Defeat Into Victory

by Field-Marshal Viscount William Slim

  To begin with, they were usually formed by attracting the best men from normal units by better conditions, promises of excitement, and not a little propaganda. Even on the rare occasions when normal units were converted into special ones without the option of volunteering, the same process went on in reverse. Men thought to be below the standards set or over an arbitrary age limit were weeded out to less favoured corps. The result of these methods was undoubtedly to lower the quality of the rest of the Army, especially of the infantry, not only by skimming the cream off it, but by encouraging the idea that certain of the normal operations of war were so difficult that only specially equipped corps d’élite could be expected to undertake them. Armies do not win wars by means of a few bodies of super-soldiers but by the average quality of their standard units. Anything, whatever short cuts to victory it may promise, which thus weakens the Army spirit, is dangerous. Commanders who have used these special forces have found, as we did in Burma, that they have another grave disadvantage—they can be employed actively for only restricted periods. Then they demand to be taken out of the battle to recuperate, while normal formations are expected to have no such limits to their employment. In Burma, the time spent in action with the enemy by special forces was only a fraction of that endured by the normal divisions, and it must be remembered that risk is danger multiplied by time.

  The rush to form special forces arose from confused thinking on what were, or were not, normal operations of war. In one sense every operation of war is a special one, whether it is attack, defence, withdrawal, penetration, raids behind the enemy’s lines, destruction of his detachments, assault over a beach, river crossings, jungle or mountain warfare, or any of the rest; each has its peculiar requirements. Yet all are and have always been familiar operations of war; any standard unit should expect that, at some time or other, it may be called upon to engage in any of them. The level of initiative, individual training, and weapon skill required in, say, a commando, is admirable; what is not admirable is that it should be confined to a few small units. Any well-trained infantry battalion should be able to do what a commando can do; in the Fourteenth Army they could and did. This cult of special forces is as sensible as to form a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and say that no soldier, who does not wear its green hat with a bunch of oak leaves stuck in it, should be expected to climb a tree.

  I would lay it down that any single operation in which more than a handful of men are to be engaged should be regarded as normal, and should be carried out by standard formations. The only exception I would allow to this is a parachute landing, which, until facilities for training much larger numbers in the drill of jumping are available, must require something of a special force. The absence of such forces does not, of course, mean that ordinary units would not, as they have always done, practise and train for particular operations, but it would avoid having large numbers of picked troops, either waiting long periods to be used for short periods, or eventually being employed for something quite different from that for which they have so long and laboriously prepared. Private armies—and for that matter private air forces—are expensive, wasteful, and unnecessary.

  There is, however, one kind of special unit which should be retained—that designed to be employed in small parties, usually behind the enemy, on tasks beyond the normal scope of warfare in the field. There will be an increasing need for highly qualified and individually trained men—and women—to sabotage vital installations, to spread rumours, to misdirect the enemy, to transmit intelligence, to kill or kidnap individuals, and to inspire resistance movements. They will be troops, though they will require many qualities and skills not to be expected of the ordinary soldier and they will use many methods beyond his capacity. Each small party would study and train intensively for a particular exploit and should operate under the direct control of the Higher Command. They should rarely work within our own lines. Not costly in manpower, they may, if handled with imaginative ruthlessness, achieve strategic results. Such units, based on the Army, but drawing on all Services and all races of the Commonwealth for specially qualified men and women, should be an essential component of our modern Armed Forces.

  The question of control of these clandestine bodies is not without its pitfalls. In the last war among the Allies, cloak and dagger organizations multiplied until to commanders in the field—at least in my theatre—they became an embarrassment. The trouble was that each was controlled from some distant headquarters of its own, and such was the secrecy and mutual suspicion in which they operated that they sometimes acted in close proximity to our troops without the knowledge of any commander in the field, with a complete lack of co-ordination among themselves, and in dangerous ignorance of local tactical developments. It was not until the activities of all clandestine bodies operating in or near our troops were co-ordinated, and where necessary controlled, through a senior officer on the staff of the commander of the area, that confusion, ineffectiveness, and lost opportunities were avoided.

  The Future

  In Burma we thus developed a form of warfare, based more on human factors than on lavish equipment, which had certain characteristics. The chief of these were:

  (i) The acceptance as normal of the regular movement and maintenance of standard formations by air.

  (ii) Great tactical freedom for subordinate commanders.

  (iii) The operation, over wide distances in most difficult country, of comparatively small forces in tactical independence but strategic combination.

  (iv) Reduced scales of transport and equipment, supplemented by ingenuity and improvisation from local resources.

