By the afternoon of 6 July, Charles had relocated his command post to Stammersdorf on the lower slops of the Bisamberg, an indication of the proposed line of retreat north-west. Passing the lower Bisamberg slopes, he intended to make a phased retreat with his main force, that is the right wing and centre – V Corps, I, II, and III Corps, the Cavalry Reserve and the Grenadiers – towards the Stockerau– Hollabrunn road. Leading eventually to Znaim and Brünn in Moravia, this was a good choice. Protected by V Corps, it passed over the western slope of the Bisamberg where there were a number of good defensive positions, through the narrow defile at Langen-Enzersdorf and then opened up into a plain around Korneuburg, a small walled town. The much smaller force on the left wing, Rosenberg’s IV Corps joined by elements of Hohenzollern’s II Corps, was already disengaging from the edge of the Russbach plateau north in the direction of Bockfluss-Schrick-Gaunersdorf and eventually to Brünn.
There have been suggestions that a retreat into northern Bohemia might have been a better strategic option for Charles. From there he might have threatened Napoleon’s line of communications and would also have found substantial resources at Prague and Eger and in the fortresses of Königgrätz, Theresienstadt and Josephstadt.3 But this, of course, would have sacrificed the southern part of the Habsburg Monarchy, especially Hungary where there was little war matériel available but where the Emperor Francis was shifting to establish his new headquarters at Komorn. Contact would also be lost with Archduke John’s Army of Inner Austria and the insurrectio troops promised by the Palatine Archduke Joseph. Finally, Napoleon had been mustering a Westphalian X Corps. Commanded by King Jerome, this was a poor and undisciplined body of conscripts and volunteers, about 7,500 strong, operating in Saxony supported by a division from the Kingdom of Holland under GD Gratin, while also collecting a Reserve Corps under old Marshal Kellermann of Valmy fame at Frankfurt. Neither of these formations had high combat potential, but their position in the rear of an army retreating into northern Bohemia could not be ignored. The last option, a retreat straight north up the line of the river March had become precarious because of the Russian advance on Cracow. Most importantly, however, the archduke was not repositioning himself to continue the campaign. On the contrary. Almost from the outset of the war he had desired peace and his main objective was to reassemble his forces in Moravia to retain an army in being as a military asset for the negotiations he now considered as absolutely necessary for the survival of the Habsburg dynasty.
His immediate orders were for his left wing, II and IV Corps to retire in the direction of Seyring. The Austrians retreated in two columns. Hohenzollern’s II Corps, with Brigade Hardegg still attempting to hold on to Baumersdorf, extricated itself without too much French interference and marched north-west, crossing the Russbach at Helmadorf. Meanwhile, Rosenberg’s IV Corps was to retreat to Bockfluss some 6 miles further north. Oudinot followed Hohenlohe slowly, while Rosenberg extricated most of his IV Corps north, keeping Radetzky with the Erzherzog Ferdinand Hussars, elements of the Hessen-Homburg and Primatial Hussars and some light troops as a flank guard. Rosenberg outdistanced Morand’s and Friant’s infantry and halted at the Wendliger Hof to facilitate Hohenzollern’s II Corps to cross the Russbach at about 4 p.m. in good order at Helmadorf. Across the river Hohenzollern took up positions around Gross-Engersdorf to the north, his infantry and artillery repelling a number of minor probing attacks. Late in the afternoon, on receipt of orders, II Corps moved north-west through Seyring to Enzesdorf, regaining control of its units that had joined IV Corps, and reached the road to Znaim by nightfall. Further east, in a vain effort to outflank IV Corps, Morand’s light cavalry, the 12th Chasseurs à cheval, had managed to push to the Bockfluss before Rosenberg’s column reached it. But volleys from the formed masses of infantry, and a countercharge by two squadrons of Erzherzog Ferdinand Hussars repelled the French cavalry. At this point Davout ceased further pursuit action. The heat was still oppressive, his troops were fatigued and thirsty and his horses blown. In addition, he was still concerned that Archduke John might yet arrive on his right flank though, to be sure, Napoleon had ordered strong cavalry formations to screen his right wing against such an eventuality.
