CHAPTER EIGHT
Wagram: The second day
BATTLE PLANS ON BOTH SIDES
At about 10.30 p.m., combat petered out. Only an occasional shot by a nervous picket, touching off a brief exchange of fire, disturbed the night. Troops on both sides were exhausted and slept fitfully on their arms. This was especially true of the French, who had been on the move since the afternoon of the previous day, drenched during the evening and night and then exhausted by the extreme heat of 5 July. By contrast, the night of 5 July was unseasonably cold. Campfires were lit, meals cooked and horses fed, but rations for man and beast were meagre at best, though the marshals and generals certainly did better for themselves. Meanwhile, exhaustion notwithstanding, with the battle so evenly poised, the senior commanders and their staff on both sides made their plans to resume fighting the next day.
At his command post near Raasdorf, Napoleon issued his orders for the coming day to his assembled marshals and senior officers. (Still trying to reorder his Saxons, Bernadotte alone was absent.) Retreat was clearly not an option: the emperor’s principal objective remained the destruction of the main Austrian army behind the Russbach. Holding the central position, Napoleon planned that 9 Saxon Corps, which he still considered combat capable, and Oudinot’s 2 Corps would pin down the archduke around Wagram. Davout’s 3 Corps, with its strong attached cavalry shielding its right, was to deliver the main thrust, turning the Austrian left at Markgrafneusiedl and then rolling up the Austrian line. When Davout had taken the plateau, the decisive moment would arrive for the Army of Italy, Macdonald’s corps leading, to breach the Austrian line around Wagram. With this in mind, and also to be able to react to any contingency, such as the possible arrival of Archduke John, at about 2 a.m. Napoleon reinforced his centre, ordering Masséna’s 4 Corps closer to Aderklaa, leaving only Boudet’s division near Aspern to guard the Lobau and its vital bridges. During the night and early morning, the French were further reinforced by the arrival of Broussier’s and Pacthod’s infantry divisions from the Army of Italy, Marmont’s XI Corps and Wrede’s Bavarian division. These formations, however, would not come into action until after midday. The Imperial Guard, Marmont’s corps, Wrede’s Bavarians and the Reserve Cavalry were kept at his disposal in reserve. Orders issued, Napoleon, protected only by a windbreak formed by twelve stacked drums and guarded by the sentries of his Old Guard, snatched a few hours of sleep.
Across the Russbach, Archduke Charles returned to his headquarters in Wagram about 11 p.m. He was satisfied with the outcome of the first day. Although he had not prevented the French from deploying on the Marchfeld – in fact, bringing them there had been part of his plan, though the speed of their advance had come as a surprise – they had been decisively repulsed in their unexpected evening assault on the Russbach line. Except for the damage done to Nordmann’s Advance Guard, its remnant now attached to Rosenberg’s IV Corps, all his major formations were intact, and his soldiers had fought well. But it had been a defensive battle and the terrain, especially along the Russbach, had been a vital factor. Charles was convinced that Napoleon would have to attack the next day and, given his superiority in infantry, cavalry and guns, that he might well succeed in breaking the apex of the Austrian position in the plain west of the Russbach, where the terrain offered no defensive advantage. Therefore he had decided not to cede the initiative to the French. The only possible salvation was to launch a preemptive attack at dawn the next day.
The conception of the operational plan adopted for the coming day, known as the ‘Disposition’ in Austro-German military usage, has been much disputed. It followed the plan already discussed before the battle. Though certain historians have continued to claim that Grünne and Wimpffen foisted the scheme on a sick Charles, who allegedly suffered a severe epileptic attack around midnight, such claims must be considered a legend. Certainly the archduke was tired; moreover he had been lightly wounded in the combat at Baumersdorf earlier in the evening. Equally certainly, however, he was capable of authorizing the Disposition.1 The basic idea was daring: a near-simultaneous general attack along the whole front at 4 a.m. ‘The generalissimus had decided to attack both wings of the enemy at dawn.’2 It envisaged a double envelopment of the French army between the right and the left wings of the Austrian army, with the apex held by the Reserve Cavalry and grenadiers. Theoretically, it was sound. Given Napoleon’s numerical superiority, it was perhaps the only option. There was, however, a fatal flaw. The Austrian battle frontage extended for over 11 miles, while the more compact French front was less than 6 miles wide. These distances were especially serious for the two corps on the Austrian right wing, the most distant from the enemy, though a well-mounted staff officer could ride the distance in less than twenty minutes. The inevitable delay between the issue of the operational orders and their receipt, coupled with the time then required for them to be acted on – troops assembled, marched to their start lines and finally deployed in battle – made coordinated attacks on both wings impossible.
