NAPOLEON’S LEFT FLANK THREATENED
But Napoleon’s overall situation on his left continued to deteriorate. From 7.30 a.m. onwards Austrian III and VI Corps were finally intervening in the battle, with Kolowrat linking up with Prochaska’s Grenadier Brigade at Süssenbrun at about 9.30 a.m. At this point, however, having received no instructions to change his standing order to align with the corps on either side, he halted with his main force. Klenau, who had the longest approach march and had to reorder his troops, advanced his VI Corps in battalion columns down the Kagran–Aspern road with cavalry support on his flanks. Opposed only by Boudet’s division of Masséna’s corps, at about 8 a.m. he closed on Aspern and Essling. In a reckless effort, Boudet had sent one of his batteries forward to enfilade Klenau’s advance, but Wallmoden’s light cavalry brigade, the Liechtenstein and Kienmayer Hussars, had captured the guns. Although a gallant counter-attack by the 56th Line retook the guns there were no horses to pull them back and, under heavy fire from Klenau’s 64 guns, Boudet fell back to the old bridgehead area. Meanwhile MG Vecsey’s Saint Georg and Brod Grenzer entered Aspern and advanced to reoccupy the works east of Essling. Under heavy pressure and vastly outnumbered, Boudet, who after attempting to hold Aspern with the 93rd Line behind the cemetery wall and the 3rd Light in Essling, made a hasty retreat towards the Mühlau salient. By 10 a.m. Klenau, now only some 3 miles from Breitenlee, was in position either to strike into the rear of the French army or to attack the bridges. But he did neither. He positioned two batteries to fire on the bridges south of Gross Enzersdorf, causing near panic among the supply drivers and miscellaneous non-combatants, but, except for a feeble attack on the bridgehead, repelled by the garrison, one Baden and one Neuchâtel regiment, made no further advance.7 His orders made no provision for such a move and, aligning his troops with III Corps, as his operations journal tells it, he ‘waited for developments in the centre’.8 Moreover, Boudet’s retreat had uncovered the Lobau batteries and Klenau’s battalions and guns were coming under intense bombardment from the heavy guns and mortars on the Lobau. It should be remembered that Klenau had only 14,000 men, was not in direct contact with Kolowrat and that his orders specifically directed him to keep his corps aligned with the adjoining formation. Probably a combination of lack of orders and personal initiative along with the weight of fire from the Lobau batteries contributed to Klenau’s hesitation.
Klenau was not alone in hesitating. By this time, except for the two corps behind the Russbach and V Corps on the Bisam, the entire Austrian army was facing east in line between the Danube and Wagram, outflanking Masséna and leaving a large gap in the French line, the Austrians did not attack. The favourable turn of events in the centre had not been expected. While the Austrian corps commanders did not dare to act on their own, the slow and cumbersome Austrian command-and-control system could not take advantage of the opportunity. Meanwhile Napoleon, always at his best in a crisis, acted rapidly.9
NAPOLEON STABILIZES HIS LEFT FLANK
From his command post on a small knoll near Raasdorf, conspicuous on his white charger, Euphrates, and surrounded by his staff, Napoleon had observed the attack on his left. He and his staff were under constant fairly heavy artillery fire (some twenty-six headquarters officers were killed that day). But unmoved, Napoleon now displayed an outstanding example of battle management. Holding the central position within a curving battlefront, he issued his orders. Prince Eugène, who at Wagram had revealed himself a competent commander, had on his own initiative already refused his flank. With Grenier’s corps, consisting of Durutte’s and Pacthod’s divisions, facing the Russbach, he pivoted Macdonald’s corps – Lamarque’s, Seras’s and Broussier’s divisions – to face west, keeping his small Italian Guard in reserve.10
The emperor also pressed Davout to intensify his effort against Markgrafneusiedl, the all-decisive operation, which once it had reached beyond the tower above Markgrafneusiedl would be the signal for the general attack. Meanwhile, Masséna was ordered to disengage and march south across the Austrian front to deal with Klenau. To disengage Masséna’s corps out of line and gain time preventing Liechtenstein’s cavalry from forming up to attack Masséna’s vulnerable march columns, Bessières’s cavalry was launched against the weakest link in the Austrian front, the seam between the Grenadier Corps and Kolowrat near Süssenbrun. To cover the gap that would appear in his front and unwilling to engage his remaining infantry reserves, the Guard, Marmont and the Bavarians, Napoleon concentrated a Grand Battery, the famed ‘battery of 100 guns’ (some sources make it 112 pieces). It included all sixty of the Guard’s guns as well as guns from the Army of Italy and the Bavarian 12-pounder battery. The time was now about 11 a.m.11
