The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  Finally, (25) although there are many forms of oligarchies and democracies, Socrates speaks of their revolutions as though there were only one form of either of them.

  * * *

  1 Cp. iv. c. 2.

  2 iii. 1282b 18–30, Cp. 1280a 9 sqq.

  3 Cp. iii. 1284b 28–34.

  4 Cp. 1304b 4.

  5 Cp. iv. 1294a 21.

  6 Cp. iv. 1292b 11.

  7 Cp. vii. 1333b 34.

  8 Cp. iii. 1287a 7.

  9 a26.

  10 Cp. iv. 1296a 13.

  11 Cp. c. 6.

  12 Cp. c. 5.

  13 1301a 33 sqq., b35 sqq.

  14 1. 32.

  15 Cp. iii. 1284a 17.

  16 Cp. 1304b 27.

  17 Cp. iii. 1284b 8.

  18 1301a 33.

  19 Cp. ii. 1274a 12; viii. 1341a 29.

  20 Cp. 1311a 39.

  21 Cp. 1302a 17.

  22 Cp. 1302b 23.

  23 Cp. 1302b 31, iv. 1300a 17.

  24 Cp. 1309a 14.

  25 Cp. 1310b 14; Plato, Rep. viii. 565 D.

  26 Cp. 1310b 20.

  27 Cp. 1303b 2.

  28 1303b 37–1304a 77.

  29 1305b 2 sqq.

  30 i. e. the illegitimate sons.

  31 Cp. iv. c. 7.

  32 Cp. 1303a 31.

  33 Cp. ii. 1270a 18.

  34 1302b 4, 1303a 20–25, b17.

  35 Cp. iv. 1296a 32.

  36 Cp. Nic. Eth. v. 1129a 13.

  37 Cp. iv. 1297a 13–38.

  38 Cp. vi. 1321a 26.

  39 1305b 23 sqq.

  40 Cp. 1305a 7.

  41 Cp. 1303b 17–31.

  42 Cp. 1306b 6–16.

  43 Cp. 1302b 18; iii. 1284a 17.

  44 Cp. 1316a 39.

  45 iv. 1296b 15, vi. 1320a 14. Cp. ii. 1270b 21 sq., iv. 1294b 37.

  46 Cp. viii. 1337a 14.

  47 Cp. iv. 1295b 17.

  48 Cp. Pl. Rep. viii. 556 D.

  49 Cp. 1305a 8; Plato, Rep. viii. 565 D.

  50 Cp. 1305a 15.

  51 1. 2 sq.

  52 Cp. iii. 1285b 6.

  53 iii. 1279b 6 sq., iv. 1295a 19.

  54 Cp. iii. 1285a 24.

  55 Cp. 1284a 26.

  56 1310a 40 sqq.

  57 Cp. 1302b 2, 21, 1311a 25.

  58 Cp. i. 1259a 7.

  59 Cp. Plato, Laws, iii. 695.

  60 Cp. Rhetoric, ii. 1382a 12.

  61 1302b 25–33, 1304b 20–1306b 21.

  62 1311a 15–22.

  63 Cp. vi. 1319b 27.

  64 1313a 35–1314a 29.

  65 Cp. 1308b 15.

  66 Cp. i. 1254a 25.

  67 This is an extract from the much fuller account in Rep. viii. 546 B.C.

  68 Rep. viii. 544 C.

  69 Rep. viii. 550 E.

  70 Rep. viii. 551 D.

  71 sc. from oligarchy to democracy.

