The McMahon Line- a Century of Discord

by J J Singh

  In fact, the intercepted telegram of Lu Hsing-chi of 30 October 1913 to the military governor, Hu, and administrator Yin at Chengdu read: ‘If you have any detailed maps of the Tibetan frontier or other documentary proof, please send them as soon as possible by insured post.’47 This reveals the paucity of original documents with the Chinese to support their claims. Another secret telegram from Lu Hsing-chi to the Chinese cabinet on 13 November 1913 exposes the Chinese frontier strategy: ‘As regards boundaries, if we can use as proof the map prepared by Fu Sung-mu, former Warden of the Marches, which shows Chiang-ta [Giamda] as the frontier, not only shall we be able to include several thousand li extra but every important strategical point will come into our possession (emphasis added).’48

  Expectedly, there was a robust rejection of the Chinese claims in the Tibetan statement on ‘Limits of Tibet’ tabled by Lonchen Shatra. This consisted of a voluminous set of documents, some of them duly translated into English, as concrete and empirical evidence of the Tibetan claim to their historical boundary comprising areas inhabited by Tibetan people, who were Buddhists sharing the same culture, language and way of life, and comprising also certain tribal areas under Tibetan control. One of the documents says: ‘These places formed part of Tibet during the reigns of the several successive righteous kings of the old dynasty, and after that of the Incarnate Chen-re-zi Drogon Phagpa and nineteen generations of the Sakya Hierarch’s line, and after them Desrid Phagdru and ten successive rulers of his line, three generations of Rimpung Chogyal and three generations of Tsangpa Gyalpo.’49 The line claimed by the Tibetans extended up to Tachienlu (Dartsendo) in the east.

  The Tibetan statement had seven descriptive parts, each being a brief historical sketch providing details of the relevant areas, along with the original documents and records. All of this made out a strong case for Tibet and at the same time effectively rebutted the Chinese claims. Among the records were fifty-six different registers, containing details such as ‘numbers of monasteries, houses or families, both religious and secular according to doorsteps and fireplaces, amount of income and expenditure, etc.’. In these areas, by and large, the writ of the Dalai Lama was unquestioned and it was His Holiness who appointed both the high lamas and the administrative officials and issued ‘all the warrants, deeds, patents and orders’. Moreover, the people were obliged to provide free labour, transport and riding ponies to the Tibetan officials. Various monasteries were required to send ‘noviciate monks to Sera, Drepung and Ganden monasteries and regular periodical money tributes to the Dalai Lama’. The Tibetan statement highlights the cruel, vengeful, high-handed, irreligious (anti-Buddhist) and unforgiving attitude of Chao Erh-feng and his ‘scorched-earth, pillage and plunder’ policy that earned him the nickname of ‘butcher Chao’. He had destroyed several temples and villages by setting fire to them without any provocation and massacred many hundreds of Lamas and lay people. He plundered gold, silver, rare bronze images and many other priceless treasures and relics. He cast the bronze and copper offering vessels of worship into bullets and small coins. The most sacrilegious of all his acts of vandalism was to have paper soles for shoes made out of leaves of sacred Buddhist scriptures which contained the teachings of the Lord Buddha.50

  Objectively viewed, however, Chao Erh-feng could be described as a ruthless but successful military leader who was a visionary in strategic terms. A strict disciplinarian, he is known to have executed a number of his own soldiers too for insubordination or for mutiny. With a relatively small force, his campaigns bore spectacular results, and his overall achievements are legendary. None of his successors came anywhere close to him, as leaders, tacticians or achievers.

  The Tibetans emphatically rebutted the Chinese claims, particularly those based on Chao’s so-called conquests, saying that

  Chao Erh-feng had been guilty of such glaring misdeeds and that even if he had a hundred lives he should forfeit every one of them to the law … to base their claim on his raids as conquests and call it incontrovertible proof of just claim, it is like trying to swallow a living person—an impossible feat …51

  By the end of his examination of the hotly contested territorial claims by the two sides, McMahon was convinced that the best way to resolve the matter was to divide the ‘enlarged Tibet’—based on history, culture, religion, tradition and the claims put forward by Lonchen Shatra—into two parts, Outer Tibet and Inner Tibet, as explained earlier (Figure 17).

