THE ADVANCE TO THE RUSSBACH LINE
Napoleon had now deployed the bulk of his army on the Marchfeld. Masséna was to advance north-west between Aspern and Breitenlee, behind the light cavalry of Lasalle and Marulaz, on the extreme left; Oudinot was to advance to the Russbach opposite Baumersdorf (Parbasdorf); and Davout was to seize Glinzendorf in the plain below Markgrafneusiedl. Unsure about the location of the enemy’s main army, Napoleon sent three brigades of light horse forward to Rutzendorf, where they swung north-west to Pysdorf, coming across Austrian cavalry. Neither side, however, wished to engage and the encounter consisted mainly of an exchange of long-range horse artillery fire in which the more numerous and better-handled French cavalry batteries gained the upper hand. Behind them advanced Davout’s infantry, who occupied Rutzendorf before continuing north. As the three corps fanned out across the Marchfeld, marching on a broad front through the ripe corn in extreme heat, artillery well to the front, a large gap opened between Masséna and Oudinot, which Napoleon filled with Eugène’s Army of Italy and Bernadotte’s Saxon 9 Corps.
At about 1 p.m. Nordmann, concerned about French cavalry turning his flank, had decided to fall back to Grosshofen and Markgrafneusiedl. At 1.30 p.m., Charles ordered Liechtenstein’s cavalry forward to protect the retreating Advance Guard, but, moving east with his five regiments towards Glinzendorf, Liechtenstein showed no inclination to attack. Nordmann withdrew in good order, keeping his infantry in masses to fight off the French cavalry though suffering heavy losses from French artillery fire. An attempt to delay the French advance at Glinzendorf was brushed aside at about 3 p.m. as Davout reached the line between Glinzendorf and Raasdorf, closing up on Oudinot. At about the same time and to Oudinot’s left at Raasdorf, the advance element of Bernadotte’s corps, Dupas’s division, ran into resistance from Riese’s brigade, which had now been joined by the remnants of the Wallach-Illyrian Grenzer and the Chasteler Regiment. But the defenders were speedily ejected by two battalions of the 5th Light and driven in on Hohenzollern’s II Corps. The bulk of Bernadotte’s corps now swung to take Aderklaa where at about 3.30 p.m. its leading cavalry encountered d’Hurbal’s cuirassier brigade. There followed a clash between the Saxon light cavalry and the Austrian cuirassiers. As some units on both sides shared the same regimental patron, Duke Albert of Sachsen-Teschen, the encounter came to enjoy a degree of celebrity. In reality, however, it was a minor clash only. To allow the French horse to deploy, the Saxon Prinz Klemens Chevaulegers charged repeatedly but were repelled by Austrian carbine volley, delivered in defiance of regulations and contrary to the best practice of the day from a standing position, an indication of the poor command and training now common in the Austrian mounted branch. Undeterred, the Saxons, now reinforced, charged again and Rousell’s troopers were driven off, their escape covered by Lederer’s brigade. At around 4 p.m., Liechtenstein withdrew most of his cavalry to their original locations between Wagram and Gerasdorf, leaving behind five regiments with IV Corps at Markgrafneusiedl. Overall, the Austrian cavalry achieved little on this opening day of the battle, despite suffering 1,000 casualties, a painful loss considering that the Cavalry Reserve Corps numbered only 12,000 effectives. Also, throughout the day, the grenadiers of the Reserve Corps had remained stationary at Seyring.
To the east, Nordmann finally reached safety in a new position between Markgrafneusiedl and Ober-Siebenbrunn. His losses in the fighting during the night and day of 4 and 5 July were estimated at 6,000 men, about 50 per cent of his strength. The Advance Guard had been sacrificed to let Klenau escape, but these losses could have been reduced if Charles had permitted the Guard to retire earlier that morning. Incorporated into Rosenberg’s IV Corps, the remnant of the Advance Guard would be in combat again the next day. Few units in history have suffered such heavy casualties and remained capable of fighting the following day.
