Prisoner of the State: The Secret Journal of Premier Zhao Ziyang

by Adi Ignatius

  Before the voting began, I almost made a statement: “Because I spoke out in self-defense, my punishment has been augmented, setting a bad precedent by blatantly violating the Party Charter, the first such incident since the Third Plenum of the Seventh Central Committee [1950].” However, I reconsidered: if I were to make a statement with all the elders present, Deng Xiaoping and Marshal Nie [Rongzhen] and others, they would be even more offended. So, just as the words reached my lips, I refrained myself.

  When the voting took place on the resolution, however, I not only refused to vote in favor, I raised my hand to vote to oppose the measure and at the same time proclaimed, “I do not take issue with being dismissed from my positions, but I do not agree with nor accept the two accusations!” After I said this, no one, not even Deng or Li Peng, who was chairing the meeting, made a sound. Perhaps they had already anticipated it.

  This Politburo meeting that voted to impose administrative punishment on me violated the Party Charter and rules in more ways than what I have just mentioned. First of all, what procedure was being followed in the decision to hold the enlarged Politburo meeting? No Politburo meeting had been held to discuss the matter beforehand. The exclusion of Hu Qili and me from the Standing Committee meeting was also illegal. When Wang Renzhong had come to my house, he had said that no Politburo meetings had been held. Therefore, how these enlarged Politburo meetings had been decided upon, and who had made the decision—all of this was problematic.

  The Party Charter clearly states that Politburo meetings should be chaired by the General Secretary. However, before my title was legally removed, I had already been deprived of my right to chair Politburo meetings, which was passed to Li Peng. This was also illegal.

  What was especially ironic was that when voting was to begin, Deng Xiaoping actually said, “All participants, whether a member of the Politburo or not, have the right to vote.” At enlarged Politburo meetings, nonmember attendants are permitted to listen and to speak, but how can they be allowed to participate in the voting? Apparently, they wanted to rally more support. Li Xiannian explained that this right to vote was being granted by Li Peng, the chairman of the meeting. This was completely rule by force! What Party Charter or rules were they following?! The elders, long accustomed to the Party’s custom of “acknowledging neither laws nor heavenly constraints,” of course, were not concerned.

  Now I have spoken of this matter; I don’t know how this will be recorded in the Party’s history.

  A Central Committee meeting was held from June 23 to 24 to pass the political and administrative judgment made against me at the enlarged Politburo meeting. I was notified about the meeting and attended the group to which I’d been assigned, the North China Group. I listened as a few comrades criticized me, then I spoke briefly.

  I said, “Thank you all for your advice. I have a written statement that is a revised version of the statement I prepared for the enlarged Politburo meeting. I have already submitted it to the Service Division. I hope copies of my written statement will be distributed to all comrades in attendance.”

  [Director of the Propaganda Department] Wang Renzhi was also in this group, and said that the Central Committee had agreed to distribute copies of the statement to all the participants. But, in fact, the statement was passed out to participants only as the meeting was about to end, and then quickly retrieved. However, [Beijing mayor] Chen Xitong and [State Education Commission director] Li Tieying’s rebuttal of my statement had been distributed earlier. So, in the meeting, it was a bizarre situation in which participants were reading the criticism of my statement without having seen my statement, then were finally shown my statement toward the end of the meeting only to have it immediately retracted again. As a result, I’m afraid many people had to rush through my statement, or did not get a chance to read it at all.

  So-called “background information” about June Fourth was also distributed, in the name of the General Office. It amassed a large quantity of material from around the country and overseas, implying that I was a conspirator representing counterrevolutionary forces in the country and overseas aimed at overthrowing the Chinese Communist Party and Deng Xiaoping. It also included material making false accusations that my staff cooperated with the students, sent information to them, and revealed the military secret of the plan to impose martial law. It was obvious that the point of printing such “background material” was to create a general impression that I was indeed guilty of the most heinous crimes and was unpardonably wicked.

  They sought to completely destroy my political and moral standing. Some of the speeches delivered at the meeting were entirely in the style of the Cultural Revolution: reversing black and white, exaggerating personal offenses, taking quotes out of context, issuing slanders and lies—all in Cultural Revolution language. At the time, I thought to myself, if records of this meeting were not clearly marked “CCP Fourth Plenum of the Thirteenth Party Congress,” one could easily have mistaken them for documents from the Cultural Revolution.

  According to the Party Charter, the dismissal of a member of the Central Committee requires a two-thirds majority in the plenum to pass. It was obvious that the top leaders were not confident they could achieve that. If sectet voting were to take place, it was possible that they would not obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. Instead they abandoned secret voting and called for voting by a show of hands. Obviously, in that kind of atmosphere and under that kind of pressure, by having to publicly raise one’s hand, a lot of people felt unable to vote according to their real opinions. With everyone watching and cameras rolling, some people were forced to raise their hands even if they were opposed. Therefore, the resolution was unanimously passed.

