Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites

by Dwayne Day

  THE DECISION IS REEVALUATED

  The initial decision in favor of the Navy program did not settle the issue. Von Braun’s group justifiably felt that they were more qualified to complete the mission than the unproven Vanguard team. Throughout 1955 and 1956 the Army team proceeded with development of a Jupiter/Redstone rocket designed to conduct re-entry tests of ballistic nose cones. It also continued to lobby behind the scenes to obtain permission to proceed with its own satellite launching program.

  Von Braun’s group’s complaints about not being selected for the program eventually reached Washington. On April 23, 1956, the Army informed the Office of the Secretary of Defense that a Jupiter could orbit a satellite in January 1957. On May 16, 1956, the Secretary of Defense’s Special Assistant for Guided Missiles rejected any use of the Jupiter as an alternative to Vanguard. Apparently not convinced that the Army had gotten the message, six days later the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense informed the ABMA that no plans or preparations should be initiated for using the Redstone or Jupiter as launch vehicles.

  But in government there is never such a thing as a final answer. So ABMA took its appeal to the National Security Council. It complained to Deputy Secretary of State Herbert Hoover Jr., who was chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, assigned to monitor NSC directives. Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, Eisenhower’s staff secretary, reported the group’s appeal:

  On May 28th Secretary [Deputy Secretary of State] Hoover called me over to mention a report he had received from a former associate in the engineering and development field regarding the earth satellite project. The best estimate is that the present project would not be ready until the end of ’57 at the earliest, and probably well into ’58. Redstone had a project well advanced when the new one was set up. At minimal expense ($2–$5 million) they could have a satellite ready for firing by the end of 1956 or January 1957. The Redstone project is one essentially of German scientists and it is American envy of them that has led to a duplicative project.

  I spoke to the President about this to see what would be the best way to act on the matter. He asked me to talk to Secretary Wilson. In the latter’s absence, I talked to Secretary [Deputy Secretary of Defense Reuben B.] Robertson today and he said he would go into the matter fully and carefully to try to ascertain the facts. In order to establish the substance of this report, I told him it came through Mr. Hoover (Mr. Hoover had said I might do so if I felt it necessary).20

  Von Braun’s group, not privy to the strategic considerations that had led to its losing the competition, blamed the decision on anti-German prejudice. This incident started a new evaluation of the satellite selection process, which ultimately rejected the Huntsville group once again. On June 22, 1956, Homer J. Stewart reported the results of two meetings held by the group in late April to Charles C. Furnas, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development (by this time Quarles had left that position to become Secretary of the Air Force). Stewart reported that although Project Vanguard was suffering some minor setbacks and was short of highly capable people, in general the project was on a satisfactory schedule and “one or more scientific satellites can be successfully placed in orbit during the IGY.”21 Stewart also stated:

  Redstone re-entry vehicle No. 29, now scheduled for firing in January 1957, apparently will be technically capable of placing a 17 pound payload consisting principally of radio beacons and doppler-equipment in a 200-mile orbit, even with the degradation in performance below the present design figures which might reasonably be expected, but without any appreciable further margin. This capability will depend upon successful accomplishment of several developments, such as the use of a new fuel in the Redstone booster, and the spinning cluster of fifteen solid propellant motors. The probability of success of this single flight cannot be reliably predicted now, but it would doubtless be less than 50 per cent.

  Stewart explained why the Army proposal should be rejected once again:

  In any case, such a single flight would not fulfill the Nation’s commitment for the International Geophysical Year because it would have to be made before the beginning of that period. Adequate tracking and observation equipment for the scientific utilization of results would not be available at this time. Moreover, any announcement of such a flight (or worse, any leakage of information if no prior announcement were made) would seriously compromise the strong moral position internationally which the United States presently holds in the IGY due to its past frank and open acts and announcements as respects VANGUARD.

  Stewart mentioned that a Redstone (in actuality a Jupiter) could be used as a backup later in 1957 if Vanguard fell behind schedule and that No. 29 was the only vehicle that could be used without interfering with the Redstone program. He concluded, “At the present time, therefore, the Group does not recommend activating a satellite program based on the Redstone missile, but will reconsider this question and the possibilities of the ICBM program at its subsequent meetings when the critical items of the VANGUARD program are further advanced.”22

  On July 5, 1956, E. V. Murphree, DoD’s Special Assistant for Guided Missiles, wrote to Reuben B. Robertson Jr., the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Murphree stated that he had looked into the possibility of using a Jupiter reentry test vehicle for launching a satellite into orbit. He stated that the January 1957 test could be adapted to this purpose with little effort and no impact on the program and said that an attempt could be made in September 1956, although this would affect the Jupiter program.

