Grasping Gallipoli

by Peter Chasseaud

  On 31 August, while the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was still retreating from Mons towards the Marne, the Dardanelles issue was discussed by Churchill and Kitchener. The latter was called away to Paris on the following day, to force Sir John French to cooperate with the French instead of insisting on pulling the BEF out of the line to refit but, at this time of great crisis in France, Churchill, in view of the imminent risk of Turkey declaring war, asked Sir Archibald Murray, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), to task two officers to examine and work out, with two officers from the Admiralty, a ‘plan for the seizure of the Gallipoli Peninsula, by means of a Greek army of adequate strength, with a view to admitting a British fleet to the sea of Marmara’. Churchill later claimed to be ignorant, at this stage, of the existing Greek plan to capture the Peninsula, the outline of which was communicated in September. He emphasised that this was ‘Urgent, as Turkey may make war on us at any moment.’ The Official Historian took the view that, at this stage, no naval operation was contemplated (all the fighting would be done by the Greeks, who would merely ‘admit the British fleet to the Marmara’), and there was no idea of precipitating hostilities.38 On the face of it this seems a most disingenuous assumption.

  On 1 September the Director of Military Operations, Major-General Charles Callwell (who had drawn up the 1906 memorandum), recalled to the War Office from retirement to replace Sir Henry Wilson who had gone to France with the BEF, gave his view that the operation was too dangerous (see Chapter 4), and two days later, pressured by Churchill, restated the General Staff view that an attack on the Peninsula would be extremely difficult. The land defences had been elaborated during the war of 1911–12, and also in 1913, and were now strong enough to resist a surprise attack. The peacetime garrison of 27,000 men had probably been considerably strengthened. A Turkish corps on the Asiatic side could be rapidly brought across the Straits to reinforce. The operation was not assured of success unless it was executed with at least 60,000 men supported by strong siege artillery (i.e. high-trajectory howitzers).39 This view was not as pessimistic as the 1906 memorandum, which had concluded that the General Staff ‘were not prepared to recommend its being attempted’ owing to the risk involved, which was more or less what Callwell had repeated on 1 September.40

  A key player now reappears on the stage. This was Rear-Admiral Kerr in Greece, who was on very good terms with King Constantine, the Prime Minister (Venizelos), and the Greek General Staff and naval authorities. To him, the Foreign Secretary and Churchill expressed ‘in our most secret cypher’ (in which Kerr also replied) the new British view that, in the event of hostilities with Turkey, a blow should be struck at Constantinople in cooperation with the Greeks and Russians. On 4 September Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Athens that the British government wanted to avoid war with Turkey, but would cooperate with Greece if that proved impossible because of Turkish aggression. Kerr was therefore given instructions to discuss, in strict secrecy, details of such cooperation with the Greek naval and military staffs if the Turks forced a war. It was to be understood that Greece should not give any provocation to Turkey.41

  These instructions were contained in a ‘most secret’ telegram sent by Churchill to Kerr almost simultaneously on the same day. The gist of this was that the Admiralty considered it necessary, as a staff precaution, to discuss with the Greek general and naval staff the appropriate strategy to pursue if Britain and Greece became allied in a war against Turkey. Churchill authorised Kerr, if so approached by the Greeks, to begin discussions on behalf of the Admiralty, and stated that the Amiralty proposed to reinforce the Greek Fleet sufficiently to give ‘decisive and unquestionable superiority’ over Turkish and German ships it might encounter, and that Kerr should command the combined British and Greek fleets from the British battle-cruiser Indomitable. The Admiralty would also provide any reinforcements that might prove necessary. Churchill stated that ‘the right and obvious method of attacking Turkey is to strike immediately at the heart’, and this entailed a Greek army capturing the Gallipoli Peninsula under the guns of the fleet, thus allowing the combined fleet through the Dardanelles to the Sea of Marmara. The final stage, in cooperation with the Russian Black Sea Fleet and Russian military forces, would be to place such force at Constantinople that ‘the whole situation can be dominated’. Churchill asked Kerr to hold immediate talks along these lines with the Greeks, and to obtain their views. In particular, Churchill wanted to know the size of the military force the Greeks thought necessary assuming that the British Navy guaranteed safe transit, and whether the Greeks could provide the necessary transports, or would these have to be found by the British?42

