Sources of Chinese Tradition, Volume 2
Page 57
Zhang Junmai has mobilized his soldiers of science to protect his specter of metaphysics and engage in warfare with Ding Wenjiang. Liang Qichao has formulated for them “laws of the war of words” in preparation for stepped-up mobilization on both sides and for a prolonged struggle. . . . To some extent I feel that even if the struggle lasted for a hundred years, there would be no conclusion. [pp. 24–25]
What philosophy of life have you, oldster? Well, friends, let me tell you. . . .
We need only say that “the universe is a greater life.” Its substance involves energy at the same time. To use another term, it may also be called power. From this power the will is produced. . . . When the will comes into contact with the external world, sensations ensue, and when these sensations are welcomed or resisted, feelings arise. To make sure that the feelings are correct, thought arises to constitute the intellect. When the intellect examines again and again a certain feeling to see to it that it is natural and proper or to correct the intellect’s own ignorance, this is intuition. [pp. 28–30]
What is the need of any spiritual element or the so-called soul, which never meets any real need anyway? [p. 32]
I strongly believe (1) that the spirit cannot be separated from matter . . . , (2) that the universe is a temporary thing . . . ,(3) that people today are superior to people in the past and that people in the future will be superior to people today . . . , (4) that they are so in both good and evil . . . , (5) that the more advanced material civilization becomes, the more plentiful will material goods be, the human race will tend more and more to unity, and complicated problems will be more and more easily solved . . . , (6) that morality is the crystallization of civilization and that there has never been a low morality when civilization reached a higher state . . . , and (7) that all things in the universe can be explained by science. [pp. 112–137]
[Wu, “Yige xinxinyang,” in Zhang et al., Kexue yu rensheng guan 2: 24–137—WTC]
HU SHI: SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE
The Chinese people’s philosophy of life has not yet been brought face-to-face with science. At this moment we painfully feel that science has not been sufficiently promoted, that scientific education has not been developed, and that the power of science has not been able to wipe out the black smoke that covers the whole country. To our amazement there are still prominent scholars [like Liang Qichao] who shout, “European science is bankrupt; blame the cultural bankruptcy of Europe on science, deprecate it, score the sins of the scientists’ philosophy of life, and do not let science exert any influence on a philosophy of life.” Seeing this, how can those who believe in science not worry? How can they help crying out loud to defend science? This is the motive that has given rise to this big battle of “science versus philosophy of life.” We must understand this motive before we can see the position the controversy occupies in the history of Chinese thought. . . .
Zhang Junmai’s chief point is that “the solution of problems pertaining to a philosophy of life cannot be achieved by science.” In reply to him, we should make clear what kind of philosophy of life has been produced when science was applied to problems pertaining to a philosophy of life. In other words, we should first describe what a scientific philosophy of life is and then discuss whether such a philosophy of life can be established, whether it can solve the problems pertaining to a philosophy of life, and whether it is a plague on Europe and poison to the human race, as Liang Qichao has said it is. I cannot help feeling that in this discussion consisting of a quarter of a million words, those who fight for science, excepting Mr. Wu Zhihui, share a common error, namely, that of not stating in concrete terms what a scientific philosophy of life is, but merely defending in an abstract way the assertion that science can solve the problems of a philosophy of life. . . . They have not been willing publicly to admit that the concrete, purely materialistic and purely mechanistic philosophy of life is the scientific philosophy of life. We say they have not been willing; we do not say they have not dared. We merely say that with regard to the scientific philosophy of life, the defenders of science do not believe in it as clearly and firmly as does Mr. Wu Zhihui and therefore they cannot publicly defend their view. . . .
In a word, our future war plan should be to publicize our new belief, to publicize what we believe to be the new philosophy of life. The basic ideas of this new philosophy of life have been declared by Mr. Wu. We shall now summarize these general ideas, elaborate and supplement them to some extent, and present here an outline of this new philosophy of life:
1. On the basis of our knowledge of astronomy and physics, we should recognize that the world of space is infinitely large.
2. On the basis of our geological and paleontological knowledge, we should recognize that the universe extends over infinite time.
3. On the basis of all our verifiable scientific knowledge, we should recognize that the universe and everything in it follow natural laws of movement and change—“natural” in the Chinese sense of “being so of themselves”—and that there is no need for the concept of a supernatural Ruler or Creator.
4. On the basis of the biological sciences, we should recognize the terrific wastefulness and brutality in the struggle for existence in the biological world, and consequently the untenability of the hypothesis of a benevolent Ruler who “possesses the character of loving life.”
5. On the basis of the biological, physiological, and psychological sciences, we should recognize that man is only one species in the animal kingdom and differs from the other species only in degree but not in kind.
6. On the basis of the knowledge derived from anthropology, sociology, and the biological sciences, we should understand the history and causes of the evolution of living organisms and of human society.
7. On the basis of the biological and psychological sciences, we should recognize that all psychological phenomena are explainable through the law of causality.