It was more difficult to extricate the Austrian centre right and right wings from their engagement around Wagram and Aderklaa. According to orders, Bellegarde’s I Corps was to fall back on Gerasdorf in the plain, its movement covered by Liechtenstein’s cavalry drawn up in front of Gerasdorf. Infantry of I Corps occupied the village, supported by the reserve brigade that Kolowrat had left behind in the morning and by guns on the Stammersdorf heights. Meanwhile Kolowrat’s III Corps was to pull back to Stammersdorf and the Grenadier Corps was to return to Hagenbrunn. Both formations were to make contact with I Corps, Kolowrat to his left and the grenadiers to their right. Beyond Kolowrat’s right was V Corps, now marching towards the Stockerau road to assume its original mission to cover a retreat. Finally, along the Danube and then up the road to the Stammersdorf heights, Klenau’s VI Corps was being pursued by Masséna.
The degree of French pressure against the various Austrian formations on the right wing varied. Marmont, the Bavarians and the Young Guard division exerted but light pressure against I Corps. The retreat of III Corps was also relatively untroubled until dusk when it was attacked by French cavalry, including squadrons from Nansouty’s heavy horse, the Guard Cavalry and the cavalry component of the Army of Italy. Liechtenstein countercharged with GM Kroyherr brigade, Cuirassier Regiments 1 Kaiser and 6 Moritz Liechtenstein and GM Teimern light brigade, the 1st Knesevich Dragoons and the 6th Rosenberg Chevaulegers. They managed to hit the French flank and drove it off. Still, by this time, around 8 p.m., Archduke Charles considered III Corps’ position around Gerasdorf too exposed and ordered a further withdrawal up the Bisamberg slopes towards Stammersdorf, where it took up positions across the Brünn road towards Hagenbrunn, roughly aligned with Klenau’s VI Corps retreating up from the Danube.4
In fact, VI Corps and the Grenadier Corps faced the most difficult time withdrawing from their forward positions. The grenadiers had held a position in the plain south-west of Aderklaa and at about 3 p.m. began to retreat through the burning village, taking substantial losses from artillery fire. Among the casualties was their divisional commander, FML d’Aspré, another French emigré, who was killed by an artillery round shot. Once through the village, the grenadiers were attacked by French horse and had to form square, making another convenient target for artillery, until the approach of Liechtenstein’s cavalry deterred further attacks and allowed the grenadiers to continue their march north to Hagenbrunn. Finally, on the extreme left of the Austrian line Klenau’s VI Corps was facing Masséna, who pursued slowly but on a broad front with a strong column including most of his cavalry. After clearing the bank of the Danube beyond Aspern, he followed Klenau’s line of retreat to the Stammersdorf heights. He hoped to outflank Klenau, who by then was passing through Leopoldsau. Aware of his exposed position, Klenau had already begun to withdraw shortly before 2.30 p.m., with the Splenyi brigade, still defending Aspern and Essling, gaining him time to form up for an orderly retreat and fight a number of rearguard actions. Retiring back to the Stammersdorf heights, the 4th Landwehr battalion unter dem Manhartsberg was placed to defend Stadlau, another block position, two battalions from IR 39 Duka were placed at Kagran, and a third positioned at Leopoldsau.
The isolated Landwehr battalion at Stadlau was forced to surrender after suffering heavy casualties while the two battalions of the Duka regiment were expelled from Kagran. The battalion at Leopoldsau, defending itself behind some stone walls, held out for some time, but attacked by infantry from the front and by Lasalle’s light cavalry on its flank – an attack in which the gallant Lasalle was killed – it had to withdraw. BG Marulaz, the commander of the corps’ light cavalry, took over command. Swinging north-west, Masséna again tried to attack Klenau beyond Leopoldsau before he reached the critical Lang Enzersdorf defile but was delayed by Aust
rian detachments, among them the combined Vienna Landwehr battalions under Major Waldstein. Finally, attempts to cut VI Corps off at Strebersdorf were blocked when III Corps sent some help, two battalions of IR 7 Karl Schroeder reinforced by four companies from IR 29 Lindenau joined later by a battery from V Corps. During the fighting here Marulaz was wounded and had to turn over command of the two divisions of light cavalry to GB Bruyère. The various setbacks and losses incurred during these actions induced Masséna to halt his pursuit and assemble his tired troops near Leopoldsau, with his advance elements near Gross Jedlersdorf skirmishing with Klenau’s rearguards under GM Wallmoden. The Saxons, who had also advanced in the afternoon but had seen no action, their spirit shattered and their ranks depleted, also camped at Leopoldsau.
