Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang

by Adi Ignatius

  At that moment, I thought that perhaps if we held the National People’s Congress Standing Committee meeting ahead of schedule we could allow the NPC, the organization with proper authority, to use the means of democracy and law to turn the situation around. On May 21, I spoke to [Central Committee Secretariat member] Yan Mingfu about this idea, and asked him to speak with [Yang] Shangkun to see if it was feasible.

  Before this, [NPC vice chairman] Peng Chong had come over to talk. He said that since Wan Li was abroad, he [Peng Chong] had held a meeting with the heads of the NPC committee. They all felt that an NPC Standing Committee meeting should be held. He also went to Yuquanshan [Jade Spring Mountain, west of Beijing] to visit [influential Party elder] Peng Zhen, who also agreed that this should be done. They had already written a report to the Central Committee requesting that Wan Li return from abroad ahead of schedule.

  In the afternoon of the 21st, [PSC member] Hu Qili came to my house to report that no one had responded to the request to have Wan Li return. It was in limbo. I asked Hu Qili to tell Peng Chong to telegram Wan Li directly in the name of the Party Group of the NPC to request his return. Hu Qili asked if he could say that I had agreed to this, and I said, “Yes.”

  I then phoned [Vice Premier] Wu Xueqian and asked him to find a way to send the telegram. I later learned that Li Peng sent another telegram to Wan Li to tell him not to return. It is possible that he had Deng’s prior approval, so Wan Li was unable to make an early return.

  On the night of June 3rd, while sitting in the courtyard with my family, I heard intense gunfire. A tragedy to shock the world had not been averted, and was happening after all.

  I prepared the above written material three years after the June Fourth tragedy. Many years have now passed since this tragedy. Of the activists involved in this incident, except for the few who escaped abroad, most were arrested, sentenced, and repeatedly interrogated. The truth must have been determined by now. Certainly the following three questions should have been answered by now.

  First, it was determined then that the student movement was “a planned conspiracy” of anti-Party, anti-socialist elements with leadership. So now we must ask, who were these leaders? What was the plan? What was the conspiracy? What evidence exists to support this? It was also said that there were “black hands” within the Party. Then who were they?

  Second, it was said that this event was aimed at overthrowing the People’s Republic and the Communist Party. Where is the evidence? I had said at the time that most people were only asking us to correct our flaws, not attempting to overthrow our political system.

  After so many years, what evidence has been obtained through the interrogations? Have I been proven right, or have they?

  Many of the democracy activists in exile say that before June Fourth, they had still believed that the Party could improve itself. After June Fourth, however, they saw the Party as hopeless and only then did they take a stand to oppose the Party. During the demonstrations, students raised many slogans and demands, but the problem of inflation was conspicuously missing, though inflation was a hot topic that could easily have resonated with and ignited all of society. If the students had intended on opposing the Communist Party back then, why hadn’t they utilized this sensitive topic? If intent on mobilizing the masses, wouldn’t it have been easier to raise questions like this one? In hindsight, it’s obvious that the reason the students did not raise the issue of inflation was that they knew that this issue was related to the reform program, and if pointedly raised to mobilize the masses, it could have turned out to obstruct the reform process.

  Third, can it be proven that the June Fourth movement was “counterrevolutionary turmoil,” as it was designated? The students were orderly. Many reports indicate that on the occasions when the People’s Liberation Army came under attack, in many incidents it was the students who had come to its defense. Large numbers of city residents blocked the PLA from entering the city. Why? Were they intent on overthrowing the republic?

  Of course, whenever there are large numbers of people involved, there will always be some tiny minority within the crowd who might want to attack the PLA. It was a chaotic situation. It is perfectly possible that some hooligans took advantage of the situation to make trouble, but how can these actions be attributed to the majority of the citizens and students? By now, the answer to this question should be clear.

  5

  The Accusations Fly

  Zhao is purged from his leadership role as Party elders close ranks to oppose him. Zhao argues that their tactics violate Party regulations, but he is powerless to fight back. Yet just as he refuses to sign off on the decision to bring the army into Beijing, he declines the Party’s demand to make a “self-criticism”—an important tool in the Party’s efforts to maintain one official version of the truth. Zhao does express concern about how a comment he made to Mikhail Gorbachev was misconstrued as a veiled attack on Deng.

  I want to raise another issue here, that is, the unfair treatment that I received because of the political unrest in Beijing.

  I had refused to attend the meeting of May 19 that announced martial law. This made Deng and the other elders extremely angry. On the 20th, Deng called Chen Yun, Li Xiannian, Wang Zhen, Peng Zhen, Yang Shangkun, Li Peng, Qiao Shi, and Yao Yilin for a meeting at his house. Of course, I was not informed. They did not notify Hu Qili, either, so he did not attend.

  I hear that in the meeting, Wang Zhen furiously vilified me as being counterrevolutionary. Li Xiannian accused me of setting up “second headquarters.” In the end, Deng decided to remove me from the post of General Secretary, but added that the announcement to the public should be delayed until after the completion of some necessary procedures. I was brushed aside just like that.