8. On the basis of biological and historical knowledge, we should recognize that morality and religion are subject to change and that the causes of such change can be scientifically discovered.
9. On the basis of our newer knowledge of physics and chemistry, we should recognize that matter is not dead or static but living and dynamic.
10. On the basis of biological and sociological knowledge, we should recognize that the individual—the “small self’—is subject to death and extinction, but humanity—the “Large Self’—does not die and is immortal and [we] should recognize that to live for the sake of the species and posterity is religion of the highest kind and that those religions that seek a future life either in Heaven or in the Pure Land are selfish religions.
This new philosophy of life is a hypothesis founded on the commonly accepted scientific knowledge of the last two or three hundred years. We may confer on it the honorable title of “scientific philosophy of life.” But to avoid unnecessary controversy, I propose to call it merely “the naturalistic philosophy of life.”
[ Hu, Hu Shi wencun, collection 2, ch. 1, pp. 121–139—WTC]
THE CONTROVERSY OVER CHINESE AND WESTERN CULTURES
Intimately related to the debate on science and metaphysics was the controversy over Chinese and Western cultures, which arose from the apparent disillusionment with the West of some who not long before had been the strongest champions of Westernization. In 1919 Liang Qichao returned from Europe, where he had observed the aftermath of World War I. The picture he proceeded to give of the West was much in contrast to his early view of it as the vanguard of social progress and enlightened civilization. Now he saw it as sick and declining, the victim of its own obsession with science, materialism, and mechanization. The notion of inevitable progress, which had once inspired his belief that China could rise above its past and move forward to new greatness, was now bankrupt. Its bankruptcy, however, was all the West’s, not Liang’s. If Europe fell victim to its own shattered illusions, neither he nor China need suffer in the catastrophe, for the failure of science and mate
rialism served only to vindicate China and its “spiritual” civilization.
Liang was by no means ready to forgo completely the benefits of science and material progress. The failure of the West he saw as resulting from its proclivity toward extremes, its current overemphasis on materialism being an excessive reaction to the exaggerated idealism and spirituality of medieval Europe. China’s historical mission had been to preserve a balance between the two, and in the modern world it was specially equipped to reconcile these divergent forces in a new humanistic civilization. Thus Liang arrived at a new synthesis. Whatever was of value in Western science and material progress China could claim for herself and blend with her own spiritual traditions.
Strong support for this view came from Liang Shuming (1893–1988), who likewise saw the superiority of Chinese civilization as lying in its capacity for harmonizing opposing extremes. As in the debate over science and metaphysics, however, the voices of those who spoke for progress and modernism—with Hu Shi again among the leaders—prevailed against the neo-traditionalists. The latter might appeal to national pride or self-respect and thus swell a growing sense of nationalism, but they could not arrest the steady disintegration of traditional Chinese civilization, which Liang himself had done much to hasten.
LIANG QICHAO: “TRAVEL IMPRESSIONS FROM EUROPE”
What is our duty? It is to develop our civilization with that of the West and to supplement Western civilization with ours so as to synthesize and transform them to make a new civilization. . . .
Recently many Western scholars have wanted to import Asian civilization as a corrective to their own. Having thought the matter over carefully, I believe we are qualified for that purpose. Why? In the past, the ideal and the practical in Western civilization have been sharply divided. Idealism and materialism have both gone to the extreme. Religionists have one-sidedly emphasized the future life. Idealistic philosophers have engaged in lofty talk about the metaphysical and mysterious, far, far removed from human problems. The reaction came from science. Materialism swept over the world and threw overboard all lofty ideals. Therefore I once said, “Socialism, which is so fashionable, amounts to no more than fighting for bread.” Is this the highest goal of mankind?
Now pragmatism and evolutionism are being promoted, the aim being to embrace the ideal in the practical and to harmonize mind and matter. In my opinion, this is precisely the line of development in our ancient systems of thought. Although the schools of the sages—Confucius, Laozi, and Mozi—are different, their common goal is to unify the ideal and the practical. . . . Also, although Buddhism was founded in India, it really flourished in China. . . . Take Chinese meditation Buddhism [Chan, Zen]. It can truly be considered as practical Buddhism and worldly Buddhism. Certainly it could have developed only outside India, and certainly it can reveal the special characteristics of the Chinese people. It enables the way of renouncing the world and the way of remaining in the world to go hand in hand without conflict. At present, philosophers like Bergson and Eucken want to follow this path but have not been able to do so. I have often thought that if they could have studied the works of the Buddhist Idealistic School, their accomplishments would surely have been greater, and if they could have understood Meditation Buddhism, their accomplishments would have been still greater.
