Grasping Gallipoli

by Peter Chasseaud

  On 16 February a crucial informal meeting of most of the War Council (including Asquith, Churchill, Fisher and Kitchener) decided that the Dardanelles should be forced, that troops should be committed to the operation, and that the 29th Division and Birdwood’s two Anzac divisions should be sent to Lemnos. On the same day, Kitchener sought the opinion of Captain Wyndham Deedes, an intelligence officer at the War Office who had served with the Turkish Army, about a purely naval attack, but refused to listen when Deedes told him it was fundamentally unsound.57 Yet the feeling of the meeting was that troops were necessary. Kitchener, however, reversed his decision to use the 29th Division three days later. He instructed Maxwell, GOC Egypt, to coordinate operations with Carden. The naval attack on the outer forts began on 19 February.

  It was decided that the Admiralty should arrange transports for 50,000 men, and Rear-Admiral Wemyss would be sent to Mudros, as Governor of the Island of Lemnos, as a first step towards establishing an Allied base there. On 22 February a Base General Staff (A and Q Branches) for the new Constantinople Expeditionary Force (as it was first called, with an alarming disregard for security) was mobilised at the Tower of London. One of the GSOs was Major Plunkett. The embryonic base organisation sailed from Avonmouth in the Dunluce Castle on 27 February, arriving at Lemnos on 10 March.58 It was followed a few days later by the Royal Naval Division. The facilities, including the lack of a suitable harbour, proved so inadequate that the base was temporarily moved to Alexandria. Dunluce Castle therefore sailed from Lemnos on 25 March, arriving at Alexandria on the 27th. GHQ MEF (less its A and Q echelon) returned to Lemnos on 10 April. According to Lady Hamilton, Churchill wanted the Navy to get the kudos for the successful and potentially war-winning operation of forcing the Dardanelles, bringing Turkey to her knees and swinging the Balkans behind the Allies, and was reluctant to share the laurels with the Army. Kitchener, on the other hand, was anxious to send troops in before the naval attack had sacrificed all surprise.59

  On the 19th the Allied fleet under Carden began its ill-advised bombardment of the Dardanelles forts,60 the Navy finding that seaplanes were not effective at observing and reporting ships’ fire during the bombardment.61 The Turks were now under no illusions as to what was coming. In Egypt, Ronald Storrs wrote that ‘After the first naval assault we had so advertised our military intention as to convince some of my neutral friends (but alas none of the enemy) that we must be feinting for Alexandretta.’62 This illusion may have been strengthened within the Ottoman camp by the arrival of the battleship Bacchante off Alexandretta on 14 February.

  At all costs

  The War Council, with Churchill providing much of the driving force, now reached a crucial decision. On 24 February it decided that a withdrawal in the event of naval failure at the Dardanelles would involve too great a loss of prestige, and serious strategic disadvantage in the Balkans. The operation must be carried out at all costs. Kitchener agreed that the Army must help if necessary, and that operations should be pressed forward. However, the size of the required force and the nature of its task were not discussed. The government was waiting to hear on these points from Carden, who in turn expected to receive instructions from London.

  On the same day (24 February), Kitchener outlined his reasoning in a further telegram to Maxwell, speaking of Birdwood ‘concerting operations’, with the forcing of the Dardanelles by the Navy to be immediately followed by the retirement of the Turkish garrison and the subsequent occupation of the Peninsula by British troops. He did not envisage a ‘landing in force’ in the presence of the assumed Turkish garrison of 40,000 men, stating that ‘To land with 10,000 in the face of 40,000 seems extremely hazardous’, but went on to allow that:

  If it can be done without seriously compromising the troops landing for the purpose, there would be no objection to the employment of troops to secure forts or positions already gained or dominated by naval fire, and to deny their reoccupation by the enemy.63

  In other words, he wanted the military to take the minimum of risks; it was an application of the French doctrine developing on the Western Front: ‘Artillery conquers, infantry occupies.’ This was essentially the War Office view that prevailed up to the failure of the great naval attack on the Narrows on 18 March, following which the logic was suddenly reversed – the army must now clear the way for the navy. Also on 24 February Maxwell telegraphed Kitchener, passing on Maucorps’ view that the Peninsula had been heavily fortified, was ‘practically a fort’, and that heavy guns, on land, were necessary to the success of such an operation.

