Boots on the Ground: The history of Project Delta

by Carpenter, Stephen

  A Hatchet Force was sent into the area to recover the bodies of the air crew and SGT Dyer. The Hatchet Force was an immediate reaction force that was a part of the sterile SOG unit. They went in with Vietnamese helicopters. They found the bodies of all five laid out neatly on a trail next to the crash site. The bodies had been booby trapped. The team was able to recover parts of three bodies before having to depart under enemy fire. Air strikes were called in on the area effectively destroying any chance for further recovery of remains. SGT Dyer and one crewman were carried as “Killed Body Not Recovered”.30

  The name of Russell Bott is inscribed on Panel 13E, Line 3 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  The name of Willie Stark is inscribed on Panel 13E, Line 7 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  The name of Irby Dyer III is inscribed on Panel 13E, Line 4 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  During Operation 13-66 Project Delta identified an area of troop concentration of NVA regulars along the Laotian border where they were amassed for a major offensive. Safe and secure in the politically protected Laotian fringe, they would be free to train and supply for a major attack of their choosing. It would take a year to launch, but the Marine outpost at Khe Sanh would hear from this group again.

  CHAPTER XI: 1967; BACK TO THE AN LAO VALLEY

  Until early 1967 Project Delta Recon was the province of the experienced Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) of Special Forces. It was an all volunteer organization that had developed its own methods of operation and developed a warrior ethos that fiercely protected its inner workings and represented a tremendous pride in ownership. Many of the officer corps served valiantly and well in Project Delta, primarily as Senior Advisors to the Rangers and as the heads of the organizational “S” shops. Most of the staff officers rotated in and out of the staff positions from field assignments with the Rangers and, less commonly, Recon. Many of the officers served previous tours with Special Forces A-Teams or with conventional units. In late 1966 and early 1967 a group of seven young lieutenants was assigned to Project Delta. The understanding was that someone had decided that each Recon team should be led by an officer. The real reason emerged some time later.44

  The NCO led Recon teams of Project Delta had provided some very valuable and, in some cases, unbelievable information gathered on forays into areas far removed from conventional operations. The information was unusual to the point of losing its value on upper echelon staff soldiers who lacked the experience and ability to absorb anything out of the ordinary. These young officers were brought in to verify the information reported by the teams. The professional soldiers of Project Delta understood full well the folly of assigning any inexperienced person the responsibility of conducting clandestine missions far from any zone of comfort, regardless of rank or pay grade. They understood that not every man, again regardless of rank or pay grade, possessed the natural innate field sense, leadership abilities or physical abilities to perform the task at hand. The experienced NCOs of the Recon Section set out to prepare the young officers for their new assignment. What followed was a strenuous physical training program, hours of classroom instruction, immediate action drills and a live fire graduation field exercise. Project Delta had established the MACV Recondo School in the last year and was fully prepared to move forward expeditiously. Another factor that was sorely tested was the character of these young officers. LT Jerry Estenson recalls that he was sent to the air field and instructed to perform parachute jumps with the Rangers until all the pre-packed parachutes were used up. He was told that he needed to do this in order to qualify for Vietnamese Jump Wings. He performed no less than a dozen jumps in one day before he was finally told that award of the VN Jump Wings was honorary; no jumps were required. Jerry was one of the young men who was successful at running Recon. A young Captain by the name of Henry “Hugh” Shelton was designated the Platoon Leader of the Recon Platoon. Many years later he would become the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Few of these young officers would run multiple Recon missions before realizing that their particular talents ran more to the conventional infantry type applications of the Rangers, or with administrative duties removed from the field. Not everyone was cut out for Recon.44 Of these seven officers, three, Lieutenants Carney, Coulter and Estenson, continued to run recon for their short tours with Delta. LT Richardson was wounded by a punji stake and medevaced, LT Ford became a decorated Senior Ranger Advisor, LT Sullivan also moved to the Rangers, LT Hadden served two tours with Delta in Recon, as a Ranger advisor and in the S-2, S-3, and S-5 shops. Captain Shelton also served as the Recon platoon leader, as a Ranger advisor and in the S shops. 93