  This was not a Politburo Standing Committee meeting, since only three of its five members were in attendance. Neither Hu Qili nor I had been removed from our posts before the meeting began, so we were still members of the PSC. In my opinion, it cannot be considered legal to have made such a decision when two members of the PSC had not even been notified.

  I took a three-day leave, from the 19th to the 21st. Nobody actually told me that I had been removed from my position. Of course, nobody contacted me on any work-related issues, either. Essential communication channels had been cut off, and I had been isolated. I heard through other channels that Li Peng, Yang Shangkun, Yao Yilin, and [Director of Organization Department] Song Ping each held meetings with various departments announcing my “crime.” They also organized working groups and drafted documents to prepare for an upcoming Central Committee meeting at which they planned to announce my case. Meanwhile, they assembled in Beijing the first-and second-rank leaders of all the provinces and municipalities to brief them.

  Through all these important arrangements, the Politburo did not hold a single meeting; nor did the Politiburo Standing Committee make any decisions. The Standing Committee was made up of five members; with Hu Qili and me excluded, there could be no legitimate PSC meeting. All these arrangements were lacking in legal authority.

  The Party Charter lays out these rules: “When the Central Committee is not in session, the Politburo assumes power on its behalf…. Meetings of the Politburo are to be chaired by the General Secretary.” It is obvious that none of these arrangements were made through Politburo meetings, and of course they were not chaired by me. Therefore, no matter what organization held meetings, or who chaired them, they were all in violation of the Party Charter.

  Under these circumstances, in which no one had announced that I had been removed from my post, yet I was unable to use my authority, I worried that I would ultimately be accused of having abandoned my post. Therefore, I talked to [director of the Party’s General Office] Wen Jiabao to suggest a Politburo meeting. Wen Jiabao replied that, in fact, the Central Committee General Office had been brushed aside as well. All arrangements had been made by Li Peng and Yang Shangkun, bypassing the General Office. He said that if I really wanted
to call a meeting, the General Office would send out the notice, but he believed that the consequences would not be good and hoped I would carefully reconsider.

  Since I could not call for a meeting, I asked my secretary to phone Yang Shangkun to ask him over for a talk. My intention was to ask him to clarify whether I had already been removed from my position. I also wanted to explain to him why I had talked to Gorbachev about Deng Xiaoping’s position within the Party [Zhao expounds on this in Chapter 7].

  On June 2, [Vice Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference] Wang Renzhong and [Vice Minister of State Planning] Ding Guan’gen came to my house and said that in response to my request to speak to Yang Shangkun, the two of them had been sent by the Central Committee and entrusted with this discussion. They said that the Central Committee was soon to hold Politburo and Central Committee meetings to deal with my case and that I should carefully consider preparing a self-criticism.

  I started off by explaining to them my discussion with Gorbachev. Then I raised the issue of how the Central Committee’s organizations could be functioning when two of the five members of the Standing Committee had been pushed aside. Who was participating in the meetings? Wang Renzhong said there had been no Standing Committee reelections, nor had there been any meetings held of late.

  I said that having taken three days’ sick leave, I could understand if I was not permitted to resume work. I had no problems with being asked to stand aside, but I should not later be accused of having neglected my work and abandoning my post. That was the reason I had asked to talk with Yang Shangkun. With regards to preparing a self-criticism, I said that I had not been told anything. Criticisms of me were being made everywhere without attempts to check with me about the facts. Documents of criticisms were circulating all over the place, but none had been shown to me. How could I write a self-criticism under such conditions? If I were to be given a chance to speak in the future on issues that I admitted had been in error, I would make a self-criticism.

  It was a long talk, lasting more than two hours. I did most of the talking. I spoke about the conditions and my views on the April 26 editorial, the speech on May 3 to the youth delegates, the May Fourth speech at the ADB meeting, and my refusal to attend the May 19 meeting to announce martial law.

  And lastly, I strongly protested the way in which they had detained Bao Tong. On May 28, Bao Tong had been called in by the Department of Organization for a talk, from which he never returned. Meanwhile, they searched his office. I had immediately asked my secretary to call [Director of Organization Department] Song Ping to voice my protest. To Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen I said, “If they believe Bao Tong has done anything wrong, the appropriate Party organization should conduct an investigation, but they must proceed according to the Party Charter and the law. Party organizations, much less the Department of Organization, have no authority to deprive him of his personal freedom. We are now in the 1980s; we cannot use these old methods of past political campaigns.” I demanded that they relay my message to the Central Committee.

  In their assessment of this talk, they deemed my attitude to have been very bad indeed. Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen returned to my home on June 17. They said that on June 19 the Central Committee would hold a Politburo meeting to deal with my case, and they requested that I appear modest, show restraint, and keep calm even if some of the elders used harsh words. I could choose to speak or remain silent, but I was not to argue excessively.

  I replied, “If this is a meeting to deal with my case, I must be given the chance to speak freely.”

  Ding Guan’gen also asked me to reflect seriously on my faults and adopt a proper attitude for the meeting. Wang Renzhong revealed that internally they had decided to maintain my Central Committee membership and Hu Qili’s Politburo membership.* He also said that they had already relayed my opinion of Bao Tong’s “isolation and investigation” to the Central Committee; Bao Tong was now under “surveillance and house arrest,” which [they said] conforms with proper legal procedures.

