Well, if that approach didn’t work on Sunday, you were out of luck. That’s why we had so many schemes to block him that day.”

  It wasn’t simply the multiplicity of methods: The 49ers’ success stemmed from what they didn’t have to sacrifice in order to keep Montana on his feet. Brian Billick put it best: “You can always stop one guy, but at what price? Walsh wanted to contain Taylor, and he also wanted to leave his quarterback with enough options to make plays. When the Niners accounted for L.T. in that game without sacrificing any eligible receivers, it forced the Giants’ defense to have to cover people they normally didn’t cover, and that created doubt in their minds. Handling five receivers in the pattern made their job much tougher.”

  49ers Series No. 1

  3rd Quarter, 12:49 remaining: San Francisco 24, New York 10

  The Giants had the ball to start the third quarter, but failed to pick up a first down. With one more score, the 49ers would put a stranglehold on the game. They started strongly from their own 36 when Cooper faked a run inside but broke it back around right end for 14 yards. Then New York’s defense made its most important play of the game. Montana dropped to pass but couldn’t escape either Jeter or rookie linebacker Byron Hunt. With both in hot pursuit, he forced a throw that was picked off by strong safety Bill Currier. It was Joe’s only significant mistake in the entire game.

  On New York’s first play following the turnover, Brunner threw a laser between two 49ers defenders. It ended up in the hands of Giants receiver Johnny Perkins, who quickly broke away and sprinted 59 yards for the touchdown. As poorly as New York had played up to this moment, it was back in the game.

  49ers Series No. 2

  3rd Quarter, 11:13 remaining: San Francisco 24, New York 17
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  For the first time all afternoon, the Candlestick crowd was uneasy. Its team had dominated play, but now a rare Montana turnover had allowed the Giants to draw within a touchdown. Ideally, the 49ers wanted to mount a clock-consuming drive that would shift momentum and end with points, but that didn’t happen right away. Although it had taken a while, defensive coordinator Parcells finally got his athletes to start playing up to their reputation. San Francisco began well enough when Montana play-faked, then hit Ricky Patton in the flat. Patton got clocked by Terry Jackson, but bounced off and staggered to a first down at the Niners’ 46. On the next play, center Fred Quillan was whistled for holding, and conditions for San Francisco quickly deteriorated from there.

  With a first-and-20, Taylor finally had the opportunity to pin his ears back and rush the pocket with abandon. Ayers, sensing that L.T. was coming full tilt, moved to his left and stood up the rookie in his tracks. It was muscle on muscle, and Ayers won this battle. Unfortunately for the Niners, while great blocks can earn film-session props from your position coach, they don’t always translate into yardage. That’s what happened here, because Haynes had Solomon blanketed, so Montana was forced to throw it away.

  L.T. turned the tables on the next snap. Ayers tried to block him high, but L.T. slid to his left as Montana moved up in the pocket. Taylor turned, found Joe virtually in his lap, and dragged him down for the sack. It was only L.T.'s second tackle of the day, but the wait was brief to get number three. On third-and-23, Taylor initially dropped into coverage. Then he rotated back to the flat, shoving Audick to the side to get the drop on running back Lenvil Elliott. San Francisco was forced to punt, and the Giants took over at their own 29, with the wind at their backs and momentum on their side.

  I believe this was the drive that decided the game. New York maintained possession for over five minutes, running off a dozen plays to get inside San Francisco’s 5-yard line. But there the 49ers’ defense held fast, and on fourth-and-3, the Giants resigned themselves to settling for a field goal. New York’s bench then groaned in disbelief when Danelo badly shanked his 21-yarder wide to the left. Two great Giants defensive stands and an efficient offensive drive had amounted to nothing.

  49ers Series No. 3

  3rd Quarter, 4:12 remaining: San Francisco 24, New York 17

  The 49ers were clearly elated to maintain their one-touchdown lead, but the Giants kept playing solid defense and got off the field quickly. They gave up an early first down when tight end Eason Ramson slipped past Taylor off a Montana play-fake for an 11-yard reception. The next play was also a pass, and Ayers moved to his left to find Taylor. In another display of sheer strength, the six-foot-five left guard blocked L.T. so effectively that he almost appeared to swallow him up. But New York’s pass coverage was airtight, and Joe had nowhere to go, so he took off. Showing the foot speed that I became painfully familiar with, Taylor wriggled away from Ayers, moved to his left, and ran Montana down from behind to hold him to just a couple of yards.

  After a Cooper run that gained almost nothing and another incomplete pass, the Niners punted. But a special-teams penalty pushed the Giants back inside their own 10-yard line. It was early in the fourth quarter and still only a one-possession game, but the Giants needed to march over 90 yards for the tying score. When New York couldn’t convert on third-and-1, it was forced to punt within the shadow of its own goalposts. Dave Jennings got off a decent enough kick, driving Solomon back to his own 42, but New York’s coverage was poor, and Freddie weaved his way for a solid return to the Giants’ 36.

  49ers Series No. 4

  4th Quarter, 14:07 remaining: San Francisco 24, New York 17

  It seemed as if San Francisco was going to squander its excellent field position when a flat pass to rookie running back Bill Ring lost 4 yards and a holding call on Young pushed them back another 10. But the Giants gave it all back on the next snap, when Jeter was penalized for unnecessary roughness. With a fresh set of downs on the Giants’ 26, the Niners weren’t going to blow it again. Walsh called a double reverse, with Elliott taking the initial handoff and then pitching it to Solomon, who cut back for a dozen yards.