  Kerr replied via Sir Francis Elliott on 9 September that he had carried out consultations with the Greek General Staff, and agreed with them that Greece could make a sufficient force available to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula if Bulgaria did not attack Greece. He stressed that it was not sufficient for Bulgaria to undertake to remain neutral, as the Greeks would not trust her unless she also turned all her forces to attacking Turkey. Kerr declared that the plan, originally worked out by the Greek General Staff and himself without outside assistance, to capture the Dardanelles was ready, given the conditions about Bulgaria, and that Greece could provide sufficient transports for the troops. He also gave details of the size and composition of the required British naval force – two battle-cruisers, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers and a flotilla of destroyers and mine-sweepers. However, Kerr noted that as Turkey had now mobilised and obtained the Goeben and Breslau, the required operation had become greater in scale. He also revealed that the Greek General Staff had an alternative plan to capture the Baghdad railway from Mesopotamia at Alexandretta, the block to be garrisoned by a large force, but this would need financing by Britain. This would cut off the supply of cereals sent to Germany.43

  In fact the situation was already lost by the time this last telegram (to which no reply was made) was sent, for Constantine had changed his mind, saying that Greece would not attack Turkey unless attacked by her first.44 The Alexandretta operation, here mentioned for the first time, and for which T E Lawrence later pressed (he had reconnoitred this region earlier in 1914), was to cast a baleful influence on preparations for an attack on the Dardanelles.

  Thus, although the British later claimed that they were never given a full copy of the Greek plan,45 it was in fact an Anglo–Greek plan, with Kerr providing key elements; the British were therefore in possession of all its important details. This is made clear by Kerr himself in post-war correspondence with the Committee of Imperial Defence’s Historical Section. As the plan was the property of the Greek General Staff, Kerr had to ask Constantine’s permission before sending details to London on 9 September. Kerr stated that Constantine was extremely well-disposed to the Allies, and at once agreed to the British being given the plan. He also telephoned to the General Staff to update it, and tell Kerr when it was ready. This accounted for the three days’ delay in answering the Admiralty telegram.

  Kerr again emphasised that the Greek General Staff stressed that Bulgarian neutrality was not a sufficient condition for carrying out the plan, and that the Greeks had to maintain a sufficient force to attack them if they entered the war, before any expeditionary force could leave Greece. The Greek Army possessed only 180,000 men with modern equipment, and insufficient ammunition for more than a month of war, which implied that the Allies would have to provide a large military force to carry out the plan, given that the Bulgarian Army amounted to 350,000 men, with another 150,000 available to be mobilised. It would clearly be foolish to send the Greek Army to Gallipoli and replace them in Greece with Allied forces.

  Kerr noted that Constantine and his government were fully aware of the Bulgarian understanding with Germany, and that they were obliged to enter the war at Germany’s request. Further, Serbia had declared that she could not cooperate with the Greek General Staff as her new Russian allies required all their forces on their northern frontier with
Germany and Austria-Hungary, and could not therefore help Greece to defend the eastern frontier of Serbia and the Greek northern frontier with Bulgaria. Nor did Serbia believe that Bulgaria posed a threat. Despite this, Kerr claimed that the Allies ignored the Greek plan and tried a purely naval attack to force the Dardanelles; the Greek plan was for an essentially military operation with naval support, while the Allies attempted a naval operation without even military support. Finally, Kerr recalled that he was in the Greek Ministry of Marine when news arrived on 3 November that the Allied fleet was bombarding the Dardanelles forts. Reading the telegram, he realised immediately the implications of the loss of surprise, and commented to his Greek flag-lieutenant: ‘That is the end of the Dardanelles expedition.’46 To summarise, the Anglo–Greek plan was based on Kerr’s correct appreciation that:47

  1. No fleet could enter the Marmara until the mines had been swept;

  2. The mines could not be swept until the forts protecting them had been captured;

  3. The forts could not be captured without extensive landing operations on both sides of the Straits, and

  4. After the fall of the forts, other distant points, notably the Bulair Lines, would have to be taken and held to prevent the arrival of troops to recapture the Straits.

