Whirlwind

by Barrett Tillman

  193 “I’m very sorry”: Ibid., 89.

  CHAPTER SEVEN: THE HARBOR WAR

  Page

  195 “a motivator”: Thomas M. Coffey, Iron Eagle: The Turbulent Life of General Curtis LeMay (New York: Crown, 1986), 153.

  196 Three nights later: Frederick M. Sallagar, Lessons from an Aerial Mining Campaign (Operation “Starvation”). RAND Corporation, April 1974, 47.

  196 “an outstanding leader”: http://home.att.net/~sallyann6/b29/56years-4507a.html.

  196 “On 27 May”: Assistant Chief of Air Staff–Intelligence, HQ AAF, Mission Accomplished: Interrogations of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil Leaders, Washington, DC, 1946, 30.

  197 “became expert”: Sallagar, Lessons from an Aerial Mining Campaign, 51.

  198 “Due to the fact”: Mission Accomplished, 29–30.

  199 “phenomenal”: Coffey, Iron Eagle, 169.

  199 “About 1 April”: Mission Accomplished, 30–31.

  199 “a real salty old dog”: Diary of Lieutenant Richard W. De Mott, VBF-85, June 9, 1945.

  200 “his striking resemblance”: Monsarrat, 20.

  200 “I don’t think”: Rear Admiral William N. Leonard (Ret) to author, 1981.

  200 “Working with the B-29s”: Clark G. Reynolds, The Fast Carriers: The Forging of an Air Navy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968), 354.

  202 “setting off an explosion”: Fighting Squadron 6 History, 1945.

  203 “second generation”: “The Chippewa Chief,” http://www.pequotmuseum.org/Home/CrossPaths/CrossPathsFall2003/BookReview.htm.

  203 “He never got wise”: “Shangri-La Horizon,” USS Shangri-La (CV-38) newspaper, undated clipping, 1945.

  204 “Several Japs came out”: Ibid.

  205 “Scapa Flow with bloody palm trees”: N. M. Heckman, “England’s Shadow Fleet,” Sea Classics, May 2004.

  205 “of the utmost importance”: Admiral Sir Bruce Fraser in Nicholas E. Sarantakes, “The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 1st quarter, 2006, 86.

  205 “a very nasty”: Quoted by Peter C. Smith, e-mail to author, June 2008.

  206 “fully aware”: Sarantakes, “The Short but Brilliant Life of the British Pacific Fleet,” 88–89.

  206 “were able to match us”: Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, 371.

  207 Additionally, the RN: Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), 401.

  207 In one series of strikes: Hastings, 400, 401.

  207 “The kid”: Rear Admiral William N. Leonard (Ret) to author, 1981.

  208 “Some Neanderthals”: Rear Admiral William N. Leonard (Ret) to author, 1992.

  208 “a waste of time”: Reynolds, The Fast Carriers, 372.

  210 “I passed”: “Navy Cross for an Unlikely Hero,” Decatur Journal (Alabama), November 24, 2005, http://legacy.decaturdaily.com/decaturdaily/news/051124/hero.shtml.

  211 Essex aviators claimed six hits: Samuel Eliot Morison, History of U.S. Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific (Boston: Little, Brown, 1960), 316, unaccountably attributes the damage to Yorktown fighters, based on a report by an obscure junior officer. Morison states that all other TF 38 squadrons over Yokosuka were engaged in suppressing flak for the main effort by VF-88 Hellcats.

  212 “the toughest dogfighter”: Henry Sakaida, Winged Samurai: Saburo Sakai and the Zero Fighter Pilots (Mesa, AZ: Champlin Museum Press, 1985), 123–24.

  213 “almost exactly on the centerline”: http://www.combinedfleet.com/amagi.htm.

  217 “completely flooded”: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, The Campaigns of the Pacific War (Washington, D.C.: Military Analysis Division, 1946), 340.

  217 “Don’t you suppose”: Rear Admiral John S. Christiansen (Ret), Tailhook reunion, Reno, NV, 2006.

  217 “If the other reasons”: William F. Halsey and J. Bryan III, Admiral Halsey’s Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), 264–66.

  219 “Halsey is going wild”: Diary of Lieutenant Richard W. DeMott, VBF-85, July 14, 1945.

  219 “If we ever find”: Jack DeTour, e-mail to author, March 2008.