The cavalry attack was hastily organized and poorly handled, but none the less it achieved its main purpose, protecting Masséna’s disengagement. No orders seem to have reached the Guard Cavalry. Saint-Germain’s cuirassier brigade was kept back in reserve while the rest of Nansouty’s heavy cavalry division, some 4,000 cuirassiers and carabiniers, was committed to the charge led by Bessières in person. As they passed Napoleon each regiment raised a loud cheer. Advancing towards the enemy line they received heavy converging defensive fire. Bessières was wounded and only Brigadier’s DeFrance’s carabiniers came into close contact with the enemy, who remained drawn up in masses backed by the Hessen-Homburg Cuirassiers. DeFrance’s troopers had little choice but to retreat, pursued by Austrian fire. Coming into action too late, the Guard Cavalry, four squadrons of Polish Chevaulegers and four squadrons of chasseurs à cheval, no more than 2,000 sabres combined, attacked but also achieved no breakthrough. In all, the French cavalry lost some 1,200 horses but they stopped Liechtenstein from interfering with Masséna’s move and halted the advance of the grenadier’s right and Kolowrat’s left wing.
Thus covered, Masséna proceeded to disengage and begin his spectacular and daring flank march south, while around 11 a.m. Napoleon deployed his Grand Battery which he ordered to drive the enemy from the area between Aderklaa and Süssenbrunn. Under the overall command of General Lauriston, a gunner and one of the emperor’s senior aides, the Grand Battery came into action. First came the Guard Horse Artillery, six batteries with 6- and 8-pounders and 24-pounder howitzers, led by Colonel d’Aboville, galloping to their appointed positions. They were followed by Lieutenant Colonel Drouot’s four foot batteries, three equipped with six 12-pounder cannons each. Joined by the pieces from the Army of Italy and the Bavarian 12-pounders, the Grand Battery, with the Italian guns on the left, Drouot in the centre and d’Aboville on the flanks, formed a 2,000-yard-wide gun line. Deploying within heavy canister range, as each battery reached its designated position it unlimbered and immediately opened fire while attempting to advance the gun line. At a range of between only 400 to 600 yards from the Austrian infantry, it poured a heavy volume of fire on Kolowrat and Liechtenstein, over 200 rounds of solid shot as well as canister for each gun in the Guard Artillery. Here, the weight of the shot fired by the heavier 8- and 12-pounder guns was most effective. Not only did they have a longer range both with solid round shot and heavy canister, the heavier shot, due to the kinetic energy that varies directly with the weight but according to the square of the velocity, had much more hitting power. The heavier pieces fired larger and more far-reaching canister; they also produced a much more terrifying noise.
Gradually pushing forward, the Grand Battery inflicted substantial casualties on the Austrian infantry, forcing Kolowrat to retire on Breitenlee. The Austrian counter-battery fire, mainly light- and medium-brigade batteries, some now out of ammunition, but augmented by position batteries, including two 12-pounder batteries at Wagram only 1,000 yards away and firing solid round shot, inflicted heavy losses in men and horses on the French batteries. In addition, there was the musketry of the Austrian infantry. There was no safety even in the rear. Overshooting cannonballs hit Napoleon’s staff and tore into the imperturbable ranks of the Old Guard. With several senior officers wounded, inc
luding Drouot and d’Aboville, whose right arm was torn off (in all, twenty-eight officers were put out of action), and with gun crews seriously weakened, Napoleon called for volunteers from the infantry of the Guard. He asked for twenty men from each company; an average of fifty stepped forward, double-timed, to the guns, and according to Drouot, behaved ‘with the greatest gallantry’.12 Meanwhile the high corn around the guns on both sides had been set alight by sparks and discarded match. Those wounded, on both sides, unable to crawl to safety, were burned alive.