  (v) The high quality of the individual soldier, his morale, toughness, and discipline, his acceptance of hardship, and his ability to move on his own feet and to look after himself.

  War in the future may vary in scope from unlimited nuclear war aimed at the complete annihilation of a whole people, to a restricted tactical employment of nuclear weapons, or even to the small war of traditional pattern. Whatever form it takes, especially when nuclear weapons are employed as they will be in any war between great powers, one thing is reasonably certain. Modern war, with its destruction of bases, disruption of communications, and disorganization of control, will, if they are to operate at all, compel armies to disperse.

  Dispersed fighting, whether the dispersal is caused by the terrain, the lack of supplies, or by the weapons of the enemy, will have two main requirements—skilled and determined junior leaders and self-reliant, physically hard, well-disciplined troops. Success in future land operations will depend on the immediate availability of such leaders and such soldiers, ready to operate in small, independent formations. They will have to be prepared to do without regular lines of communication, to guide themselves and to subsist largely on what the country offers. Unseen, unheard, and unsuspected, they will converge on the enemy and, when they do reveal themselves in strength, they will be so close to him that he will be unable to atomize them without destroying himself. Such land operations, less rigidly controlled and more individualistic than in the past, will not be unlike ours as we approached the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy, and stalking terrorists in a Malayan jungle is today, strange as it may seem, the best training for nuclear warfare. The use of new weapons and technical devices can quickly be taught; to develop hardihood, initiative, mutual confidence, and stark leadership takes longer.

  The air attacks we sustained and delivered were, compared with what they might be now, feeble things. Yet determined troops, especially in close or broken country, who are prepared to jettison all but fighting essentials and move in small, self-contained formations, will, I believe, make their own way even through the chaos of atomic bombing. In unlimited war, after the first shock of mutual devastation had been survived, victory would go, as it did in our other jungle, to the tougher, more resourceful infantryman. The easier and more gadget-filled our daily life becomes, the harder will it be to produce him. It took us some time to do so in Burma. It can be done in peac
e; in war there will no longer be so much time.

  Until the very horror of modern mass destruction forces men to find some more sensible way of settling national disputes, war will remain, and while it remains it will continually change. Yet, because it is fought between men rather than between weapons, victory will still go, when armaments are even relatively equal, to the side which is better trained and of higher morale—advantages which are obtained neither easily, quickly, nor without the sacrifice of more than money in peace. War remains an art and, like all arts, whatever its variation, will have its enduring principles. Many men, skilled either with sword or pen, and sometimes with both, have tried to expound those principles. I heard them once from a soldier of experience for whom I had a deep and well-founded respect. Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the ‘Principles of War’, listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-Major came upon me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’t bother your head about all them things, me lad,’ he said. ‘There’s only one principle of war and that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin’!’ As a recruit, I earned that great man’s reproof often enough; now, as an old soldier, I would hope to receive his commendation. I think I might, for we of the Fourteenth Army held to his Principle of War.

  In these pages I have written much of generals and of staff officers; of their problems, difficulties, and expedients, their successes and their failures. Yet there is one thought that I should like to be the overall and final impression of this book—that the war in Burma was a soldiers’ war. There comes a moment in every battle against a stubborn enemy when the result hangs in the balance. Then the general, however skilful and far-sighted he may have been, must hand over to his soldiers, to the men in the ranks and to their regimental officers, and leave them to complete what he has begun. The issue then rests with them, on their courage, their hardihood, their refusal to be beaten either by the cruel hazards of nature or by the fierce strength of their human enemy. That moment came early and often in the fighting in Burma; sometimes it came when tired, sick men felt alone, when it would have been so easy for them to give up, when only will, discipline, and faith could steel them to carry on. To the soldiers of many races who, in the comradeship of the Fourteenth Army, did go on, and to the airmen who flew with them and fought over them, belongs the true glory of achievement. It was they who turned Defeat into Victory.

  INDEX

  The index that appeared in the print version of this title was intentionally removed from the eBook. Please use the search function on your eReading device for terms of interest. For your reference, the terms that appear in the print index are listed below

  A

  ‘Aberdeen’

  ‘Administrative Box’

  Japanese threat to

  7th Division H.Q. in

  Japanese capture and lose

  suicide force near

  African forces, too many white men with

  response of, to spiritual appeal

  ‘African Way’

  Agartala airstrip

  Aijal

  Air: defence weaknesses

  reconnaissance

  support lacking for 1 Burma Corps

  support for 15 Corps

  transport in jungle warfare

  transport of Chinese to India

  transport for Arakan offensive

  evacuation of sick and wounded

  support for Fourteenth Army

  transport for Burma campaign

  organization of Allied forces

  supply and transport for Chindits

  supply of Arakan campaign

  supply of Yunnan forces

  supply and support of Imphal–Kohima battle

  transportable brigade

  transport shortages

  bases on road to Rangoon

  support of land operations

  maintenance of formations. See also Royal Air Force Group; United States Army Air Force.