Just think. Weren’t the pre-Qin philosophers and the great masters of the Sui and the Tang eras our loving and sagely ancestors who have left us a great heritage? We, being corrupted, do not know how to enjoy them and today we suffer intellectual starvation. Even in literature, art, and the rest, should we yield to others? Of course we may laugh at those old folks among us who block their own road of advancement and claim that we Chinese have all that is found in Western learning. But should we not laugh even more at those who are drunk with Western ways and regard everything Chinese as worthless, as though we in the last several hundred years have remained primitive and have achieved nothing? We should realize that any system of thought must have its own period as the background. What we need to learn is the essential spirit of that system and not the conditions under which it was produced, for once we come to the conditions, we shall not be free from the restrictions of time. For example, Confucius said a great deal about ethics of an aristocratic nature, which is certainly not suitable today. But we should not take Confucius lightly simply because of this. Shall we cast Plato aside simply because he said that the slavery system should be preserved? If we understand this point, we can study traditional Chinese subjects with impartial judgment and accept or reject them judiciously.
There is another very important matter. If we want to expand our civilization, we must borrow the methods of other civilizations because their methods of study are highly refined. . . . I therefore hope that our dear young people will, first of all, have a sincere purpose of respecting and protecting our civilization; second, that they will apply Western methods to the study of our civilization and discover its true character; third, that they will put our own civilization in order and supplement it with others’ so that it will be transformed and become a new civilization; and fourth, that they will extend this new civilization to the outside world so that it can benefit the whole human race.
[Liang, in Yinbing shi heji, vol. 5, juanji no. 23, part i, sec. 13, pp. 35–37—WTC]
LIANG SHUMING: CHINESE CIVILIZATION VIS-A-VIS EASTERN AND WESTERN PHILOSOPHIES
At a time when Confucianism was being decried as decadent and outmoded, Liang Shuming (1893–1988), originally a Buddhist, endorsed Confucianism as the basis for a reconstruction of Chinese civilization and later for world civilization as well. In the first passage translated below, written in 1922, he is quite negative with regard to “Indian attitudes,” but later he saw them as still relevant to the evolution of the world at large.
Though not unappreciative of certain Western values, such as individualism and science, which might be embraced in a synthesis with China’s own humanistic values, he condemned wholesale Westernization as impractical and undesirable. Instead he believed that underlying traditional values and orientations would constitute a more practical basis for building a cohesive modern society, as well as the basis for a future human culture.
According to Liang, the underlying bases of Western democracy—material, social, and spiritual—were totally lacking in China. Consequently, political democracy of the Western type could not possibly succeed there. Reformers and revolutionaries who tried arbitrarily to superimpose Western institutions on China failed to recognize the essentially rural and agrarian character of Chinese society. A sound program of reconstruction, Liang believed, could start only at the grass roots and slowly evolve a new socialist society, avoiding the excesses of both capitalism and communism.
To promote such reconstruction of agriculture and rural life, Liang founded the Shandong Rural Reconstruction Institute. He was one of the founders of the Democratic League and was prominent in the attempt to mediate between the Nationalist and Communist parties after World War II. Later, under the pressure of Communist ideological campaigns, he steadfastly refused to confess any errors.
There are three ways in human life: (1) to go forward; (2) to modify and to achieve harmony, synthesis, and the mean in the self; and (3) to go backward. . . . The fundamental spirit of Chinese culture is the harmony and moderation of ideas and desires, whereas that of Indian civilization is to go backward in ideas and desires [and that of the West is to go forward]. [pp. 54–55]
Generally speaking, Westerners have been too strong and too vigorous in their minds and intellect. Because of this they have suffered spiritually. This is an undeniable fact since the nineteenth century. [p. 63]
Let us compare Western culture with Chinese culture. First, there is the conquest of nature on the material side of Western culture—this China has none of. Second, there is the scientific method on the intellectual side of Western culture—this also China has none of. And third, there is democracy on the social side of Western culture—this, too
, China has none of. . . . This shows negatively that the way of Chinese culture is not that of the West but is the second way [mentioned above—namely, achieving the mean]. . . . As to Indian culture . . . religion alone has flourished, subordinating to it philosophy, literature, science, and art. The three aspects of life [material, intellectual, and social] have become an abnormal spiritual development, and spiritual life itself has been an almost purely religious development. This is really most extraordinary. Indian culture has traveled its own way, different from that of the West. Needless to say, it is not the same as that of Chinese culture. [pp. 64–66]
In this respect Chinese culture is different from that of India, because of the weakness of religion, as we have already said. For this reason, there is not much to be said about Chinese religions. The most important thing in Chinese culture is its metaphysics, which is applicable everywhere. . . . Chinese metaphysics is different from that of the West and India. It is different in its problems. . . . The problems discussed in the ancient West and ancient India have in fact not existed in China. While the problems of the West and India are not really identical, still they are the same insofar as the search for the reality of the universe is concerned. Where they are the same is exactly where they are decidedly different from China. Have you heard of Chinese philosophers debating monism, dualism, or pluralism, or idealism and materialism? The Chinese do not discuss such static problems of tranquil reality. The metaphysics handed down from the greatest antiquity in China, which constituted the fundamental concept of all learning—great and small, high and low—is that completely devoted to the discussion of change that is entirely nontranquil in reality. [pp. 114–115]