THE CAVALRY CLASH AT OBER-SIEBENBRUNN
The time was just past noon. At this juncture, recognizing the critical situation developing on his right and leaving Archduke Ludwig in temporary charge on his right wing, Archduke Charles arrived with reinforcements from Hohenlohe’s II Corps that in its positions at Baumersdorf had not been engaged thus far. He ordered Hohenlohe to send five battalions from IR 57 Joseph Colloredo and IR 15 Zach, and the 6-pounder brigade artillery battery from Buresch’s brigade, as well as four squadrons of Hessen-Homburg Hussars. In addition, he sent the Hohenzollern Cuirassiers from the Reserve Cavalry. The infantry joined the attempt to hold back Davout’s advance; the cuirassiers, reinforcing Nostitz’s cavalry, were ordered to drive off Montbrun’s and Grouchy’s cavalry before falling on the flank of the French infantry.
Now, in the vicinity of Ober-Siebenbrunn, the battle’s major cavalry encounter took place. With over forty squadrons Nostitz at first drove back the outnumbered nine squadrons of Montbrun’s division with Wartensleben’s brigade, the Blankenstein Hussars and the O’Reilly Chevauxlegers, repelling the 7th Hussars. Following this, the Hohenzollern Cuirassiers attacked Montbrun’s second line, which curiously tried to repulse the Austrian charge at the halt with a futile carbine volley, a blunder that allowed the Austrians to break the line and capture ten cavalry guns. But then, as Montbrun sent in new squadrons, the 11th and 12th Chasseurs, the 11th hitting the flank of the O’Reilly Chevaulegers, while at the same time Grouchy’s dragoon division formed up in line to countercharge, the balance tilted in favour of the French. In the mêlée that followed, Nostitz and MG Rothkirch were wounded, the Austrians retired to reform and the French recovered their guns. Contributing to this outcome was that the Austrian cavalry was poorly handled. Not trained for a massed charge, instead of attacking in divisions or brigades, they attacked in single regiments that could not withstand the massed charge by Grouchy’s division. For instance, the after-battle report of the Riesch Dragoons claimed that it had faced a six-fold superiority of hostile horse. By 1 p.m., the disordered Austrian cavalry fell back on its shaken infantry to join Rosenberg’s IV Corps in a gradual and orderly retreat north in the direction of the Wendling-Hof.
At about noon both Napoleon and Charles realized that the end of the battle was in sight. A messenger from John informed Charles that his army would arrive only at 5 p.m., too late, the archduke recognized, to affect the outcome of the battle. In fact, John’s troops, following Austrian Army custom, were resting and cooking their rations at Marchegg, still some 10 miles away from the battle. Charles now began to think about extricating his army in good order. At about 2.30 p.m., he issued instructions to begin a phased withdrawal.
Since mid morning Napoleon had anxiously trained his spyglass to watch the progress of his right wing. When the powder smoke showing Davout’s firing line had moved west well beyond the square tower, Napoleon told his staff that the battle was won and issued orders for a general assault. Oudinot was to press forward to the escarpment against Hohenlohe, Eugène was to storm Wagram, and Macdonald’s attack column, supported by cavalry on his flanks, was to break the Austrian centre between III Corps and the Grenadier Corps. Finally, he informed Masséna that with the battle won he was to mount an immediate all-out attack against Klenau.
MACDONALD’S ATTACK COLUMN
Macdonald had begun his advance shortly before 1 p.m. Contrary to the views of many writers, its purpose was not to achieve a breakthrough but to prevent Charles from detaching troops to his left wing. Macdonald, who would win his marshal’s baton for this action, later wrote that ‘I was far from thinking that this demonstration was to be the main attack on the enemy’s centre’. He had formed his three divisions – twenty-three battalions now shrunk to approximately 8,000 men – in a large hollow rectangle, not the massive column so often described. The front of the column consisted of eight battalions, four each from Broussier’s and Lamarque’s divisions, formed in two lines three deep and 365 metres wide. The front was sustained on the right by eight battalions in column and on the right by four battalions also in column. Three battalion columns from Seras’s division, deployed side by side, formed the rear, resulting in a hollow rectangle with a front of some 900 yards and a depth of about 600. This unusual formation was not adopted because the troops were inexperienced but because of the probability that it would be attacked from three sides. Both divisional artillery and a forward move by the Grand Battery on its right were to support the column. Cavalry – Sahuc’s light division of the Army of Italy and the Guard Cavalry on its right and Nansouty’s division on its left – was to cover the column. Conspicuous on his white charger, Napoleon had ridden through Austrian fire to be present when the column moved out in the direction of Süssenbrunn, flags flying, drums beating the charge and the men cheering.