  72 Rep. viii. 555 D.

  73 Rep. viii. 557 C, 564.

  BOOK VI

  1 We have now considered the varieties of the deliberative or supreme power in states, and the various arrangements of law-courts and state offices, and which of them are adapted to different forms of government.1 We have also spoken of the destruction and preservation of constitutions, (35) how and from what causes they arise.2

  Of democracy and all other forms of government there are many kinds; and it will be well to assign to them severally the modes of organization which are proper and advantageous to each, (40) adding what remains to be said about them.3 [1317a] Moreover, we ought to consider the various combinations of these modes themselves; for such combinations make constitutions overlap one another, so that aristocracies have an oligarchical character, and constitutional governments incline to democracies.4

  When I speak of the combinations which remain to be considered, and thus far have not been considered by us, I mean such as these:—when the deliberative part of the government and the election of officers is constituted oligarchically, (5) and the law-courts aristocratically, or when the courts and the deliberative part of the state are oligarchical, and the election to offices aristocratical, or when in any other way there is a want of harmony in the composition of a state.5

  I have shown already6 what forms of democracy are suited to particular cities, (10) and what of oligarchy to particular peoples, and to whom each of the other forms of government is suited. Further, we must not only show which of these governments is the best for each state, but also briefly proceed to consider7 how these and other forms of government are to be established. (15)

  First of all let us speak of democracy, which will also bring to light the opposite form of government commonly called oligarchy. For the purposes of this inquiry we need to ascertain all the elements and characteristics of democracy, since from the combinations of these the varieties of democratic government arise. (20) There are several of these differing from each other, and the difference is due to two causes. One (1) has been already mentioned8—differences of population; for the popular element may consist of husbandmen, (25) or of mechanics, or of labourers, and if the first of these be added to the second, or the third to the two others, not only does the democracy become better or worse, but its very nature is changed. A second cause (2) remains to be mentioned: the various properties and characteristics of democracy, (30) when variously combined, make a difference. For one democracy will have less and another will have more, and another will have all of these characteristics. There is an advantage in knowing them all, whether a man wishes to establish some new form of democracy, or only to remodel an existing one.9 Founders of states try to bring together all the elements which accord with the ideas of the several constitutions; but this is a mistake of theirs, (35) as I have already remarked10 when speaking of the destruction and preservation of states. We will now set forth the principles, characteristics, and aims of such states.

  2 The basis of a democratic state is liberty; which, (40) according to the common opinion of men, can only be enjoyed in such a state;—this they affirm to be the great end of every democracy.11 [1317b] One principle of liberty is for all to rule and be ruled in turn, and indeed democratic justice is the application of numerical not proportionate equality; whence it follows that the majority must be supreme, (5) and that whatever the majority approve must be the end and the just. Every citizen, it is said, must have equality, and therefore in a democracy the poor have more power than the rich, because there are more of them, and the will of the majority is supreme. This, (10) then, is one note of liberty which all democrats affirm to be the principle of their state. Another is that a man should live as he likes.12 This, they say, is the privilege of a freeman, since, on the other hand, not to live as a man likes is the mark of a slave. This is the second characteristic of democracy, whence has arisen the claim of men to be ruled by none, (15) if possible, or, if this is impossible, to rule and be ruled in turns; and so it contributes to the freedom based upon equality.

  Such being our foundation and such the principle from which we start, the characteristics of democracy are as follows:—the election of officers by all out of all; and that all should rule over each, (20) and each in his turn over all; that the appointment to all offices, or to all but those which require experience and skill,13 should be made by lot; that no property qualification should be required for offices, or only a very low one; that a man should not hold the same office twice, or not often, or in the case of few except military offices: that the tenure of all offices, (25) or of as many as possible, should be brief; that all men should sit in judgement, or that judges selected out of all should judge, in all matters, or in most and in the greatest and most important—such as the scrutiny of accounts, the constitution, and private contracts; that the assembly should be supreme over all causes, or at any rate over the most important, (30) and the magistrates over none or only over a very few. Of all magistracies, a council is the most democratic14 when there is not the means of paying all the citizens, but when they are paid even this is
robbed of its power; for the people then draw all cases to themselves, as I said in the previous discussion.15 (35) The next characteristic of democracy is payment for services; assembly, law-courts, magistrates, everybody receives pay, when it is to be had; or when it is not to be had for all, then it is given to the law-courts and to the stated assemblies, to the council and to the magistrates, or at least to any of them who are compelled to have their meals together. And whereas oligarchy is characterized by birth, (40) wealth, and education, the notes of democracy appear to be the opposite of these—low birth, poverty, mean employment. [1318a] Another note is that no magistracy is perpetual, but if any such have survived some ancient change in the constitution it should be stripped of its power, and the holders should be elected by lot and no longer by vote. These are the points common to all democracies; but democracy and demos in their truest form are based upon the recognized principle of democratic justice, (5) that all should count equally; for equality implies that the poor should have no more share in the government than the rich, and should not be the only rulers, but that all should rule equally according to their numbers.16 And in this way men think that they will secure equality and freedom in their state. (10)