  220 “he wanted to get”: Henry Wolff, Jr., “Col. Hawes Was a Hero in Every Sense,” Victoria Advocate (Texas), November 10, 1996.

  220 “The weather was lousy”: Colonel Jack DeTour, USAF (Ret), the Veterans History Project, http://lcweb2.loc.gov/diglib/vhp/bib/10207.

  220 “It must have caught”: Lieutenant Colonel Charles M. Crawford, USAF (Ret), e-mail to author, March 2008.

  220 Ed Hawes: Navigator John Long also left a wife and two children. In 1946 American investigators traced the remains of Hawes’s crew. Five bodies had washed ashore and were buried by the Japanese, later being returned to the States. Hawes’s body was never recovered. Details courtesy of Long’s nephew, Andrew H. Farmer, Finding the Way: The Story of a Combat Navigator in World War II (Lynchburg, VA: Warwick House, 2006).

  221 Gray was likely the last Canadian: Stuart E. Soward, “A Brilliant Flying Spirit,” CFB Esquimalt Naval and Military Museum, http://www.navalandmilitarymuseum.org/resource_pages/heroes/gray.html. Lieutenant Commander Eugene Esmonde posthumously received the VC for a torpedo attack against German cruisers in the English Channel in 1942.

  CHAPTER EIGHT: “A MOST CRUEL BOMB”

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  224 “recent work by”: http://hypertextbook.com/eworld/einstein.shtml.

  226 “death or worse”: Author’s father, J. H. Tillman, a wartime cadet at Naval Air Station Pasco.

  227 “was thick with experts”: Jennet Conant, 109 East Palace (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2005), 231.

  228 “The entire population”: Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 696–97.

  228 “a matter of generations”: Alvin Coox, Japan: The Final Agony (New York: Ballantine, 1970), 10–11, 17.

  229 The Manhattan Project: Program costs in 1945 dollars: B-29: $2.53 billion; Manhattan: $1.88 billion. Stephen I. Schwarz, Atomic Audit, Brookings Institution, 1998. Brookings Institution data cited at http://virtualology.com/MANHATTANPROJECT.COM/costs.manhattanproject.net.

  229 “His manner was reserved”: Charles W. Sweeney with James A. Antonucci and Marion K. Antonucci, War’s End: An Eyewitness Account of America’s Last Atomic Mission (New York: Avon, 1997), 40.

  230 Into the air: Gordon Thomas and Max Morgan Witts, Enola Gay (New York: Pocket, 1977), 195.

  231 “The 509 Composite Group”: Truman to Stimson to Marshall, in Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 713–14.

  231 “of unimaginable destructive force”: Sweeney, War’s End, 153.

  232 “Colonel, are we”: Thomas and Morgan Witts, Enola Gay, 197; “En Route on Enola Gay,” http://www.2020hindsight.org/2005/08/05/1945-en-route-on-enola-gay/.

  233 “My god”: Thomas and Morgan Witts, Enola Gay, 317.

  233 The actual toll: From Hiroshima’s estimated military and civilian population of 255,000 to 320,000, some 66,000 to 80,000 were killed and 69,000 to 80,000 wounded as variously determined by Manhattan Engineering District (MED), 1946; U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, 1946), 16. And Vincent C. Jones, Manhattan: The Army and the Atomic Bomb (Washington, DC: Army Center of Military History, 1985), 547.

  233 “Clear cut”: 509th Composite Group. http://www.enolagay509th.com/groves.htm, accessed September 3, 2009.

  234 “This is the greatest thing”: USS Augusta Web site, http://www.internet-esq.com/ussaugusta/truman/index.htm.

  234 General Groves did not: Conant, 109 East Palace, 234.

  234 “a violent, large”: “Magic” intelligence intercept, August 7, 1945, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/61.pdf.

  235 “The hell with it”: Sweeney, War’s End, 211.

  235 “I’ve got it!”: Ibid., 217.

  2
36 In bombing terms: Apparently confusion as to Fat Man’s miss distance (stated to be as much as two miles) was due to ground zero in relation to the briefed aim point versus the actual aim point. The field order specified the Mitsubishi works on the east bank of the Urakami River. But the 509th’s planning summary cited a point east of the harbor in an area more likely affected by the blast.

  236 “a superbrilliant white”: Sweeney, War’s End, 219.