  Birdwood’s preparations for the Alexandretta operation were made before he had received any suggestion that his force might be required for the Dardanelles. Thus at a critical period Birdwood, Maxwell and their staffs were using valuable time and intelligence effort in preparing for the Alexandretta operation rather than landings on the Gallipoli Peninsula. That said, Birdwood admitted that in the period January–March 1915 the weather would have made it absolutely impossible to land troops, stores and ammunition on the Peninsula. As there were no harbours, any men landed would have been cut off.64

  Despite all the deliberation in London, there was still no General Staff preliminary plan for the landing of military forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula, and this omission was later remarked upon by the Dardanelles Commission. In effect, the General Staff had adopted the Greek plan, or an Anglo–Greek variant as envisaged by Kerr. Although the CIGS, Lieut.-Gen. Sir James Wolfe Murray, attended all War Council meetings, he did not participate in them to the extent of speaking, and when he returned to the War Office after each meeting he failed to issue any instructions to Callwell (the DMO) or to any other officer of the General Staff.65 Nor did Callwell, although he was asked to prepare staff appreciations on the Dardanelles in September 1914 and February 1915, take it upon himself to instigate such work. We do not know whether he suggested this to Wolfe Murray or Kitchener, but presumably if he had done so he would have made this clear in his evidence to the Dardanelles Commission and in his memoirs. Until 11 March, therefore, the General Staff were to some extent in the dark; they were not officially informed that the War Council was considering large-scale military operations in the Dardanelles. Thus the whole purpose of a General Staff – to prepare contingency plans for future operations – was negated.

  The influence of Callwell, who also had responsibility for Intelligence, which was a sub-division of his Directorate, on Kitchener and the campaign is highly significant. He blew cold in September 1914, then warmer in February 1915 when, according to Aspinall-Oglander, his very optimistic memorandum influenced Kitchener in his later decision to go ahead with the land operations.66

  Though there may have been agreement on a clear strategic aim, the same could not be said at an operational level. There was no shared view of operational objectives and priorities, and it was unclear at this time whether a true combined operation was intended. Indeed, there was a divergence of views. This arose because the problems had not yet been fully appreciated, and without such an appreciation there could be no plan. It was felt in London that only those on the spot could make such an appreciation, and therefore in turn two sailors and two soldiers – Carden, Birdwood, de Robeck and finally Hamilton – made their reconnaissances and gave their opinions.

  Naval opinion was very much in favour of certain land operations, and as naval operations progressed (or rather failed to make much progress), the belief that land forces should be employed became firm. On 15 February Sir Henry Jackson advised the early seizure of shore spotting stations to overcome the difficulties of the operation, emphasising that in the Russo–Japanese War, the capture of the Port Arthur Peninsula by the Japanese depended on the taking of 203-Metre Hill, a vital observing station which Admiral Togo stressed was the decisive primary objective for the army.67 Achi Baba, the commanding hill in the Helles sector of the Peninsula, came to have the same significance at Gallipoli, to the point of obsession.

  Birdwood and the Anzacs


  On 20 February Kitchener cabled Maxwell (3180 Cipher), informing him that the fleet had begun an attack on the Dardanelles, and warning him to prepare to send a force of two divisions (30,000 troops) of the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC, or Anzac) under Birdwood, to be ready to sail from Egypt on about 9 March. An advanced force as large as could be accommodated in the available transports should be sent to Lemnos immediately, in case Carden needed troops at once. Birdwood’s task was ‘To assist the navy … to give any co-operation that may be required, and to occupy any captured forts.’68 Clearly no serious opposition from the Turkish garrison of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles was expected. Maxwell replied on the same day: ‘621E. Your 3180 Cipher. We have no maps available here. Please supply.’69

  The War Office duly arranged for the forces sailing from England to bring stocks of the 1908 one-inch map (overprinted with red ‘artillery squares’) with them. A decision was made by Maxwell and Birdwood, perhaps in consultation with the navy who were to land the troops and support them with covering fire, that this one-inch map should be enlarged to 1:40,000; this was done in Egypt during March.