None the less, shortly after midnight, orders went out for a general attack at 4 a.m., just before sunrise. The French left was to be driven in by VI and III Corps advancing aligned, supported to the north by a simultaneous attack by part of the Cavalry Corps joined by the Grenadier Reserve. On the Austrian left, IV Corps, supported by I Corps artillery and then, as deployment room was gained, joined by I Corps, was to attack Davout. To avoid congestion, II Corps in the centre was to remain in place and only provide artillery support until there was enough space to bring its formations beyond the Russbach. Actually IV Corps was not all that strong, but then Charles still expected the arrival of Archduke John on his left wing. Tactically, infantry was to advance in masses, cavalry in chequerboard formation. Charles and his battle staff were to locate themselves behind I Corps.3 Significantly, and much criticized by later commentators, Charles did not retain a battle reserve, except for one brigade and one battery of III Corps at Stammersdorf, another provision to secure the potential line of retreat. Also V Corps was kept out of action. Its role, indicative of Charles’s inclination never to risk all, was to remain in position to protect a possible retreat by the right wing of his army across the Bisamberg to Moravia and Bohemia.
The success of the Austrian operational plan depended on synchronized movement, always a difficult task for the command and control apparatus, the battle management, of the Austrian staff. In fact, on this occasion, as already pointed out, cooperation was impossible because the instructions were issued far too late. III and VI Corps on the right wing, farthest both from the Austrian command and the enemy, should have received their orders by 1 a.m. but did not receive them before 3 a.m; they therefore could not possibly arrive at their start line between Kagran and Breitenlee one hour later and be in action before 8 a.m. For that matter, the Grenadier Corps, still in reserve at Seiring, who were supposed to join these two corps, also came into action several hours late.
THE ADVANCE OF AUSTRIAN IV CORPS
On 6 July the archduke and the emperor took the offensive almost simultaneously. Unaware of the delay on the right flank and centre, IV Corps moved out on time at about 4 a.m. advancing in three columns. The Hessen-Homburg Brigade, six battalions strong, pushed on Grosshofen; the second column, with twelve line and four Landwehr battalions, advanced on Glinzendorf. FML Radetzky commanded a ten-battalion advance guard, supported by ten squadrons of the Erzherzog Ferdinand Hussars. The third column to the left of the infantry with Leopoldsdorf as their objective rode a thirty-squadron-strong cavalry column. Commanded by FML Nostitz, it consisted of ten squadrons of Blankenstein Hussars and eight of O’Reilly’s Chevaulegers, both from MG Wartensleben’s brigade, as well as six squadrons of Riesch and Erzherzog Johann Dragoons from MG Rothkirch’s brigade. Finally at Ober-Siebenbrunn there were remaining units of Nordmann’s former Advance Guard, the Hessen-Homburg, Primatial and Stipsicz Hussars.
Although Archduke Charles had ordered absolute silence so commands could be heard, the Aust
rians proceeded with much noise and disorder. Nevertheless, they might have achieved a tactical surprise. At about 2 a.m. Berthier had dispatched one of his trusted aides, Colonel Lejeune, to cross the Russbach to try to discover any signs of Austrian movement. At Markgrafneusiedl, he found Rosenberg’s IV corps forming up for an attack, but he was unable to penetrate the Austrian outposts and had to make a wide detour to the south-east before he could return to imperial headquarters.4
But even so, any tactical surprise that the Austrians might exploit here was at best limited. Almost simultaneously Davout’s troops were preparing to move against Markgrafneusiedl. On his left, along the embankments of the road from Grosshofen to Glinzendorf, Friant’s division, still 8,000 strong, had posted a heavy skirmish screen with the bulk of the division deployed in two lines behind it. Grosshofen itself was held by one regiment from Puthod’s division while behind Friant, who was down to 4,000, Morand’s division was in reserve. Gudin held Glinzendorf. On the right flank Montbrun with nineteen and Grouchy with twenty-one squadrons opposed the Austrian cavalry column, with Montbrun sending some squadrons forward towards Ober-Siebenbrunn. At about 5 a.m., after driving in the French outposts, Radetzky’s Advance Guard, displaying uncommon bravery in the face of heavy musketry and the fire of one battery, managed to penetrate into Grosshofen. Davout’s main body now arrived and, with units from Puthod’s division attacking frontally and units from Gudin attacking the flank, the Austrians were evicted.