  Figure 17: Proposed division into ‘Inner’ and ‘Outer’ Tibet: McMahon’s red and blue lines (1914)

  Regarding their political status, McMahon had not been able to finalize the extent of autonomy to be accorded to Inner Tibet, whereas Outer Tibet would be fully autonomous and under temporal and spiritual control of the Dalai Lama, with minimal presence of the Chinese, although it too would remain under China’s suzerainty. However, McMahon was clear that Inner Tibet should not be allowed to be converted into a regular Chinese province, and short of that the Chinese could do as they pleased. In his opinion, the Batang boundary pillar would be the most appropriate point on the Inner–Outer Tibet boundary line, which could follow the Yangtze–Mekong divide in the north–south direction. This would also ensure that the strategic node of Chamdo remained within autonomous Tibet. But this strategy would mean ceding the areas of Nyarong and Derge, two of the most productive districts of Tibet and Kokonor region, to Inner Tibet, in an effort to placate China. From a geopolitical and strategic point of view, McMahon had created the buffer of autonomous Outer Tibet between British India and the Chinese republic, particularly along the north-eastern frontier of India, as also between British India and the Russian Empire in the north-west. Evidently, this formula was based largely on the Mongolian model.

  The British government did not have an issue with the division of Tibet into inner and outer zones. The viceroy proposed the division on 18 December 1913, and Whitehall gave its approval without loss of much time, on 6 January 1914.52 While doing so, Whitehall’s telegram from the secretary of state cautioned the viceroy: ‘Tibetan position in non-autonomous zone will have to be clearly defined, and we should avoid incurring responsibility in respect of that area. Importance of including Zayul in autonomous zone will not be overlooked.’53 However, the home government took its time to go through the draft convention. It was at this stage that McMahon decided to define the southern limits of Tibet, keeping in mind this boundary’s impact on the security of the north-eastern frontier of British India, including north Burma. Having already received the valuable survey report of Captains Bailey and Morshead, McMahon asked Bell to carry out detailed discussions with Lonchen Shatra and his team to delineate this boundary on the map.

  Fourth Meeting: Delhi, 17 February 1914

  The British government’s amendment to the draft convention dated 14 February 1914 was received by telegraph immediately before the fourth meeting of the conference on 17 February. McMahon conducted the discussions on the basis of the guidelines contained in it.54 Having meticulously analysed the evidence produced by China and Tibet at the last conference, McMahon laid on the table the British understanding of the ‘limits of Tibet’, along with a skeleton map showing the ‘historic Tibetan frontiers’, indicated by a red line, and the supporting records made available by the Chinese and Tibetan sides. The British statement enunciated the rationale for division of Tibet into two zones, mentioning the Treaty of AD 822 and certain maps going back to the Chinese Tang dynasty period, and traced the historical events leading to the contemporary state of affairs at the time of the conference.55

  To end the ‘state of war’ that existed between the two sides, the map also drew the proposed boundary between Tibet and China in a blue line; east of it lay the ‘sphere of periodical Chinese intervention in Tibet’, and west of it lay the ‘sphere in which Chinese dictation was of a purely nominal nature’ and the unquestionable writ of the Dalai Lama prevailed.56 It was McMahon’s design that greater Tibet retained to a reasonable degree its political and geograp
hical identity, and that China was allowed to restore its ‘historic position’ in areas forming part of Inner Tibet. In this manner he put paid to the Chinese plans to incorporate eastern Tibet and the Marches into the new Hsikang province.