  I must point out that in the past, whether for General Secretary or for Politburo or Politburo Standing Committee memberships, all elections were carried out through secret voting. Voting in this way, with a show of hands, was quite abnormal. In that kind of atmosphere, under that kind of pressure, and with investigations of events and people connected to me already under way, how could people feel free to express their opinions while raising their hands?

  By insisting on my view of the student demonstrations and refusing to accept the decision to crack down with force, I knew what the consequences would be and what treatment I would receive. Mentally, I was fully prepared. I knew that if I persistently upheld my view, I would ultimately be compelled to step down. I had already considered this. If I wanted to keep my position, or give up my post in some face-saving way, I would have to give up my viewpoint and conform. If I persisted, then I had to be prepared to step down.

  After repeated and careful consideration, I had decided I would rather step down than conform to their view. I had spoken with my wife and children at home about what I was thinking, and had asked them to be prepared.

  I was also mentally prepared for the consequences of my speech at the enlarged Politburo meeting. I thought I might be expelled from the Party, since it was necessary for a person who had committed an error to hang his head in guilt in order to be judged as having the correct attitude. I thought that probably I would not be put in prison, since I had done nothing wrong. For people like me who had had some amount of influence at home and abroad, they could not possibly manage to conduct an absolutely secret trial. Hence I determined that stepping down was a certainty, expulsion from the Party was the worst that might happen, and imprisonment was unlikely.

  Under a political system such as ours, it made very little difference whether I remained in the Party or was expelled from it. People in my situation who have retained Party membership don’t have the normal rights of membership anyway. Furthermore, expulsion from the Party would not affect my beliefs and ideals.

  After the Fourth Plenum of the 13th Central Committee, Cultural Revolution–style tactics that had been condemned and abandoned long ago were taken up to be used against me. These tactics included inundating the newspapers with critical articles making me out to be an enemy, and cas
ual disregard of my personal freedoms. Immediately after the Cultural Revolution, having learned from its painful experiences, the Party had passed a new Party Charter at the 12th Party Congress [1982], “Several Rules Governing Political Life in the Party.” The rules were aimed at preventing the Cultural Revolution from ever happening again.

  After June Fourth, they entirely disregarded these rules in their treatment of me, instead openly violating them and reassuming the ultraleft tactics of the Cultural Revolution. This was something I had not anticipated.

  7

  Zhao’s Talk with Gorbachev

  One of the mysteries about the events leading up to the Tiananmen Massacre is when precisely Deng Xiaoping decided to part ways with his reform ally, Zhao Ziyang. When Zhao met with Gorbachev, he stressed that Deng, despite a lack of official titles, was still in charge. While Zhao says he meant only to highlight the importance of Gorbachev’s meeting with Deng, his detractors accused him of trying to subtly place blame for the political turmoil on Deng’s shoulders. It’s unclear whether Zhao’s comment really cost him Deng’s trust. But if it did, the losses of hundreds of lives could ultimately be traced to the paranoia and lack of judgment of one man, Deng, in a time of crisis. Zhao’s intimate account sheds no light on the mystery, though it reveals his deep sense of regret for any misunderstanding, and his continued gratitude for his relationship with Deng.

  Here I’d like to comment on the issue of my talk with Gorbachev on May 16.

  Deng was quite displeased with my May Fourth speech at the Asian Development Bank conference. However, I’m afraid my talk with Gorbachev didn’t just make him angry, but really hurt him. After June Fourth, he told [Nobel Prize–winning Chinese American physicist] Professor Tsung-Dao Lee that I had pushed him to the forefront during the student turmoil. What he actually meant was that I had abandoned him to confront the public alone. Notions of this kind circulated among the populace as well.

  When I talked with Gorbachev, I spoke of Deng Xiaoping’s role in our country and in the Party. These comments were entirely intended to uphold Deng’s prestige, but resulted in a great misunderstanding. People thought I was shirking responsibilities, pushing Deng to the forefront [and forcing him to] confront the public at a critical moment. I absolutely did not foresee this.

  Ever since the 13th Party Congress [in 1987], whenever I met with foreign leaders, especially fellow Party leaders, I always informed them that even though Deng was no longer on the Politburo Standing Committee, his role as the major decision maker in our Party had not changed. This had almost become a convention. In April, I had informed Kim Il Sung in North Korea of the same. What was different with this talk was that the message gained prominence through TV and newspaper coverage.

  Why did I do this?

  The publication of Deng’s April 25 remarks by Li Peng and his associates had resulted in a public outcry. Students and youths were particularly unhappy with Deng. Because of the dissatisfaction with his remarks, they focused on and assailed his special position. I heard many remarks such as “Why does the Politburo Standing Committee have to report to Deng Xiaoping, who is not even a member? This does not conform with the principles of the Party’s organization!” The phrase “hanging a curtain to administer the affairs of state” was spreading. Amid all of this, I thought I should come out with a clarification and an explanation.