  Murphree further noted that proposals for using the Jupiter were not new and that the original Redstone satellite and reentry test vehicle proposals resulted from a common study (made by Wernher von Braun) which argued that the same vehicle could be used for both. Murphree also stated that the first two tests of the Jupiter were essentially propulsion system tests and could accomplish much of their goals for that program even if used for satellite launch attempts. Murphree continued, “There is, however, room for serious doubt that two isolated flight attempts would result in achieving a successful satellite, and the dates of such flights would be prior to the Geophysical Year for which a satellite capability is specifically required, and prior to the time when tracking instrumentation will be available.”23

  Murphree then stated that these facts had been taken into consideration at the time that the Office of the Secretary of Defense reviewed the satellite program and decided to assign the mission to the Navy group. He said, “That decision was based largely on a conviction that the VANGUARD proposal offered the greater promise for success. The history of increasing demands for funds for this program confirms the conviction that this is not a simple matter. I know of no new evidence available to warrant a change in that decision at this time.”

  The Vanguard satellite was small, scientific, and, most important, civilian—all necessary for peacefully establishing the right of “freedom of space.” Here a Vanguard satellite sits atop its launch vehicle.

  The rest of Murphree’s memorandum is extremely interesting and is reprinted below in full:

  While it is true that the VANGUARD group does not expect to make its first satellite attempt before August 1957, whereas a satellite attempt could be made by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency as early as January 1957, little would be gained by making such an early satellite attempt as an isolated action with no follow-up program. In the case of VANGUARD, the first flight will be followed up by five additional satellite attempts in the ensuing year. It would be impossible for the ABMA group to make any satellite attempt that has a reasonable chance of success without diversion of the efforts of their top-flight scientific personnel from the main course of the JUPITER program, and to some extent, diversion of missiles from the early phase of the re-entry test program. There would also be a problem of additional funding not now provided.

  For these reasons, I believe that to attempt a satellite flight with the JUPITER reentry test vehicle without a preliminary program assuring a very strong probability
of its success would most surely flirt with failure. Such probability could only be achieved through the application of a considerable scientific effort at ABMA. The obvious interference with the progress of the JUPITER program would certainly present a strong argument against such diversion of scientific effort.

  On discussing the possible use of the JUPITER re-entry test vehicle to launch a satellite with Dr. Furnas, he pointed out certain objections to such a procedure. He felt there would be a serious morale effect on the VANGUARD group to whom the satellite test has been assigned. Dr. Furnas also pointed out that a satellite effort using the JUPITER re-entry test vehicle may have the effect of disrupting our relations with the non-military scientific community and international elements of the IGY group.

  I don’t know if I have a clear picture of the reasons for your interest in the possibility of using the JUPITER re-entry test vehicle for launching the satellite. I think it may be helpful if Dr. Furnas and I discuss this matter with you, and I’m trying to arrange for a date to do this on Monday.24

  Robertson’s special assistant, Charles G. Ellington, forwarded the memos to White House Staff Secretary Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster wrote on the bottom of Ellington’s cover memo, “Secy. Robertson feels no change should be made—per Mr. Ellington. Reported to President.”25

  HOW TO “BEAT” THE SOVIETS

  As one would expect, scientists involved in the satellite program stressed that a scientifically useful program would enhance U.S. prestige. National Science Foundation Director Alan Waterman specifically noted that the schedule was less important than the prestige to be gained from a program that produced a major scientific breakthrough. In other words, being first but not scientifically significant was not as important for national prestige as accomplishing something scientifically noteworthy.26 One could win the physical race, but lose the scientific competition.

  Rather surprisingly, this was also the conclusion of the National Security Council’s Planning Board. NSC 5520 had mentioned the possibility of the Soviets developing a satellite, but took no position on whether the United States should attempt to launch before the Soviets. The Defense Department’s response in NSC 5522 stated with more urgency that the United States should be first, but must do so carefully. The NSC Planning Board, in November 1956, made this remarkable statement:

  The USSR can be expected to attempt to launch its satellite before ours and to attempt to surpass our effort in every way. It is vitally important in terms of the stated prestige and psychological purposes that the United States make every effort to (1) make possible a successful launching as soon as practicable and (2) put on as effective an IGY scientific program as possible. The prestige and psychological set-backs inherent in a possible earlier success and larger satellite by the USSR could at least be partially be offset by a more effective and complete scientific program by the United States. Even if the United States achieved the first successful launching and orbit, but the USSR put on a stronger scientific program, the United States could lose its initial advantage.27

  Thus, one year before Sputnik, the NSC’s official position was that the United States could lose prestige even if it launched a satellite first but the Soviets developed a better space science program. Therefore, science was given higher priority than schedule.

  The issue of the propaganda value of launching a satellite had been mentioned in numerous documents, including NSC 5520 and NSC 5522.28 It was even the focus of a study at the RAND Corporation. Clearly, many top U.S. policymakers felt that it was a major issue. Eisenhower always dismissed these concerns. He did not believe that it would be that important an issue.29 From a domestic political standpoint, he proved to be dreadfully wrong, but not necessarily from the standpoint of international law.

  SPUTNIK CRISIS?