  McMahon’s dispensation of Inner and Outer Tibet and the boundary between them was vehemently opposed by both the Chinese and Tibetan delegates, and they conveyed their opposition to him in ‘notes verbale’ on 7 March. The Chinese were not prepared to accept the concept of Inner and Outer Tibet or to concede any areas brought under the Chinese yoke even briefly as a result of Chao Erh-feng’s campaigns. The Chinese claim was ridiculously exaggerated and oblivious of ground reality; it extended to Chiangta (Giamda) near Lhasa. Further, the Chinese were only prepared to concede ‘a limited Tibetan autonomy in a loosely defined area … in the immediate vicinity of Lhasa’. On Tibet’s part, it demanded inclusion of areas in eastern Tibet, such as Batang and Litang, on the basis of the clinching evidence furnished by their plenipotentiary, and also refused to accept many Tibetan-inhabited areas that were under no kind of control of the Chinese, as part of Inner Tibet.57

  As communicated in Sir John Jordan’s despatch number 131 of 2 April 1913:

  The Chinese claim to the Chiangta frontier appears to have been based on a recommendation by Chao Erh-feng in the spring of 1911, but even in the heyday of his advance, Chao never succeeded in securing any effective Chinese administration beyond a point between Derge and Chamdo, as is shown by the Chinese evidence contained in General Fu Sung-mu’s book on the Marches.58

  This has been aptly elaborated on in Alston’s memorandum of 30 August 1913:

  The historic Chinese frontier, as marked by the boundary stone of A.D. 1727, follows the Ching Ning Range just west of Batang, and is shown by a red line on the accompanying map. The dotted red line is considered by the Government of India as the extreme limit to which the Chinese could be allowed to advance towards the West without serious prejudice to the territorial integrity of Tibet and the safety of the North-East frontier of India. The Chinese show a persistent tendency to secure the submission of Pomed and Zayul, but they can show no historical claim, nor any claim by conquest, to these two districts which are entirely beyond the bounds of their control.59

  The Chinese intrigues in the Marches, at Chamdo, and in the Pomed region were aimed at scuttling the forthcoming conference in India by trying to reach some sort of an agreement with the Tibetans directly.

  In a note to Earl of Crewe, the Secretary of State for India, on 3 June 1913, Viceroy Lord Hardinge emphasized:

  I do not agree with Jordan’s view that, by showing weakness to the Chinese, we have a better chance of getting mining and railway concessions. The experience of the Russians is just the reverse. They have bullied the Chinese over Mongolia, and they are getting all the railway concessions they want from there.60

  Interestingly, while refuting the Tibetan claims based on tax collections from areas administered by Lhasa, the Chinese delegate stressed that the Dalai Lama’s spiritual authority ‘should not be confused’ with the temporal; the taxes paid to the Tibetans by the various tribes in Hsikang were merely contributions to the monasteries, ‘rather charity, than tax’.61 On 9 March 1914, McMahon categorically rebutted Ivan Chen’s statement and deputed Rose to convey his rationale in formulating the blue line in person to Chen. Yet it had become obvious to McMahon that the discussions had stalemated and that they were almost back to square one! Something needed to be done urgently. In the meanwhile, he had also received reports of armed clashes in the Marches between the Tibetans and the Chinese. Accordingly, he called for a meeting of the full conference on 11 March.

  Fifth Meeting: Delhi, 11 March 1914

  At the onset of this meeting, McMahon conveyed a warning to Ivan Chen and Lonchen Shatra of the grave consequences of the unabated hostilities and endeavours to change the ‘status quo’ along the frontier of eastern Tibet. The armistice was being violated by both sides and had to be put an end to. Neither side accepted the charges, but accusations flew back and forth. Thereafter, McMahon placed on the table the draft convention approved by Whitehall, with certain provisions ingeniously inserted to provide for leeway and bargaining space. He exhorted his colleagues to display statesmanship and an accommodative approach, stressing on the need for ‘prompt and decisive action’ to bring the onerous task entrusted to them to its culmination.

  In keeping with the established Chinese strategem of protracted negotiations, Ivan Chen desired to know if it wasn’t premature to discuss the draft convention before the broad principles had been accepted by all parties. He had not yet received assent from China, he said. McMahon dismissed this remark, insisting that, in view of the grave situation in the Marches, the matter had to be dealt with expeditiously, although acceptance of the general principles by all concerned was unexceptionable. It had come to the notice of the British government that Lu Hsing-chi, the Chinese intelligence operative at Calcutta, was behind the obstructive and non-cooperative attitude adopted by China during the proceedings. Unknown to him, all his secret communications from Calcutta to Peking and other places were being intercepted by the British, and a careful watch was being kept on his activities. On 10 July 1913, Lu Hsing-chi claimed that he had been appointed as ‘Officiating Chinese Resident in Lhasa’. This was unacceptable to the British Indian government. In view of his intrigues and other subversive activities, he was administered a warning on 30 July that ‘any attempt to carry out the duties of Amban would result in his deportation from India’.62 Writing about Lu’s role, McMahon said:

  Lu advised his government that McMahon felt that the internal situation in India made it impossible for us [India] to force upon China any agreement that was distasteful to her, and he [Lu] urged upon them a categorical refusal of our demands at Delhi and a direct appeal to His Majesty’s Government.63

  Peking did precisely as Lu advised, and on 20 March, McMahon was informed by Ivan Chen that his government had virtually rejected the entire draft convention. Simultaneously, representations were made both in London and Peking by the Chinese authorities demanding a better deal than the Simla conference was offering them. They were informed that the ‘legitimate interests’ of the three countries would be taken care of.

  McMahon responded to Ivan Chen on 26 March, urging the Chinese to keep in mind the present ground realities in Tibet and work in a constructive manner towards a mutually acceptable solution. He warned that in the absence of such cooperation he would be compelled to ‘withdraw’ the draft convention and the ‘accompanying map’, and to ‘lay before the Conference proposals of a different nature’.64 This warning unnerved the Chinese to some extent, and they displayed unease at the prospect of the conference being called off, which might perhaps result in an Anglo-Tibetan accord to the exclusion of China. The upsurge of activities of the Chinese in the frontier region at this time could be ascribed to this apprehension.

  Sixth Meeting: Simla, 7 April 1914

  At the behest of Ivan Chen, a sixth meeting was called on 7 April 1914, during which the latest Chinese proposal was presented. Disregarding the actual conditions in Tibet, the Chinese again changed the goalposts, which they referred to as their final concessions: China’s western boundary was now shifted back from Giamda to the Salween river; east of this river, all territory would be part of China to all intents and purposes. China further claimed that all of Tibet ‘west of the Salween shall be within the limits of the autonomy of Tibet, provided it is agreed that Tibet forms a portion of the territory of the Republic of China just the same as Outer Mongolia’.65

  Succinctly summed up, the Chinese version of the boundary would hive off a large part of greater Tibet comprising Kokonor region, parts of Amdo, Gyade, Derge, Nyarong and Chamdo regions, Markham, Batang and areas east of it up to Tachienlu, and eastern Kham, in favour of China. It was evident that this dispensation would not be acceptable to the other two parties. At the end of another frustrating round of discussions, McMahon had
a private tête-à-tête with Ivan Chen. After covering the course of the deliberations of the past six months and once again emphasizing the need for a mature understanding of the challenges involved in arriving at a ‘settlement which would prove equitable to the three countries concerned’, McMahon in no uncertain terms blamed the Chinese for the breakdown of the convention. Thereupon he decided to ‘suspend’ all interaction with Chen till such time as the Chinese side adopted a more reasonable stand. McMahon asked Rose to try and convince Chen as best he could, and also convey to him that the final meeting of the conference was being scheduled for 14 April, and would be of a ‘conclusive nature’.66

  In Peking too, Jordan exhorted the Wai Chiao-pu to see reason and ‘show the same magnanimity’ that the British had displayed in Lhasa in 1904, particularly in view of confirmation that had been recently received from Louis King, an intelligence officer who had been stationed in the Marches, that ‘the Chinese had never at any time received any revenues from the districts west of Chiamdo’,67 implying that the Chinese claims to those areas were baseless.

  However, one day prior to the final meeting, Ivan Chen appealed to the Foreign Office to postpone the meeting by a few days so that he could obtain further directions from Peking. His request was granted, with a clear understanding that at the next meeting on 22 April, the draft convention, along with the map that was presented on 17 February, would be placed before the conference for final approval and acceptance by the three delegates. A warning was also conveyed to Ivan Chen that if he failed to initial the above-mentioned documents, the entire proposal would be withdrawn. Ivan again requested for some concessions regarding the boundary, and McMahon, in an effort to take the proceedings forward, indicated he was prepared to offer ‘exclusion from Tibet of the Lake of Kokonor and the towns of Tachienlu and Atuntze’.68