To confront this array, which on the flat ground appeared to the Austrians as an enormous solid breakthrough mass supported by cavalry and artillery, Charles had decided to refuse the flanks of III Corps and the Grenadier Reserve. This exposed the column to some close musketry and canister fire from three sides. As the column and the artillery moved into point-blank range, the Austrians opened up with everything they had, disabling fifteen artillery pieces before they had advanced far, and then pulled back out of canister range. Macdonald’s column continued forward, sustaining heavy losses from converging fire that within an hour had reduced it to little more than half-strength; most historians speak of just about 1,500 men. The column dented the Austrian line, but could not achieve a breakthrough. To buy time for the Austrians to reform their battle line, Liechtenstein threw all available cavalry frontally against Macdonald’s column but was repelled by hastily formed squares.
To Napoleon’s disgust the French cavalry had put in a disappointing performance. The accompanying heavy cavalry achieved little. Nansouty had kept his division, already battered during the last two days, too far to the rear, and when called forward by Macdonald the squadrons arrived too late. The Austrians had formed masses backed by artillery and Nansouty’s troopers achieved little. Even more disappointing was the failure of the Guard heavy cavalry division commanded by General Walther, a veteran officer, 48 years old, with service dating back to the Revolutionary Wars. With Bessières out of action after he had impatiently ridden forward with Nansouty’s cavalry and had been seriously wounded by a cannon ball, Walther, responding to Macdonald’s call for assistance, replied that the ‘Guard acted only on direct orders of the Emperor himself or from our chief Marshal Bessières’. As no direct orders from the emperor had been received and with Bessières incapacitated, the heavy division of the Guard halted in place. An angry Napoleon told his staff that his cavalry had never before let him down in this fashion. When he taxed Nansouty about the cavalry’s poor performance, Nansouty first tried to explain and finally turned away muttering, ‘After all, there is nothing Your Majesty can teach me about handling cavalry’. Despite their shortcomings on this occasion, both Nansouty and Walther would continue to serve as senior cavalry commanders.
By 2 p.m., then, Macdonald’s advance had stalled but the emperor now had the augmented Bavarian division, over 5,000 men and equal in strength to some of the decimated French corps, at his disposal. When Wrede reported to Napoleon, he expected to be sent to support the extreme French left. Instead, however, Napoleon told him that ‘You can see Macdonald’s awkward position. March, relieve his corps, and attack the enemy, act [as] as you think best.’ Wrede moved forward, his four 6-pounder batteries in front, infantry following and his cavalry brigade accompanied by its mounted battery on his right. Passing to the right of Macdonald’s stalled column, he advanced to a line between Aderklaa and Süssenbrunn, his 6-pounders reinforcing the remnants of Macdonald’s artillery. His infantry, however, did not see much action: the Austrians were already retiring in good order. During the artillery action Wrede was wounded lightly, grazed by a passing ball, but exclaimed to Macdonald, ‘Tell the emperor that I die for him and r
ecommend my wife and children to his care!’ To this theatrical outburst, the French general replied that the Bavarian should tell this to the emperor in person and that, moreover, he could well make more children with his wife.14
With General Reille bringing up the battalions of the Young Guard, constrained by Napoleon’s orders not to ‘get involved in adventures because I have nothing left but two regiments of the Old Guard’, the reinforced column resumed the advance. Supported by the Young Guard, the Bavarians captured Süssenbrunn. But now the troops were too exhausted to continue beyond their original object and so ended Macdonald’s famous attack, with only the Bavarians, swinging northwest, continuing a slow pursuit. To relieve pressure on Macdonald, Napoleon had sent Pacthod’s battered reserve division of the Army of Italy against Wagram, while Marmont’s fresh 11 Corps marched to fill the gap created between Oudinot and the Army of Italy. Finally, to assist Masséna, who was ordered south to deal with Klenau, Durutte’s division of the Army of Italy had seized Breitenlee.
For his leadership and courage in this action – Napoleon was heard to exclaim, ‘What a brave man!’ – Macdonald, much to the army’s satisfaction, would be promoted to marshal. No doubt about his bravery, but a debate among historians continues as to whether the attack had been a glorious failure or whether it had achieved its objective. If, as some still maintain, its purpose was to bring the decision in the battle by breaking through the adversary’s front, it failed. But if, as Macdonald described it, it was designed to fix the Austrians and prevent them from shifting major reinforcements to their left wing, it was a success. Even if there had been a breakthrough that might have made it possible to interfere with Archduke Charles’s withdrawal to the north and northwest, the outcome was not certain. Giving the stubborn resistance offered by the Austrian rearguards and the heat exhaustion of the French and allied troops, leaving only a few formations, above all Marmont’s corps and the Bavarians, capable of exploitation, it would most probably not have had major results.
