Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2

by Wm. Theodore de Bary

  Our nation’s emphasis on civil service examinations has sunk deep into people’s minds for a long time. Intelligent and brilliant scholars have exhausted their time and energy in such useless things as the stereotyped examination essays, examination papers, and formal calligraphy. . . . We should now order one-half of them to apply themselves to the manufacturing of instruments and weapons and to the promotion of physical studies. . . . The intelligence and ingenuity of the Chinese are certainly superior to those of the various barbarians; it is only that hitherto we have not made use of them. When the government above takes delight in something, the people below will pursue it further: their response will be like an echo carried by the wind. There ought to be some people of extraordinary intelligence who can have new ideas and improve on Western methods. At first they may take the foreigners as their teachers and models; then they may come to the same level and be their equals; finally they may move ahead and surpass them. Herein lies the way to self-strengthening. [60a–61a]

  It may be argued: “Guan Zhong repelled the barbarians and Confucius acclaimed his virtue; the state of Chu adopted barbarian ways and [Confucius in] the Spring and Autumn Annals condemned them. Is not what you are proposing contrary to the Way of the sages?” No, it is not. When we speak of repelling the barbarians, we must have the actual means to repel them, and not just empty bravado. If we live in the present day and speak of repelling the barbarians, we should ask with what instruments we are to repel them. . . . [The answer is that] we should use the instruments of the barbarians but not adopt the ways of the barbarians. We should use them so that we can repel them.

  Some have asked why we should not just purchase the ships and man them with [foreign] hirelings, but the answer is that this will not do. If we can manufacture, repair, and use them, then they are our weapons. If we cannot manufacture, repair, and use them, then they are still the weapons of others. . . . In the end the way to avoid trouble is to manufacture, repair, and use weapons by ourselves. Only thus can we pacify the empire; only thus can we become the leading power in the world; only thus can we restore our original strength, redeem ourselves from former humiliations, and maintain the integrity of our vast territory so as to remain the greatest country on earth. [61a–62b]

  [Jiaobinlu kangyi, Zhiyangqi yi, pp. 58b–63a—CT]

  ON THE ADOPTION OF WESTERN LEARNING

  Western books on mathematics, mechanics, optics, light, and chemistry contain the best principles of the natural sciences. In the books on geography, the mountains, rivers, strategic points, customs, and native products of the hundred countries are fully listed. Most of this information is beyond the reach of the Chinese people. . . .

  If we wish to use Western knowledge, we should establish official translation bureaus in Guangzhou and Shanghai. Brilliant students not over fifteen years of age should be selected from those areas to live and study in these schools on double allowances. Westerners should be appointed to teach them the spoken and written languages of the various nations, and famous Chinese teachers should be engaged to teach them classics, history, and other subjects. At the same time they should learn mathematics. (Note: All Western knowledge is derived from mathematics. . . . If we wish to adopt Western knowledge, it is but natural that we should learn mathematics). . . . China has many brilliant people. There must be some who can learn from the barbarians and surpass them. [67b–68a]

  It is from learning that the principles of government are derived. In discussing good government, the great historian Sima Qian said (following Xunzi), “Take the latter-day kings as your models.” This was because they were nearer in time; their customs had changed from the past and were more similar to the present; and their ideas were not so lofty as to be impracticable. It is my opinion that today we should also take the foreign nations as our examples. They live at the same time and in the same world with us; they have attained prosperity and power by their own efforts. Is it not fully clear that they are similar to us and that their methods can easily be put into practice? If we let Chinese ethics and Confucian teachings serve as the foundation, and let them be supplemented by the methods used by the various nations for the attainment of prosperity and power, would it not be the best of all solutions?