As night fell, Archduke Charles had managed to reestablish a fairly cohesive if irregular front. With army headquarters at Enzesfeld, I Corps was between Stammersdorf and Hagenbrunn, II Corps at Seyring, III Corps in front of Posthaus Rendezvous, IV Corps north of Wolkersdorf and Bockfluss and still moving towards Nikolsburg, V Corps on the Bisamberg and VI Corps at Jedlersdore, though with some elements still near Stammersdorf. The Grenadier Corps was rallying at Hagenbrunn while the Cavalry Corps was covering the area between Seyring and Hagenbrunn. The archduke wisely used the hours of darkness to concentrate his troops further. At about midnight III Corps moved across the Bisamberg to Korneuburg, a small walled town in the plain beyond the Lang Enzersdorf defile, to be joined some hours later by I Corps, the Grenadier and the Cavalry Corps. During the morning of 7 July, Archduke Charles established his headquarters at Göllersdorf north of Korneuburg on the road to Znaim.
The French army consolidated itself with Masséna at Leopoldsau and the Army of Italy at Gerasdorf. Oudinot spent the night at Seyring with Wrede’s Bavarians resting to his south. Davout remained with his headquarters in Wagram, with Gudin’s, Puthod’s and Friant’s divisions bivouacking between Wolkersdorf and Bockfluss, and Morand’s just across that river. His cavalry divisions, Montbrun, Arrighi and Grouchy, camped further east, toward Auersthal. The emperor, deadly tired, tented in the midst of his Old Guard infantry between Aderklaa and Raasdorf. No further orders for action were issued that night and in fact, though Napoleon rose early the next day, 7 July, he only issued orders to begin an active large-scale pursuit at 2 that afternoon.5
NAPOLEON PURSUES ARCHDUKE CHARLES
Victory had been gained at a very high cost. As always, the worst fate was that of the severely wounded. Dead and dying men covered the battlefield, sometimes in rows where they had been struck down. Though some of the wounded tried to drag themselves to field hospitals, many died where they lay, their suffering increased by the heat and lack of water. Local civilians offered some succour, but their capabilities were limited. Napoleon placed no great emphasis on medical services and did not regard them as part of the line. For the 1809 campaign, Larrey had been able to hastily organize a number of flying ambulance detachments, one for each corps, but these never reached full strength and the heaviest burden of caring for the wounded had to be carried by the often poorly qualified regimental surgeons and their assistants. Only the Imperial Guard, whose medical officers were paid three times as much as regular surgeons, had a proper casualty clearing service, ambulances and hospitals. Larrey’s men helped out where they could, but facilities remained totally inadequate.
Even his unwounded troops, all them exhausted, many of them dead drunk, having broken into the wine cellars that abounded in the region, were beyond further combat. A day of rest and reorganization was clearly indicated. Also, ammunition had to be replenished. With the French artillery having fired an estimated 90,000 to 100,000 rounds during the battle, caissons and divisional ammunition wagons were empty and had to be restocked. Finally, riderless horses, cavalry as well as draft animals, had to be corralled. An immediate pursuit was not possible.
Moreover, Napoleon had remained uncertain whether the archduke intended to renew the battle the next morning. Not until he rode forward in the early morning to survey the situation personally and to receive reports from his outposts was he convinced that the Austrian army was indeed in retreat, though he remained unsure about its exact direction. He commended commanders and troops he encountered, telling the Army of Italy: ‘You are brave soldiers; you have covered yourself with glory.’6 He ordered Macdonald to report and embraced him, exclaiming, ‘On the battlefield of glory where I owe you so large a part of yesterday’s success, I make you a Marshal of France.’7 Macdonald was the only Napoleonic marshal created on the battlefield. The emperor was quite annoyed with Oudinot for his impetuous and unauthorized attack against the Russbach the previous day, telling him he should have been shot, and he still was angry about Marmont’s delay in moving to the Lobau before the battle. Still, both men received the coveted marshal’s baton. Finally, the emperor ordered investigations into Boudet’s actions in defence of the bridgehead, specifically the loss of his artillery, and into the causes of the rout of Saint-Cyr’s division and the Saxons at Aderklaa.
