Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites

by Dwayne Day

  Freedom of Space. The present possibility of launching a small artificial satellite into an orbit about the earth presents an early opportunity to establish a precedent for distinguishing between “national air” and “international space,” a distinction which could be to our advantage at some future date when we might employ larger satellites for intelligence purposes.6

  Land, Killian, and others considered a reconnaissance satellite to be technologically unrealistic in the near future. They believed that the CL-282 and an Air Force reconnaissance balloon program known as GENETRIX were more realistic near-term possibilities. But they also felt that the United States should begin establishing a precedent to enable future satellite reconnaissance missions. The TCP advocated such a strategy.

  THE SCIENTIFIC SATELLITE PROGRAM

  In parallel to the deliberations of the TCP, serious proposals for an initial U.S. scientific satellite emerged. Wernher von Braun and his colleagues at the Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama, teamed up with the Office of Naval Research to propose a satellite called Orbiter. Later in the year, the American Rocket Society prepared a detailed survey of possible scientific and other uses of a satellite and proposed to the National Academy of Sciences’ U.S. National Committee for the IGY that such a satellite be developed for use during the IGY.

  The Feed Back and the Killian reports were both highly secret, although the Orbiter proposal was not. The CL-282 proposal, in particular, was known to only a handful of people. One person who knew of all three projects, as well as the TCP report, was Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development Donald Quarles, no stranger to proposals for earth-orbiting satellites. In 1952, President Truman had asked Aristid Grosse, a physicist at Temple University, to prepare a report on the “Present Status of the Satellite Problem.” The report was not completed before Truman left office and instead was presented to Quarles, who was in charge of virtually all defense-related research projects in the early years of the Eisenhower presidency.

  On March 14, 1955 (the same day the TCP report was completed), the U.S. National Committee on the International Geophysical Year of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) presented a recommendation to Alan Waterman, the director of the National Science Foundation (NSF). The committee recommended that a scientific satellite be developed as part of the IGY.7 Quarles, who was aware of the TCP report’s findings, asked Waterman to formally suggest this idea to the National Security Council. Four days later Waterman sent a letter to Deputy Undersecretary of State Robert Murphy, proposing that the United States conduct just such a scientific mission.8 Those at the National Academy would not have been privy to information about Feed Back, CL-282, or the TCP report, so they were unlikely to have recognized the strategic objectives behind the satellite proposal.

  Four days later Murphy met with Waterman, Detlev Bronk, president of the NAS, and Lloyd Berkner, one of the academy’s influential members, to discuss the issue. In a letter one month later, Murphy stated that such a proposal would “as a matter of fact, undoubtedly add to the scientific prestige of the United States, and it would have a considerable propaganda value in the cold war.”9 Having gained the support of the Department of State, Waterman then discussed the issue once again with Quarles, who suggested that he consult the Director of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles, on how best to proceed. Waterman did so and gained Dulles’s support for the program. He also spoke with Percival Brundage, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, to gain his cooperation when needed. Thus the scientific satellite proposal now had the support of the departments of State and Defense and the CIA, as well the Bureau of the Budget. Waterman also agreed to formally propose the full program to an executive session of the National Science Board on May 20.10

  NSC 5520

  The speed at which these events took place is startling. Only nine weeks after the TCP report recommended the approval of a scientific satellite program, on May 20, 1955, the National Security Council approved a top-level policy document known as NSC 5520, “U.S. Scientific Satellite Program.” The document stated that the United States should develop a small scientific satellite weighing 5–10 pounds. It stated:

  The report of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the President’s Science Advisory Committee recommended that intelligence applications warrant an immediate program leading to a very small satellite in orbit around the earth, and that re-examination should be made of the principles or practices of international law with regard to “Freedom of Space” from the standpoint of recent advances in weapon technology.11

  The document continued:

  From a military standpoint, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated their belief that intelligence applications strongly warrant the construction of a large surveillance satellite. While a small scientific satellite cannot carry surveillance equipment and therefore will have no direct intelligence potential, it does represent a technological step toward the achievement of the large surveillance satellite, and will be helpful to this end so long as the small scientific satellite program does not impede development of the large surveillance satellite.12

  NSC 5520 also stated:

  Furthermore, a small scientific satellite will provide a test of the principle of “Freedom of Space.” The implications of this principle are being studied within the Executive Branch. However, preliminary studies indicate that there is no obstacle under international law to the launching of such a satellite.

  It should be emphasized that a satellite would constitute no active military offensive threat to any country over which it might pass. Although a large satellite might conceivably serve to launch a guided missile at a ground target, it will always be a poor choice for the purpose. A bomb could not be dropped from a satellite on a target below, because anything dropped from a satellite would simply continue alongside in the orbit.

  Although the document correctly noted the limited utility of satellites as active military offensive threats, this was not the purpose of the surveillance satellite program. In fact, deploying weapons systems in orbit has never been a major aspect of American military space policy.