  On May 13, two days before Gorbachev’s arrival, I held a dialogue with delegates of workers and cadres from official workers’ unions. A worker raised a question along these lines. I replied by explaining that this was in accordance with a resolution passed at the First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee. This plenum had decided that we must consult with Deng Xiaoping on any matters of great importance. This was for the benefit of the whole Party because Deng’s political wisdom and experience was richer than that of any member of the Politburo Standing Committee. The answer seemed to go over well, as that worker did not pursue the question any further. Hence, I thought that if we gave the same explanation through the press, it would have a positive effect on Deng’s public image. At least it would clarify that this wasn’t a case of Deng grabbing power, but rather a collective decision made at the Central Committee’s First Plenum.

  Therefore, when I met with Gorbachev, I told him that our Party’s First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee had formally decided that on major issues, we still needed Deng to be at the helm. Ever since the 13th Party Congress, we had always kept him informed and sought his opinion on major issues. Deng had always been fully supportive of our work and our collective decisions. In fact, the original resolution was not only that we should seek his opinion and keep him informed, but also that he could call for a meeting and make the final decision on major issues. Taking into consideration what the public would be able to accept, I intentionally did not mention this last point. I believed the public explanation that I did make would benefit Deng, and at the very least clarify that it was not an illegal situation, but in fact a legitimate one.

  There was another reason for me to make these remarks: Gorbachev’s visit was a summit between China and the Soviet Union. Which person actually met with Gorbachev was of symbolic importance in defining such a summit. Of course, both domestically and abroad, everyone knew that the so-called “Sino-Soviet Summit” was between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping. But Gorbachev was the President of the U.S.S.R. and the General Secretary of the Communist Party, while Deng was neither President of the state nor General Secretary of the Party, but only the chairman of the Central Military Commission. My sincere intention was to prominently declare that the summit was defined by the meeting between Gorbachev and Deng, not between Gorbachev and anyone else.

  Originally, the Foreign Ministry planned to dilute the message, neither avoiding the issue altogether nor being too formal about it; it was not to be included in the declaration or in any formal discussions between the two parties. They asked me to say to Gorbachev, “Our meeting as the General Secretaries of our respective parties naturally signifies the restoration of the relationship between our two parties.” But on May 13, two days before I was to meet with Gorbachev, while I was talking to Deng at his home regarding Gorbachev’s visit, Deng stated that the relationship between the two parties would be restored after he met with Gorbachev. This departed from the original plan of the Foreign Ministry. I paid specific attention to this remark from Deng.

  Because of all these considerations, after Gorbachev had already met with Deng, I started my meeting with him by saying that the relationship between our two parties had been restored by his meeting with Deng, that his meeting with Deng was the culmination of his visit. Naturally, I then followed up with discussion of Deng’s position and the decision made by the First Plenum of the 13th Central Committee.

  My comment was meant to explain two issues simultaneously: why Gorbachev’s meeting with Deng defined the summit and the fact that Deng’s continued position as the paramount decision maker for the Chinese Communist Party was a ruling of the Central Committee, consequently legitimate. At the time, I felt that my remark was extremely appropriate, resolving problems in a natural way.

  After the talk, I initially received positive responses. Later I learned that, on the contrary, Deng and his family were not only displeased with my remarks, but extremely angered by them. This was beyond what I could have foreseen. Exactly why did Deng get the idea that I had intentionally pushed him into confronting the public, while I was evading my own responsibilities? I have yet to learn who it was or how that person managed to provoke Deng.

  My intentions were good: to maintain and to protect his prestige, and to do my part in bearing the responsibility. However, it unexpectedly resulted in a great misunderstanding and caused him to feel that I had intentionally hurt him. I indeed feel deeply aggrieved by this affair. I could have chosen to do nothing at all. In fact, it had been unnecessary. I truly, deeply regret it.

  Why have I placed such special attention to this matter? Because other iss
ues were caused by a difference of ideas and viewpoints. Since I had persisted with my position, even my dismissal from the position of General Secretary was understandable. I started with only good intentions. No matter what kinds of differences I had with Deng over the June Fourth issue, it was a difference of political opinions.

  Before the June Fourth incident, I had always felt that, overall, Deng had treated me very well and shown a lot of trust in me. It is a Chinese tradition to value integrity of character and faithfulness in our relationships. If I had given Deng the impression that I had diverted blame in the midst of a crisis, then not only was this a profoundly false impression of me, but it might cause him deep unhappiness or even emotional pain. The thought of a man of his years, perhaps soon to leave this world, suffering from such an impression was truly unbearable to me.

  Therefore, I wrote to Deng on May 28 specifically to explain my remarks to Gorbachev. However, I told him of only one of my considerations, which I mentioned before, that I was asserting that the summit was officially between Deng and Gorbachev, and because of this, I had naturally commented that Deng was still the main decision maker. I did not mention my second consideration, that is, to refute the popular view that he was power hungry, continuing to control the Politburo Standing Committee even though not a member of it. Amid this public criticism, some kind of explanation had been necessary. There was no reply to the letter I sent.