  Jerry Estenson, a professor in the University of California system, insists that the NCOs of Project Delta provided him with a foundation for his future that has guided him in his successful family and professional life, but also caused him extreme frustration. During his initial training he was assigned to Joe Markham for his primary instruction and mentoring. Joe was, even then, an icon in the small world of Recon. Known for his cool demeanor, flawless planning and relentless pursuit of perfection in the field, Joe “Pea Head” Markham took Jerry under his wing and guided him through preparation for his first mission. The first time in “the hole” Jerry found himself frozen on the insertion LZ for what seemed to him to be minutes. In reality it was only a second or two, but enough to cause him some self doubt. He told Markham about it and Joe just laughed and told him not to worry, it was a normal feeling given the enormity of a first trip into Delta’s work place. Jerry credits Markham with having such a profound effect on him that on each subsequent mission he led as a Team Leader, and continuing to the present day, when confronted with a difficult decision, he asks himself, “What would Joe do?” Jerry found himself emerging from his Project Delta tour with a personal set of values he attributes to Joe Markham, Gary Kerley, Doc Simpson and the other NCOs he served with. They include a proclivity for intense preparation and organization; setting personal performance and ethical standards that far exceed those of most others; and a level of determination to continue the mission at hand. Jerry’s biggest frustration is seeing his peers and his students falling far short of the standards he sets for himself.

  On January 9th, 1967 the local CIDG force charged with security around Nha Trang notified Project Delta that one of its company sized patrols had been ambushed and was surrounded in the hills west of the city. He requested assistance in rescuing the beleaguered patrol. LT Col. Hayes, LT Lewis, SFC Adams, and SSG Nichols led a platoon of Rangers on an air assault of an LZ near the CIDG. The Rangers proceeded toward the CIDG Company’s position and were engaged in a fire fight by an enemy unit of unknown strength. The enemy broke contact and the platoon continued and linked up with the CIDG force and recovered their dead and wounded. They began to move towards an LZ and were again engaged by heavy automatic weapons fire. Hayes requested additional Rangers be inserted on the next morning. On January 10th the 1st Ranger Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion, led by Major Jones, MSG Gambill, SSG Jantz and SGT Millam landed and headed toward the combined Ranger and CIDG force. They were stopped just short of the rendezvous by LT Col. Hayes who requested that they secure an LZ for extraction. 1st Company proceeded down the mountain and secured an LZ. 2nd Company and the CIDG force, encumbered by the dead and wounded, were forced to find a place to remain overnight because of darkness. They proceeded to the LZ on the 11th and were extracted without further incident. 1st Company under LT Carney, MSG Gambill, SSG Jantz and SGT Buchanon would conduct a search and destroy mission for a VC base camp in the same vicinity on January 20th and 21st. They discovered that the camp had been abandoned recently and destroyed the buildings and bunkers.45

  Two recon missions were conducted during 1-67. Teams 3 (SFC Roderick, LT Best, SFC Low) and 4 (SFC Tucker, LT Hadden, SSG Stedman) would report finding signs of recent enemy activity but no sightings. Operation 2-67 was an extension of Project Delta’s Operation 1-67 in the area near Nha Trang known as Binh Ta
n. A total of six recon, three Roadrunner and two Ranger missions were accomplished during this period.45,46 The enemy were discovered to be well hidden and entrenched in a series of caves high in the hills west of Nha Trang. The information was passed on to MACV who then assigned a search and destroy mission to the Korean allied forces (ROK). Air attacks had had little effect on the VC positions and MACV was under pressure from Washington to minimize U.S. losses and avoid political repercussions of any kind. The ROK, having no such constraints, assaulted the caves with flame throwers, driving the VC further into the mountain. When they had suppressed the enemy fire they painted large white semi-circles around the cave openings so they could be identified from far away. They then retreated and proceeded to direct artillery fire into the cave openings, effectively dismantling the enemy positions.30,44

  Operation 3-67 was planned for an area in northern II Corps to locate several regimental sized VC and NVA forces known to be operating in the area. The Operations Order was given and mobilization began to set up an FOB at Kham Duc. The FOB was set up and visual reconnaissance was performed as the teams readied for insertion. Higher headquarters scrapped the operation on the 18th of February and Project Delta returned to Nha Trang.47

  Operation 4-67 was conducted in support of the 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) from LZ Pony in II Corps. Just a year after the disastrous beginning of 1966, Project Delta would return to the An Lao Valley to search for two NVA Divisions and a VC Regiment located in their AO. During this operation fifteen Recon missions, ten Roadrunner missions and seven Ranger operations would take place.