  Moreover, during the past twenty years since the opening of trade, a great number of foreign chiefs have learned our written and spoken language, and the best of them can even read our classics and histories. They are generally able to speak on our dynastic regulations and civil administration, on our geography and the condition of our people. On the other hand, our officials from the governors down are completely ignorant of foreign countries. In comparison, should we not feel ashamed? The Chinese officials have to rely upon stupid and preposterous interpreters as their eyes and ears. The mildness or severity of the original statement, its sense of urgency or lack of insistence, may be lost through their tortuous interpretations. Thus frequently a small grudge may develop into a grave hostility. At present the most important political problem of the empire is to control the barbarians, yet the pivotal function is entrusted to such people. No wonder that we understand neither the foreigners nor ourselves and cannot distinguish fact from untruth. Whether in peace negotiations or in deliberating for war, we are unable to grasp the essentials. This is indeed the underlying trouble of our nation. [69a–70a]

  [Jiaobinlu kangyi, Cai xixue yi, pp. 67b–70—CT]

  Principle Versus Practicality?

  One of the first projects of the Self-Strengtheners was to set up schools for the study of Western languages, sciences, and technologies, the first an interpreters school in Beijing in 1861, subsequently expanded to include mathematics and technology. This set off a debate (1867) in which the Self-Strengtheners’ proposals were opposed on grounds of principle by Confucians at court, of whom a Mongol grand secretary, Woren, was the leader. For him Western technology was no substitute for classical humanistic learning and China would be corrupted by doctrines of expediency.

  Mathematics, one of the six arts, should indeed be learned by scholars as indicated in the imperial decree, and it should not be considered an unworthy subject. But according to the viewpoint of your servant, astronomy and mathematics are of very little use. If these subjects are going to be taught by Westerners as regular studies, the damage will be great. . . . Your servant has learned that the way to establish a nation is to lay emphasis on rites and rightness, not on power and plotting. The fundamental effort lies in the minds of people, not in techniques. Now, if we seek trifling arts and respect barbarians as teachers . . . all that can be accomplished is the training of mathematicians. From ancient down to modern times, your servant has never heard of anyone who could use mathematics to raise the nation from a state of decline or to strengthen it in time of weakness. . . .

  Since the conclusion of the peace, Christianity has been prevalent, and half of our ignorant people have been fooled by it. The only thing we can rely on is that our scholars should clearly explain to the people the Confucian tenets, which may be able to sustain the minds of the ignorant populace. Now if these brilliant and talented scholars, who have been trained by the nation and reserved for great future usefulness, have to change from their regular course of study to follow the barbarians, then the correct spirit will not be developed, and accordingly the evil spirit will become stronger. After several years it will end in nothing less than driving the multitudes of the Chinese people into allegiance to the barbarians.

  The Self-Strengtheners’ Rebuttal, 1867

  In response to Woren’s challenge, the Self-Strengtheners at court countered that he had no practical way to deal with Western power and, moreover, that the pursuit of Western studies need not be at the expense of traditional ones.

  Your ministers have examined the memorial of Woren: the principles he presents are very lofty and the opinion he maintains is very orthodox. Your ministers’ point of view was also like that before they began to manage foreign affairs; and yet today they do not presume to insist on s
uch ideas, because of actual difficulties that they cannot help. . . .

  From the beginning of foreign relations to the present there have been twenty or thirty years. At first the officials inside and outside the capital did not grasp the crux of the matter, and whether they negotiated peace or discussed war, generally these were empty words without effect. . . . Therefore your ministers have pondered a long-term policy and discussed the situation thoroughly with all the provincial officials. Proposals to learn the written and spoken languages of foreign countries, the various methods of making machines, the training of troops with foreign guns, the dispatching of officials to travel in all countries, the investigation of their local customs and social conditions, and the establishment of six armies in the area of the capital in order to protect it—all these painstaking and special decisions represent nothing other than a struggle for self-strengthening. . . .

  We too are afraid that the people who are learning these things will have no power of discrimination and are likely to be led astray by foreigners, as Woren fears. Therefore we have deliberated and decided that those who participate in the examinations must be persons from regular scholastic channels. It is indeed those students who have read widely and who understand right principles and have their minds set upon upright and grand purposes—and the present situation is just what causes the scholars and officials to feel pain in heart and head—who would certainly be able to lie on faggots and taste gall [i.e., nurse vengeance] in order to encourage each other vigorously to seek the actual achievement of self-strengthening. They are different from those who have vague, easygoing, or indifferent ideas.