By 6 p.m., Napoleon’s army, the infantry marching in battalion columns behind a light cavalry screen, had reached the Russbach. Masséna was at Breitenlee, his divisions spread out widely from Boudet near the Danube to Legrand at Süssenbrunn. Bernadotte was at Aderklaa with Dupas’s division opposite Baumersdorf and the Army of Italy behind him. Oudinot’s corps, to the right of Baumersdorf, stretched back to Grosshofen, with Davout deployed between Grosshofen and Glinzendorf, his attached cavalry divisions further out on the right. The French left wing was only 27,000 strong while the bulk, some 110,000 men, faced the Russbach line. The Imperial Guard, 11,000 strong, was in reserve in the centre near Napoleon’s command post and Bessières’s heavy cavalry was moving up. Marmont’s corps and Wrede’s 2nd Bavarian division were still crossing the bridges.
On the Austrian side the left wing was deployed behind the Russbach from Wagram to Markgrafneusiedl with I Corps on the right, II Corps in the centre and IV Corps on the left. West of this position the terrain provided no major defensive assets. Here, at Gerasdorf, Charles stationed the Cavalry Corps, backed up at some distance by the Grenadier Corps. Klenau’s VI Corps had pulled back to the foothills of the Bisamberg and aligned with III Corps to its left. The Austrian line therefore formed a sharp angle. Potentially, it could take the French in a double envelopment, but the apex was weakly held and the line stretched for over 12 miles, making coordination and control of the two separate wings problematic. Napoleon, meanwhile, held the advantage of the central position and a shorter line.
THE ATTACK ON THE RUSSBACH LINE FAILS
That evening Charles was not expecting any more major action. Napoleon, however, still uncertain about the location and intentions of the Austrian main force, decided to use the remaining daylight hours for an immediate attack against the Russbach line. Perhaps the emperor was dissatisfied with his failure to come to grips with the main army or wanted to discover the strength of the enemy; perhaps, relying on false reports that the Austrians were retreating, he wanted to prevent Charles from slipping away during the night. In any case, it was the wrong decision. His men were dead tired and not all of his formations were properly concentrated and positioned forward. None the less, he ordered an immediate assault against the Russbach line with the aim of breaking the Austrian line around Deutsch-Wagram. Orders were issued shortly after 6 p.m., but with units requiring different approach times, Napoleon specified neither a clear time for the assault to begin nor clear objectives. He also failed to assign specific targets for the supporting artillery. These shortcomings were compounded by assigning the key objective of Deutsch-Wagram to some of the weakest formations in his army. Oudinot’s corps, for example, was largely composed of new recruits. Similarly, to have expected much from Bernadotte’s 9 Corps Saxons, even when augmented by Dupas’s division, Sahuc’s light division and eventually by Macdonald’s exhausted and depleted French divisions of the Army of Italy, can only be considered a mistake. But the flow of battle had brought these formations into attack positions at this point and this could not be changed.
At about 7 p.m. the French batteries opened their preparatory bombardment and, with the sinking sun at their back, the attack columns, supported by cavalry, went forward. Oudinot had orders to attack II Corps, Dupas, followed by the Army of Italy, was to drive between I and II Corps, while on the flanks Bernadotte, supported by twenty-four horse-drawn guns of the Imperial Guard, was to take Deutsch-Wagram, and Davout was to storm Markgrafneusiedl. With orders hastily issued and the timing of the assaults poorly coordinated, no ground was taken and all the attacks were repulsed.
Oudinot was first to attack, at about 7.30 p.m., against Hohenzollern’s II Corps at Baumersdorf. These were well-positioned troops protected in part by hastily built or dug fortifications and supported by sixty-eight guns. Behind its heavy skirmish line, II Corps was drawn up in two lines. Elements of Frère’s division managed to cross the Russbach and reach the escarpment where the small hamlet of Baumersdorf, some thirty houses with a small wooden bridge straddling the brook, was on fire. But although vastly outnumbered, the troops of MG Ignaz Hardegg’s brigade, the 8th Jäger
Battalion and the 2nd Battalion of the Erzherzog Karl Legion, stubbornly defended the position. They had prepared hasty field defences, including rifle pits (Jägergruben) and trenches. Oudinot now launched a flanking attack, committing the 10th Light and the 57th Line Regiments of Grandjean’s division. The ‘terrible 57th’, perhaps the most renowned line regiment in the French Army, broke into the village but was not able to make much progress against the defenders. Meanwhile, the 10th Light made its way across the boggy terrain along the brook and up the steep incline to the plateau. But here it ran into heavy cannon fire and point-blank musketry from battalions of MG Buresch’s brigade of II Corps before being charged by the Vincent Chevaulegers, a depleted regiment only some 500 troopers strong but personally led by Prince Hohenzollern. The isolated French light infantry broke and, fleeing down the escarpment, took the 57th with it. Both units eventually regrouped north of Raasdorf where they were confronted by the steady battalions of the Imperial Guard. With darkness closing in, the Austrians did not pursue but merely reoccupied their former positions. By 8 p.m., Oudinot’s attack had been repulsed with substantial losses.