  Birdwood, commanding the Anzacs, was also charged with the local direction of the ‘Special Mission,’ ‘Detached Force’ or ‘L Scheme’ (for Lemnos?), as the Anzac Staff knew it. Colonel E G Sinclair-MacLagen, Yorkshire Regiment, commander of 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade, was OC ‘Special Mission’ landing force, and was later to command the Anzac covering force on 25 April. The Special Mission force sailed from Egypt on 2 March for Mudros, arriving on the 4th, where they trained in landing operations. While at sea the force officers were lectured by Mr Hough, an interpreter, on Turkey and the Turkish Army.70 The cover destination for this force was Alexandretta.

  It was appreciated in London that Turkish forces on the Gallipoli Peninsula numbered some 40,000 (a figure supplied by Colonel Maucorps, of the French Mission in Egypt), so the landing of only 10,000 men was an alarming prospect. Maxwell and Birdwood wanted to be able to control the uses to which their troops were put, and needed much more information about the situation.71 By 23 February Maxwell had enough transports to carry a brigade, but the Anzac Corps as a whole still lacked much in the way of equipment and stores, which all had to come from England, before it could take the field. On the same day, Kitchener ordered Birdwood to clarify the situation by making an immediate reconnaissance of the Dardanelles and producing, together with Carden, a joint appreciation:

  Proceed to meet Admiral Carden at the earliest possible opportunity and consult him as to the nature of the combined operations which the forcing of the Dardanelles is to involve. Report the result to me. You should learn, from local observation and information the numbers of the Turkish garrison on the peninsula, and whether the Admiral thinks it will be necessary to take the forts in reverse; if so what force will be required, and generally in what manner it is proposed to use the troops. Will the Bulair lines have to be held, and will operations on the Asiatic side be necessary or advisable.72

  Carden was waiting for instructions from England before formulating his requirements for military forces, but the government was waiting on him. On 23 February he told Maxwell:

  I have been directed to make preparations for landing a force of 10,000 men, if such a step is found necessary; at present my instructions go no further. If such a force is sent, I would propose landing it at Sedd el Bahr with the object of occupying the Gallipoli peninsula as far east as the Soghanli Dere – Chanav Ova.73

  This was a line across the Peninsula at the foot of the south-western slopes of the Kilid Bahr Plateau, thus including the Achi Baba heights but excluding the crucial Kilid Bahr Plateau itself, the importance of which was stressed in pre-war reports.

  Apart from making his reconnaissance and appreciation on the Dardanelles combined operation, Birdwood was also asked to inform Kitchener at the same time how he thought additional troops should be employed ‘for a further enterprise after the Straits have been forced’, a clear reference to an advance eastwards towards Constantinople. On 25 February Carden signalled to the Admiralty that it might be necessary, to protect the fleet from concealed guns, to land a force at Sedd-el-Bahr to occupy the tail of the Peninsula as far as the Soghanli Dere line. This area included Achi Baba. However, as unsettled weather put the maintenance of such a force at risk, he was not going to attempt the landing unless it was essential.74 The next day Maxwell passed on a report by Colonel Maucorps, former French Military Attaché at Constantinople and now leading the French Military Mission in Cairo, stating that a landing on the Peninsula with its garrison of 40,000 men (and another 30,000 on the Asiatic Shore) would be extremely hazardous, that the Bulair Lines had been rearmed, and that the Turkish commander was excellent and energetic.75

  Birdwood and Carden make their appreciation

  Birdwood and Lt-Col. Skeen, his senior staff officer (GSO1), embarked in the Swiftsure on 24 February, and while at sea received a message telling them to make for Imbros. Swiftsure arrived in the lee of this island on 28 February, and Birdwood met Carden the next day, 1 March, before transferring to the Irresistible on 2 March to make his reconnaissance.