  A year later, another White House document stated that the scientific satellite program would have the target date of 1958 “with the understanding that the program developed thereunder will not be allowed to interfere with the ICBM and IRBM programs but will be given sufficient priority by the Department of Defense in relation to other weapons systems to achieve the objectives of NSC 5520.”13 In other words, the scientific satellite would not be allowed to interfere with ballistic missile programs like Atlas and Jupiter, but it also would not be allowed to languish without attention while the Department of Defense focused on other programs such as military satellites. Such inattention would have effectively undercut the entire purpose of NSC 5520, to lay the foundation for reconnaissance satellites. At the same time, the launching of such a satellite was not to interfere with the development of those satellites. In reality, this latter point was moot, for the reconnaissance satellite program was severely underfunded at the time.

  NSC 5520 directed that the scientific satellite program be associated with the International Geophysical Year. “Freedom of space” could be challenged by the Soviets more easily if the United States simply launched a satellite at any time. The IGY provided an international context for conducting the program—a legitimate cover story even better than the civilian auspices of the existing program. Even if the Soviets had not announced their intention to build a satellite for the IGY, the United States would be able to use the IGY to justify its program if the Soviets complained. Quarles himself specifically noted this only a week after the approval of NSC 5520.14

  WAS A POLICY EVEN NEEDED?

  The TCP report, perhaps one of the most influential documents of the early Cold War, served as the starting point for a number of major American defense programs in the 1950s. It recommended the development of not only what became the U-2, the scientific satellite program, and reconnaissance s
atellites, but also what became the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile, the SOSUS underwater sonar array, and the extension of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line.

  Implementing this extensive list of recommendations required a concerted effort by various agencies and military services. It required an extensive oversight effort as well, a task that fell to the Operations Coordinating Board of the National Security Council, which produced a progress report in June 1955 on the status of the TCP recommendations. This progress report, known as NSC 5522, also included various government departments’ views on the panel’s recommendations.

  In response to the TCP recommendation concerning freedom of space, NSC 5522 stated:

  State, Treasury, Defense and Justice Comment: Any unilateral statement by the U.S. concerning the freedom of outer space is unnecessary It is clear that the jurisdiction of a state over the air space above its territory is limited and that the operation of an artificial satellite in outer space would not be in violation of international law. State and Justice point out that by the convention on international civil aviation of 1944 (to which the U.S. is a party, but the U.S.S.R. is not) and by customary law every State has exclusive sovereignty “over the air space above its territory.” However, air space ends with the atmosphere. There has been no recognition that sovereignty extends into airless space beyond the atmosphere.15

  This statement may have appeared self-evident to those involved, but in effect it begged the question: if space was not sovereign territory, how was a nation to determine where the atmosphere ended and space began? The edge of the atmosphere was not a clearly defined boundary and, indeed, could not be defined until satellites began orbiting the earth to measure the extent of the atmosphere. Still, it made sense for the departments to advise that the United States not issue a unilateral statement concerning freedom of space, for such a statement would only draw attention to the subject at a time when the whole point of the scientific satellite program was to establish freedom of space in as innocuous a manner as possible.

  The CIA also weighed in on the matter. Its comments are very illuminating and highly prescient, especially in light of the world reaction to Sputnik two years later:

  The psychological warfare value of launching the first earth satellite makes its prompt development of great interest to the intelligence community and may make it a crucial event in sustaining the international prestige of the United States.

  There is an increasing amount of evidence that the Soviet Union is placing more and more emphasis on the successful launching of the satellite. Press and radio statements since September 1954 have indicated a growing scientific effort directed toward the successful launching of the first satellite. Evidently the Soviet Union has concluded that their satellite program can contribute enough prestige of cold war value or knowledge of military value to justify the diversion of the necessary skills, scarce material and labor from immediate military production. If the Soviet effort should prove successful before a similar United States effort, there is no doubt but that their propaganda would capitalize on the theme of the scientific and industrial superiority of the communist system.

  The successful launching of the first satellite will undoubtedly be an event comparable to the first successful release of nuclear energy in the world’s scientific community, and will undoubtedly receive comparable publicity throughout the world. Public opinion in both neutral and allied states will be centered on the satellite’s development. For centuries scientists and laymen have dreamed of exploring outer space. The first successful penetration of space will probably be the small satellite vehicle recommended by the Technological Capabilities Panel. The nation that first accomplishes this feat will gain incalculable prestige and recognition throughout the world.

  The United States’ reputation as the scientific and industrial leader of the world has been of immeasurable value in competing against Soviet aims in both neutral and allied states. Since the war the reputation of the United States’ scientific community has been sharply challenged by Soviet progress and claims. There is little doubt but that the Soviet Union would like to surpass our scientific and industrial reputation in order to further her influence over neutralist states and to shake the confidence of states allied with the United States. If the Soviet Union’s scientists, technicians and industrialists were apparently to surpass the United States and first explore outer space, her propaganda machine would have sensational and convincing evidence of Soviet superiority.