To the west, also at about 8 p.m., Dupas’s small mixed division, temporarily attached to the Army of Italy, made use of the smoke from the burning buildings of Baumersdorf to advance across the Russbach. By lucky accident Dupas had hit the seam between I and II Corps and, though sustaining substantial losses, he inclined his units along the brook west towards Deutsch-Wagram before climbing up the escarpment. But his force was small, a mere five French battalions augmented by two Saxon battalions, the Metzsch light infantry and the Radeloff grenadiers, and his divisional guns were to be supported by some horse batteries of the Guard. After Dupas’s infantry reached the plateau it came up against the eastern edge of Deutsch-Wagram, defended by a brigade of Austrian regulars from Dedovich’s division, and ground to a halt in house-to-house fighting. Shortly thereafter troops of Macdonald’s corps from the Army of Italy, Lamarque’s division, followed while in turn the divisions of Serras and Durette also managed to gain footholds on the plateau. They were supported by Sahuc’s light cavalry, which had found a way across the brook and ridden up the edge of the plateau where they began to attack the Austrian positions.
Attacked by infantry and cavalry, the Austrian gunners panicked and abandoned their pieces to shelter behind the infantry of Bellegarde’s I Corps. The Austrian first line broke. It had been disposed in masses and this, of course, made it much less effective in a fire fight. IR 47 Vogelsang fell back in disorder, in turn disrupting IR 35 Argenteau. The position of I Corps looked dangerous, but the corps commander, Bellegarde, managed to rally his regiments and, by refusing his flank, restored his battle line. Luck was on his side. At this point, with visibility sharply reduced by smoke from the burning buildings, clouds of black powder and falling darkness, Lamarque’s assault columns faltered amid heavy point-blank fire. The situation became confused. Follow-up French reinforcements from Macdonald’s corps, with Macdonald in person, sword in hand, trying to restore order, mistook the two white-uniformed Saxon units of Dupas’s division, the Metzsch Schützen and the Radeloff Grenadier battalions, for Austrians and fired on them. The attack failed in the confusion and the reformed Argenteau regiment immediately counter-attacked, driving the stunned Saxons and French back. Meanwhile, Seras’s division had gained the plateau, posing a new danger. But Archduke Charles himself rode up, and using the flat of his sword, restored discipline among the wavering Vogelsang infantry. Amid the confused close fighting, the archduke was slightly wounded and almost taken prisoner, but saved through the intervention of Lt von Weidenfeld. Now IR 42 Erbach counter-attacked the French. In addition, the position at Baumersdorf secured, Hohenzollern returned with the Vincent Chevaulegers and the Hessen-Homburg Hussars and completed the rout of the outnumbered French. Here, too, the Austrians did not pursue beyond the Russbach, in Macdonald’s opinion saving the demoralized French divisions from destruction. Despite the initial orderly conduct of the retreat, Austrian pressure turned retreat into a near rout at the return crossing over the Russbach. But the Austrians halted at the Russbach. Night pursuit was risky and the main concern of all generals was to keep troops under control in a confused situation. As it was, Eugène spent the rest of the night restoring order among his shattered battalions.3
A second, belated attack against Wagram from the west by the Polenz’s 2nd Division of Bernadotte’s corps also failed. Later Bernadotte would claim that he had pleaded for hours for the intervention of this division, but with only ten battalions available and with the Austrian Reserve Cavalry Corps deployed in the plain on his left flank, he had hesitated to commit it. Even though he had received his orders shortly after 7 p.m. he did not move until 9.30 p.m. He was also short of artillery after various detachments had left him with only eighteen guns. On reaching the plateau, three Saxon battalions of Lecoq’s brigade of the 2nd Division ran into heavy fire from two battalions of IR 17 Reuss-Plauen and one battalion of 2nd Jäger and stalled. Additional Saxon reinforcements, arriving rather late, were soon absorbed in the confusion of a night combat where everyone, except the Jäger, wore white uniforms. The final blow came at about 10.30 p.m when MG Hartizsch arrived with the last of the Saxon infantry, elite grenadier battalions, which, however, had not been informed that Saxon troops were already fighting in the village. Once again, confronted by white-uniformed soldiers they opened fire. Although the mistake was cleared up in a few minutes, the friendly fire and the critical wounding of Hartizsch was the last blow to the Saxon morale. Believing themselves surrounded, at about 11 p.m., having sustained over a third of their number in casualties, they fled in disorder from the escarpment and into the plain beyond Aderklaa.