  Even though we run the risk of receiving the criticism of the empire, we will not try to avoid it. But the grand secretary [Woren] considers our action a hindrance. Certainly he should have some better plans. If he really has some marvelous plan that can control foreign countries and not let us be controlled by them, your ministers should certainly follow in the footsteps of the grand secretary, exhausting their mean abilities in careful discussions with him, in order to show our harmony and mutual help and to console your imperial anxiety. If he has no other plan than to use loyalty and sincerity as armor, and rites and rightness as a shield, and such similar phrases, and if he says that these words could accomplish diplomatic negotiations and be sufficient to control the life of our enemies, your ministers indeed do not presume to believe it.

  [Adapted from Teng and Fairbank, China’s Response to the West, pp. 76–79]

  ZENG GUOFAN AND LI HONGZHANG: ON SENDING YOUNG MEN ABROAD TO STUDY

  Zeng Guofan (1811–1872) and his protege Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) were, in the practical sphere, the outstanding exponents of “self-strengthening” during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Acclaimed as the conqueror of the Taipings, and long governor-general in central China, Zeng was also admired as a scholar in the classical tradition and a Confucian “gentleman” who exemplified the traditional virtues in government: industry, frugality, honesty, and integrity in office and loyalty to the dynasty. He was the type of “noble man” whose learning and personal character inspired the devotion of his subordinates and gave Confucians a confidence that such personal qualities could meet the challenge of the times. Intellectually an eclectic, Zeng minimized doctrinal differences and sought agreement on the ethical bases of action. His support of certain types of modernization for purposes of national defense also reflected a readiness to make compromises for the achievement of practical ends.

  In this letter, submitted in March 1871 to the Zongli Yamen, a new but minor institution that handled foreign affairs, Zeng and Li emphasize not only China’s practical need to learn from the West but also the preeminent practicality of the Westerners. They are convinced that Western methods can be mastered only through prolonged and intensive study abroad, and they propose sending a select group of young men for this purpose. In Japan at this time the top leaders were themselves visiting the West and preparing to reeducate a whole nation. The aims of Zeng and Li are much more circumscribed—to train an elite corps with a combination of classical Chinese and Western studies, carefully directed and controlled in the interests of the state. Yet even so modest a proposal met with strong opposition at court before it was put into effect in 1872.

  Last autumn when I [Zeng] was at Tianjin, Governor Ding Richang frequently came to discuss with me proposals for the selection of intelligent youths to be sent to the schools of various Western countries to study military administration, shipping administration, infantry tactics, mathematics, manufacturing, and other subjects. We estimated that after more than ten years their training would have been completed and they could return to China so that other Chinese might learn thoroughly the superior techniques of the Westerners. Thus we could gradually plan for self-strengthening. . . . After Mr. Bin Chun and two other gentlemen, Zhigang and Sun Jiagu, had traveled in various countries at imperial command, they saw the essential aspects of conditions overseas, and they found that cartography, mathematics, astronomy, navigation, shipbuilding, and manufacturing are all closely related to military defense. It is the practice of foreign nations that those who have studied abroad and have learned some superior techniques are immediately invited upon their return by academic institutions to teach the various subjects and to develop their fields. Military administration and shipping are considered as important as the learning that deals with the mind and body, and nature and destiny of man. Now that the eyes of the people have been opened, if China wishes to adopt Western ideas and excel in Western methods, we should immediately select intelligent young men and send them to study in foreign countries. . . .

