Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites

by Dwayne Day

  In November, newly appointed Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy proposed centralizing control of the various American space projects then underway, such as Vanguard and WS-117L, along with advanced ballistic missile development. They would be put in a Defense Special Projects Agency (DSPA), which would be responsible for whatever projects the secretary would assign to it. The idea for the DSPA apparently came from the Science Advisory Council in mid-October, just days after both Sputnik’s launch and McElroy’s nomination.36 Eisenhower himself expressed the opinion that a fourth service should be established to handle the “missiles activity.”37 McElroy said that he was weighing the idea of a “Manhattan Project” for antiballistic missiles. The president thought that a separate organization might be a good idea for this problem as well.38 In testimony before Congress, Quarles, who might easily have been regarded as an Air Force partisan, stated that long-range, surface-to-surface missiles had been assigned to the Air Force because it possessed the targeting and reconnaissance capabilities to use them, not because they accomplished a unique Air Force mission.39 Space could conceivably be treated in the same way.

  Although the plan for incorporating ballistic missile development in it was eliminated, the idea of a new space agency proceeded. A Special Projects Agency would act as a central authority for all U.S. space programs and would essentially contract out missions to the separate services, civilian government agencies, and even universities and private industry. “Above the level of the three military services, having its own budget, it would be able to concentrate on the new and the unknown without involvement in immediate requirements and inter service rivalries.” McElroy stated in front of Congress that “the vast weapons systems of the future in our judgment need to be the responsibility of a separate part of the Defense Department.”40 This proposal was placed in a DoD reorganization bill. At this point, it was still assumed that the entire American space program would remain under military control, although at the level of the Secretary of Defense in an office specially created to manage it.

  A mockup of the Sputnik II payload complete with Soviet dog. When the Soviet Union launched Sputniks I and II, they raised fears of surprise attack among many in the West. But they also unwittingly played into the Eisenhower administration’s hands and established the concept of “freedom of space” for future reconnaissance satellites. (Photo courtesy of the National Reconnaissance Office)

  Discussion of the Defense Special Projects Agency continued within the administration. Its name was changed to the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) and Eisenhower sent a message to Congress on January 7 requesting supplemental appropriations for the agency.41

  On February 7, 1958, James Killian and Din Land, who was also a member of the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, met with Eisenhower and his staff secretary, General Andrew Goodpaster. They briefed the president on the potential of both a recoverable space capsule and a supersonic reconnaissance aircraft program, suggesting that in order to speed up the development of a reconnaissance satellite, the United States should pursue the recoverable capsule idea as an “interim” solution. Eisenhower accepted this recommendation and the satellite program was soon named CORONA.

  An equally important result of this first meeting was the decision to finalize Secretary of Defense McElroy’s proposal and create ARPA to house highly technical defense research programs. General Electric executive Roy Johnson was named as its director. Eisenhower decided to give ARPA control of all military space programs, including the military man-in-space program, meteorological programs, and WS-117L.

  Sputnik also led to the creation of NASA, a civilian space program. Although Eisenhower initially felt that the military could handle the task of space science, he was eventually persuaded that a civilian space agency was needed, in part by Vice-President Nixon, who argued that a civilian agency was important for international prestige purposes. A military space agency could not be used as an effective means to show the flag, particularly if the president wanted to prevent escalation of the Cold War.

  The creation of these new organizations, both civilian and military, proceeded apace, drawing much attention from the Congress and the public. ARPA was officially in charge of the nation’s WS-117L reconnaissance satellite program, whose existence the Air Force had leaked to the press in the aftermath of Sputnik. At the same time, Eisenhower directed that the recoverable satellite program—the program that eventually became known as CORONA—be handled by a covert team involving the Air Force and the CIA. For many who had been involved in it, including those who had proposed it, the recoverable satellite program simply ceased to exist. As far as they knew, WS-117L was the only U.S. reconnaissance satellite program.

  Those in charge of WS-117L eventually divided it into several programs, including the SENTRY reconnaissance program (later SAMOS), an early warning satellite known as MIDAS, and Discoverer, an engineering and development program that was to include the launching of biomedical payloads such as mice and monkeys. In reality, Discoverer was nothing more than a cover for the CORONA program, and SENTRY appears to have been continued publicly at least in part as a sleight of hand to distract attention away from Discoverer. Canceling it would have been too suspicious and would also have raised the ire of the Air Force.

  FREEDOM OF SPACE MARCHES ON

  The National Security Council addressed the issue of the militarization of space in August 1958. Known as NSC 5814/1, the document stated that the United States should urgently seek a political framework that would place the uses of U.S. reconnaissance satellites in a political and psychological context favorable to the U.S. intelligence effort. Responding to this, the State Department declared that one of the priorities for the United States was establishing an acceptable policy framework for the WS-117L program.42 Even within this highly classified document, CORONA was nowhere mentioned.