  If the United States successfully launches the first satellite, it is most important that this be done with unquestionable peaceful intent. The Soviet Union will undoubtedly attempt to attach hostile motivation to this development in order to cover her own inability to win this race. To maximize the effectiveness of Soviet accusations, the satellite should be launched in an atmosphere of international good will and common scientific interest. For this reason, the CIA strongly concurs in the Department of Defense’s suggestion that a civilian agency such as the U.S. National Committee of the IGY supervise its development and that an effort be made to release some of the knowledge to the international scientific community.

  The small scientific vehicle is also a necessary step in the development of a larger satellite that could possibly provide early warning information through continuous electronic and photographic surveillance of the USSR. A future satellite that could directly collect intelligence data would be of great interest to the intelligence community.

  The Department of Defense has consulted with the [Central Intelligence] Agency, and we are aware of their recommendations, which have our full concurrence and strong support.16

  LEGAL ISSUES

  If those involved with the legal issues needed their thinking focused about the subject of international airspace, they could ask for no better lesson than that provided by the GENETRIX reconnaissance balloon program. Beginning in January 1956 hundreds of balloons were launched to drift over the Soviet Union, their cameras photographing the countryside. The majority were never seen again and American officials knew that they had come down (or been shot down) inside the Soviet Union. On February 7, anticipating the Soviet response, Eisenhower suggested to Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that the operation be suspended and “we should handle it so it would not look as though we had been caught with jam on our fingers.” On February 9 the Soviets held a press conference outside Spridonovka Palace. About fifty balloons and instrument containers were placed on display. The balloons, the Soviets said, were part of an espionage project and had been a clear violation of their airspace. This was a major embarrassment for the United States.

  Meanwhile, legal issues concerning exactly what “freedom of space” meant occupied U.S. government lawyers. The State Department’s Policy Planning Staff was assigned the task of reporting on-going progress on achieving several of the TCP report’s recommendations. On October 2, 1956, the Policy Planning Staff reported some preliminary thinking on the issue of freedom of space:

  So far as law is concerned, space beyond the earth is an uncharted region concerning which no firm rules have been established. The law on the subject will necessarily differ with the passage of time and with practical efforts at space navigation. Various theories have been advanced concerning the upper limits of a state’s jurisdiction, but no firm conclusions are now possible.

  A few tentative observations may be made: (1) A state could scarcely claim territorial sovereignty at altitudes where orbital velocity of an object is practicable (perhaps in the neighborhood of 200 miles); (2) a state would, however, be on strong ground in claiming territorial sovereignty up through the “air space” (perhaps ultimately to be fixed somewhere in the neighborhood of 40 miles); (3) regions of space which are eventually established to be free for navigation without regard to territorial jurisdiction will be open not only to one country or a few, but to all; (4) if, contrary to planning and expectation, a satellite launched from the earth should not be consumed upon reentering the atmo
sphere, and should fall to the earth and do damage, the question of liability on the part of the launching authority would arise.17

  A downed GENETRIX reconnaissance balloon system recovered in China. Hundreds of GENETRIX balloons and their camera payloads came down in the Soviet Union and China in 1956 and embarrassed the United States. President Eisenhower finally forbade their future use. (Photo courtesy of Dino Brugioni)

  SELECTING A SATELLITE PLAN

  After the scientific satellite concept was approved by NSC 5520, it had to be turned into programmatic reality. Not surprisingly, this task was given to Donald Quarles, who was essentially the adminstration’s point man on space issues. On June 8, 1955, Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson delegated to Quarles the responsibility for implementing the plan, which had essentially been Quarles’s idea all along. Quarles then created an Advisory Group on Special Capabilities, chaired by Homer J. Stewart, to select a scientific satellite and a method for launching it. The advisory group held hearings, listened to presentations by the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and ultimately selected the Navy’s proposal, Project Vanguard. The Air Force, already involved in the development of an intelligence satellite, was not seriously interested in the scientific satellite program.18

  Many of those involved, particularly Wernher von Braun and his group of engineers working under Army auspices (for the Army Ballistic Missile Agency, or ABMA), were surprised that the Army team had lost out, since they had begun developing their proposal a year before. Years later, when explaining the decision, members of the advisory group gave a number of reasons, including Navy developments in satellite instrumentation, the supposed lower costs and growth potential of the Vanguard, and the desire to avoid using a ballistic missile for the program.19 The last point was the most relevant one: NSC 5520 was quite explicit in stating that the satellite program should not interfere at all with ICBM and IRBM programs. There was no way that the Army proposal could be selected without interfering with Army development of the Redstone booster as the basis of a ballistic missile to be called Jupiter—at least without significant additional cost.