  It seems the purpose of their visit was: one, to notify me about the upcoming meeting, and two, to persuade me not to stage a challenge, or to keep my arguments to a minimum. When Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen first came to my house on June 2 to inform me of the meeting arranged to deal with my case, they said that Deng Xiaoping had mentioned that the handling of Hu Yaobang’s case had resulted in criticisms both at home and abroad, so this time with Zhao’s case, we must follow proper procedures. He directed them to prepare proper documentation; as soon as these documents were ready, a meeting would be held.

  It was all a terrific irony. In fact, I had already been detained and isolated by them without justification or legality. First they illegally deposed me from my position as General Secretary, then they claimed to be in accordance with procedures. This shows that they were apprehensive; afraid of criticism from others.

  They would have held the meeting earlier, but it was delayed by the events of June Fourth.

  6

  The Campaign Against Zhao

  The military “victory” over peaceful demonstrators in Tiananmen Square fails to deliver a sense of political victory. Party leaders, vilified around the world, move quickly to punish Zhao, convening an enlarged Politburo meeting before the end of June to make their accusations. Having been criticized for their handling of Hu Yaobang’s dismissal two years earlier, Party leaders make a show of going through the proper steps this time. But Zhao points out the widespread violations of Party procedure and how he is the victim of Cultural Revolution–style tactics. He also reflects on the calculated risks he takes in sticking to his beliefs even as his colleagues turn against him.

  The Politburo held an enlarged meeting from June 19 to 21. First, Li Peng, representing the four members of the Standing Committee, set the tone of the proceedings by giving a report that accused me of having committed the serious errors of “splitting the Party” and “supporting turmoil.” He proposed that I be removed from my positions as General Secretary, Politburo member, and Politburo Standing Committee member. He also said that further investigations of me would be conducted.

  Afterward, the participants took turns speaking, each expounding on those criticisms. The most vicious and slanderous personal attacks came from Li Xiannian. At the beginning of the criticism meeting, Deng Xiaoping was absent. Chen Yun also did not appear, but provided a written statement containing two lines. It said that I had failed to meet the Party’s expectations and that he supported the Party’s decision to punish me. Wang Zhen’s remarks were mainly about how Deng had been too lenient in punishing [Hu] Yaobang, allowing him to keep his membership on the Politburo and giving him a state funeral, thereby encouraging bourgeois liberalism.

  In the latter half of the last day of criticism speeches, Yao Yilin acted as chairman of the meeting. It seemed that they had no intention of letting me speak.

  The first time Wang Renzhong and Ding Guan’gen had come to my home, they had requested that I prepare a self-criticism. The second time they came, they had realized I was not going to write one, so they had tried to persuade me to remain silent. When the meeting was drawing to a close, I requested a chance to speak.

  He [Yao Yilin] looked at his watch and said, “We’ve run out of time. If you must speak, keep it under ten minutes.”

  I was very upset. I said, “After all this time in session to deal with my case, after two whole days of criticisms, how can you now allow me so little time to respond?!”

  Without waiting for his go-ahead, I began reading aloud a speech that I had prepared. I checked my watch afterward: it had taken me twenty minutes. In my speech I laid out the truth and the actual context of the debates and rebutted the accusations that had been made against me in the meeting. It came as a surprise to the meeting’s participants. Some of them had intense expressions on their faces, appearing irritable and restless while I was talking.

  As soon as I finished speaking, Yao Yilin abrupt
ly adjourned the meeting. I immediately left the scene. No one else moved. It was obvious that they had been instructed beforehand that they would be expected to express agreement with the displeasure with my speech and my attitude.

  The meeting resumed the next day. A vote was held to decide my case. They took out a statement that contained a resolution to strip me of all my official positions. Li Peng’s original report and other people’s speeches had all proposed dismissing me from my position as General Secretary and terminating my membership on the Politburo and Standing Committee, but preserving my membership on the Central Committee. But in this statement, my Central Committee membership was removed as well.

  It is obvious that after I’d delivered my speech the day before, they had all remained for a discussion and then determined that because of my bad attitude, a more severe punishment was appropriate. Since Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun were not present during my speech, they must have reported to Deng and Chen afterward.

  In fact, I did not really care whether or not I was to keep my membership in the Central Committee, since it really made no difference. However, the Party Charter defines clearly that any member refusing to accept administrative punishment has a right to file for an appeal. The document, titled “Several Rules Governing Political Life in the Party,” also states clearly that with regard to the Party’s administrative punishments, Party members have the right to make a statement, to request an appeal, to file a complaint, and to make a defense. Retaliation by the prosecutor against the defendant or those who filed the complaint is prohibited. However, I had been given additional punishment for having spoken in self-defense. This was in total violation of the Party Charter and the rules of the Party. Li Peng’s initial report and the other speeches all recommended the retention of my Central Committee membership, but when it was later terminated, there was no indication or explanation as to what had changed. This was highly irregular.