  3 Next comes the question, how is this equality to be obtained? Are we to assign to a thousand poor men the property qualifications of five hundred rich men? and shall we give the thousand a power equal to that of the five hundred? or, if this is not to be the mode, ought we, still retaining the same ratio, to take equal numbers from each and give them the control of the elections and of the courts?—Which, (15) according to the democratical notion, is the juster form of the constitution—this or one based on numbers only? Democrats say that justice is that to which the majority agree, (20) oligarchs that to which the wealthier class; in their opinion the decision should be given according to the amount of property. In both principles there is some inequality and injustice. For if justice is the will of the few, any one person who has more wealth than all the rest of the rich put together, ought, upon the oligarchical principle, to have the sole power—but this would be tyranny; or if justice is the will of the majority, (25) as I was before saying,17 they will unjustly confiscate the property of the wealthy minority. To find a principle of equality in which they both agree we must inquire into their respective ideas of justice.

  Now they agree in saying that whatever is decided by the majority of the citizens is to be deemed law. Granted:—but not without some reserve; since there are two classes out of which a state is composed—the poor and the rich—that is to be deemed law, (30) on which both or the greater part of both agree; and if they disagree, that which is approved by the greater number, and by those who have the higher qualification. For example, suppose that there are ten rich and twenty poor, and some measure is approved by six of the rich and is disapproved by fifteen of the poor, and the remaining four of the rich join with the party of the poor, (35) and the remaining five of the poor with that of the rich; in such a case the will of those whose qualifications, when both sides are added up, are the greatest, should prevail. If they turn out to be equal, there is no greater difficulty than at present, when, if the assembly or the Courts are divided, (40) recourse is had to the lot, or to some similar expedient. [1318b] But, although it may be difficult in theory to know what is just and equal, the practical difficulty of inducing those to forbear who can, if they like, encroach, is far greater, for the weaker are always asking for equality and justice, (5) but the stronger care for none of these things.