  Meanwhile the Germans continued to assist the Turks in fortifying the Dardanelles. Towards the end of October, Churchill, in view of Turkey’s imminent ‘rupture’ again discussed the matter with Callwell, the DMO, who restated his view that the capture of the Straits was mainly a military rather than a naval task, and stressed its extreme difficulty.48

  Hostilities with Turkey, the Dardanelles reconsidered

  On 29 October the Goeben and Breslau, now ‘sold’ to Turkey and under the command of the German Admiral Souchon, bombarded Odessa, Sebastopol and other Russian Black Sea ports, forcing Turkey at last into the war. On 3 November 1914, while the First Battle of Ypres was raging in Flanders and the Channel Ports were still threatened, to Germany’s great satisfaction hostilities commenced between Turkey and the Allies. The British blockading squadron bombarded the outer forts of the Dardanelles. Germany had not yet achieved hegemony of the Balkans, as Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania for the time being remained neutral, but the ensnarement of Turkey was a huge triumph for her. By threatening the Suez Canal and British oil interests in the Persian Gulf, Turkey could create valuable diversions and tie up large numbers of British troops. The same was true of Turkish action against Russia in the Caucasus, which served to relieve Russian pressure on their front with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

  In London, the closing of the Dardanelles did not lead to any immediate decision concerning an attack on Turkey; the prime concern in the Middle East was the security of Egypt and the Suez Canal, which the Turkish advance across Sinai threatened. Around 24 November, at the first meeting of the new War Council, Churchill suggested that the best way to protect Egypt and the Suez Canal was to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula. However, he repeated Callwell’s words of 3 September in saying that it would be very difficult and involve large military forces.48 Churchill later changed his tune, claiming it could be done as a purely naval operation – the view he (incredibly) persuaded the War Council to endorse on 13 January 1915.

  Then, towards the end of the year, faced with continuing stalemate on the Western Front as French attacks against the deepening German trench system broke down in bloody failure (a portent of what was to happen in Gallipoli), the British government began to reconsider the policy of concentrating resources on the Western Front. The situation in Serbia was insecure. If the Austrian–German forces defeated Serbia, Bulgaria would join them, opening a route for German assistance to Turkey should the latter attack the Suez Canal.

  ‘Jackie’ Fisher, the new First Sea Lord, who took over from Prince Louis of Battenberg in October 1914, had previously commanded the Mediterranean Fleet and had long exercised his mind with the problem of forcing the Dardanelles. He expounded his views to his new political master and Churchill, fired by Fisher’s eccentric enthusiasm, decided to push matters further. On 2 January 1915 the British Ambassador at St Petersburg cabled that the Russians were asking Kitchener for a British naval or military demonstration against Turkey to relieve pressure in the Caucasus. That day Kitchener discussed a purely naval operation with Churchill, and cabled the Russians, with the agreement of the Foreign Office, that a demonstration would be made, suggesting to Churchill that the Dardanelles was the only spot where Turkish reserves might be pinned down. He was only contemplating a naval demonstration, making it clear that no troops were available and that, in any case, ‘we shall not be ready for anything big for some months’. In fact the Turkish surrender at Sarikamish in the Caucasus had by 3 January obviated the necessity for such diversionary action but the British Government, not knowing this, pressed ahead.50

  On 3 January Fisher, who was in the picture, wrote to Churchill strongly supporting an immediate Allied attack on Turkey – British forces to land at Besika Bay, on the Asiatic coast south of the Dardanelles, with diversions at Haifa and Alexandretta, the Greeks to land on the Gallipoli Peninsula, the Bulgarians to attack Adrianople, and the Rumanians, Russians and Serbs to attack Austria. Simultaneously, the Navy should force the Dardanelles. ‘Celerity – without it Failure.’ Unfortunately the diplomatic situation rendered this magnificent plan nugatory. However, it was not completely stillborn. Churchill seized on the naval part of the plan; if it could be achieved without committing troops, a concept totally at variance with his earlier ideas, he thought it should be taken further.