  Air Commando, No. 1, with Wingate’s Force

  Airborne troops

  in capture of Meiktila

  at Palel

  in advance on Rangoon. See also Chindits.

  Akyab, conference at

  Air Wing at

  abandonment of airfield at

  Japanese forces in

  capture of

  Akyab Island, withdrawal from

  plan to take

  Japanese forces in

  air base required on

  capture of

  building airfield on

  operation ‘Dracula’ starts at

  Alexander, Fieid-Marshal Sir Harold (Viscount of Tunis), impossible task before

  escapes from Rangoon

  Chinese Armies of

  Chief of Staff to

  conference with, at Prome

  orders offensive to aid Chinese

  at Allanmyo conference

  orders holding of Taungdwingyi

  courage of

  sends Chinese Division

  discusses disposal of Chinese Armies

  sends directive for withdrawal

  in conference at Ye-u

  Alison, Colonel J. R.

  Allagappa

  Allanmyo, conference at

  retreat through

  Japanese withdraw to

  capture of

  action near

  Aung San at.

  Mentioned

  Allied Air Command

  Allied Land Forces, South-East Asia

  provides aircraft

  provides engineers for boats

  orders attack on Mandalay and Rangoon

  author in command of

  expansion of area under

  and Japanese surrender

  Alon

  railway from

  Amarapura

  American: training of Chinese troops

  airfield construction

  railway troops

  road construction

  attitude to Burma campaign

  troops in Burma. See also United States.

  American Combat Engineers

  American Field Service Ambulance

  American Military Police in Calcutta

  American Volunteer Group, Third Squadron

  Amphibious operations, planning of

  abandonment of

  off Kra Isthmus

  in Arakan. See also ‘Dracula’, operation.

  An, attack on

  An Pass

  Japanese way of retreat

  Japanese retain possession of

  Andaman Islands, projected operation in

  bombardment of

  included in area of S.E.A.L.F.

  Anstice, Brigadier J. H.

  Anthony, mess butler

  Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League

  Anti-tank Regiment

  ‘A’ Battery

  Apaukwa

  Aradura Ridge

  Arakan, refugees march to

  15 Corps in

  author visits

  chaos and civil war in

  geography of

  Giffard visits

  supply route to

  ration scales in

  Japanese strength in

  reinforcements for Central front from

  author relieved of front in

  need for air supply bases in

  cut in air-lift to

  enemy division withdrawn from

  general Japanese withdrawal from

  Arakan campaign:

  First

  planning of

  limited objective

  preliminary successes of

  enemy stand and advance

  Air Force in

  losses in, of men and morale

  learning lessons of

  Second

  preparations for

  plan for amphibious landing in

  limited plans for

/>   start of advance

  armoured support for

  ensuring superiority in numbers for

  strong enemy defences in

  enemy counter-stroke in

  air battles over

  initiative passes again to British

  turning-point of Burma campaign

  Third

  plan for

  Japanese in general retreat in

  Arakan Yomas

  Arakanese

  Armoured Brigade

  at Prome

  in striking force

  covers withdrawal

  covers 1 Burma Corps

  under Chinese command

  escape route for

  crosses Irrawaddy

  returns to 1 Burma Corps

  and withdrawal from Monywa

  ferries troops

  crosses Chindwin

  Armoured Brigade, 50th, at Ranchi

  author takes over

  in Arakan

  Army Group, 11th

  H.Q. of

  Arnold, Lieut-General H.

  Asian fighting man as compared to British

  Assam, 1 Burma Corps reaches

  unprepared as army base

  interrupted communication with India

  communications with India

  evacuation of non-combatants from. See also Imphal

  Assam front

  supply routes to

  ration shortages on

  in 1943

  Japanese strength on

  Japanese prepare offensive on

  reinforcements for

  Assam Railway

  defence of

  Assam Regiment, in Imphal–Kohima battle

  establishes bridgehead over Chindwin

  Assam Rifles

  Atomic bombs

  Auchinleck, Field-Marshal Sir Claude

  helps solve difficulties of Fourteenth Army

  danger of rivalry between Mountbatten and

  and repatriation problem