The sound of the guns had disturbed Napoleon and his staff at breakfast. In fact, the emperor feared that they signalled the arrival of Archduke John. He therefore mounted and rode post-haste to Davout, ordering the Imperial Guard and the cuirassier divisions of de Casanova’ (who had replaced d’Espagne, killed at Aspern) and Nansouty’s to follow him. When he arrived at about 6 a.m. he found that the Austrians were already retreating on Markgrafneusiedl on the orders of Archduke Charles who had become aware that neither his right wing nor Archduke John had come into action and was afraid of leaving IV Corps in an exposed position. Radetzky covered the retreat. He deployed MG Provenchères’s brigade in a heavy skirmish line, backed by a second line in masses supported by his cavalry battery. Against an enemy who followed somewhat cautiously, he successfully returned to his line of departure. By 6 a.m. the corps was back in its original position, though having suffered about 1,100 casualties and with lowered morale. Even so, Rosenberg’s sally had consequences. After his personal inspection of the terrain, Napoleon, who had originally envisaged a frontal attack against the heights, now changed his orders to Davout. He instructed the marshal to use two of his divisions frontally, but sent his other two divisions and his attached cavalry to cross the Russbach downstream to deliver a flank attack up the gentle slope to the east of the Austrian position. The change forced Davout to reorder his troops, build a bridge for his artillery some miles downstream and delayed his attack on Markgrafneusiedl by about two hours.
Informed by his far-ranging cavalry scouts that as yet there was no sign of John, Napoleon rode back to his command post, directing the Guard and Nansouty’s division back to their original positions in reserve. He left Arrighi’s cuirassiers as well as a 12-pounder battery with Davout, who was instructed to continue his operations against Rosenberg and take Markgrafneusiedl, while Oudinot and Eugène were directed to pin the Austrian forces on the Russbach. On his way back to his interrupted breakfast, he halted briefly to confer with Oudinot when an Austrian shell exploded nearby, grazing the general, who exclaimed: ‘Sire, they are firing on the general staff!’ to which an unfazed Napoleon replied, ‘Oh well, in war every accident is possible’.5 Then, passing the cheering ranks of Tharreau’s division, he returned to his command post.
THE STRUGGLE FOR ADERKLAA
No sooner had the emperor returned when he was faced by a major crisis that nearly shattered his centre. Bellegarde’s I Corps had also moved on time. Leaving behind General Dedovich with seven battalions on the plateau, advance elements from Fresnel’s division, one battalion each from the Legion Archduke Charles, the 2nd Jäger and the Kolowrat Infantry Regiment, accompanied by six squadrons of the Klenau Chevaulegers, had been surprised to find Aderklaa, a stoutly built village, undefended. Protected by an embankment, the village was important strategically. For the French it was a jump-off position to take Wagram from the west, while for the Austrians it protected the right flank of the Russbach position. But during the night Bernadotte, under the pretext that his troops were too exposed, had irresponsibly, and without notifying the emperor, withdrawn his shaken Saxon infantry – by now no more than 6,000 effectives – some 1,000 yards south-east of the village while placing his cavalry on the left. Almost not believing his good fortune, Bellegarde at once occupied Aderklaa. He used his main force to extend his position in two lines to Wagram while the grenadiers, finally arriving at 6 a.m., deployed to the left of Aderklaa to Breitenlee and the Cavalry Corps, less one cuirassier regiment sent to II Corps, formed up behind the infantry. To counter the Austrian move, Bernadotte established a twenty-six-piece gun line in front of his corps and soon artillery of both sides came into action and inflicted heavy casualties. Enfiladed by the Austrian batteries from Wagram, the Saxon gunners suffered terribly and during the next three hours fifteen guns were dismounted.