Given its limitations in training, the Saxon infantry had fought well enough, but it was not trained to fight in flexible open order. With street fighting always confusing, especially at night, the Saxons soon became muddled in the smoke-filled side alleys of Deutsch-Wagram. The debacle was not only an indication of Bernadotte’s diminished leadership – he later complained to the emperor that a ‘hidden hand’ at headquarters had prevented him from receiving proper support – but also a sign that the French Army of 1809 was no longer the cohesive force of 1805.4 During the night, while continuing to complain about his mistreatment at headquarters, Bernadotte attempted to rally and reform the Saxons around Aderklaa, but he was hardly inspiring and had only limited success.
Finally, Davout, on the French right, had received his orders to attack Markgrafneusiedl too late. At about 9 p.m., following a hasty artillery bombardment which caused little damage, he advanced Gudin’s division followed by Puthod’s forward frontally from Grosshofen, while Friant’s and Morand’s divisions were instructed to cross the Russbach further down river, their flanks supported by cavalry. But Markgrafneusiedl, a naturally strong position made stronger by light earthworks, could not be taken easily. When at around 10 p.m. Davout realized that the attacks on Baumersdorf and Deutsch-Wagram had failed and that his tired troops faced Rosenberg’s fresher IV Corps with strong cavalry support on its left flank, he called off his attack and withdrew his corps to Glinzendorf for the night. In years to come, quite unfairly, Napoleon was critical of Davout’s decision and claimed that it had cost him the first day battle.
Napoleon was wrong. All along the line of contact the attacks had been uncoordinated and badly prepared. Overall, the losses sustained by the French, especially the divisions of the Army of Italy, had been substantial. Three divisional commanders had been wounded, Serras, Sahuc and Grenier, the last with a shattered hand that prevented him from fighting the next day. If it had been Napoleon’s objective to fix the enemy in position and to defeat him the next day, he had succeeded. But if he had hoped to destroy substantial elements of the Habsburg army during the night, he failed. It has been argued that the archduke’s defensive success that night lured him into adopting an offensive plan of operations for the next morning. Even though concerned that Archduke Jo
hn’s army, designed to close the ring into which he thought he had drawn Napoleon, was not yet in place, he had no doubt that his brother would arrive.
By 11 p.m. all was quiet along the battle line. For Napoleon, though occupying only the same positions he had reached that evening, the first day of battle had been a qualified success. He had crossed the Danube and successfully deployed his army and stores. If he had not destroyed the main Austrian army, it is unlikely that there had ever been a realistic chance of a victory on the opening day. On the Austrian side, the troops, especially the infantry, had performed exceedingly well, and fighting on good defensive ground had repelled the evening attacks. At the same time, there had been shortcomings in the high command, wavering in decision-making and slow communications, all combining to cause unnecessary casualties. It would appear that as late as the morning of 5 July, Archduke Charles was still uncertain whether to let the enemy cross the river for a decisive battle or merely replay the battle of Aspern–Essling. In fact, observing the rapid advance of the French across the Marchfeld from their observatory on the Bisamberg, the Emperor Francis had asked Charles whether this development formed part of the Austrian plan. Charles replied that all was going to plan, the French would be allowed to cross, attack the Austrian position and then be thrown back into the river. Somewhat less than convinced Francis responded, ‘That is alright then, just do not let too many across.’5 Both sides then were determined to renew battle the next day.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 16