The Basic Works of Aristotle (Modern Library Classics)

by Mckeon, Richard

  5 The mere establishment of a democracy is not the only or principal business of the legislator, or of those who wish to create such a state, (35) for any state, however badly constituted, may last one, two, or three days; a far greater difficulty is the preservation of it. The legislator should therefore endeavour to have a firm foundation according to the principles already laid down concerning the preservation and destruction of states;28 he should guard against the destructive elements, and should make laws, (40) whether written or unwritten, which will contain all the preservatives of states. [1320a] He must not think the truly democratical or oligarchical measure to be that which will give the greatest amount of democracy or oligarchy, but that which will make them last longest.29 The demagogues of our own day often get property confiscated30 in the law-courts in order to please the people. (5) But those who have the welfare of the state at heart should counteract them, and make a law that the property of the condemned should not be public and go into the treasury but be sacred. Thus offenders will be as much afraid, for they will be punished all the same, and the people, having nothing to gain, (10) will not be so ready to condemn the accused. Care should also be taken that state trials are as few as possible, and heavy penalties should be inflicted on those who bring groundless accusations; for it is the practice to indict, not members of the popular party, but the notables, although the citizens ought to be all attached to the constitution as well, (15) or at any rate should not regard their rulers as enemies.

  Now, since in the last and worst form of democracy the citizens are very numerous, and can hardly be made to assemble unless they are paid, (20) and to pay them when there are no revenues presses hardly upon the notables (for the money must be obtained by a property-tax and confiscations and corrupt practices of the courts, things which have before now overthrown many democracies); where, I say, there are no revenues, the government should hold few assemblies, and the law-courts should consist of many persons, but sit for a few days only. This system has two advantages: first, the rich do not fear the expense, even although they are unpaid themselves when the poor are paid; and secondly, (25) causes are better tried, for wealthy persons, although they do not like to be long absent from their own affairs, do not mind going for a few days to the law-courts. Where there are revenues the demagogues should not be allowed after their manner to distribute the surplus; the poor are always receiving and always wanting more and more, (30) for such help is like water poured into a leaky cask. Yet the true friend of the people should see that they be not too poor, for extreme poverty lowers the character of the democracy; measures therefore should be taken which will give them lasting prosperity; and as this is equally the interest of all classes, (35) the proceeds of the public revenues should be accumulated and distributed among its poor, if possible, in such quantities as may enable them to purchase a little farm, or, at any rate, make a beginning in trade or husbandry. [1320b] And if this benevolence cannot be extended to all, money should be distributed in turn according to tribes or other divisions, and in the meantime the rich should pay the fee for the attendance of the poor at the necessary assemblies; and should in return be excused from useless public services. By administering the state in this spirit the Carthaginians retain the affections of the people; their policy is from time to time to send some of them into their dependent towns, (5) where they grow rich.31 It is also worthy of a generous and sensible nobility to divide the poor amongst them, and give them the means of going to work. The example of the people of Tarentum is also well deserving of imitation, (10) for, by sharing the use of their own property with the poor, they gain their good will.32 Moreover, they divide all their offices into two classes, some of them being elected by vote, the others by lot; the latter, that the people may participate in them, and the former, that the state may be better administered. A like result may be gained by dividing the same offices, (15) so as to have two classes of magistrates, one chosen by vote, the other by lot.

  Enough has been said of the manner in which democracies ought to be constituted.

  6 From these considerations there will be no difficulty in seeing what should be the constitution of oligarchies. We have only to reason from opposites and compare each form of oligarchy with the corresponding form of democracy. (20)

  The first and best attempered of oligarchies is akin to a constitutional government. In this there ought to be two standards of qualification; the one high, the other low—the lower qualifying for the humbler yet indispensable offices and the higher for the superior ones. (25) He who acquires the prescribed qualification should have the rights of citizenship. The number of those admitted should be such as will make the entire governing body stronger than those who are excluded, and the new citizen should be always taken out of the better class of the people. The principle, narrowed a little, (30) gives another form of oligarchy; until at length we reach the most cliquish and tyrannical of them all, answering to the extreme democracy, which, being the worst, requires vigilance in proportion to its badness. (35) For as healthy bodies and ships well provided with sailors may undergo many mishaps and survive them, whereas sickly constitutions and rotten ill-manned ships are ruined by the very least mistake, so do the worst forms of government require the greatest care. [1321a] The populousness of democracies generally preserves them (for number is to democracy in the place of justice based on proportion); whereas the preservation of an oligarchy clearly depends on an opposite principle, viz. good order.