  4 Of the four kinds of democracy, as was said in the previous discussion,18 the best is that which comes first in order; it is also the oldest of them all. I am speaking of them according to the natural classification of their inhabitants. For the best material of democracy is an agricultural population;19 there is no difficulty in forming a democracy where the mass of the people live by agriculture or tending of cattle. (10) Being poor, they have no leisure, and therefore do not often attend the assembly, and not having the necessaries of life they are always at work, and do not covet the property of others. Indeed, they find their employment pleasanter than the cares of government or office where no great gains can be made out of them, (15) for the many are more desirous of gain than of honour.20 A proof is that even the ancient tyrannies were patiently endured by them, as they still endure oligarchies, if they are allowed to work and are not deprived of their property; for some of them grow quickly rich and the others are well enough off. (20) Moreover, they have the power of electing the magistrates and calling them to account;21 their ambition, if they have any, is thus satisfied; and in some democracies, although they do not all share in the appointment of offices, except through representatives elected in turn out of the whole people, (25) as at Mantinea;—yet, if they have the power of deliberating, the many are contented. Even this form of government may be regarded as a democracy, and was such at Mantinea. Hence it is both expedient and customary in the afore-mentioned22 type of democracy that all should elect to offices, (30) and conduct scrutinies, and sit in the law-courts, but that the great offices should be filled up by election and from persons having a qualification; the greater requiring a greater qualification, or, if there be no offices for which a qualification is required, then those who are marked out by special ability should be appointed. Under such a form of government the citizens are sure to be governed well (for the offices will always be held by the best persons; the people are willing enough to elect them and are not jealous of the good). (35) The good and the notables will then be satisfied, for they will not be governed by men who are their inferiors, and the persons elected will rule justly, because others will call them to account. Every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be allowed to do just as he pleases; (40) for where absolute freedom is allowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in every man. [1319a] But the principle of responsibility secures that which is the greatest good in states; the right persons rule and are prevented from doing wrong, and the people have their due. It is evident that this is the best kind of democracy, and why? Because the people are drawn from a certain class. (5) Some of the ancient laws of most states were, all of them, useful with a view to making the people husbandmen. They provided either that no one should possess more than a certain quantity of land, or that, if he did, the land should not be within a certain distance from the town or the acropolis. Formerly in many states there was a law forbidding any one to sell his original allotment of land.23 (10) There is a similar law attributed to Oxylus, which is to the effect that there should be a certain portion of every man’s land on which he could not borrow money. A useful corrective to the evil of which I am speaking would be the law of the Aphytaeans, who, (15) although they are numerous, and do not possess much land, are all of them husbandmen. For their properties are reckoned in the census, not entire, but only in such small portions that even the poor may have more than the amount required.

  Next best to an agricultural, and in many respects similar, (20) are a pastoral people, who live by their flocks; they are the best trained of any for war, robust in body and able to camp out. The people of whom other democracies consist are far inferior to them, (25) for their life is inferior; there is no room for moral excellence in any of their employments, whether they be mechanics or traders or labourers. Besides, people of this class can readily come to the assembly, because they are continually moving about in the city and in the agora; whereas husbandmen are scattered over the country and do not meet, (30) or equally feel the want of assembling together. Where the territory also happens to extend to a distance from the city, there is no difficulty in making an excellent democracy or constitutional government; for the people are compelled to settle in the country, (35) and even if there is a town population the assembly ought not to meet, in democracies, when the country people cannot come. We have thus explained how the first and best form of democracy should be constituted; it is clear that the other or inferior sorts will deviate in a regula
r order, (40) and the population which is excluded will at each stage be of a lower kind. [1319b]

  The last form of democracy, that in which all share alike, is one which cannot be borne by all states, and will not last long unless well regulated by laws and customs. The more general causes which tend to destroy this or other kinds of government have been pretty fully considered.24 (5) In order to constitute such a democracy and strengthen the people, the leaders have been in the habit of including as many as they can, and making citizens not only of those who are legitimate, but even of the illegitimate, and of those who have only one parent a citizen, (10) whether father or mother;25 for nothing of this sort comes amiss to such a democracy. This is the way in which demagogues proceed. Whereas the right thing would be to make no more additions when the number of the commonalty exceeds that of the notables and of the middle class—beyond this not to go. When in excess of this point, (15) the constitution becomes disorderly, and the notables grow excited and impatient of the democracy, as in the insurrection at Cyrene; for no notice is taken of a little evil, but when it increases it strikes the eye. Measures like those which Cleisthenes26 passed when he wanted to increase the power of the democracy at Athens, (20) or such as were taken by the founders of popular government at Cyrene, are useful in the extreme form of democracy. Fresh tribes and brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of families should be restricted and converted into public ones; in short, (25) every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with one another and get rid of old connexions. Again, the measures which are taken by tyrants appear all of them to be democratic; such, for instance, as the licence permitted to slaves (which may be to a certain extent advantageous) and also that of women and children, (30) and the allowing everybody to live as he likes.27 Such a government will have many supporters, for most persons would rather live in a disorderly than in a sober manner.