  Protection of WS-117L became a U.S. goal. The State Department debated satellite reconnaissance internally and eventually brought it before the United Nations. At the suggestion of the United States, the United Nations created the UN Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS). COPUOS became the source of much heated debate over the next several years, as the Soviet Union refused to participate and instead complained about American nuclear weapons and overseas bases, stating that U.S. concessions on these issues were a prerequisite to its participation in COPUOS. Calls by COPUOS for cooperation between the superpowers on space projects were met with derision from the Soviets, who feared that such cooperative efforts would reveal the limitations of their ICBM technology. Much controversy was generated, but no actual policy evolved. While the issue was being discussed in the United Nations, the newspapers, and in classified State Department meetings, CORONA continued its development totally unknown to even those at high levels of the government who were discussing the legal protection of the more overt WS-117L program.

  The advent of military reconnaissance satellites themselves created its own legal issues. In January 1959, O. G. Villard Jr. of Stanford University, a member of the National Academy of Sciences and the Space Science Board (SSB), wrote Lloyd V. Berkner, chairman of the SSB. Villard expressed concern that the U.S. military might attempt to portray its satellite launchings as scientific in nature. This deception, he suggested, could have negative effects on American space science, particularly with regard to international cooperation. Villard stated that it was in the best interests of U.S. scientists that such deception not occur.

  On January 28, 1959, Berkner brought the issue to the attention of Killian, Eisenhower’s science advisor. On February 13 Killian mentioned it to NASA Administrator T. Keith Glennan and Gordon Gray, Eisenhower’s special assistant for national security affairs. Gray felt that the concerns raised by Villard might require further action by the National Security Council.43 The results of their discussion of the issue are not known, but this discussion took place over a year after Eisenhower had directed that a small re
connaissance satellite program be peeled away from the bigger reconnaissance program (the one that Villard referred to in his letter) and be conducted covertly. Indeed, the first launch was scheduled to take place later in the month—under the cover of a scientific program!

  The first Discoverer was launched on February 28, 1959. It was actually a test of equipment for the CORONA program. Although the satellite did not reach orbit, the Soviets still protested the flight, decrying its military nature. This prompted Richard Leghorn, the architect of Eisenhower’s 1955 Open Skies proposal and the president of Itek, which was then managing the manufacture of CORONA cameras, to draft a proposal for the president titled “Political Action and Satellite Reconnaissance.” In it Leghorn stated:

  The problem is not one of technology. It is not a problem of vulnerability to Soviet military measures. The problem is one of the political vulnerability of current reconnaissance satellite programs.

  For many years the U.S. has had overflight capabilities (aircraft and balloons) which have been substantially invulnerable to Soviet military countermeasures, but very vulnerable politically. Already the Communists (East Germany) have attacked Discoverer I as an espionage activity, and we can anticipate powerful Soviet political countermeasures to the Discoverer/SENTRY series.44

  Leghorn continued:

  What is needed is a program to put reconnaissance satellites in the white through early and vigorous political action designed to:

  1. blunt in advance Soviet political countermeasures;

  2. gain world acceptance for the notion that the surveillance satellites are powerful servants of world peace and security, and are not illegitimate instruments of espionage;

  3. regain the political initiative of the open skies proposal.

  Leghorn was fully aware of all American reconnaissance satellite efforts and it is impossible to believe that his proposal was anything other than a continuation of his earlier thinking on overflight. But at this time the United States still had not orbited a reconnaissance satellite (and would not for over a year, suffering a string of failures with CORONA) and was not officially anywhere near flying a reconnaissance satellite. Taking any public position at all on the subject seemed premature at best and foolish at worst. From the White House’s point of view it was best to let the political deliberations at the United Nations run their course. Leghorn’s proposal went nowhere.

  Gary Powers’s U-2 reconnaissance aircraft was shot down on May 1, 1960, creating yet another public embarrassment for Eisenhower and revealing a carefully planned and executed strategy to gather intelligence on the Soviet Union—a strategy that also relied upon a scientific cover story to mask the true purpose of the high-flying plane. While the downing ruined the upcoming summit, the U-2 had proved an intelligence bonanza for the United States, something that Eisenhower did not wish to emphasize even in his television address to the nation following the incident.45 Eisenhower felt that it was better to suffer the humiliation than to reveal American capabilities or gloat about American ingenuity.

  Soviet Premier Khrushchev used the event to maximum propaganda effect, rejecting Eisenhower’s renewed proposal for Open Skies. Khrushchev declared “as long as arms exist our skies will remain closed and we will shoot down everything that is there without our consent.” France’s President Charles de Gaulle then asked whether this would include satellites, noting that Soviet satellites had already carried cameras into space. Khruschev replied, “As for sputniks, the U.S. has put up one that is photographing our country. We did not protest; let them take as many pictures as they want.”46

  The State Department continued to discuss the subject of freedom of space. By mid-1960, the Bureau of European Affairs at the State Department had drafted a policy paper concerning the planned upcoming launch of the SAMOS reconnaissance satellite. One option proposed was an open approach, which advocated the sharing of all reconnaissance photographs taken by SAMOS. This option was considered more likely to facilitate wide acceptance of photographic satellites than the closed approach.47 While the State Department debated the merits of sharing reconnaissance satellite photographs with the world community (something that the United States had not done even with U-2 photographs), CORONA’s engineers were preparing for another launch. The memo was written August 12. Six days later CORONA returned its first images of the Soviet Union.