  237 “The dropping of pamphlets”: Assistant Chief of Air Staff–Intelligence, HQ AAF, Mission Accomplished: Interrogations of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil Leaders, Washington, DC, 1946, 27. Also see Harry S. Truman Library, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/truman/psources/ps_leaflets.html.

  237 Even before Okinawa was secured: Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 691.

  238 “appearing like magic”: Lieutenant General George Kenney, in Ibid., 692.

  239 “quickly turned”: Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 696.

  239 “The enemy could decide”: Ibid., 700.

  240 “one of the most”: Maj. Gen. Frank Armstrong, unpublished ms., Wake the Sleeping Giant. East Carolina Manuscript Collection, J. Y. Joyner Library, Greenville, NC.

  240 “This performance”: Ibid.

  240 “This target destroyed”: Ibid.

  241 By the time replacement bombers: Osamu Tagaya, Mitsubishi Type 1 Rikko “Betty” Units of WW 2 (London: Osprey, 2001), 97; Gordon Rottman, Akira Takizawa, et al., Japanese Paratroop Forces of World War 2 (London: Osprey, 2005).

  241 “rain of ruin”: Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=100&st=atomic&st1=bomb.

  242 “Rumors and reports”: Dick DeMott diary, 14 August 1945.

  242 “As we returned”: Armstrong manuscript.

  243 “All Strike Able”: Richard L. Newhafer, “I’ll Remember,” Naval Aviation News, December 1976.

  243 “On our way”: DeMott diary, August 15, 1945.

  244 “all the hope”: Newhafer, “I’ll Remember.”

  245 The Seafires had scored: David Brown, The Seafire (U.K.: Ian Allan, 1972), 127–28, http://www.jaircraft.org/smf/index.php?topic=4522.msg32615#msg32615.

  246 “it being far”: John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), 1038.

  246 “The Japs will never”: Barrett Tillman, Alpha-Bravo-Delta Guide to the U.S. Air Force (New York: Penguin, 2003), 135.

  247 “display of air power”: Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 733–34.

  248 “While Japan did agree”: Henry Sakaida, Imperial Japanese Navy Aces (London: Osprey, 1998), 80.

  248 “We were greeted”: Report by Lieutenant Colonel Clay Tice to 5th Air Force Headquarters, August 26, 1945; Tice interview with author c. 1985.

  249 “I started off”: http://www.aerofiles.com/tice.html.

  250 “a full throttle”: Vice Admiral Malcolm W. Cagle, USN (Ret), correspondence, 1977.

  250 In three weeks following August 27: Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 734–35.

  251 “Now with the advent of peace”: Jefferson J. DeBlanc, The Guadalcanal Air War (Gretna, LA: Pelican, 2008), 168. After the war DeBlanc received the Medal of Honor for a mission in 1943. A Ph.D. educator, he died in 2007, age eighty-six.

  CHAPTER NINE: LEGACY

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  252 The bombing of Japan: For conflicting perspectives on bombing Japan: see Merle Miller, Plain Speaking: An Oral Biography of Harry S. Truman (New York: Berkley, 1974); and Fred Halstead, “Hiroshima 1945: Behind the Atom Bomb Atrocity,” The Militant, August 14, 1995.

  253 “There was no efficient pooling”: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific), Japanese Airpower: Weapons and Tactics (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, July 1946), 26.

  253 In June 1944: For joint air defense areas: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Japanese Airpower: Weapons and Tactics (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, January 1947), map, 58.

  254 A major part of the problem: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Japanese Airpower; Weapons and Tactics (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, July 1946).

  254 “very poor”: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey (Pacific): Japanese Airpower, ibid., 26.

  255 “In order to overcome”: Air Combat Regulations, Combined Fleet Ultrasecret Operation Order 86, mid-1944, via David C. Dickson, December 2007, http://indoctrine.googlepages.com/operationsordersandorders, 1941–45.

  255 “Why do we need radar?”: Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–45 (New York: Dial, 1979), 47.

  255 From 1940 onward: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Japanese Air Weapons and Tactics, 71.

  256 “The Japanese fighter defense”: Japanese Airpower, 51.

  256 “Those responsible for control”: Assistant Chief of Air Staff–Intelligence, HQ AAF, Mission Accomplished: Interrogations of Japanese Industrial, Military, and Civil Leaders, Washington, DC, 1946, 51.

  256 Germany’s toll: Estimates for German bombing victims run from 305,000 to nearly 600,000. See John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 1989); and Stephen Budiansky, Air Power (New York: Viking, 2004), 330.