  The results of these missions indicated the presence of both NVA and VC in large but static numbers, indicating that many troops were moving into and out of the area. Base camp facilities were found unoccupied but showed signs of frequent use. The most significant sighting was made by the 3rd Platoon, 5th Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion that had been inserted on a reconnaissance in force mission. Accompanied by LT Livingston, SFC Walter “Doc” Simpson, and SGT Cole, the platoon observed a total of 123 enemy troops and called in artillery and air strikes against them. They were engaged in a firefight by a small group and again on the LZ while being extracted. Roadrunner Teams 101 and 102 also reported significant enemy sightings. Team 102 sighted 70 enemy troops that were a mix of Vietnamese and Montagnards and led by an NVA officer. Team 101 heard movements along a trail next to which they had settled for the night. These movements were intermittent and each lasted approximately thirty minutes, leading them to believe that a force of 300-500 enemy troops had moved west across the border during the night. Most of the teams observed smaller squad and platoon sized units that appeared to be engaged in rear security operations. They also experienced new tactics developed by the enemy whereby they would attempt to follow and locate the teams and then surround them at night in order to engage them at first light. The enemy seemed to know that the teams were small in number and would seek extraction upon contact.

  On March 11th Recon Team 2 made contact with an enemy force of unknown size and requested immediate extraction. SFC Bill Roderick was wounded in the exchange and treated at the FOB. On March 16th Recon Team 9 detained three men, a woman, and two children for questioning and were extracted. On March 21st Team 7 was surrounded and requested immediate extraction. In the ensuing firefight both U.S. advisors were wounded.

  Team 2, Doc Simpson and Allen Archer, was inserted at last light on March 21st. Early on the morning of the 22nd, Team 2 was ambushed by 30-40 enemy dressed in black. SFC Allen Archer was killed in the attack. The remaining team members moved rapidly away from the ambush site and called in artillery on the enemy positions. The 5th Ranger Company was quickly mobilized to recover SFC Archer’s body.

  Recon Team 5 was extracted on March 23rd due to a punji stake wound sustained by LT Richardson.

  Team 8, Jerry Estenson, Jay Graves and SFC Brewer, inserted high above the An Lao and descended toward the valley floor. Their mission plan called for crossing the valley floor and climbing to an LZ on the opposite side after searching for and surveilling high traffic trails. On the 23rd Team 8 halted a short distance above a trail while Jay Graves crept closer to observe. As Graves approached the trail he saw 12 NVA soldiers in battle uniform traveling toward him. He stepped back and crouched in hiding. As he watched the NVA pass he became aware of pain radiating from his leg just above the boot line and saw a Banded Krait chewing on his calf. The Banded Krait has small rows of teeth and administers its venom in the same manner as the North American Coral snake. Graves attempted to trap the snake and capture it but it escaped. He made his way back to the team and pointed out his situation. SFC Brewer applied a restrictive bandage above the bite and Jerry Estenson tried to make contact with the FAC or any air relay without success. At that time recon teams still carried the PRC 64, a heavy radio set capable only of keyed transmissions in Morse Code, as a backup means of communication. Jerry had been a school trained commo man before transferring to demolitions school. He threw the antenna out and began to tap out an SOS along with his distinct call sign. Within ten minutes a FAC was overhead directing a helicopter toward the team for extraction. Estenson then ran out onto a sandbar in the river and signaled their location for extraction. Knowing that the team’s location would be compromised by the medevac of Graves, Estenson called for the entire team to be extracted. The Detachment CO, LTC Hayes, argued that the remainder of the team should continue the mission. Estenson credits Captain Hugh Shelton with the fortitude to buck his superior officer and convince Hayes that the entire team should be extracted. The team was extracted under enemy fire. Graves recalls that the medic aboard the recovery ship held two syringes in his hand and asked, “Where’s the snake?” Graves responded that he couldn’t catch it but was sure it was a Krait. The medic threw down one syringe and proceeded to inject Jay with the second saying, “I hope you’re Goddamn sure it was a Krait.” As with many recon stories, this one didn’t end with the conclusion of the mission. Jay was transported to a field hospital where treatment continued. He was in a tent by himself when he finally fell into a deep sleep. When he awoke there were about thirty troops in the same tent, all with bullet wounds to the back. He learned that they had been sent charging up a hill in response to Delta’s information about enemy locations. As Jay tells it, “Instead of walking mortar fire up the hill to prep it, some ‘Hey Diddle Diddle Up the Fuckin’ Middle’ Second Lieutenant sent the troops straight up. Nobody paid any attention to the part of our reports that said the hills were covered with spider holes.” The enemy waited until the infantrymen were past them then popped from their concealed positions and fired from the rear.