  Some may say, “Arsenals have been established in Tianjin, Shanghai, and Fuzhou for shipbuilding and the manufacture of guns and ammunition. The Tongwen College [for foreign languages] has been established in Beijing for Manchu and Chinese youths to study under Western instructors. A language school has also been opened in Shanghai for the training of young students. It seems, therefore, that a beginning has been made in China and that there is no need for studying overseas.” These critics, however, do not know that to establish arsenals for manufacturing and to open schools for instruction is just the beginning of our effort to rise again. To go to distant lands for study, to gather ideas for more advantageous use, can produce far-reaching and great results. Westerners seek knowledge for practical use. . . . If we Chinese wish to adopt their superior techniques and suddenly try to buy all their machines, not only will our resources be insufficient to do so but we will be unable to master the fundamental principles or to understand the complicated details of the techniques, unless we have actually seen and practiced them for a long time. . . .

  We have heard that youths of Fujian, Guangdong, and Ningbo also occasionally have gone abroad to study, but they merely attempted to gain a superficial knowledge of foreign written and spoken languages in order to do business with the foreigners for the purpose of making a living. In our plan, we must be doubly careful at the beginning of selection. The students who are to be taken to foreign countries will all be under the control of the commissioners. Specializing in different fields, they will earnestly seek for mastery of their subjects. There will be interpreters, and instructors to teach them Chinese learning from time to time, so that they will learn the great principles for the establishment of character, in the hope of becoming men with abilities of use to us.

  [Zeng Wenzhong gong quanji, Yishu hangao 1: 19b–21b—CT]

  XUE FUCHENG: ON REFORM

  A onetime secretary and adviser to both Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang, Xue Fucheng (1838–1894) achieved no high rank or position in the bureaucracy (not having competed in the examinations for the higher civil service degrees). He did, however, become an influential advocate of reform through the circulation of his essays and memorials in official circles and, besides assisting in the negotiation of the Chefoo Convention (1876), helped to draft plans for a new Chinese navy.

  This excerpt is taken from Xue�
��s Suggestions on Foreign Affairs (Chouyang chuyi), which was submitted to Li in 1879 and forwarded by him to the Zongli Yamen. Xue argues for reform on the ground that change is inevitable and nothing new to Chinese history. But if he is tempted to accept the idea of progress as a law of history, there is no indication of it here. Rather, his premise is the thoroughly traditional one of cyclical or pulsatory change at calculable intervals, which may be for good or ill but in any case must be coped with, as indeed even the sage kings had to cope with it. A great change in circumstances, therefore, calls for a great change in methods (fa, which can also be understood as “laws” or “institutions”).

  Xue nevertheless contends that changes in method do not mean abandonment of the “immutable” Way of the sages. Indeed, it is the use of new methods that will preserve that Way inviolate. Thus a dichotomy is established between ends and means. Here the means Xue has in mind adopting is “the study of machines and mathematics.” Consequently the dichotomy is between the Way and “instruments” (fa, as in the sense of methods). How far he would go toward changing fa in the sense of basic institutions is left unclear.

  It is the Way of Heaven that within several hundred years there are small changes and within several thousand years great changes. . . . In several thousand years [under the early sage kings] there was change from a primitive world to a civilized world. From the age of the sage kings through the Three Dynasties there were most truly peace and order. Then the First Emperor of the Qin swallowed up the feudal states, abolished the enfeoffed lords, broke up the well-fields, and destroyed the laws of the early kings. Thus it was two thousand years from the time of [the sage kings] Yao and Shun that the feudal world was changed into a world of [centrally administered] prefectures and districts. . . . As we come down to the present, the European states suddenly rise up and assert themselves overseas because of their knowledge of machinery and mathematics. . . . In ninety thousand li around the globe there is no place where they do not send their envoys and establish trade relations. Confronted with this situation, even Yao and Shun would not have been able to close the doors and rule the empire in isolation. And this likewise is now two thousand years from the time of Qin and Han. Thus there has been a change from a world in which the Chinese and barbarians were isolated from each other to a world in which China and foreign countries are in close contact. . . . When change in the world is small, the laws governing the world will accordingly undergo small change; when change in the world is great, the laws will accordingly undergo great change. [46B]