Behind the left of the Grand Battery Napoleon, who kept a close watch on Davout’s progress, instructed Macdonald to form up his three divisions in an attack column to exploit any opportunity arising. It now was near noon and Masséna’s 4 Corps column was approaching Klenau. Its 5-mile march across the front of two Austrian corps had been an impressive performance. Along with Saint-Sulpice’s cuirassier division, with its light cavalry shielding its right and with Masséna conspicuous in his carriage, the corps marched in column across Kolowrat’s front. This was a dangerous manoeuvre but Kolowrat did not move except for one easily repulsed attack by a hussar regiment. The column, partially concealed by man-high cornfields, remained out of musket range and was only impeded by artillery fire. Shortly after noon, advance elements of Legrand’s division arrived at the Neu Wirtshaus, in sight of Essling, while Marulaz’s troopers, galloping ahead, drove off some Austrian light horse harrying Boudet’s rearguard and then surprised and captured the Austrian batteries firing on the bridges. By this time, however, Davout had gained a decisive success. He had stormed Markgrafneusiedl, with Oudinot joining the attack during the last phase, and was now pushing beyond. Napoleon declared the battle won and issued orders for a general advance.
DAVOUT TAKES MARKGRAFNEUSIEDL
Napoleon considered the capture of Markgrafneusiedl, the bastion of the Austrian left line, as essential for victory. Located below the escarpment, which here turned north-east, sloping gently down into a plain and providing an opportunity for an outflanking attack, the village was a strong position. The Russbach also turned south-east here, widening its valley. The houses of the village were well built and there were number of larger defensible stone buildings including a mill and a monastery. On the plateau above were a disused church crowned by a square stone tower and surrounded by a dry moat and some remains of old earthworks, survivals from earlier times when it had served as an outpost against Hungarian mounted raiders.
Davout’s attack had been delayed by two hours. Originally his orders had been to make a frontal assault north, but early in the morning Napoleon had instructed him to envelop Markgrafneusiedl and destroy Rosenberg. It took him a further two hours to transfer the bulk of his corps across the Russbach some miles downstream in preparation for an outflanking attack utilizing the sloping approach to the plateau in the east for his main effort. Following an intense bombardment by his reinforced corps artillery, including some twenty-three 12-pounders, and supported by some guns from Oudinot’s corps, which silenced most of the Austrian guns in the plain and damaged some of the artillery on the escarpment, Davout began his attack at 9.30 a.m. Two of his four divisions, Puthod on the left and Gudin on the right, were to advance frontally against the village, now on fire, while a short distance downstream at Leopoldshof his engineers threw a bridge across the Russbach. This allowed his substantial cavalry force, Pajol’s light cavalry and the attached divisions of Grouchy, Pully and Montbrun, to cross and drive the Austrian cavalry near Ober-Siebenbrunn, Fröhlich’s brigade, to the rear. Once accomplished, this gained deployment room for Morant and Friant, accompanied by their artillery, to cross the Russbach and form up facing the left wing of Rosenberg’s IV Corps. The presence of the cavalry divisions not only secured the infantry against a counter-attack by the Austrian cavalry on the plateau but protected its flank against John’s army, still expected to come into action. Against this contingency and to keep a battle reserve, Arrighi’s cuirassier division and its horse battery remained in reserve at Grosshofen. The deployment went more slowly than expected and it was 10.15 a.m. before Davout’s infantry reached their assault positions, Morand on the right and Friant to his left extending to the Russbach, aided by the movement of Arrighi’s 8-pounder battery to a small elevation in the ground from where it was able to enfilade the Austrian line on the plateau.
Rosenberg, commanding IV Corps, was desperately hoping for the arrival of Archduke John. Earlier that morning he had voiced his doubts to Archduke Charles that IV Corps, even bolstered by the remnants of Nordmann’s Advance Guard, was strong enough to withstand assault. But except for leaving Nostitz’s cavalry division behind, the archduke disposed of no reserves, a major shortcoming of his operational plan, and could only offer the optimistic assurance that the Army of Inner Austria would arrive on his left flank. Though Rosenberg enjoyed the advantage of an uphill and partly fortified position, and his attached cavalry divisions far outnumbered those of his opponent, overall his strength was inferior to Davout’s. Including Nordmann’s battered units, he disposed of some 18,500 infantry and sixty guns, albeit two 12-pounder batteries, while Davout, counting the horse batteries of his attached cavalry divisions, deployed 114 pieces.