THE FINAL GENERAL ATTACK
As soon as Davout had passed west of the tower at about 1 p.m., Oudinot’s 2 Corps, which had exchanged artillery fire against Hohenlohe’s II Corps all day, advanced to the Russbach and prepared to scale up the escarpment. Hohenlohe’s corps still maintained its positions in and on both sides of Baumersdorf on the plateau, but was now coming under pressure from two sides, while the remaining elements of Rosenberg’s IV Corps were retiring towards the Bockfluss where they remained under pressure by Friant and Morand. To avoid being out-flanked, Hohenlohe had to refuse five battalions from his second line together with some batteries to confront the advancing French, who were also enfilading his line with batteries placed at Markgrafneusiedl. Perceiving the moment opportune, though he had not yet received direct orders, Oudinot, sword in hand and disregarding the heavy defensive fire, led his 2 Corps forward up the plateau. Wounded twice and having his horse shot beneath him, he evicted the stubborn Austrian defenders under MG Hardegg from Baumersdorf and then wheeled left, pressing Hohenlohe’s corps back on Bellegarde’s I Corps around Wagram. Seruzier pushed and dragged his horse guns across the Russbach then, joined by Colbert’s divisional cavalry, deployed on the plateau to support the push on Wagram. Encountering staunch resistance, with attacks and counter-attacks, the French gradually advanced on Bellegarde. Most of the Russbach plateau was now in French hands. At around 2.30 p.m., Charles instructed his troops to disengage by corps and, with IV Corps already moving north, the remaining corps were to conduct a fighting retreat to the north-west. His instructions read: ‘To the degree that GdK Bellegarde retreats, Prince Liechtenstein, FML d’Aspré, FZM Kolowrat and FML Klenau will conform.’ The instruction continued that Bellegarde was to move towards Gerasdorf, Liechtenstein was to remain in the Gerasdorf plain and send patrols toward the Russbach, Kolowrat was to retire to the Stammersdorf heights, the grenadiers to Hagenbrunn and Klenau to take up positions between Gerasdorf and Leopoldsau. ‘I shall establish my headquarters at Stammersdorf and each corps commander will send one officer there before nightfall to receive further orders.’15
Wagram and the adjoining heights, where Bellegarde left behind a strong rearguard, including one division of Hohenzollern’s cavalry corps, to cover the retreat of the Austrian formations in the plain, was taken by Tharreau’s division of Oudinot’s corps and Pacthod’s division of the Army of Italy. Pacthod’s division, supported by elements of the Italian Royal Guard, took the village frontally, while Durutte’s division stormed the adjoining heights.16 The Austrians were not shaken and the assault was bitterly contested. An officer of the 52nd Line of Pacthod’s division, Chef d’Batallion Bernard, described the action. ‘At two in the afternoon the division moved out and the regiment followed the 1st brigade.’ Crossing the muddy Russbach with some difficulty, he continued that ‘… where the enemy directed its fire … the grape shot, shrapnel and cannonball fired by the pieces from an enemy redoubt, which was on our left, covered the ground. The regiment suffered considerable losses. Arriving on the plateau the regiment was met with a hail of canister and fire from the same pieces and five columns [masses] of Austrian infantry.’ After exchanging a number of volleys the regiment crossed bayonets with the enemy and ‘… our pieces which came up to support routed the [Austrian] masses. But the 52nd had suffered heavy casualties, more than 1,000 men had been wounded.’17
In the centre III Corps, the Grenadier Corps and Liechtenstein’s cavalry fell back according to orders with the cavalry and artillery, covering each other in turn as they took up new positions, shielding the retreat. The grenadiers retired to Hagenbrunn, III Corps to the heights of Stammersdorf. Overall, the Austrian phased retreat was well executed and the army remained combat capable as it withdrew in echelon with one formation retreating and the next covering it. Special credit should go to the Austrian artillery, directed by GM Smola, who managed to mass enough guns to enable an orderly retreat.