  On March 25th Team 4 made contact with an unknown sized enemy force resulting in wounds to LT Richardson and SFC Seal, the two U.S. advisors. The team was extracted under small arms fire. And so it went for the duration of Operation 4-67. The air assets of the 281st AHC performed admirably in support of the operations and performed medevac and rescue missions for the II Corps Mobile Guerrilla Force (Mike Force) operating nearby. The teams ran multiple missions and encountered many small units of enemy. The 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) supported the operation with air and artillery assets in a quick and responsive fashion. Throughout the operation the 1st Cavalry moved and expanded Delta’s AO and preempted Delta insertions with their own higher priority missions. This caused concern for direct support of teams on the ground that were separated by much greater distances than usual making continuous radio relay coverage impossible and immediate response times unnecessarily long. The Project returned to Nha Trang on April 5th, 1967.48

  The name of Allen Archer is inscribed on Panel 17E, Line 16 of the Vietnam Veterans’ Memorial.

  CHAPTER XII: BACK TO THE ASHAU

  Back at Nha Trang, morale seemed to be waning towards an all time low. Some new personnel had been assigned to the Project without the usual vetting process in kind of a “warm body” approach to staff the declining numbers. Major Allen called a
formation and with all men present he gave them an ultimatum similar to that given by Charlie Beckwith two years earlier: “If you don’t want to be here then get the hell out. Now.” Several of the unwilling soldiers left immediately. Delta’s all volunteer status was once again restored. Project Delta barely had time to regroup and prepare equipment and manpower before an advance team departed Nha Trang on April 10th for Khe Sanh and then on to establish FOB Phu Bai. It was back to the Ashau Valley for Operation Pirous, 5-67. Delta would once again be OPCON to the 3rd Marine Amphibious Force (MAF). The mission was to confirm the presence of two NVA divisions and a VC regiment in and around the Ashau. During Operation Pirous, twenty Recon missions, eighteen Roadrunner missions, and 9 Ranger operations were conducted.

  Visual reconnaissance from the air began on April 16th, with the Command and Control element taking ground fire on the first over flight. On April 18th the FAC was on his way to take a recon team leader for an aerial reconnaissance of his AO when he spotted 27 enemy troops and two large trucks moving along a roadway. He called in an air strike as the enemy tried to camouflage the trucks and destroyed them.

  Insertions continued to be plagued by poor weather conditions in the AO. The steep slopes required insertions by jumping from higher than normal and by rappelling or rope ladders. Several teams suffered injuries on infiltration and had to be immediately extracted. Other LZs were under enemy surveillance and helicopters drew fire while trying to insert teams. On April 27th Team 9 reported being pursued by a platoon sized force and requested immediate extraction. The first rescue ship managed to lift two LLDB team members out through the thick canopy by electric hoist. The second helicopter attempted to get to the team and was shot down by small arms and automatic weapons. The crew was not injured and managed to recover machine guns and ammo from the downed helicopter and link up with the four remaining team members from Team 9. 5th Company, 91st Airborne Ranger Battalion was scrambled at Phu Bai and loaded three Marine CH-46 helicopters. Two of the ships landed and discharged their Rangers, the third crash landed with only a minor injury to one Ranger. The injured Ranger, the air crew and weapons from the downed helicopter were immediately rescued by another CH-46. The Rangers linked with the team and called in tactical air strikes. Once enemy fire was suppressed five additional CH-46s arrived from the Marines and extracted the remaining air crew, Rangers, and Team 9.49