  By the fall of 1957, the Vanguard satellite program was proceeding roughly on schedule, with first launch anticipated for late 1957 or early 1958, during the IGY. No one expected the first launch to be successful. The satellite reconnaissance program, however, was underfunded, and not making significant progress. Land and Killian took renewed interest in it by the fall of 1957 and the Science Advisory Committee even sponsored a special briefing for the White House on the subject on September 20.30 The strategy was proceeding, but by October it was overtaken by events.

  On October 4, 1957, the Soviet Union launched a 184-pound metallic ball called Sputnik. It was instantly major news around the world. On October 7, acting on the publicity generated in the wake of Sputnik, President Eisenhower asked Quarles, by then Deputy Secretary of Defense, to explain why the United States was in the position it was. Goodpaster related Quarles’s explanation in the minutes of the meeting:

  The Science Advisory Committee had felt, however, that it was better to have the Earth satellite proceed separately from military development. One reason was to stress the peaceful character of the effort, and a second was to avoid the inclusion of material, to which foreign scientists might be given access, which is used in our own military rockets.… [Quarles] went on to add that the Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space—this seems to be generally accepted as orbital space, in which the missile is making an inoffensive passage.31

  Two days later, Eisenhower mentioned this issue again. “When military people begin to talk about this matter, and to assert that other missiles could have been used to launch a satellite sooner, they tend to make the matter look like a ‘race,’ which is exactly the wrong impression.”32 Eisenhower’s fiscal conservatism was yet another important part of this deliberate strategy—he did not want to spend a lot of money in an arms race or a space race with the Soviets. But equally important was his desire to not unnecessarily inflame the Cold War. Interservice rivalry was not simply expensive; it also exacerbated tensions with the Soviet Union.

  THE CIA AND THE SCIENTIFIC SATELLITE

  When Alan Waterman met with Allen Dulles in early May 1955 to discuss NSF sponsorship of a scientific satellite, he also met with Richard Bissell, whom he described as “the one in Central Intelligence who is following this closely.”33 Bissell had good reasons to follow it closely, since he was then in the middle of managing the newly created U-2 reconnaissance aircraft program. Use of the U-2 would violate international law.

  As the scientific satellite program continued and ran into significant cost overruns, surprisingly the CIA provided money for it to continue. In April 1957, the director of the Bureau of the Budget, Percival Brundage, sent a lengthy memo to Eisenhower on Vanguard cost overruns. Vanguard was initially supposed to cost $15–20 million. By spring 1957, it was projected to cost 10 times that amount. Brundage recounted the funding difficulties of the program and stated, “Apparently, both the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation are very reluctant to continue to finance this project to completion. But each is quite prepared to have the other do so.” Brundage also noted that the National Science Foundation had contributed an extra $5.8 million in funds to the Department of Defense to fund the program and that the CIA had contributed $2.5 million of its own money as well.34

  Why was the CIA, which had no official stake in the scientific satellite program and no space programs underway or even under study, willing to spend its own money on a civilian scientific space program? The answer is unknown. But it was likely due to Bissell’s intervention, since he was the person delegated to follow the program and he was also in charge of the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft.35 By April 1957, when the CIA provided the money to the scientific satellite program, the U-2 had already made nearly a dozen flights over the Soviet Union, each protested vigorously but quietly by the Soviets. Although the CIA did not have a reconnaissance satellite program at this time, it would be given one by Eisenhower less than a year later, a program code-named CORONA. Bissell was placed in charge of that endeavor as well. Bissell was in control of a substantial amount of funding for covert operations at CIA and it is likely that
the money to support the scientific satellite program came from these funds or from DCI Allen Dulles’s substantial discretionary account.

  Brundage concluded his memo to Eisenhower by noting that the Air Force had already started its own, much larger reconnaissance satellite. “Therefore, whether or not the International Geophysical Year satellite project is completed, research in this area will not be dropped.” But this missed the point, since the scientific satellite program had less to do with research than with establishing legal precedent. Brundage may have been yet another top government official unaware of this secret strategy.

  Richard Bissell, as CIA manager of the U-2 program, provided $2.5 million of CIA funding for the U.S. scientific satellite program. He wanted to ensure that the legal questions that surrounded the U-2 aircraft’s overflight of foreign territory did not apply to reconnaissance satellites. (Photo courtesy of the CIA)

  GOING UNDER COVER

  The Soviets’ launch of Sputnik II on November 5 had an even more profound public relations impact than its predecessor. Sputnik II was not only far larger than Sputnik I, but it also carried a dog, demonstrating a sophistication that belied early administration attempts to downplay the Soviet achievement. The size of the payload was clearly sufficient for the carrying of an atomic bomb, which heightened Americans’ fear that the Soviets could now effectively attack the United States. A little over a month later, the U.S. attempt to launch the Vanguard satellite ended in embarrassing failure. Clearly, in the realm of space exploration, the Soviets had taken a substantial lead. From an international legal standpoint, this should have rendered the subject of freedom of space moot, but it did not.