  The Admiralty therefore, on 3 January 1915, signalled to Admiral Carden, commanding the Eastern Mediterranean Squadron, whether he thought it feasible to attempt to force the Dardanelles, which it was known was now mined as well as protected by shore batteries and torpedoes, using obsolete battleships. Carden replied, hedging his bets, on 5 January: ‘I do not consider Dardanelles can be rushed. They might be forced by extended operations with large numbers of ships.’ The following day the Admiralty asked him to expand on this curt answer, but, strangely, the idea was not even mentioned at War Council meetings on 7 and 8 January, though on the latter occasion Kitchener suggested that the Dardanelles might make the most suitable objective for the New Armies then forming in the United Kingdom, as such an operation, involving 150,000 men, could be made in cooperation with the fleet. He suggested a minor operation in the form of a landing at Alexandretta as a stop-gap. At present, however, no troops were available, and Kitchener would make no judgement until a clearer study had been made.51 No such study was made at the War Office, and no combined staff was created to assess the feasibility of such an operation.

  Carden replied to the Admiralty’s request for a development of his ideas on the 11th, providing a detailed four-stage plan involving reducing the forts at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale at the mouth to the Dardanelles, destroying the inside defences up to Kephez at the entrance to the Narrows, reducing the forts at the Narrows and, finally, clearing the minefield, reducing the defences above the Narrows and advancing into the Marmara. He reckoned this would all, given the prevailing weather conditions in this season, take a month. The feeling at the Admiralty was that a combined operation was to be preferred to a purely naval attempt, and that troops would be needed to follow up a naval success and clinch the matter; the Gallipoli Peninsula and Constantinople would have to be occupied. The Admiralty War Staff accepted Kitchener’s dictum that no troops were available, but considered that it would not do much harm to carry out a purely naval attempt. Only a demonstration had been called for by the Russians, and this could be called off if it proved futile. It was not, therefore, envisaged at this stage that any military landing force would have to be used.52

  This was the context of that extraordinary War Council meeting on 13 January when Churchill, seizing on Carden’s cautiously worded reply and ignoring the evidence of earlier studies, flung a bombshell in the face of the Council by proposing a purely naval attack on the
Dardanelles. He explained Carden’s scheme (Lord Fisher and Sir Arthur Wilson remaining silent), and the Council, knowing that no troops were available, came to the bizarre decision that: ‘The Admiralty should prepare for a naval expedition in February to bombard and take [!] the Gallipoli Peninsula with Constantinople as its objective.’53 How the navy could capture the Peninsula on its own was not explained. On 19 January Churchill went further, in assuring the Russians that the government intended to ‘press the matter to a conclusion’.54 This was no mere ‘demonstration’ to help the Russians.

  Preparations went further when a ‘Special Service Force’ of two battalions of Royal Marines of the Royal Naval Division was warned for Dardanelles service on 29 January and sent out to the island of Lemnos on 6 February to be used as demolition parties against forts and batteries.55

  Diversions and landings

  In January and February 1915 the possibility of landing troops at Alexandretta – the Greek alternative plan – was being discussed in London, partly as a diversion while the Navy forced the Dardanelles. A landing at this point, as T E Lawrence and others were feverishly pointing out, would cut Turkey’s strategic railway communications with Palestine, Arabia and Mesopotamia. Sir William Birdwood, at that time commanding the Anzac Corps in Egypt, recalled that at this time Maxwell (GOC Egypt) told him that he had received a message from Kitchener asking if Birdwood could send 5,000 of his Australians to Alexandretta. This was before any intimation had been received that the Anzacs might be required for Dardanelles operations. Birdwood replied in the affirmative, but was shown no intelligence reports or documents of any sort relating to Alexandretta or Asia Minor; he was training his Corps for France, and was completely ‘in the dark’ as to other theatres. In any case he thought his whole Corps, not just a brigade or two, might be necessary for the Alexandretta operation. Kitchener told him that he would be supported by some 20,000 Armenians, whom Birdwood would supply with rifles. As a result of this directive from Kitchener, Birdwood and his staff prepared all the details of the landing, including the planning of operations to seize and hold the Bailan Pass.56 Such a diversion of planning effort from the Dardanelles was to contribute to the failure of the Gallipoli operation.