On the extreme right wing, Klenau found himself in a difficult position and had to guard against being cut off as he retreated from the river in the direction of Kagran and Leopoldsau to the heights of Stammersdorf. Masséna had responded to orders to attack. Legrand’s division stormed Essling where the Austrians stubbornly defended the granary. When the 26th Light was repulsed, Masséna in his carriage placed himself in front of the 18th Line, shouting, ‘Scoundrels, you get five sous a day and I am worth 600,000 francs a year and yet you make me go ahead of you!’18 Spurred on by this strange encouragement the French infantry surged forward to capture the position. Meanwhile the remaining divisions, Saint-Cyr and Molitor on the right, swung north-west, while Boudet issued from the bridgehead to follow Klenau. Aspern fell without much resistance as Klenau disengaged and, apparently shaken by this sudden turn of events, reported at about 3 p.m. to Charles that he ‘feared a disaster’.
None the less, Klenau’s corps managed to retreat in good order. At Kagran, when pressed by Marulaz’s light cavalry, two solid Austrian masses withstood their charges and the corps artillery had to be brought into action to blow the defenders away. At Leopoldsau, in the last great cavalry charge of the battle, Lasalle, charging ahead of the 8th Husssars accompanied by squadrons of the Saxon Prinz Klemens Chevaulegers, attacked the Austrian rearguard deployed behind a wide flood moat and supported by some 6-pounder guns. While trying to rally the troopers for a second charge, Lasalle, who had once pronounced that ‘any hussar who is not dead at 30 is gold-bricking’, was killed. He was 33 years old, the best-known light cavalry leader in the army. Marulaz now tried to avenge him, taking command of the 8th Hussars, but their charges, too, were repelled several times, their colonel shot dead. Persisting, Marulaz received a serious wound in his arm and a cannon ball killed his horse under him. Soon thereafter, at around 5 p.m., Klenau managed to disengage his corps and join the general retreat, during the night leading his trains through the narrow defile at Langen– Enzersdorf to elude his French pursuers.
After marching and fighting fo
r forty hours, suffering from the heat, a cold night, little water and scanty rations, the exhausted French pursued slowly but were unable to impede seriously the retreating Austrian army, which remained combat capable. French exhaustion, physical and nervous, is illustrated by incidents in the centre and the right rear of the army. At about 4 p.m., there was a brief panic when there was some firing around Wagram with some dozens of French infantry scampering down the escarpment. The Old Guard hastily formed up in square to protect Napoleon’s headquarters, but it soon became clear that some foragers had encountered enemy cavalry and panicked.19 About an hour later, advance patrols of John’s cavalry appeared near Glinzendorf. Again, this caused the Imperial Guard to stand to arms and some French troops to fall into formation, while to the south a crowd of wagoners, stragglers and such made for the bridges and were turned back with canister fire by General Reynier. But John, informed by courier that the battle was over, halted and then withdrew hastily.
At about 8 p.m. on 6 July the guns fell silent and, widely distributed across the plain and the plateau, the French lit their campfires. In the distance were the sounds of the retreating Austrian army. Napoleon held the field. Except for some formations attempting to follow the Austrians, generally held off by efficient rearguards, his troops were too fatigued to commence an immediate pursuit. Perhaps there was no need. Although Wagram was unlike the smashing victories of the past, it can none the less be called a decisive victory. It deprived the enemy of the will to continue fighting and convinced Archduke Charles, who always held that the army should be preserved at all costs, not to hazard another battle and to press for peace.
CHAPTER NINE
Wagram, Znaim and the end of the war
THE AUSTRIAN RETREAT
Wagram was Napoleon’s last decisive victory. It compelled Austria to make peace, but it was no Austerlitz, Auerstädt or Jena where the enemy’s armies had been destroyed. Archduke Charles managed to disengage the greater part of his army in good order and Napoleon came away with new respect for the Austrians. On more than one occasion he reprimanded those who belittled it stating, ‘It is obvious that you were not at Wagram’.1 Charles had already discussed the general direction for the line of retreat in early June, when there had been plans for an offensive across the Danube at Pressburg, and the subject came up again as Charles waited for the French attack on the Marchfeld. Properly cautious, the archduke had certainly been prepared for the contingency of defeat and had planned the outlines for an orderly retirement when he made his deployments during the first days of July. This alone can be the explanation for the archduke leaving V Corps, only a few miles from the battlefield, out of the action, and for detaching a battery and one of Kolowrat’s brigades to take up positions behind Stammersdorf. And finally, when early on the second day Prince Liechtenstein asked for permission to send additional units of the Cavalry Corps to Markgrafneusiedl, permission was denied because, as the archduke explained, in case of retreat the cavalry would be required in the plain around Süssenbrunn.2
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