The weakest sector in Rosenberg’s battle line, a hook-shaped line along the rim of the plateau with Markgrafneusiedl and the square tower serving as the hinge, was on his left flank, to the south-east, where the plateau sloped gently down towards the Ober-Siebenbrunn plain. At its southern end there was a ditch defended by five battalions; where it ended to the north, Rosenberg placed GM Mayer’s brigade, the IR 4 Hoch und Deutschmeister and the IR 49 Kerpen as well as two Landwehr battalions. Some 200 paces behind and forming a second line were the remaining troops of IR 44 Bellegarde, 46 Chasteler and 58 Beaulieu together with the combined Landwehr battalions, 1st and 2nd Wiener Wald and 3rd Manhartsberg. On the extreme left wing, around the Siedichfür farmstead, Nostitz, detached from the Cavalry Reserve, assembled the bulk of his division. The dragoons of Brigade Rothkirch extended the line on the heights while the light horse of Wartensleben’s brigade was posted in the plain together with the remainder of Frölich’s cavalry from the Advance Guard. Facing south in the original position across the Russbach there remained three weak brigades and on the escarpment near the tower Rosenberg emplaced a 12-pounder battery covered by one battalion of IR 3 Erzherzog Karl and the Unter dem Manhartsberg Landwehr battalion. An additional 6-pounder battery on the rim of the plateau was defended by two battalions. Given the absence of prepared field fortifications and his numerical inferiority, Rosenberg made the best dispositions he could, hoping that a tenacious defence of his east-facing line, coupled with strong and effective shock action by Nostitz’s cavalry squadrons against the French flank, might hold the French attack until the hoped-for arrival of Archduke John.
The fighting for Markgrafneusiedl, in which MG Peter Vécsey was killed, was fierce, and the outcome not finally determined until some time after noon. As the Austrian guns in the plain were silenced, a mounted Davout personally led Gudin’s and Puthod’s divisions forward. Despite receiving heavy defensive musket fire, the two divisions managed to enter the village, now in flames. Gudin was wounded and Davout had his horse shot from under him. Even so, the defenders, having now evacuated the building below the escarpment, had regrouped, still willing to fight, around the tower position. Gudin’s skirmishers scaled up to reach the rim of the plateau. On the right flank, Morand’s division, attacking in two lines with the 13th Light and the 17th Line leading, reached the crest of the slope, but was immediately countercharged by the Hoch und Deutschmeister and Kerpen infantry supported by eight squadrons from the Erzherzog Ferdinand Hussars. The French attack was temporarily halted with the 17th Line in some disarray. But Morand received support from Friant who sent in Gilly’s brigade with the 15th Light and the 33rd Line against the Austrian flank. Despite Nordmann’s effort to rally the troops, an action during which this gallant officer was killed by a musket ball, the Austr
ians, having suffered heavy casualties, were soon pushed back to their original position. Then, instead of executing a mass charge, successive separate charges by the Blankenstein and the Hessen-Homburg Hussars also failed and by 11.30 Montbrun and Friant were firmly established on the plateau.
Around the tower position, Gudin and Puthod were gaining the upper hand, with counter-attacks by the remaining troops of the Riese Brigade, the much-reduced regiments Chasteler, Bellegarde and Beaulieu, all failing. Their morale was not improved by the absence of their brigade commander, GM Riese, who as one Austrian historian scathingly commented ‘was not to be seen’.13 Friant’s men consolidated their hold on the tower position and moved forward to roll up the Austrian line. But for a while the determined resistance continued as Rosenberg tried to regroup in a new line on the plateau north-east of the tower and the Austrians repeatedly counter-attacked, stalling further French advances. Davout now ordered Arrighi’s division to charge the enemy infantry, but executed reluctantly and conducted up an incline across difficult terrain, it failed and Davout then sent it back to the plain.
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