Napoleon had his headquarters shifted to Wolkersdorf, from where the Emperor Francis had observed the battle. Here, but only at about noon, he received reliable reports indicating the direction of the Austrian retreat, though he still remained somewhat uncertain about the exact direction of the two Austrian columns – the left one under Charles and the right one reduced now to Rosenberg’s IV Corps. Therefore he ordered Marmont’s relatively fresh corps, which had suffered only some 500 casualties, augmented by the Bavarians and three brigades of Montbrun’s light cavalry division, to push forward on the Nikolsburg–Brünn road following Rosenberg. The next day, 8 July, Napoleon ordered Davout, accompanied by Grouchy’s dragoons and Arrighi’s cuirassiers, to follow Marmont. Augmented by Bruyères’ light cavalry, Masséna, with orders to catch and then maintain touch with the enemy, was dispatched to take the road to Znaim following the main Austrian column. Macdonald’s small remnant brought up the rear. To provide support if needed for either of these two pursuit columns, Napoleon, with the Imperial Guard, Oudinot and Nansouty’s heavy cavalry division, marched between the two highways. Curiously cautious, Napoleon remained concerned about a threat to his rear by John, now reinforced by the remnants of Chasteler’s and Gyulai’s divisions, a force whose potential he greatly overestimated. To keep an eye on John he shifted Vandamme east along the Danube closer to Vienna and told Masséna to remain in touch with the Vienna garrison. Moreover, he formed a new task force, assigning the Württembergers and Saxons to the Army of Italy to shield his army against Archduke John’s, who still was maintaining a foothold on the Marchfeld and pushing various ambitious scheme to operate against the rear of the main army. Between 9 and 12 July, in some minor actions, Eugène pushed John back into Hungary.8
On 7 July, Charles, making good use of a series of night marches, had managed to assemble the main bulk of his forces, including V Corps, which joined the retreat at Korneuburg, on the Prague road towards Znaim. Only Rosenberg’s IV Corps, separated during the last phase of the fighting on the Russbach heights, was still moving towards Brünn, an objective it managed to reach successfully. Masséna was in contact with the main force, but he remained at a fair distance, with fighting limited to some mounted vedettes exchanging a few shots. Even so, aware that the enemy would catch up, on 7 July Charles again informed Francis that peace was imperative if the dynasty were to survive. Meanwhile, with his cavalry and Legrand’s division as lead elements, Masséna pushed on towards Znaim, fighting a number of small actions. On 8 July there was an encounter between Legrand’s division and the Austrian rearguard under Klenau at Stockerau, and the following day there was a major engagement at Hollabrunn. While neither of these actions was decisive, they revealed the Austrians as still combat capable. In fact, at Hollabrunn, Masséna had to break off the combat to wait for the arrival of his three remaining divisions. But these encounters finally clarified the location and direction of the main Austrian body. Masséna could repor
t to Napoleon that he was on the right track, Charles was retiring across the river Laa, a tributary of the Thaya. On the 10th, the bulk of the Austrian army took up defensive positions around Jetzeldorf on the river Pulka, but evacuated these when Charles was informed by a courier from the Emperor Francis, who was about to leave for Hungary, that a major column was approaching Znaim from the east.
The column in fact was Marmont, who had abandoned his march north towards Nikolsburg when his cavalry reconnaissance informed him that Charles was now attempting to reach Znaim. Correctly anticipating the archduke’s intentions, Marmont drove his troops to the west, left the road north and instead marched his corps east along the Laa. He took a risk here, but Napoleon’s orders had granted him certain operational latitude, and in any case he assumed that Davout would continue north to Nikolburg. Marching through fine wine country, his veterans’ discipline weakened and, breaking into wine cellars, many became drunk and committed excesses against the civilian population. Drastic measures were needed and on the morning of 9 July an incensed Marmont had several looters shot to restore order. The same day, he continued his approach to Znaim, the open terrain and a good road along the left bank of the Thaya enabling 11 Corps to advance in combat formation. A Bavarian division, led by GM von Minucci, who had replaced Wrede, marched on the left, General Clauzel in the centre and Montbrun on his right flank with Dupas’s division, now detached from the Saxon Corps, but only six battalions strong, following as support. Having been reprimanded repeatedly by Napoleon for his slow operational style, Marmont now pushed his corps to gain the bridges over the Thaya, and occupy the heights before Charles arrived. From the south-west, Masséna speeded up in pursuit of V Corps.
The Emperor's Last Victory Page 20