  The State Department continued to examine the benefits of the American space program, but gradually even SAMOS itself was enveloped within the dark cloak of secrecy that surrounded CORONA. State Department discussions of satellite reconnaissance in general, and public statements in particular, ceased. Freedom of space had been achieved. Further discussion was largely irrelevant. And CORONA began to chalk up success after success, as the press focused on SAMOS and the public paid attention to NASA and its daring Mercury astronauts. Early American space policy involved wrapping a riddle (CORONA) in a mystery, and surrounding it with an enigma.

  GERALD HAINES

  6

  THE NATIONAL RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

  Its Origins, Creation, and Early Years

  Formally established on September 6, 1961, as a super-secret, covert agency, the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) has since developed and managed the revolutionary U.S. satellite reconnaissance effort.1 Focusing its efforts primarily on the Soviet Union, for nearly 30 years the NRO provided U.S. policymakers and military planners with unique and essential raw intelligence on Soviet war-making capabilities that threatened or might threaten U.S. national security interests. The intelligence product from NRO reconnaissance satellite systems tracked Soviet weapon and missile developments, military operations, order of battle information, nuclear capabilities, and industrial and agricultural production.

  It is difficult to exaggerate the value of this unique source of intelligence to U.S. policymakers and military planners.2 The role played by the NRO during the Cold War was absolutely crucial. Moreover, the NRO and the satellite reconnaissance systems it developed radically changed the entire concept of intelligence. The satellite systems allowed the United States to collect an ever-increasing volume of detailed intelligence never before available and permitted U.S. civilian and military decisionmakers far more flexibility in reacting to potential Soviet threats during the Cold War. In addition, the NRO’s unique mission drove innovative scientific and technological developments in space and created a model for government-industry cooperation in a crisis atmosphere.

  This brief study outlines the origins of the U.S. reconnaissance effort in the 1950s and traces the creation and development of the NRO in the 1960s. It also examines in some detail the struggle between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the U.S. Air Force for control of overhead reconnaissance and the NRO. In 1991, the Cold War ended as the Soviet Union collapsed. In 1992, the Department of Defense declassified the fact of the existence of the NRO and thus officially recognized the existence of this unique organization. Only now may the vital role the NRO played during the Cold War be revealed. This is an initial part of that story.

  ORIGINS OF THE NRO: THE U-2

  The origins of the National Reconnaissance Office date back to the first cooperative efforts between the CIA and the U.S. Air Force to develop overhead reconnaissance systems. First was the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, begun in late 1954 and developed by a small team consisting of the CIA, the Air Force, and several defense contractors. To achieve maximum security, CIA official Richard Bissell and Air Force Brigadier General Osmond Ritland made the project self-sufficient. It had its own contract management, administrative, financial, logistics, communications, and security personnel. Funding was also kept separate from other CIA or Air Force projects. Bissell reported directly to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Allen Dulles. Bissell’s use of “unvouchered funds” simplified competitive bidding procedures and significantly sped up the procurement process.3 It simplified security because such funds did not need to be reported.

  Bissell and Ritland gave Lockhe
ed “performance” specifications for the U-2 rather than using the standard Air Force practice of giving “technical” specifications. According to Clarence L. “Kelly” Johnson, Lockheed program manager for the U-2, this allowed Lockheed to focus on performance goals rather than individual specifications. It gave the contractor greater flexibility in designing and building the aircraft. The arrangement became a unique partnership between the Lockheed Corporation and the government. Such unique streamlined management and acquisition practices were employed throughout the U-2’s development, and set a precedent for NRO’s approach to reconnaissance satellites. Time and results mattered, not bureaucratic paperwork.4

  President Eisenhower authorized the project on November 27, 1954, and less than 10 months later, on August 5, 1955, the U-2 made its maiden flight. From June 20, 1956, through May 1960, the U-2 made a total of 24 overflights of the Soviet Union. Thousands of feet of film poured into the CIA’s small Photo-Intelligence Division.

  The photographs obtained by the first U-2 flights provided a bonanza of data for U.S. intelligence agencies. In fact, a photograph of the Saratov-Engels airfield at Ramenskoye, southeast of Moscow, taken on July 5, 1956, put to rest the “bomber gap” debate. It showed fewer than three dozen of the new Soviet Myasishchev-4 (Bison) heavy bombers. At the time, the U.S. Air Force was claiming that nearly 100 of the Bisons were already deployed. The U-2 missions could find no additional Bisons at other major Soviet airfields. DCI Allen Dulles referred to this photograph in later years as the “million-dollar photo.”5