  257 “Day by day”: Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan and Her Destiny: My Struggle for Peace (London: Hutchinson, 1958).

  257 “the enemy’s offensive operations”: Onishi statement courtesy of Dr. M. G. Sheftall, 2008.

  257 “we must fight”: Alvin Coox, Japan: The Final Agony (New York: Ballantine, 1970), 99.

  258 “The gawkers”: E-mail to author from Dr. M. G. Sheftall, March 2008.

  261 After 1945: For evaluations of the Anglo-American air campaign, see Alan J. Levine, The Strategic Bombing of Germany, 1940–1945 (Westport: Greenwood, 1992), 216. Also see Alfred C. Mierzejewski, The Collapse of the German War Economy, 1944–45 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1988), 121.

  261 “The myth”: Max Hastings, Retribution: The Battle for Japan, 1944–45 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2008), xix. Another important factor, noted by historians such as John Dower and Richard Frank, is Hirohito’s concern over domestic turmoil spurred by food shortages. That view was shared by Marquis Kido, the emperor’s closest adviser, who recognized that the effects of the Allied aerial and submarine blockade would peak in the fall.

  261 “In dropping 161,000 tons”: The Allies dropped some 2.7 million tons in Europe, with nearly half falling on Germany: http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#josp, U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, Summary Report (Pacific War) (Washington, DC: Military Analysis Division, July 1946), 16.

  262 targeting urban-industrial areas: Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific: Matterhorn to Nagasaki (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), 643.

  263 area bombing remained the only option: For discussions, see Stephen Budiansky, Air Power; Max Hastings, Bomber Command: The Myths and Reality of the Strategic Bombing Offensive, 1939–45 (New York: Dial, 1979); Ronald Schaffer, Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Kenneth P. Werrell, Blankets of Fire: U.S. Bombers over Japan During World War II (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1996); and U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, “Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan’s War Economy.”

  263 postwar analysis concluded: U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, “Effects of Air Attack on Japan’s Urban Economy.” Washington, DC: 1946.

  263 “The fire bomb raids”: Mission Accomplished, 24.

  264 “From the defense point of view”: Ibid., 23.

  266 “The final decision”: Craven and Cate, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. 5: The Pacific, 713.

  267 Death figures for Hiroshima: Hiroshima’s 1944 census listed 344,000, whereas various sources list 66,000 and 200,000 dead. In 1946 th
e Hiroshima police accounted for 78,000 deaths and 14,000 missing, obviously not all the latter being fatalities. The Actual Status Inventory of Atomic Bomb Survivors (Chogoku Shimbun, August 5, 1999) tallied almost 89,000 names of people who died before 1946. “How Many Died at Hiroshima?,” http://www.warbirdforum.com/hirodead.htm.

  267 total radiation deaths: “Is Atomic Radiation as Dangerous As We Thought?,” Spiegel Online, November 2007, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,519043,00.html; “Radiation in Perspective: Improving comprehension of risks,” International Atomic Energy Agency Bulletin 2/1995, http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Magazines/Bulletin/Bull372/37205140711.pdf.

  268 Former President Herbert Hoover and General Dwight D. Eisenhower: As supreme Allied commander in Europe, Eisenhower’s oft-cited statement that Japan sought to surrender “with a minimum loss of face” was made without knowledge of Pacific Theater intelligence. In his 1948 memoir Crusade in Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1948), p. 443, he admitted that his views “were not based on any analysis of the subject.” That situation had not changed in 1963 when he wrote The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953–1956 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co, 1963). The frequently accessed Web site http://www.doug-long.com/quotes.htm quotes a full paragraph citing Eisenhower’s opposition to A-bombs, concluding, “The Secretary [Henry Stimson] was deeply perturbed by my attitude,” but deletes the concluding phrase, “most angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions” (emphasis added). The site mentions p. 380 but the quote is on pp. 312–13.

  Hoover’s May 1945 urging of Truman to make “a short-wave broadcast to the people of Japan” reveals astonishing naïveté. It assumed that Imperial Japan was a democracy and that a majority of Japanese favored surrender. It also ignored the fact that keeping unauthorized radios was a serious offense.

  268 “Neither the Army”: John Toland, The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936–1945 (New York: Random House, 1970), 561.

  268 “ ‘Blind’ bombing”: Mission Accomplished, 25.