  7 As there are four chief divisions of the common people—husbandmen, (5) mechanics, retail traders, labourers; so also there are four kinds of military forces—the cavalry, the heavy infantry, the light-armed troops, the navy.33 When the country is adapted for cavalry, then a strong oligarchy is likely to be established. For the security of the inhabitants depends upon a force of this sort, (10) and only rich men can afford to keep horses. The second form of oligarchy prevails when the country is adapted to heavy infantry; for this service is better suited to the rich than to the poor. But the light-armed and the naval element are wholly democratic; and nowadays, where they are numerous, (15) if the two parties quarrel, the oligarchy are often worsted by them in the struggle. A remedy for this state of things may be found in the practice of generals who combine a proper contingent of light-armed troops with cavalry and heavy-armed. And this is the way in which the poor get the better of the rich in civil contests; being lightly armed, (20) they fight with advantage against cavalry and heavy infantry. An oligarchy which raises such a force out of the lower classes raises a power against itself. And therefore, since the ages of the citizens vary and some are older and some younger, the fathers should have their own sons, while they are still young, taught the agile movements of light-armed troops; and these, (25) when they have been taken out of the ranks of the youth, should become light-armed warriors in reality. The oligarchy should also yield a share in the government to the people, either, as I said before, to those who have a property qualification,34 or, as in the case of Thebes,35 to those who have abstained for a certain number of years from mean employments, (30) or, as at Massalia, to men of merit who are selected for their worthiness, whether previously citizens or not. The magistracies of the highest rank, which ought to be in the hands of the governing body, should have expensive duties attached to them, and then the people will not desire them and will take no offence at the privileges of their rulers when they see that they pay a heavy fine for their dignity. It is fitting also that the magistrates on entering office should offer magnificent sacrifices or erect some public edifice, (35) and then the people who participate in the entertainments, and see the city decorated with votive offerings and buildings, will not desire an alteration in the government, and the notables will have memorials of their munificence. (40) This, however, is anything but the fashion of our modern oligarchs, who are as covetous of gain as they are of honour; oligarchies like theirs may be well described as petty democracies. [1321b] Enough of the manner in which democracies and oligarchies
should be organized.

  8 Next in order follows the right distribution of offices, their number, (5) their nature, their duties, of which indeed we have already spoken.36 No state can exist not having the necessary offices, and no state can be well administered not having the offices which tend to preserve harmony and good order. In small states, as we have already remarked,37 there must not be many of them, (10) but in larger there must be a larger number, and we should carefully consider which offices may properly be united and which separated.

  First among necessary offices is that which has the care of the market; a magistrate should be appointed to inspect contracts and to maintain order. (15) For in every state there must inevitably be buyers and sellers who will supply one another’s wants; this is the readiest way to make a state self-sufficing and so fulfil the purpose for which men come together into one state.38 A second office of a similar kind undertakes the supervision and embellishment of public and private buildings, (20) the maintaining and repairing of houses and roads, the prevention of disputes about boundaries, and other concerns of a like nature. This is commonly called the office of City-warden, (25) and has various departments, which, in more populous towns, are shared among different persons, one, for example, taking charge of the walls, another of the fountains, a third of harbours. There is another equally necessary office, and of a similar kind, having to do with the same matters without the walls and in the country—the magistrates who hold this office are called Wardens of the country, or Inspectors of the woods. (30) Besides these three there is a fourth office of receivers of taxes, who have under their charge the revenue which is distributed among the various departments; these are called Receivers or Treasurers. Another officer registers all private contracts, (35) and decisions of the courts, all public indictments, and also all preliminary proceedings. This office again is sometimes subdivided, in which case one officer is appointed over all the rest. These officers are called Recorders or Sacred Recorders, Presidents, and the like.

  Next to these comes an office of which the duties are the most necessary and also the most difficult, (40) viz. that to which is committed the execution of punishments, or the exaction of fines from those who are posted up according to the registers; and also the custody of prisoners. [1322a] The difficulty of this office arises out of the odium which is attached to it; no one will undertake it unless great profits are to be made, and any one who does is loath to execute the law. Still the office is necessary; for judicial decisions are useless if they take no effect; and if society cannot exist without them, (5) neither can it exist without the execution of them. It is an office which, being so unpopular, should not be entrusted to one person, but divided among several taken from different courts. In like manner an effort should be made to distribute among different persons the writing up of those who are on the register of public debtors. (10) Some sentences should be executed by the magistrates also, and in particular penalties due to the outgoing magistrates should be exacted by the incoming ones; and as regards those due to magistrates already in office, when one court has given judgement, another should exact the penalty; for example, the wardens of the city should exact the fines imposed by the wardens of the agora, and others again should exact the fines imposed by them. For penalties are more likely to be exacted when less odium attaches to the exaction of them; but a double odium is incurred when the judges who have passed also execute the sentence, (15) and if they are always the executioners, they will be the enemies of all.

  In many places, while one magistracy executes the sentence, another has the custody of the prisoners, as, for example, ‘the Eleven’ at Athens. It is well to separate off the jailorship also, (20) and try by some device to render the office less unpopular. For it is quite as necessary as that of the executioners; but good men do all they can to avoid it, and worthless persons cannot safely be trusted with it; for they themselves require a guard, and are not fit to guard others. (25) There ought not therefore to be a single or permanent officer set apart for this duty; but it should be entrusted to the young, wherever they are organized into a band or guard, and different magistrates acting in turn should take charge of it.