  Following this he conferred with Carden and Rear Admiral Wemyss (1st Naval Squadron). At this conference at Lemnos, the nature of the joint operations was fully discussed, including the possible course of further operations towards Constantinople in the event of success. Carden stated baldly that troops had to land to deal with the mobile batteries, following which the fleet’s minesweepers could clear the mines and the fleet could go through.76 Following the conference, Birdwood replied to Kitchener’s earlier questions on 3 March (relayed by Maxwell to London on the 4th):

  I anticipate that if required to land by Navy, in taking concealed guns or howitzers it would not in any way be possible to restrict movements to minor operations, as any guns are sure to be in strong position, abounding everywhere and being covered by strongly entrenched Infantry who in places would doubtless be able to command coast fort guns which might have been reduced by Navy…. [Regarding the Asiatic side] from personal observations I know the country is big and difficult and even a whole division would soon lose itself; so you can rely on my avoiding it if possible.77

  Birdwood’s reconnaissance of the Straits led him to conclude that the immediate landing of troops was needed as the hidden Turkish batteries putting down a barrage on the waters in which the fleet was operating were the real problem as they prevented minesweeping and therefore impeded the progress of the fleet; as these were in dead ground to the guns of the fleet they could not be located. The Turks were using terrain skilfully, and as air power was practically non-existent (only a few underpowered seaplanes were available at this stage), these guns could not be located or neutralised from the air, or by air-directed naval gunfire. It was therefore necessary to neutralise them by landing troops to occupy the ground from which they were firing.

  Birdwood wanted to land a strong force at Helles, covered by a feint at Bulair. The Helles force, having secured a bridgehead, would then fight forward to the line Gaba Tepe–Kilid Bahr. This was the line of heights just short of the Narrows, from which position the main forts on the European side of the Dardanelles could be taken in reverse and the hidden batteries on both shores dealt with (though it was not explained how the hidden batteries on the Asiatic side could be neutralised). Kitchener, at the War Office, had not yet embraced this plan to help the Navy to take the forts by direct combined operations. Could Achi Baba be permanently held? The naval view was affirmative; they believed it was possible to capture and hold Achi Baba, if not the Soghanli Dere line.78

  As far as operations east of Bulair towards Constantinople were concerned, Birdwood stated that:

  … at present I have no information to guide me in advising as to operations after the Gallipoli peninsula has been taken, and I have as yet no maps of the country [east of the peninsula, towards Constantinople]. A man-lifting kite or a captive balloon would be of great use to t
he Navy.

  He recommended the despatch of one or the other for locating concealed batteries and artillery-spotting.79

  On 26 February Kitchener told Maxwell that only minor operations were envisaged, and instructed Birdwood to practise his troops in rapid opposed beach landings. In London, in Egypt and at Lemnos, confusion and puzzlement reigned. On 23 and again on 28 February Maxwell confessed himself ‘in the dark about the intentions and objects of the fleet in forcing the Dardanelles’, wondered who was directing the operation, and asked if he might have a copy of the pre-war combined staff appreciation and plan for the forcing of the Dardanelles (he received a negative reply to this on the 26th), and Birdwood was under the impression that he was the Commander-in-Chief designate. His staff had latterly been planning the Alexandretta operation, and was now working on possible Gallipoli landings.

  On 3 March Maxwell, alarmed by Maucorps’ reports and what he had heard from Birdwood, sent his views on the expedition to Kitchener’s military secretary, Fitzgerald, to the effect that the navy was too sanguine about the prospects and that he advised leaving the Gallipoli Peninsula ‘severely alone’.80 The following day, Kitchener informed Maxwell that troops would not be used to capture the Peninsula, but they might be used for the follow-up operations towards Constantinople, and the next day telegraphed to Maxwell for Birdwood in much the same sense: ‘The Concentration of Troops at the entrance to the Dardanelles therefore is not so much for operations on the Gallipoli Peninsula as for operations to be undertaken in the neighbourhood of Constantinople.’81 On 8 March Maxwell again wrote to Fitzgerald asking ‘who is co-ordinating and directing this great combine?’82 As a result of this lethal hiatus and muddle at the highest level, no serious planning was being done, although Birdwood’s Anzac staff were doing their best; the landings took place only seven weeks later.