The time was about 7.30 a.m. Napoleon, furious that Bernadotte had abandoned his position, realized the threat of an Austrian breakthrough and after a short conference in Masséna’s carriage ordered the marshal, whose corps had come up, to recapture Aderklaa at once. The marshal detailed Saint-Cyr to take the village and, when the general hesitated, looking for an opening into the defended village, Masséna commanded him to attack at once while Bernadotte was to assist on the right. The counter-attack by Saint-Cyr’s division, led by the 24th Light and the 4th Line Regiment supported by two regiments of the excellent Hessian Leib Brigade formed in battalion columns, was preceded by skirmishers. On his right, Bernadotte’s Saxons and Dupas’s division, now reduced to little more than two French battalions and three weak Saxon battalions, attacked between Aderklaa and Wagram. Saint-Cyr’s 24th Light and 4th Line swept through the village and then proceeded to pursue the panicked defenders beyond. But here they ran into Bellegarde’s steady masses of the second line and were driven back in disorder to Aderklaa, which they and some Hessian units tried to hold. Meanwhile on the right the Saxons had also been halted and begun to retreat.
This would have been the moment for Bellegarde to mount an allout attack, but he had no instructions, his second line was disordered and his right wing as yet lacked contact with III Corps. However, the Grenadier Corps was at hand and for a short time the Austrians enjoyed numerical superiority, not counting the troops left under Dedovich, 44,000 men against some 35,000 French and Saxons. From Wagram, Archduke Charles ordered the recapture of Aderklaa. By 8 a.m., GM von Stutterheim commanding, three grenadier battalions, Scovaud, Jambline and Brzeczinski, and two battalions from the IR 42 Erbach took the village in bloody hand-to-hand fighting. Meanwhile, under pressure from the Klenau Chevaulegers and the threat of Liechtenstein’s Reserve Cavalry, the Saxon gun line was overrun and their retreat south-east of Aderklaa degenerated into a rout, joined by some French troops.
Masséna at once launched Lasalle’s and Marulaz’s light horse to attack the Austrian guns deploying before the village. The charge put the Austrian gunners to flight, but was then pushed back by Liechtenstein’s Reserve Cavalry. To avoid being stalled by the panicking mob, the marshal ordered his troops to fire into the Saxons to clear the way for another infantry assault by Leguay’s brigade joined by the 67th Line from Viviez brigade, both from Molitor’s division. Taking horrendous casualties, one in three according to some reports, and with Molitor down to 3,000 men, the French regained control of Aderklaa at about 9.45 a.m. and held it until about 11 a.m. when fresh Austrian grenadier battalions evicted them in disorder. Masséna ordered Legrand’s division to cover their retreat. The combat’s outcome clearly favoured
Charles. By 10 a.m. I Corps had formed between Wagram and Aderklaa and his Grenadier Reserve, albeit in skirmish formations and not in masses, extended his line towards Süssenbrunn.
Continuing to flee towards Raasdorf, the Saxons, accompanied by a good many Frenchmen and with Bernadotte galloping ahead, ran into Napoleon. It was standing military practice that to turn fleeing troops around, their commander should meet them head-on, but relations between Napoleon and Bernadotte were already strained and that morning the emperor was angry. As Marbot tells it, the emperor had been informed that the night before Bernadotte had boasted that Napoleon had mishandled the evening attacks and that had he, Bernadotte, been in command he would have used ‘scientific manoeuvre’ to overcome the Austrians almost without combat. Already infuriated by Bernadotte’s boasting of the previous night, Napoleon was not now in a mood to listen to excuses and demanded to know if this was the ‘scientific manoeuvre’ that would win the battle. As Bernadotte tried to justify himself, the emperor angrily dismissed him from command. ‘I remove you, sir, from the command of the army corps you handle so badly … A bungler like you is no good to me.’6 For the rest of the day, except for its ten remaining cannons and its cavalry squadrons, 9 Corps was out of action, reforming between Neu Wirtshaus and Raasdorf. The Saxon foot were good enough soldiers, but they had taken heavy casualties the night before, their tight formations were unsuitable under heavy fire and, having attacked, been repulsed and then charged by Austrian cavalry, they were at the end of their fighting strength that morning. Other troops, including French, notably Saint-Cyr’s division, had also been routed but the Saxons became a convenient scapegoat.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 17