  These are the indispensable officers, and should be ranked first;—next in order follow others, equally necessary, but of higher rank, (30) and requiring great experience and fidelity. Such are the officers to which are committed the guard of the city, and other military functions. Not only in time of war but of peace their duty will be to defend the walls and gates, (35) and to muster and marshal the citizens. In some states there are many such offices; in others there are a few only, while small states are content with one; these officers are called generals or commanders. [1322b] Again, if a state has cavalry or light-armed troops or archers or a naval force, it will sometimes happen that each of these departments has separate officers, who are called admirals, or generals of cavalry or of light-armed troops. And there are subordinate officers called naval captains, and captains of light-armed troops and of horse; having others under them:—all these are included in the department of war. (5) Thus much of military command.

  But since many, not to say all, of these offices handle the public money, there must of necessity be another office which examines and audits them, (10) and has no other functions. Such officers are called by various names—Scrutineers, Auditors, Accountants, Controllers. Besides all these offices there is another which is supreme over them, and to this is often entrusted both the introduction and the ratification of measures, or at all events it presides, in a democracy, (15) over the assembly. For there must be a body which convenes the supreme authority in the state. In some places they are called ‘probuli’, because they hold previous deliberations, but in a democracy more commonly ‘councillors’.39 These are the chief political offices.

  Another set of officers is concerned with the maintenance of religion; priests and guardians see to the preservation and repair of the temples of the gods and to other matters of religion. (20) One office of this sort may be enough in small places, but in larger ones there are a great many besides the priesthood; for example superintendents of public worship, (25) guardians of shrines, treasurers of the sacred revenues. Nearly connected with these there are also the officers appointed for the performance of the public sacrifices, except any which the law assigns to the priests; such sacrifices derive their dignity from the public hearth of the city. They are sometimes called archons, sometimes kings,40 and sometimes prytanes. (30)

  These, then, are the necessary offices, which may be summed up as follows: offices concerned with matters of religion, with war, with the revenue and expenditure, with the market, with the city, with the harbours, with the country; also with the courts of law, (35) with the records of contracts, with execution of sentences, with custody of prisoners, with audits and scrutinies and accounts of magistrates; lastly, there are those which preside over the public deliberations of the state. There are likewise magistracies characteristic of states which are peaceful and prosperous, and at the same time have a regard to good order: such as the offices of guardians of women, guardians of the laws, guardians of children, and directors of gymnastics; also superintendents of gymnastic and Dionysiac contests, and of other similar spectacles. [1323a] Some of these are clearly not democratic offices; for example, the guardianships of women and children41—the poor, (5) not having any slaves, must employ both their women and children as servants.

  Once more: there are three offices according to whose directions the highest magistrates are chosen in certain states—guardians of the law, probuli, councillors—of these, the guardians of the law are an aristocratical, the probuli an oligarchical, the council a democratical institution. Enough of the different kinds of offices. (10)

  * * *

  1 Bk. iv. 14–16.

  2 Bk. v.

  3 1318b 6–1319a 6.

  4 Cp. iv. 1293b 34.

  5 These questions are not actually discussed by A.

  6 iv. 12.

  7
Cp. iv. 1289b 20.

  8 iv. 1291b 17–28, 1292b 25 sqq., 1296b 26–31.

  9 Cp. iv. 1289a 1.

  10 v. 1309b 18–1310a 36.

  11 Cp. Plato, Rep. viii. 557 sqq.

  12 Cp. v. 1310a 31.

  13 Cp. iv. 1298a 27.

  14 Cp. iv. 1299b 32

  15 Cp. iv. 1299b 38.

  16 Cp. iv. 1291b 30.

  17 Cp. iii. 1281a 14.

  18 iv. 1292b 22–1293a 10.

  19 Cp. iv. 1292b 25–33.

  20 Cp. iv. 1297b 6.

  21 Cp. ii. 1274a 15.

  22 l. 6.

  23 Cp. ii. 1266b 21.

  24 v. 2–7, 1311a 22–1313a 16.

  25 Cp. iii. 1278a 27.

  26 Cp. iii. 1275b 35.

  27 CP. v. 1313b 32.

  28 Cp. Bk. v.

  29 Cp. v. 1313a 20–33.

  30 Cp. v. 1305a 3.

  31 Cp. ii. 1273b 18.

  32 Cp. ii. 1263a 37.

  33 Cp. iv. 1289b 32–40.

  34 1320b 25.

  35 Cp. iii. 1278a 25.

  36 iv. 15.

  37 iv. 1299a 34–b 10.

  38 Cp. i. i252b 27; Nic. Eth v. 1134a 26; Pl. Rep ii. 369.

  39 Cp. iv. 1299b 31.

  40 Cp. iii. 1285b 23.

  41 Cp. iv. 1300a 4.

  BOOK VII

  1 He who would duly inquire about the best form of a state ought first to determine which is the most eligible life; while this remains uncertain the best form of the state must also be uncertain; for, (15) in the natural order of things, those may be expected to lead the best life who are governed in the best manner of which their circumstances admit. We ought therefore to ascertain, first of all, which is the most generally eligible life, and then whether the same life is or is not best for the state and for individuals. (20)