  From the 14, Ring swept left end and escaped Taylor’s tackle for 7 more yards, a clear sign that L.T.'s competitive fire was fading. After another Niners run set up first-and-goal from the 3, Ring followed a lead block from Johnny Davis into the end zone for the touchdown. There were two times during this drive when Ayers moved out of his guard spot and successfully walled off Taylor: one on a play where the 49ers lost yardage, the other on a Giants penalty. Although the blocks had little to do with the end results, they evidenced Ayers’s ongoing mastery over the rookie linebacker—a dominance that was clearly sapping Taylor’s spirit.

  49ers Series No. 5

  4th Quarter, 9:46 remaining: San Francisco 31, New York 17

  By now Walsh was content to sacrifice scoring for clock burning, so he called mostly running plays. After two rushes netted 7 yards, Bill Ring took Montana’s pitch and followed Cross to the right side. On the tape of the telecast, what I heard was almost as incredible as what I saw. Randy leveled Currier on his first block, then wiped out veteran linebacker Brad Van Pelt a moment later. Even with the hometown crowd in a frenzy, you could still hear the explosion off Cross’s collision and an audible groan from Currier as he crumpled to the ground. Then Ring added to my surprise by showing an uncharacteristic burst, cutting back across the middle of the field for a 40-yard gain. One of his pursuers was Taylor, who not only couldn’t catch up but also hurt himself when he was kicked in the shin at the end of the play. A dejected L.T. limped off the field, and although he would eventually return, the leg injury was a fitting last straw to his thoroughly frustrating afternoon.

  Unfortunately for Ring, an illegal crackback block by teammate Mike Wilson wiped out the entire run, which would have been the longest of Bill’s career. On third-and-long, Montana was content to dodge a sack from Van Pelt and throw incomplete to avoid an interception. Even with eight minutes remaining, this would be the last pass Joe needed to throw the rest of the game. San Francisco’s unheralded but steady runners would take it from here and drain the clock. Then Ronnie Lott sealed the win with a play indirectly inspired by Taylor himself. “He was a rookie, and I was a rookie. I didn’t know him that well then, but I really respected him,” Lott explained. “For me, playing against the Giants was all about saying to the world, ‘I know L.T. is good, but there’s somebody like me with the same type of demeanor, the same type of attitude. Let me see what I can do, to show people I’m just as good and maybe even better.’ ”

  With three minutes remaining, Lott read Brunner’s eyes perfectly, picked off his pass, and ran 20 yards to the end zone for the Niners’ final touchdown. It was Ronnie’s second interception of the game, giving San Francisco a three-touchdown lead. It made a last-minute Johnny Perkins touchdown catch nothing more than a consolation prize, as the Niners decisively outclassed the “Beast from the East” Giants, 38–24. It was the most points New York’s defense had allowed in a game all season. And if the 49ers had eliminated just a few of their penalties, the margin of victory would likely have been even more decisive.

  week later, in the NFC championship before a home crowd, Dwight Clark’s iconic leaping touchdown catch in the final minute lifted the 49ers to a 28–27 upset over the Cowboys, sending them to the world championship. In Super Bowl XVI, Walsh earned some payback by beating Paul Brown’s Bengals, the team and owner that had passed him over for its head coaching job six years earlier. That 26–21 win capped a remarkable season for a franchise that would go on to change the NFL both historically and strategically. In a 2002 interview with Steve Sabol, Walsh displayed real emotion when speaking of the ‘81 season. “Looking back on it, that was Camelot,” he said. “That was the greatest experience for everyone involved that they’ll ever have in their life. Because the 49ers had been embarrassed and humiliated for a number of years by virtually everyone in football, each of our games
became a sort of vendetta: ‘We’re gonna show these guys.’ Every game, we came out with so much intensity. I never had another season like it.”

  Randy Cross had suffered through all the losing prior to Walsh’s arrival and was there for much of the glory that followed. Nineteen eighty-one was also Randy’s favorite season, and he recognized how much its success sprang from the Niners having won that first playoff game against a team like the New York Giants. “Walsh’s way challenged those who thought size and strength was what made the NFL what it was,” he maintained. “What Bill did in the early eighties was not yet looked upon with high regard. But it made sense. If you’re smaller going against bigger, what should you do? Try to flatten your forehead? Or will you trap ‘em, make ‘em move around, and do things they don’t do well?

  “The answer is obvious, and when you succeed, you end up pissing them off even more. That’s probably what pissed the Giants off more than anything else: that they gave up so many yards to us. This game proved to everyone—and ourselves—that what we did worked. Against the smashmouth New York Giants, we showed we belonged. We’d only won ten games the previous three years, and there was no rich tradition of winning, so it meant a lot to get that first one.”

  Walsh later acknowledged, “We won our first Super Bowl with a less-than-great football team, even though at the time people thought it was outstanding. But as you look back, you now realize it couldn’t compete with today’s teams. Joe was dependent on the system for survival—in fact, all of us were—and we believed in it.”